

AD-A114 108


OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF (ARMY) WASHINGTON D C  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82 (ACCS-82), VOLUME I. EXECUT--ETC(U)  
SEP 79 D L WILSON

F/G 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

1 of 4

AD-A114 108



ARMY  
**COMMAND AND CONTROL**  
**STUDY - 82**  
**(ACCS - 82)**

AD A114108



DTIC  
SELECTED  
MAY 4 1982  
H

**VOLUME I**

**EXECUTIVE SUMMARY  
AND STUDY REPORT**

**30 SEPTEMBER 1979**

DTIC FILE COPY

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A  
Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

82 05 03 048

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE		READ INSTRUCTIONS BEFORE COMPLETING FORM
1. REPORT NUMBER	2. GOVT ACCESSION NO. <i>AD-A114105</i>	3. RECIPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER
4. TITLE (and Subtitle)  <i>ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY-82 (ACCS-82)</i>		5. TYPE OF REPORT & PERIOD COVERED  <i>Final - 7810 thru 8002</i>
7. AUTHOR(s) <i>Dwight L. Wilson, Brigadier General (Promotable), US Army, et. al.</i>		6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER
9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADDRESS <i>Headquarters, Department of the Army ATTN: OCSA (DACS-CC) Washington, DC 20310</i>		8. CONTRACT OR GRANT NUMBER(s)
11. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS <i>Headquarters, Department of the Army ATTN: OCSA (DACS-DM) Washington, DC 20310</i>		10. PROGRAM ELEMENT, PROJECT, TASK AREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS  <i>F92398A (WOZUAA)</i>
14. MONITORING AGENCY NAME & ADDRESS (if different from Controlling Office)		12. REPORT DATE <i>30 September 1979</i>
		13. NUMBER OF PAGES <i>1488</i>
		15. SECURITY CLASS. (of this report)  <i>Unclassified</i>
		15a. DECLASSIFICATION/DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE <i>Not Applicable</i>
16. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of this Report)  <i>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.</i>		
17. DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT (of the abstract entered in Block 20, if different from Report)  <i>Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.</i>		
18. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES		
19. KEY WORDS (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <i>Total Force; Command and Control; Policy; Planning; Mobilization; Active Army Support of Reserve Components; Installation Management; Army Readiness Regions, Readiness Groups, and Advisors; Army Readiness and Mobilization Re- gions; Organization, Mission, and Functions of Major Army Commands</i>		
20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <i>Four Volume Report: I - Executive Summary and main body of final report -- findings, conclusions, and recommendations (374 pgs); II - Detailed description of existing command and control organizational structure in COMUS and the can- didate alternative organizations (502 pgs); III - Annexes supporting Vol I -- background leading to the study, methodology, 19 supporting sub-studies, minutes of meetings of advisory groups, selected bibliography, glossary (546 pgs); IV - Detailed description of Army Readiness and Mobilization Region (ARMR) concept (66 pgs). (See Continuation Page)</i>		

DD FORM 1 JAN 73 1473

EDITION OF 1 NOV 65 IS OBSOLETE

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE (When Data Entered)

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)

Item 20, "Abstract," Continued

Study conducted in Office of Chief of Staff, Army, by 18-man study group, led by BG (P) Dwight L. Wilson (names of other members listed in Executive Summary).

Study objective was to make recommendations to the Chief of Staff, Army, to improve Total Army CONUS command and control capabilities to perform missions during peacetime, wartime, and throughout the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

Methodology included research of literature; data collection; interviews with staff members of all Services, within OSD, with key staff members and commanders (past and present) of CONUS major commands, and at 146 Active and Reserve Component headquarters from MACOM through battalion levels; documentation of organization, responsibilities, procedures, and resources for existing CONUS command and control structure from HQDA through brigade levels; development of candidate organizational structure alternatives; quantitative and qualitative analysis of the existing structure and alternatives; Army Staff and MACOM review of, and comment concerning, the study group's findings, conclusions, and recommendations; and, presentation of the final report to the Army's leadership.

Study report provides recommendations concerning 61 specific issues identified by the group as requiring resolution in order to accomplish the study objective (Vol I, Chap 7). Recommendations are organized in three general categories:

1 - Organizational: this includes layering, installation management, spans of control, peacetime functional alignment of MACOM and selected Reserve Component units, etc..

2 - Transition (from peacetime to wartime operations): this includes use of State Area Commands (STARC), adequacy of communications and ADP support, adequacy of dedicated planning resources, requirements for mobilization exercises, etc..

3 - Other: this includes feasibility of providing "one-stop" installation support for Reserve Component units, potential use of recent retirees in selected Reserve Component units, adequacy of post-mobilization individual training programs, planning for total mobilization, etc..

UNCLASSIFIED

SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE(When Data Entered)





DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20310

17 APR 1980

DACS-DMA

SUBJECT: Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82) -- Final Report  
(Volumes I - IV)

TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN

1. Subject study has been reviewed at HQDA.
2. The recommendations of the study group, contained in Chapter 7 of Volume I, have been approved with the following modifications:
  - a. Organizational Issue 1. The Army Readiness and Mobilization Region concept, described in Volume IV, is the approved organizational alternative.
  - b. Organizational Issue 3. The activation of one additional CONUS headquarters is contingent upon the availability of resources; resource availability will be addressed during the staffing of the Army FY 82-86 Program Objective Memorandum (POM).
  - c. Organizational Issue 17. Battalion-level advisory positions may be retained on a case-by-case basis if justified by a FORSCOM review conducted in coordination with the National Guard Bureau and the Office of the Chief of Army Reserve.
  - d. Organizational Issue 20. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, HQDA, is assigned the responsibility for developing the Army Mobilization and Planning System (AMPS). The Director for the Army Staff has the authority to approve the organizational requirements to support development of the AMPS.

THOMAS U. GREER  
Major General, GS  
Director of Management

(1)

ARMY COMMAND  
AND CONTROL STUDY-82  
(ACCS-82)

VOLUME I  
STUDY REPORT

DTIC  
SELECTED  
MAY 4 1982  
H

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A  
Approved for public release;  
Distribution Unlimited

## FOREWORD

The views, opinions, recommendations, and/or findings contained herein should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy or decision, unless so designated by other official documentation.

The study group's mission was to deliberately focus on problem areas. Therefore, this report should not be viewed as being overly critical. The study group acknowledges that the Army has made considerable progress in improving its command and control capabilities and in mobilization and deployment planning. Numerous actions are under way that will enhance the efficiency of the Army's command and control systems and its readiness and deployment capabilities. Nevertheless, further improvements are possible.

Mobilization and deployment planning must be constantly improved in the interest of national security. However, improved planning systems and up-to-date plans are not enough. Resources must be identified to man, equip and sustain the Army. This report provides assistance to the decisionmakers who must allocate resources to accomplish the many missions of the Army.

This nation has no more pressing need than the maintenance of a military force adequate to deter or, if necessary, to fight and win a conventional war. This report contains recommendations that, if adopted, would assist the Army in making an orderly and rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operations.



Accession For	
NTIS GRA&I	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC TAB	<input type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	<input type="checkbox"/>
By	
Distribution	
Availability Codes	
Dist	
P	

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

### Background

The most recent reorganization of the Army in the Continental United States (CONUS), Operation STEADFAST, was accomplished in 1973. This reorganization was designed to improve the readiness of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, align schools and combat development activities and improve the quality and responsiveness of Army management. Operation STEADFAST resulted in a quantity and quality of RC support not seen before. Despite this success, training exercises such as PRIME RATE 75, POLE VAULT 76 and NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78 have shown that the emphasis on peacetime command, control and assistance for the RC may not have improved the essential capability to mobilize and prepare units for deployment, i.e., the ability to make the transition to wartime operations. There have been no significant modifications to the STEADFAST organization since its implementation.

The Army's current organization has been criticized by OSD and GAO with a variety of charges--

1. AC command and control for the RC is excessively layered and duplicative.
2. Some elements of the current RC structure lack a valid post-mobilization mission.
3. AC and RC personnel and units are insufficiently integrated.
4. HQ FORSCOM's span of control is excessive.
5. Responsibilities for installation management are unclear and conflicting during and subsequent to mobilization.

The Army's recent mobilization exercises, notably NIFTY NUGGET/MOBEX 78, identified serious organizational shortcomings involving mobilization--

1. Insufficient number of corps headquarters to support wartime requirements.

2. Inadequate communications and automatic data processing equipment to support command and control during mobilization.

3. Excessive organizational turbulence during the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

The charter for this study was established by HQDA Letter 10-78-5, 29 September 1978; a copy of this letter is at Annex A of Volume III. The HQDA letter was based, inter alia, upon an agreement reached between OSD and HQDA on 15 August 1978; see Annex B, Volume III, for the 24 August 1978 letter from the ASD(M,RA&L) to the VCSA.

#### Purpose

The purpose of this study was to examine the US Army command and control organization in CONUS. Specifically, the study determined the improvements required to insure wartime effectiveness, while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency, maintaining responsive command and control of all AC and RC forces, and providing necessary support and assistance to all RC elements.

#### Objective of Study

The objective of this study is to provide recommendations to improve the Total Army's CONUS command and control structure to perform missions during peacetime, wartime and throughout the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. The recommended structure:

1. Assures proper command and control of Army units.
2. Provides for orderly and rapid transition from peacetime to wartime operations.
3. Appropriately utilizes the RC chain of command.
4. Continues to simulate AC interest in the readiness and training of RC units.
5. Provides for mobilization and deployment planning.
6. Provides the command and control basis for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization.

### Scope of the Study

The study group examined the CONUS command and control organizations of the Total Army from the HQDA level down to, at least, the brigade level. Additionally, the study group identified many non-organizational issues relating to the Army's capability to successfully make the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. These issues are addressed in Chapters 3 and 7 of this volume.

### Organization of the Report

The study report consists of three volumes:

1. Volume I is the main body of the report and contains seven chapters--a precis of the chapters is provided in this Executive Summary.
2. Volume II contains a detailed description of the existing structure and each of the final alternatives (and variations) considered.
3. Volume III contains Annexes to the report--supporting documentation, special studies and analyses.

### Methodology for the Conduct of the Study

The overall technique for conducting the study is described below:

1. Problem Definition. Available background material reflected serious shortcomings in the Army's CONUS command and control structure, particularly as it related to accommodating the demands of mobilization and deployment. The study group further developed this basic problem area into discrete issues that were addressed in detail. The study group then developed the CONUS command and control structure which best provided for efficient management and appropriate readiness during peacetime and for effective transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

2. Research and Data Collection.

- a. Historical Research. The study group examined related command and control studies, using the work that resulted in Operation STEADFAST in 1973, and the CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102 Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), as the point of departure. This exam-

ination included a variety of studies, after-action reports, reports of investigations and surveys, regulations, directives and briefings from other Services concerning their management of the RC. References are listed in Annex I of Volume III.

b. Selected commanders and key staff members, both past and present, of current organizations were interviewed by the study group to obtain their insights concerning the current structure and alternatives which have been considered previously. Appropriate HQDA staff elements, the CONUS MACOM (with the exception of MDW), the three Continental US Armies (CONUSA), all Army Readiness Regions (ARR), and a comprehensive sampling of the Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC) and General Officer Commands (GOCOM) were visited during this phase of data collection. Selected National Guard Adjutants General (TAG), State Area Command (STARC) Directors, and commanders of major Army National Guard (ARNG) units were interviewed. A complete listing of trips is contained in Annex F of Volume III.

3. Base Case. The current command and control organization, i.e., the "base case," was defined during the research and data collection effort. The study group's analysis of the base case identified the deficiencies to be resolved.

4. Development of Alternatives. The study group developed alternatives for CONUS command and control to insure wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency. The alternatives were formulated to keep organizational turbulence to a minimum, to provide for integration of AC and RC forces, and to not unreasonably alter resource requirements. Alternatives were based on streamlining (but not necessarily requiring reduction of resources) of the present Total Army CONUS command and control structure. Each alternative developed which met the general objectives of the study was analyzed and evaluated against a set of measures of effectiveness. Between mid-December 1978 and mid-June 1979, the study group, in conjunction with the Study Advisory Group (SAG) and In-process Reviews (IPR), developed a variety of alternatives--at one stage the group worked with 36 proposals, but through synthesis, analysis and guidance, the group arrived at four basic alternatives with variations presented in this study report in Volume II and summarized in Chapter 4 of this volume.

5. Comparison of Alternatives. Each alternative structure that was developed and retained for further study was compared with the base case and all other retained alternatives. Comparisons were



based on quantitative and qualitative measures. The quantitative measures were resource data (funding and manpower). Qualitative measures were more difficult to identify because of the need to subjectively assess which functions were appropriate for each element in the structure, to predict how well the various elements would interact, and to project how well the structure as a whole would be able to perform its missions. This comparison is presented in Chapter 5 of this volume.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations. Chapter 6 of this volume describes the study group's technique for selecting the preferred organizational alternatives. Chapter 3 contains a discussion of "issues" identified during the study. Chapter 7 contains the recommendations of ACCS-82.

7. Preparation of Study Report. The draft study report was reviewed by the Army Staff and MACOM. Comments received from this staffing action were considered when the final report was prepared.

8. Phasing. This study was conducted in five phases. Each phase was based on the primary study activity occurring during that period, although some activities occurred during more than one phase. The five phases and a summary of principal activities were:

a. Developmental. (13 Nov-15 Dec 78) Organization of study group, development of study plan, and initiation of data collection and research on the base case.


b. Base Case Definition. (16 Dec 78-31 Jan 79) Establish, analyze, and evaluate current command and control structure (existing model) and begin development of alternative structures.

c. Development of Alternatives. (1 Feb 79-31 Mar 79) Develop and analyze alternative structures. Select feasible alternatives.

d. Comparison of Alternatives. (1-13 May 79) Refine, evaluate and compare feasible alternatives; develop findings, conclusions and recommendations.

e. Final Report and Implementation Plan. (14 May-23 August 79) Prepare and staff study group report; prepare plan to implement approved recommendations.

The overall management plan for the study is shown by the following chart.



## 9. Control Measures.

a. Four SAG and two IPR meetings were scheduled at key points during the study process. Each IPR was preceded by a SAG meeting. The initial SAG and IPR meetings were held on 8 January 1979 and 27 March 1979, respectively. Records (minutes) of the SAG and IPR meetings are at Volume III, Annex G.

b. SAG membership was at the O-6 level and IPR membership was the directorate level, with representation from all Army Staff elements, selected MACOM, OSD(M,RA&L) and ASA(M&RA and IL&FM). Additionally, the Army Audit Agency (AAA) participated as an observer.

10. Implementation. The study group will develop an implementation plan, in budget level detail, for the recommended command and control reorganization. A residual element from the ACCS-82 study group is necessary to manage the implementation of the approved action, at least until HQDA directives are issued to the affected

MACOM.

Current Organization - Major Problems and Findings

Various problems involving the current organization were identified during the conduct of ACCS-82. To insure a methodical approach to problem resolution--and to preclude non-productive investigation (i.e., investigations of subjects not related to ACCS-82)--problems were related to one, or more, of the study's six stated objectives. All of the problems--"issues" for ACCS-82--are presented and discussed in Chapter 3. Highlighted below are findings for the major ACCS-82 issues.

1. Proper command and control of the Army.

a. Layering and Duplication. Layering of headquarters, and duplication between headquarters, exists in the chain of command between CONUSA and RC units--this is an unsupportable luxury in today's Army (p.3-1).

b. Span of Control. HQ FORSCOM's span of control is excessive--CONUSA spans of control are satisfactory in peacetime, but may be overextended during mobilization (p.3-3).

c. Corps Headquarters in CONUS. The Army needs additional CONUS corps headquarters (p.3-2).

d. Functional Alignment of MACOM and RC. RC units should be functionally aligned in peacetime with the MACOM which will employ them in wartime (p.3-4).

e. Functional RC Commands. It is neither feasible nor desirable to organize the RC along functional (branch) lines (p.3-9).

f. STARC Organization and Missions. The full potential of STARC (ARNG State Area Commands) has not been realized due to lack of uniformity in planning and organization, and to insufficient interplay between HQDA, FORSCOM, CONUSA and STARC (p.3-12).

g. Inadequacy of Communications, ADPE and MIS. The Army's automatic data processing equipment and management information systems (ADPE/MIS) cannot adequately support full mobilization; plans for ADPE/MIS and do not integrate AC/RC requirements (pp. 3-13, -14, -20 and -28).

h. Installation Management. Responsibilities for installation management are unclear and conflicting during and subsequent to mobilization--changes of command responsibility, as AC units deploy, are unclear--installation commanders do not exercise full command over RC units reporting to the installation--some installations are subject to inter-MACOM transfer during the mobilization process (pp.3-2 and 15).

2. Orderly and Rapid Transition from Peacetime to Wartime Operations.

a. Gaining Command Program. Expansion of the Gaining Command Program should be expedited--HQ FORSCOM's SUIP and WARMUP studies (Support Unit Improvement Program and Wartime Mission/Utilization Program) will provide excellent bases for identifying planning/training relationships (p.3-15).

b. Lack of Sufficient Planning Resources. There is insufficient manpower allocated to planning at every headquarters, from HQDA through CONUSA, and at most installations (p.3-16).

c. Lack of Valid Post-Mobilization Missions. Some headquarters (notably the ARCOM and ARR) lack well-defined, long-term post-mobilization missions. However, charges that a large number of RC units lack such missions are incorrect (p. 3-17).

d. Uncovered POMCUS. The Army's plans for "uncovered POMCUS" (the equipment left in the CONUS by units deploying to POMCUS in Europe) are difficult to implement at the installation level--there is confusion about policy and procedures involving these assets (p.3-18).

e. Organizational Turbulence. Post-mobilization change of command responsibilities for installations (inter-MACOM, et. al.), cause unnecessary turbulence--proper peacetime alignments and pre-designation of responsibilities can alleviate this problem (p.3-15).

3. Appropriate Use of RC Chain of Command.

a. Elimination of Battalion-level Advisors. Manpower authorizations for battalion-level advisors could be better utilized elsewhere (p.3-9).

b. The ARR HQ is a de facto layer in the AC chain of com-

mand of the RC—the ARR is between CONUSA and MUSARC/TAG for training and readiness matters (p.3-1).

4. Stimulate AC Interest in Readiness and Training of RC.

a. Quality of AC Personnel Supporting RC. RC commanders appreciate post-STEADFAST changes that resulted in high-quality AC personnel being assigned to RC support duties. This momentum must be maintained. However, AC personnel in RC support assignments believe that their career development is adversely affected by the RC support assignment (p. 3-24).

b. RC Administrative Workload. AC administrative requirements for RC units have been decreased and are manageable--however, even more can be done to take administrative burdens off RC units (p. 3-10).

c. Need for RC Leadership Training Materials. Although RC "junior leadership" is often cited as a weakness in RC units, the AC has not provided an overall plan to help alleviate this shortcoming (p. 3-27).

5. Mobilization and Deployment Planning.

a. Proponency. HQ FORSCOM is currently HQDA's "Executive Agent" for mobilization of RC units--this is improper--HQDA should discharge this responsibility (p. 3-12).

b. Planning. There is no comprehensive Army mobilization planning system--this system should be developed to provide the framework for all Army planning (p. 3-12).

c. HQDA Guidance Does Not Always Support Strategy. Many guidance documents issued by HQDA do not reflect "short-warning" strategy (p.3-25).

6. Capabilities to Expand to Total Mobilization.

a. Lack of Planning Beyond Program Force. There is insufficient planning for expansion of the Army beyond the program ("full mobilization") force levels (p. 3-29).

b. Assignment of Compo-4 Units to MACOM. Planning advantages would accrue if selected "Compo-4" units (units currently

only identified at HQDA to meet requirements) were assigned to MACOM--MACOM should be required to make detailed plans for organizing, training and deploying these units (p.3-26).

c. Documentation of Requirements. The Army needs to document requirements for establishing and expanding the mobilization base--ODCSOPS is currently developing a method to include such requirements in the Total Army Analysis (TAA) (p. 3-22).

#### Major Recommendations

ACCS-82 provides many recommendations to the Army's leadership. A complete listing of recommendations is found in Chapter 7 and only the major recommendations are contained in this summary.

The primary recommendation involves organizational change below the MACOM level. ACCS-82 recommends adoption of organizational Alternative 2B, summarized on p.4-15 through P.4-20 of this volume and described in detail in Chapter 3 of Volume II. This alternative makes the following change to the current organization--

1. ARR headquarters are eliminated and their major responsibilities are transferred to CONUSA.
2. One additional, deployable corps headquarters is formed.
3. Most, if not all, battalion-level AC advisors to the RC are eliminated.
4. Additional mobilization planning manpower is authorized at installation and CONUSA level. Further, a short-term overstrength is authorized at HQDA to establish an Army Mobilization Planning System.
5. Non-deploying, and selected late-deploying, RC units are associated with the CONUS MACOM that will employ them after mobilization.

Recommendations for other major issues include:

1. Proper Command and Control of the Army.
  - a. Layering and duplication
    - Eliminate the ARR HQ; transfer major responsibilities

to CONUSA.

b. Span of control.

— Activate one additional corps headquarters; assign, to the extent feasible, all AC divisions to FORSCOM's three corps.

c. Corps Headquarters in CONUS.

— Activate one additional corps headquarters.

d. Functional Alignment of MACOM and RC.

— MACOM given limited OPCON for training and mobilization planning for selected non-deploying and late-deploying RC units.

e. Functional RC Commands.

— Do not adopt functional organization of the RC.

f. STARC Organization and Missions.

— HQDA, FORSCOM and CONUSA increase interplay with STARC.

g. Communications, ADPE, MIS.

— HQDA (DAAC) develop ADPE/MIS Master Plan for the AC and RC—recognize requirements for integrated AC-RC systems and RC-peculiar problems.

— HQDA (DAAC) fund, in FY 81 Budget, the FORSCOM/TRADOC interim upgrade of BASOPS ADPE (PDIP 5S04).

— HQDA (DAAC) monitor and fully fund Project VIABLE—keep on schedule and insure it meets requirements of mobilization stations.

— HQDA (DALO) develop measures to reduce the mobilization surge of requisitions on installation ADPE, to include the development of more flexible ADP systems.

h. Installation Management Responsibilities.

— HQDA (DAMO) designate, in peacetime, post-mobilization installation commanders.

— HQDA (DAMO) clarify command relationships between installation commanders and units assigned to installations.

— HQDA (DAMO) resolve timing for inter-MACOM transfers, if any, of installations.

2. Orderly and Rapid Transition from Peacetime to Wartime Operations.

a. Gaining Command Program.

— HQDA (DAMO) expedite expansion of program.

b. Lack of Sufficient Planning Resources.

— HQDA (DAMO) authorize increased manpower for planning at CONUSA and installations.

— HQDA (DACS) authorize an overstrength, for 1-2 years, within DACS, to develop a comprehensive Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS).

c. Lack of Valid Post-Mobilization Missions.

— Eliminate ARR HQ.

— ARCOM HQ provided post-mobilization missions to manage installations and be prepared to form the nucleus of divisions for total mobilization.

d. Uncovered POMCUS.

— HQ (DAMO-DALO) expedite in-process solutions.

e. Organizational Turbulence.

— Designate ARCOM HQ and Training Divisions to assume command of specific installations at specific times following M-Day.

3. Appropriate Use of RC Chain of Command



-- Eliminate most, if not all, battalion-level advisors.

-- Eliminate ARR HQ to provide opportunity for direct interface between CONUSA and MACOM/TAG.

4. Stimulate AC Interest in Readiness and Training of the RC.

a. Quality of AC Personnel Supporting the RC.

-- HQDA (DAMO and DAPE) support high-quality fill of RC support HQ.

-- HQDA (DAPE and DAPA) initiate actions to counter AC perception that assignment to RC support duties inhibits career progression.

b. RC Administrative Workload.

-- Adopt recommendations made by AAA in their 16 April 1979 report, "Administrative Workload in Reserve Components."

-- HQDA (DAPE and DAMO), in conjunction with HQ FORSCOM, examine AR 135-300 and 220-10 and CONUSA-produced AGI checklists--revise these documents to reduce administrative requirements for the RC.

-- HQDA (DAIG) and HQ FORSCOM examine AGI requirements for RC units--examine feasibility of increasing to two years the interval between unit inspections.

c. RC Leadership Training Materials.

-- TRADOC develop, on an expedited basis, self-paced leadership training programs for RC company and battalion-level commanders.

5. Mobilization and Deployment Planning.

a. Proponency.

-- Relieve FORSCOM of "Executive Agent" responsibility--move responsibility to HQDA.

b. Planning.

-- Provide additional assets to CONUSA and installations; develop AMPS.

c. Inconsistent Plans/Strategy.

-- HQDA insure all guidance for planning is consistent with "short-warning" aspects of national strategy.

6. Capability to Expand to Total Mobilization.

a. Planning Beyond Program Force.

-- HQ (DAMO) identify initial incremental requirements for transition to total mobilization.

-- HQDA (AMPS) design appropriate planning framework.

-- Post-mobilization "be prepared" missions for ARCOM HQ to form nucleus of follow-on divisions.

b. Assignment of Compo-4 Units.

-- HQDA (DAMO) assign selected Compo-4 units to appropriate MACOM; MACOM prepare definitive plans for activation, training and deployment/employment of units.

c. Documentation of Requirements.

-- HQDA (DAMO) expedite development of MOBREM; include requirements for full and total mobilization; incorporate results in Total Army Analysis (TAA).

### Precis of Chapters

Chapter 1 describes the background that led to the decision to conduct this study. The historical perspective--from 1940 through 1975--of the Army's command and control systems is described. The study's objectives, scope, assumptions, constraints and methodology are described in detail.

Chapter 2 presents a description of the existing CONUS command and control structure. Major missions and functions of HQDA and its ten CONUS MACOM are described, along with organizational diagrams showing the major subordinates of each headquarters. This chapter also explains the manner in which the other Services handle management of their RC structure and it provides a detailed description of the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve. Systems supporting the structure--personnel, logistics, financial management and communications/ADPE--are also described.

Chapter 3 provides a discussion of the problems, or "issues," identified by ACCS-82 during the course of the study. The major issues were summarized above ("Current Organization-Major Problems and Findings").

Chapter 4 contains summaries of the alternatives that were developed by ACCS-82. Initially, 36 alternative proposals were considered. Each of the initial proposals are briefly described at the end of the chapter. Various features of these 36 proposals were used in the complete development of the final alternatives that were evaluated and compared as candidates for the preferred alternative. Executive Summaries of the final alternatives and variations are contained in Chapter 4.

Chapter 5 describes the methods of evaluation used to test the adequacy and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of all alternatives. The modified-Delphi technique used by ACCS-82 is explained and tabular results are displayed. The results of sensitivity analyses are described and economic data are provided in tabular form.

Chapter 6 summarizes, and provides interpretations for, the results of the analyses and evaluations described in Chapter 5. The rationale for selecting the preferred alternative is described.

Chapter 7 presents the detailed recommendations of ACCS-82. The

major recommendations were summarized above ("Major Recommendations").

STUDY GROUP MEMBERSHIP

Brigadier General (Promotable) Dwight L. Wilson, Chairman  
Colonel Thomas E. Fitzgerald, Deputy

ANALYSTS

Colonel Kenneth B. Card  
Colonel Adolph H. Ernst, Jr.  
Colonel Thomas E. Green  
Colonel Normal E. Qualtrough  
Colonel Michael N. Zirkle  
Lieutenant Colonel G. Robert Akam  
Lieutenant Colonel Henry R. Bellinger  
Lieutenant Colonel Charles E. Cowan, Jr.  
Lieutenant Colonel Clinton O. Hyde  
Lieutenant Colonel Edward G. Preston  
Lieutenant Colonel Walter R. Shope  
Lieutenant Colonel(P) Albert R. Spaulding  
Lieutenant Colonel James E. Thomas  
Major William H. Echols  
Major Darrell W. Walker  
Mr. Wilbert Schwartzapfel

SUPPORTING STAFF

Mrs. Gloria J. Brown  
Mrs. Patricia A. Martino  
PFC Mark C. Thomas  
Word Processing Center, OTSG

TABLE OF CONTENTS  
VOLUME I: STUDY REPORT

FOREWORD	Page
Executive Summary.....	1
Table of Contents.....	i
List of Figures.....	v
List of Tables.....	vi
Chapter	
1. Introduction.....	1-1
Background.....	1-1
Statement of the Problem.....	1-2
Historical Perspective of US Army Command and Control.....	1-2
Objective of the Study.....	1-19
Scope of the Study.....	1-20
Assumptions.....	1-20
Constraints.....	1-21
Conduct of the Study.....	1-21
Evaluation.....	1-26
Consideration of Ongoing Studies and Actions.....	1-28
2. Description of Existing Structure.....	2-1
Department of Defense.....	2-1
Military Departments and Services.....	2-1
Department of the Army.....	2-3
Management of the Reserve Components.....	2-6

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
Army National Guard Structure.....	2-7
United States Army Reserve (USAR).....	2-18
Major Army Commands (MACOM).....	2-24
Systems Supporting the Current Structure.....	2-56
Summary of Organizational Strengths and Weaknesses.....	2-84
Baseline Resources.....	2-85
3. Development of Issues.....	3-1
General.....	3-1
Organizational Issues.....	3-1
Transition Issues.....	3-12
Other Issues.....	3-23
4. Description of Alternatives to Existing Structure.....	4-1
Discrete Features.....	4-1
Alternative 1.....	4-3
Alternative 2.....	4-7
Alternative 2A.....	4-11
Alternative 2B.....	4-15
Variations Comparative Analysis.....	4-19
Alternative 3.....	4-21
Alternative 3A.....	4-26

## TABLES OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
Alternative 3B.....	4-33
Variations Comparative Analysis.....	4-39
Alternative 4.....	4-43
5. Analysis of Alternatives.....	5-1
Effectiveness Evaluation.....	5-1
Summary of Major Strengths and Weaknesses.....	5-2
Impact of Strengths and Weaknesses of Command and Control Configuration on Effectiveness Measures.....	5-13
Effectiveness Assessment.....	5-23
Sensitivity Analysis.....	5-30
Economic Analysis.....	5-51
Methodology and Rationale.....	5-51
Resource Requirements.....	5-53
Item/Cost Explanation Sheets.....	5-54
6. Selection of the Preferred Alternative.....	6-1
General.....	6-1
Effectiveness of Alternatives.....	6-1
Resources Required for Alternatives.....	6-2
Resource Efficiency.....	6-4
Organizational Sensitivity and Risk.....	6-4
The Preferred Alternative.....	6-6



TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

	Page
7. Recommendations.....	7-1
Organizational Structure.....	7-1
Organizational Issues.....	7-1
Transition Issues.....	7-7
Other Issues.....	7-18

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	Page
2-1	Organization of the Department of the Army.....2-5
2-2	National Guard Management Structure.....2-10
2-3	National Guard Bureau.....2-11
2-4	Chief, Army Reserve.....2-23
2-5	Organization of Army Communication Command.....2-26
2-6	Criminal Investigation Command.....2-27
2-7	Organization of USACE.....2-29
2-8	Organizational Activities and Installations Commanded by HSC.....2-31
2-9	Intelligence Force Structure: INSCOM Field.....2-33
2-10	Organization of Materiel Development and Readiness Command.....2-36
2-11	Military District of Washington Geographical Areas.....2-39
2-12	Organization of MTMC.....2-40
2-13	Organization of TRADOC.....2-43
2-14	Organization of FORSCOM.....2-48
2-15	Corps Command Relationships and Organization.....2-49
2-16	ARR Boundaries; ARR and RG Locations.....2-55
2-17	ARNG PPBS and Funding.....2-69
2-18	FY 1979 Annual Funding Program OMARNG (2065).....2-70
2-19	NGPA FY 1979 Annual Funding Program.....2-71

# LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		Page
2-1	FORSCOM OMAR Funds (FY 79 as of 12 Mar 79).....	2-74&75
2-2	HQDA FY 79 Manpower Program.....	2-86
2-3	Department of the Army FY 79 Appropriations Data.....	2-87
5-1	Effectiveness Measures.....	5-26
5-2	ACCS-82 Relative Weighting, Percent.....	5-28
5-3	Army Staff Relative Weighting, Percent.....	5-29
5-4	FORSCOM Relative Weighting, Percent.....	5-30
5-5	Standard Deviation, Relative Weighting.....	5-31
5-6	Effectiveness Assessment, ACCS-82.....	5-32
5-7	Effectiveness Assessment, Army Staff.....	5-33
5-8	Effectiveness Assessment, FORSCOM.....	5-34
5-9	Summary Effectiveness, Primary Alternatives.....	5-35
5-10	Effectiveness Assessment, Modified Alternatives.....	5-37&38
5-11	Summary Effectiveness Assessments.....	5-39
5-12	Effectiveness Assessment, Selected Alternatives.....	5-40
5-13	Sensitivity, Planning/Mobilization Weighting.....	5-41
5-14	Sensitivity, Organizational Efficiency Weighting.....	5-43
5-15	Sensitivity, AC Commitment Weighting.....	5-44
5-16	Sensitivity, Total Mobilization Weighting.....	5-45
5-17	Effectiveness Assessment, Partial Mobilization.....	5-48
5-18	Effectiveness Assessment, Total Mobilization.....	5-49
5-19	Summary Effectiveness, Scenario Analysis.....	5-50

# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

TABLE		Page
5-20	Comparison of Alternatives.....	5-56
5-21	Estimated Annual Personnel and Dollar (\$000) Requirements Base Case FY 79.....	5-57, 58&59
5-22	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #1.....	5-60
5-23	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #2.....	5-61
5-24	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #2A.....	5-62
5-25	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #2B.....	5-63
5-26	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #3.....	5-64
5-27	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #3A.....	5-65
5-28	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #3B.....	5-66
5-29	Estimated Annual Operating Costs Alt #4.....	5-67
5-30	One-Time Costs Alt #2.....	5-68
5-31	One-Time Costs Alt #2A.....	5-69
5-32	One-Time Costs Alt #3.....	5-70
5-33	One-Time Costs Alt #3A.....	5-71
5-34	One-Time Costs Alt #3B.....	5-72
5-35	One-Time Costs Alt #4.....	5-73
5-36	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #1.....	5-74&75
5-37	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #2.....	5-76&77
5-38	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #3.....	5-78
5-39	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #4.....	5-79, 80&81
5-40	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #5.....	5-82, 83, 84&85

# LIST OF TABLES (Continued)

TABLE		Page
5-41	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #6.....	5-86&87
5-42	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #7.....	5-88,89,90,91&92
5-43	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #8.....	5-93
5-44	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #9.....	5-94&95
5-45	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #10.....	5-96
5-46	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #11.....	5-97&98
5-47	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #12.....	5-99&100
5-48	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #13.....	5-101
5-49	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #14.....	5-102&103
5-50	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #15.....	5-104,105&106
5-51	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #16.....	5-107&108
5-52	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #17.....	5-109
5-53	Item/Cost Explanation Sheet #18.....	5-110
6-1	Resources Net Changes from Base Case.....	6-3
6-2	Resource Efficiency.....	6-4

VOLUME II: EXISTING STRUCTURE AND ALTERNATIVES

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Foreword.....	i
List of Figures.....	iii
List of Tables.....	v
Chapter	
1. Existing Structure.....	1-1
2. Alternative 1.....	2-1
3. Alternative 2.....	3-1
4. Alternative 3.....	4-1
5. Alternative 4.....	5-1

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	Page
1-1	Organization of the Department of the Army.....1-5
1-2	Organization of Army Material and Development and Readiness Command.....1-16
1-3	Organization of Army Intelligence and Security Command.....1-26
1-4	Organization of Army Communications Command.....1-30
1-5	Organization of Military Traffic Management Command..... 1-43
1-6	Organization of Criminal Investigation Command.....1-46
1-7	Organization of Military District of Washington.....1-49
1-8	Organization of Army Forces Command.....1-55
1-9	Organization of Training and Doctrine Command.....1-62
1-10	Organization of Health Services Command.....1-65
1-11	Organization of the US Army Corps of Engineers.....1-70
1-12	CONUSA Geographic Areas of Responsibilities.....1-85
1-13	First United States Army Organization.....1-86
1-14	Fifth United States Army Organization.....1-87
1-15	Sixth United States Army Organization.....1-88
1-16	CONUS Corps Organizational Structure.....1-89
1-17	ARCOM Boundaries.....1-112
1-18	Organization of a Typical Army Readiness Region.....1-118
1-19	ARR Boundaries and Locations of ARR HQ and RG.....1-118
3-1	Command and Funding Responsibilities.....3-8
3-2	FORSCOM Command Lines.....3-9

LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

FIGURE		Page
4-1	REDMOB Areas of Responsibility.....	4-14
4-2	ARCOM Areas.....	4-15
4-3	Headquarters, Readiness and Mobilization Command.....	4-20
5-1	Corps Areas with Major AC Units.....	5-13
5-2	Stationing Option 4A.....	5-9-7
5-3	Stationing Option 4B.....	5-9-8
5-4	Stationing Option 4C.....	5-9-10



## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE		Page
2-1	TOE Augmentation.....	2-11
3-1	Responsibility for Dedicated Mobilization Planners.....	3-13
4-1	Factors for REDMOB Determination.....	4-11
4-2	REDMOB Locations and Areas.....	4-14
4-3	REDMOB Manpower Summary.....	4-22
4-4	Responsibility for Dedicated Mobilization Planners.....	4-24
4-5	REDMOB Location Selection.....	4-27&28
4-6	Headquarters Computers and Monthly Costs.....	4-29
4-7	ADPE Costs.....	4-30
4-8	COMPO 4 Units.....	4-35
4-9	REDMOB Units.....	4-38
4-10	Possible USAR GO Backfill.....	4-40
5-1	Computers and Monthly Cost.....	5-21
5-2	Increased Costs.....	5-22
5-3	Ratio of Staff to Units Served.....	5-3-3
5-4	Present AC-RC Support Ratio.....	5-7-2
5-5	Corps Ratio.....	5-7-3
5-6	Corps Ratio, Staff to Base.....	5-7-7
5-7	Corps TDA.....	5-7-5

# VOLUME III - ANNEXES

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD.....	i
LIST OF FIGURES.....	v
LIST OF TABLES.....	vii
ANNEX	
A. Letter of Establishment.....	A-1
B. Letter from OSD (M,RA&L) to HQDA (VCSA).....	B-1
C. Study Plan.....	C-1
D. Evaluation Methodology.....	D-1
E. History of Major Activities.....	E-1
F. Supporting Data	
1. Appendix 1: Visits by Army Command and Control Study-82.....	F-1-1
2. Appendix 2: Briefings Presented to Army Command and Control Study-82.....	F-2-1
3. Appendix 3: Installation Management Alternatives: A Feasibility Study.....	F-3-1
4. Appendix 4: Desirability of MACOM Exercising OPCON or Command Over Functional RC Units.....	F-4-1
5. Appendix 5: US Army Reserve Command.....	F-5-1
6. Appendix 6: Analysis of Army Force Mobilization Planning and Execution.....	F-6-1
7. Appendix 7: Army Readiness Regions.....	F-7-1

ANNEX	TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)	Page
8.	Appendix 8: Functionalization of the USAR.....	F-8-1
9.	Appendix 9: Garrisons, Training Divisions and USAR Schools During Mobilization.....	F-9-1
10.	Appendix 10: Installation Area Support...	F-10-1
11.	Appendix 11: Planning Requirements for Total Mobilization.....	F-11-1
12.	Appendix 12: Missions/Functions of FEMA, FPA and CDA.....	F-12-1
13.	Appendix 13: Adequacy of RC Pay Systems.....	F-13-1
14.	Appendix 14: Reserve Component Promotion Systems.....	F-14-1
15.	Appendix 15: Requirements for Battalion and Flight Facility Advisors.....	F-15-1
16.	Appendix 16: Adequacy of RG Staffing in Relation to Affiliation Program.....	F-16-1
17.	Appendix 17: Mobilization Missions for ARR and their Subordinate Elements.....	F-17-1
18.	Appendix 18: Reserve Component Forces of Selected Foreign Nations.....	F-18-1
19.	Appendix 19: Command and Control: RC Units and Installations.....	F-19-1
20.	Appendix 20: State Area Commands (STARC) Missions, Responsibilities and Capabilities.....	F-20-1

## TABLE OF CONTENTS (Continued)

ANNEX	Page
21. Appendix 21: ADPE, MIS and Communications.....	F-21-1
22. Appendix 22: Full-Time Manning (FTM) in Reserve Component Units.....	F-22-1
 G. Reports	
1. Appendix 1: Study Advisory Group Meeting Minutes, 8 Jan 79 Meeting.....	G-1-1
2. Appendix 2: Study Advisory Group Meeting Minutes, 21 Mar 79 Meeting.....	G-2-1
3. Appendix 3: Study Advisory Group Meeting Minutes, 1 Jun 79 Meeting.....	G-3-1
4. Appendix 4: In Process Review Meeting Minutes, 27 Mar 79 Meeting.....	G-4-1
5. Appendix 5: In Process Review Meeting Minutes, 12 Jun 79 Meeting.....	G-5-1
H. On-going Studies and Actions.....	H-1
I. Selected References.....	I-1
Glossary.....	Glossary-1

## LIST OF FIGURES

FIGURE	Page
F-3-1	Type A Installation-Where a Corps is Located.....F-3-5
F-3-2	Type B Installation-Where a Division is Located.....F-3-5
F-3-3	Type C Installation-Service School and Garrison.....F-3-6
F-3-4	Type D Installation.....F-3-6
F-3-3-1	IMCOM Command and Control Diagram.....F-3-3-20
F-3-3-2	Office of the Commanding General.....F-3-3-21
F-3-3-3	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel.....F-3-3-22
F-3-3-4	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Security and Mobilization.....F-3-3-23
F-3-3-5	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics.....F-3-3-24
F-3-3-6	Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management.....F-3-3-25
F-3-3-7	Office of the Inspector General.....F-3-3-26
F-3-3-8	Office of the Staff Judge Advocate.....F-3-3-27
F-3-3-9	Office of the Chief of Public Affairs..F-3-3-28
F-3-3-10	Office of the Surgeon.....F-3-3-29
F-3-3-11	Office of the Chaplain.....F-3-3-30
F-3-3-12	Office of the Engineer.....F-3-3-31
F-3-3-13	Director of Management Information Systems.....F-3-3-32

# LIST OF FIGURES (Continued)

FIGURE		Page
F-3-3-14	Office of Communication - Electronic Affairs.....	F-3-3-33
F-3-4-1	Corps of Engineers Office Chief of Engineers.....	F-3-4-5
F-3-4-2	Director of Installation Management.....	F-3-4-6
F-3-4-3	Division Engineer.....	F-3-4-7
F-3-4-4	OCE Command Relationship for Installation Management.....	F-3-4-8
F-3-5-1	FORSCOM Organization for Director of Installation Management.....	F-3-5-2
F-6-1	Mobilization Relationship.....	F-6-10
F-6-2	Mobilization Planning Flow.....	F-6-15
F-21-1	Proposed Telecommunications Network Concept.....	F-21-12

## LIST OF TABLES

TABLE	Page
F-3-1	FORSCOM use of Borrowed Military Manpower in FY 1978 to Supplement USAG Operations.....F-3-9
F-3-2	Borrowed Military Manpower to Supplement USAG Operations.....F-3-9
F-3-3-1	Summary of IMCOM Manpower Requirements.....F-3-3-19
F-3-4-1	Additional Manpower Requirements at OCE.....F-3-4-1&2
F-3-4-2	Additional Manpower Requirement at Division Engineers.....F-3-4-3&4
F-3-5-1	Summary of IM at FORSCOM.....F-3-5-3
F-6-1	Force Mobilization Planning Guidance (FMPG), Volume II of the ACP.....F-6-3
F-6-2	Planning Guidance Linkage - Mobilization of RC Units.....F-6-16
F-8-1	MUSARC.....F-8-5
F-8-2	Non-MUSARC GOCOM.....F-8-6

## Chapter 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

The most recent reorganization of the Army in the Continental United States (CONUS) was called Operation STEADFAST and was accomplished in 1973. This reorganization was designed to improve the readiness of Active Component (AC) and Reserve Component (RC) forces, align schools and combat development activities and improve the quality and responsiveness of Army management. Operation STEADFAST undoubtedly resulted in a quantity and quality of RC support not seen before. Despite this success, training exercises such as PRIME RATE 75, POLE VAULT 76 and MOBEX 78 have shown that the emphasis on peacetime command, control and assistance for the RC may not have improved the essential capability to mobilize and prepare units for deployment, i.e., the ability to make the transition to wartime operations. There have been no significant modifications to the STEADFAST organization since its implementation.

The current organization has come under increasing criticism for a variety of reasons.

1. Personnel within the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) consider the AC command and control arrangement for the RC to be excessively layered and duplicative.

2. One of the major findings resulting from MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78 concerned the CONUS organizational shortcomings with respect to command and control before, during and immediately following mobilization.

3. Some headquarters in the current structure lack a valid post-mobilization mission.

4. There is insufficient integration of AC and RC personnel, units and command structure.

5. There is an insufficient number of corps headquarters in the force to support wartime requirements.

6. There is an excessive span of control for Headquarters, US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM).



7. There are unclear and conflicting responsibilities for installation management during, and subsequent to mobilization.

8. There is inadequate communications and automatic data-processing equipment to support command and control during mobilization.

9. There is excessive organizational turbulence during the transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

The charter for this study was established by HQDA Letter 10-78-5, 29 September 1978; a copy of this letter is at Annex A. The HQDA letter was based, inter alia, upon an agreement reached between OSD and HQDA on 15 August 1978; see Annex B which contains the 24 August 1978 letter from the ASD(M,RA&L) to the VCSA.

#### Statement of the Problem

The purpose of this study was to examine the US Army command and control organization in CONUS. Specifically, the study will determine what improvements are required to insure wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency; maintain responsive command and control of all AC and RC forces; and provide necessary support and assistance to all RC elements.

#### Historical Perspective of US Army Command and Control(1)

Prelude: The Corps Areas and Armies: 1920-1939. An examination of the history of the US Army CONUS command and control revealed an evolutionary development. The National Defense Act (NDA) of 1920 established the framework for the organization of the Army in the years between World Wars I and II. The Act provided for only a small active duty "regular," force to be reinforced by the citizen soldiers of the National Guard and Organized Reserve. Congressional economy, pacifism and the depression all combined to defeat the realization of either the regular or reserve structure that the Act contemplated. Nevertheless, the command and control mechanisms developed under the Act had lasting influence on those of World War II and after. The Act remained the statutory basis of US Army organization until 1950.

---

(1) Condensed from a comprehensive report, "Army Command and Control 1940-1975," prepared by US Army Center of Military History for ACCS-82, 2 May 1979.

The NDA of 1920 included provisions for the establishment of three field armies in CONUS, each of which would command three existing corps areas. This organization remained in the planning stages until General MacArthur activated his four-Army structure in 1932. As Chief of Staff, General MacArthur was concerned about his span of control of the nine corps areas and the fact that Army commands were not to be activated until after M-Day. His solution was a four-Army plan which would give him four rather than nine subordinate commanders for the conduct of mobilization, training and defense. Each Army was to be commanded by the Senior Corps Area Commander assigned to that particular Army and it was to have a peacetime mission of planning and training only. Household chores were to be left to the Corps Area Service Commands. Funding for this force was not forthcoming until 1938.

Just prior to the outbreak of general war in Europe, the forces of the Regular Army in CONUS were scattered, reminiscent of the Indian Wars, among 130 predominantly battalion-sized posts. Field Army commands scarcely existed except in theory, and the corps area commands had come to function as administrative headquarters in the manner of the old geographic departments. Of the nine infantry divisions supposedly in existence, only three had the framework of a divisional organization. The remaining six were merely understrength brigades. In the immediate emergency of November 1939, the War Department directed that the four Army commanders be responsible for all matters directly related to preparation for war, including field training for units larger than divisions, the organization of coastal defense within the respective Army areas and the supervision of all war and mobilization planning for their respective areas. The corps area commanders were to be responsible for all matters of routine training and administration including the employment, training, and administration of divisions and smaller units and actual preparation of mobilization plans. However, quite clearly by 1939, the Armies were superseding the corps areas as the principal headquarters involved in command of troops within CONUS.

World War II. With a major war in progress in Europe, and the prospect of increased manpower authorizations, the War Department, in November 1939, announced a complete reorganization. Increased manpower would fill all nine Regular Army divisions, activate corps support troops for two corps headquarters, and activate minimum Army and General Headquarters troops plus an Air Corps. A General Headquarters (GHQ) was created in 1940 with the mission of overseeing the four Armies whose skeleton structure of the thirties was being

fleshed-out. In March 1941, the War Department divided the United States into four strategic areas (Northeast, Central, Southern and Western) to be known as Defense Commands. The four Army commanders were also designated as Commanding Generals of the Defense Commands with separate headquarters staffs to serve in operations. The training of ground combat units was to be supported by separate staffs.

On 27 August 1940, Congress authorized the induction of the National Guard into Federal Service and the call-up of members of the Organized Reserve Corps (ORC). A bill was passed on 16 September 1940 that provided for a peacetime selective service program.

The establishment of the GHQ, US Army, marked the first in a series of command and control organizations in the CONUS which eventually lead to the United States Continental Army Command. The whole GHQ arrangement was shortlived. On 9 March 1942, the War Department was reorganized under the War Powers Act to provide a better command and control organization. Three zone of interior commands--Army Ground Forces (AGF); Army Air Forces (AAF); and the Services of Supply, later renamed Army Services Forces (ASF), were formed. These three major commands took over most of the detailed functions formerly performed at the General or Special Staff level and freed the Chief of Staff, Army to concentrate on the actual direction of the war. AGF became responsible for training the ground Army and took over direction of the four zone of interior (ZI) armies. It also absorbed the functions of the Chiefs of Combat Arms, whose offices were abolished. The ASF was conceived as a supply, service and administrative command and became a catch-all for functions not otherwise assigned. The ASF took control of the nine corps areas and shortly transformed them into service commands responsible for supply, administration and housekeeping functions within their respective geographical boundaries for AGF, AAF and the defense commands.

The authority of the three major commands did not extend overseas. The massive and dispersed troop deployments of WW II required the creation of numerous Army theater commands that in turn formed part of joint or combined commands under the strategic direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS). Joint commands within the United States were not formed because the danger of enemy invasion quickly faded after 7 December 1941. As the emphasis turned to operations overseas, the role of the Army Defense Commands also diminished. Gradually, the forces assigned to defense commands were reduced in size and reassigned to the major ZI com-

mands.

There were two distinct phases of mobilization for WW II. The first covered the period from the outbreak of war in Europe in September 1939 to 7 December 1941, and had as its major purpose the creation of a force for hemisphere defense. The second involved the all-out mobilization required for fighting an overseas war on two fronts. The first phase involved a small increase in the size of the volunteer Regular Army. It was followed after the fall of France by mobilization of all the National Guard, most of the Organized Reserve officers and the institution of Selective Service to provide the needed manpower. Mobilization planning was highly centralized in the War Department General Staff for both phases. The size and shape of the Army were determined by the General Staff (G3 with advice from Operations Division (OPD) on theater needs). The number of units to be mobilized was set forth in a document known as the Troop Basis, which gave the authorized strength of the entire Army as of a specific date in the future. The Activation Schedule was derived from the Troop Basis. The AGF and ASF had extensive powers of recommendation on matters of mobilization, but the decisions were made by the War Department General Staff.

Shortly after the 1942 reorganization, the War Department established the principle that in general "the using command will train a unit."

Therefore, AGF was the major training command and became almost exclusively a training command. Its other major functions were closely related ones of making recommendations on combat and training doctrine, TOE and TDA and determining military characteristics for weapons and equipment for ground force units. Pre-WWII mobilization planning called for basic training to be concentrated in the replacement centers, with new units receiving trained personnel "fillers" from the centers. With the decision in 1942 to activate 37 new divisions during that year, it was found that a commensurate expansion of the replacement centers was impossible. Division and other units received the major portion of their fillers directly from the reception centers and had to conduct basic training themselves. The ASF operated a training establishment for service troops. Most of the ASF training facilities were under the control of the Chief of the seven Technical Services: Quartermaster, Ordnance, Engineers, Surgeon General, Signal Chemical Warfare and Transportation. Each of the technical services operated schools and replacement centers.

Control over deployment was also centralized at the War Department

level. In both planning and execution, the early deployments in 1941 and 1942 were disorderly, verging at times on the chaotic. Beginning in early 1943, standard procedures had evolved and the process was smoother in the later stages of the war. Under these procedures, OPD furnished the three major commands lists of estimated monthly overseas requirements projected six months in advance, categorized by quantities and types of units. In the case of a typical AGF unit, the ground force headquarters issued necessary alerts and instructions, beginning 90 days before sailing time, to the Army, separate corps, command or center to which the unit belonged; detailed personnel, supply and training instructions were also furnished. These orders set in motion a series of actions culminating with a final readiness IG inspection with the results submitted to the Chief of Staff, Army. Command authority remained with the appropriate major command until the unit arrived in the staging area where it passed to the post commander.

The AGF inherited the functions of the Chiefs of the Combat Arms (whose offices had been eliminated) and was responsible for making recommendations to the Chief of Staff, Army for both tactical and training doctrine. Development of tactical doctrine at AGF was centered in its G3 section, but the major work was carried out at the Service Schools and training centers. Testing and evaluation operations were vastly accelerated and testing facilities were expanded. New test boards, under AGF, were added and the Technical Services simultaneously expanded their testing establishments. A policy was established that major items of equipment would be adopted only on the recommendations of theater commanders.

Whereas budget restrictions were present during the pre-WWII period, this was not the case during WWII. The real limitations were not financial, but supply of manpower and industrial capacity. The Chief of Finance continued to be responsible for disbursement and accounting. This office was renamed the Fiscal Director in 1943. The Finance Department embraced both the staff function of policy making and procedure and the conduct of fiscal operations.

Post-war Reorganization--1946-1947. When WWII was over, the Army reverted to an organization not greatly dissimilar to that existing before the war. ASF was abolished, OPD lost its preeminence among general staff sections and the Technical and Administrative Services were restored to their former position of relative independence. The Directorates of the General Staff, with the exception of the new Research and Development (R&D) Directorate, were roughly equivalent

to the pre-war "G" sections and War Plans Division. The Chief of Staff, Army was specifically assigned "command of all components of the Army" with a Deputy Chief to assist him in his duties. Six zone of interior Armies took over the functions of the nine ASF commands in providing housekeeping services in CONUS. At the same time, these ZI armies were also to carry on training and provide tactical forces. In their service command role, they were directly responsible to the War Department, but in their tactical and training role, they were under the command of CG, AGF. The old Defense Commands disappeared and the responsibility for CONUS defense was the responsibility of the AAF, operating through a group of functional commands, and the AGF, operating through the ZI armies.

At the general staff level, the Director of Organization and Training was responsible for mobilization planning. The execution of mobilization was by the AGF, operating through the ZI armies which were responsible for "matters pertaining to organization, mobilization, training and operation of units of AGF including National Guard, Organized Reserves and ROTC."

The new organizational structure included a National Guard Bureau through which the War Department maintained relations with the National Guard in the 48 states. It also contained an Executive for Reserve and ROTC affairs who advised the Chief of Staff in his exercise of supervision and control over the Organized Reserve. AGF was charged to "supervise and inspect the training of units of the ROTC, National Guard and Organized Reserves, as instructed by the War Department." This mission was normally carried out by the Army Area Commanders who organized military districts generally along state boundaries. The officer in charge of each military district acted as the field representative of the Army Area Commander in all matters related to RC. While the authority of the Armies over the affairs of the Organized Reserve was more or less complete, authority over the National Guard was limited to supervising training, conducting annual inspections and preparing efficiency reports on senior commanders.

AGF continued to exercise the responsibility for training. The training and school responsibilities were largely assumed by the individual Technical Services. The Finance Corps was designated as the eighth technical service. Schools and replacement training centers operated by the Administrative and Technical Services were Class II installations and were exempted from the command of ZI armies. Armies furnished the housekeeping services that ASF had provided during WWII.

Under the 1946 reorganization, the Director of Plans and Operations inherited the wartime OPD functions of deployment planning. Execution of deployment was the responsibility of AGF and the Armies, with the Technical Services furnishing the supplies and services.

Combat developments and testing continued in approximately the same channels as during the war, with appropriate changes made to fit a changed Army organization. The various boards existing at the end of the war were consolidated into four main boards with branch distinctions abolished in favor of functional assignments by types of equipment--Board No. 1 at Ft Bragg for airborne and communications equipment and heavy weapons; Board No. 2 at Ft Knox for wheeled and track vehicles; Board No. 3 at Ft Benning for small arms and individual equipment; and Board No. 4 at Ft Bliss for antiaircraft artillery and guided missiles.

The return of peace once again brought budget constrictions in the form of limited Congressional appropriations. The Budget Division of the War Department was established on the Special Staff with the task of "preparing plans and policies and exercising general supervision and control over all War Department and Army budgetary matters and for formulating and coordinating basic fiscal policy for the War Department.

Readjustments to Unification and Korea. Assuming its new title and missions from the merger of ground, air and naval forces under the National Security Act of 1947, the Department of the Army (DA) instituted organizational changes to improve its functioning and to reduce the confusion in command and control relationships among the Army Staff, Technical and Administrative Services, AGF and ZI armies. The single Deputy Chief of Staff was replaced by a Vice Chief of Staff and two Deputy Chiefs of Staff, one for Plans and Combat Operations and the other for Administration. Also established under the Chief of Staff was an Army Comptroller "to improve the use of modern management techniques in the business administration of the Army, and to utilize accounting more effectively as a tool throughout the Army in the control of operations and costs."

In the General Staff, the Directorate of Research and Development was abolished as a separate staff agency and established as a division within the Directorate of Service, Supply and Procurement. This directorate also became responsible for directing and controlling the "operations and administrative activities" of the Technical Services. Similarly, the Director of Personnel and Administration was charged

with the direction and control of the Administrative Services.

Army Ground Forces was replaced by the Office, Chief of Army Field Forces (OCAFF) and was designated as a field operating agency. Concurrently, the six numbered armies in CONUS and the Military District of Washington were established as major commands and placed under control of the Chief of Staff, Army. They were responsible for the operations, training, administration, services and supply of all units, posts, camps, stations and installations of their commands.

Further changes within DA were influenced by amendments to the National Security Act, passed by Congress in 1949, which gave the Secretary of Defense greater authority and control over the military services. Among the adjustments in the Army Staff, the titles and functions of the two Deputy Chiefs of Staff were changed, and the Comptroller was elevated to the rank of a third deputy without the official title. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Programs was responsible for all basic planning, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Administration for the execution of plans, and the Comptroller for the review of Army operations for efficiency and economy. In the General Staff, the five directorates became four "G" sections under heads entitled Assistant Chiefs of Staff. The personnel functions of the Organization and Training Directorate were transferred to the G-1 and the training functions were transferred to OCAFF. These changes became a matter of statute with passage of the Army Reorganization Act in 1950. A principal prescription of the act confirmed the power of the Secretary of the Army to administer departmental affairs, including the right, within certain limits and with some exception, to prescribe the composition, duties and functions of the Army Staff and commands without reliance on either Congressional legislation or Presidential war powers. By lack of any mention in the act, the "command" role of the Chief of Staff was dropped, except as he exercised it as agent of the Secretary.

Missions assigned to the Army under the National Security Act included the provision of antiaircraft units in the defense of the US against air attack. For this mission, the Army Antiaircraft Command was established directly under the Chief of Staff, Army. This command later became a component of the unified Continental Air Defense Command established under the JCS.

In 1950, the Army Staff attempted to enforce a degree of uniformity in the military districts throughout CONUS. The Army commanders sought to maintain their authority over the organization and func-



tions of the districts and the only uniformity actually achieved was the mandatory establishment of a district in each state and the fixing of the status of the district chief as a commander and not as a staff officer. The new structure resulted in an expansion from 37 to 49 districts; with additional sub-area and sub-district headquarters. There was a temporary expansion of the role of the districts to National Guard affairs, but that role was once again limited in 1953 to "supervision and coordination of the Army Reserve, and in addition to perform certain functions related to the National Guard." The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 required the appointment of a general officer to be directly responsible to the Chief of Staff, Army for reserve affairs. This led to the establishment of the Special Assistant for Reserve Affairs in the Chief of Staff's office, but the National Guard Bureau and the Executive for Reserve and ROTC Affairs continued to handle operational matters at the Special Staff level.

Even though regulations assigned responsibility for developing plans for mobilization to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-3, planning involved all levels of the Army Staff. The Army's involvement in the limited operations of the Korean Conflict caused a partial and "creeping" mobilization to take place. In the main, its execution followed established lines of command and control. These lines provided overall direction at the DA level, and implementation largely by the armies. OCAFF had the mission of coordinating and supervising Army mobilization training plans, but not the organization of new units or the induction of selectees and reservists.

OCAFF was responsible for the general direction, supervision, coordination and inspection of all matters pertaining to training of individuals and units required by the Army in the field, including the RC. The task of conducting the actual training; the command of units, schools and training centers; and the responsibility for providing logistical support and financial control rested with the commanders of the ZI armies, Army Antiaircraft Command and the Chiefs of the Technical and Administrative Services.

In the absence of plans for an immediate commitment of troops to combat, procedures for the early deployment of forces to Korea had to be improvised. In the hurried efforts of the Far East Command (FEC) to move forces into the battle area from Japan and Okinawa, pre-deployment preparations amounted to determining unit's shortages of personnel and equipment and doing whatever was possible to reduce them by using theater resources to reduce them. For FEC requisitions for unit and individual reinforcements, DA turned to the General Reserve

and CONUS installations, placing levies that within three months reduced the number of General Reserve units by half and left most remaining units at little more than cadre strength. Upon DA selection of units for deployment, OCAFF sent teams of officers to the units to make progress reports on their readiness, which were relayed to DA G-3. These teams also assisted the units however possible. Equipment shortages necessitated substitutions and use of equipment holdings of the National Guard and Organized Reserve. The deployment procedures adopted during the first three months were generally utilized throughout the course of the war, albeit with much formalization and refinement.

As established in the 1948 reorganization of the Army, the Technical Services conducted research and development, including testing, in their respective functional areas under the General Staff supervision of the Director of Logistics (and after 1950, the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4). Most of the work was accomplished by private organizations under contract. OCAFF supervised the previously described test boards and was responsible for coordinating service tests.

Few changes in the command and control framework occurred during the next five years. The real impact of the Korean War lay in the impetus it gave to Army research and development. Emerging from this was the concept of Combat Developments in which the development of new doctrine, new organization and new materiel and their integration into units in the field were seen as an interrelated system of obtaining the greatest combat effectiveness using the minimum of men, money and materials. In mid-1952, the Chief of Staff directed OCAFF to establish a combat developments organization. This resulted in the position of Deputy Chief for Combat Developments in OCAFF headquarters, combat developments departments at the Command and General Staff College and at the four combat arms schools then in existence and within the Office of the Special Weapons Development at Ft Bliss. In 1953, the Combat Developments Group was established in OCAFF headquarters and a contract was arranged with Johns Hopkins University to establish a group of scientific advisors, the Combat Operations Research Group (CORG), for developing long-range requirements and finally, coordinating combat developments for the Army as a whole.

The central theme of the performance, or "program" budget, made mandatory in 1949, was that the budget process was focused on programs and functions, that is, on work to be done, not on things to be bought. On the basis of approved apportionments, the Secretary of

the Army, through the Comptroller, issued a funding program and allocation of funds to each operating agency. The operating agencies, in turn, made allocations to the installations under their jurisdiction. Funds for operations of ZI armies and other installations flowed directly from DA and OCAFF had no power of sub-allocation.

Further Adjustments, 1955-1961. The increasing centralization of authority in the hands of the Secretary of Defense in the fifties, combined with internal pressures within DA, produced changes in the Army system of command and control. A series of changes in the command structure was completed by 1956. At DA level, the General Staff came to consist of five Deputy Chiefs of Staff (Personnel, Operations, Logistics, Comptroller and Research and Development) and two Assistant Chiefs (Intelligence and Reserve Components). The Office of the Chief of Staff, Army was reorganized to make the Vice Chief responsible for effective administration and management of the Army Staff. A major development was the establishment of a ground force command, the Continental Army Command, in image of the former AGF. The amendments to the National Security Act of 1958 further strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense and lessened that of the military departments. Nearly all combat forces were placed under unified commands, with the operational chain of command to run from the President and Secretary of Defense, by-passing the military departments.

On 1 February 1955, the Continental Army Command assumed the training functions and tasks previously accomplished by OCAFF and established command responsibility over the six numbered CONUS armies and MDW; the chief additional function assigned was budgeting and funding.

Additional controls were gained in 1957, when the Army adopted the Theater Army concept. This assigned to a major Army commander the control over all resources required to exercise effectively his command responsibility. The Continental Army Command authority was expanded to include the direction and control over the personnel, intelligence, logistics, comptroller and administrative activities of his command. On 1 January 1957, the name of the command was changed to United States Continental Army Command (USCONARC).

After enactment of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955, the Army Staff organization had been changed to provide for an Assistant Chief of Staff for Reserve Components (ACSRC). However, the Chief, NGB, and the Chief of Reserve and ROTC Affairs continued to function in their Special Staff status. In the field, in 1957, the Army began to

replace the 49 Military Districts with US Army Corps (Reserve). This was a move to reduce the number of major headquarters and to provide more efficient command and control. This conversion was completed by 1959. Each corps was commanded by an Active Army Major General who was responsible for the training, administration and support of USAR units within the corps area. The corps could also be assigned supervisory duties, in connection with the ROTC, by the Army area commander. The corps were divided into sector commands that were generally located at the former Military District Headquarters. The sector commands were responsible for command supervision relating to USAR training, except for those units commanded by a general officer.

The role of JCS in mobilization received additional impetus in 1958. The size of the JCS was increased to provide manpower to perform its planning functions without relying on the military services. This left Army planners in primarily a supporting role with the job of devising force packages containing the units and men required to meet the needs established by the joint plans. This task was carried out at the Army Staff level in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations (ODCSOPS). USCONARC was responsible for preparing, coordinating and supervising actual mobilization and demobilization in the command. The Berlin crisis in mid-1961 led to a partial mobilization of the Army's RC for the purpose of rounding-out US Army forces in Europe, developing a six-division force for possible deployment to Europe and expanding the CONUS mobilization and training base. Other contingency operations during this period involved deployment of AC units and mobilization of National Guard units in civil disturbances at Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1956, and Oxford, Mississippi, in September 1962. In both instances, USCONARC was entirely bypassed. Army commanders were called on for only logistical support, and the entire mobilization and employment of the National Guard was controlled directly by DA.

A major recommendation of the Davies Committee (appointed by the Secretary of the Army to study the Army's organization) was that a training command should be established. USCONARC's training function was centered in three staff divisions (Reserve Components, Training and Schools). There remained, however, a certain amount of fragmented responsibility in the area of unit training. USCONARC was responsible for training tactical organizations, as well as many support units, but OACSI, ASA, the five Administrative Services and ODCSLOG and the seven Technical Services also conducted training of specialized units.

Under the 1955 reorganization of the Army, USCONARC was made responsible for the general direction of combat development throughout the Army, including that in the Technical Services. Its Combat Developments Section was raised to the level of a staff division and two months later the US Army Combat Developments Experimentation Center (CDEC) was established at Ft Ord, California. At HQDA level, the Office of the Chief of Research and Development, which was created as a separate entity in 1955, exercised primary responsibility for qualitative materiel requirements. However, combat development, the generating force behind these requirements, was under the general staff supervision of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations. By 1960, the Directorate of Combat Developments within ODCSOPS had three divisions: Doctrine and Concepts, Materiel Development and Missiles.

Another result of the 1955 Army reorganization was the strengthening of the role of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Financial Management. Actions were taken to integrate the numerous accounting systems used in the Army, and the functions of the Office of the Chief of Finance were integrated with the Office of the Comptroller of the Army.

Reorganization, 1962-1972. In 1961, a new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, initiated the first major reorganization of the Army since 1946. The basic principles behind the reorganization, carried out in 1962-1963, were first, that the Army Staff should not operate as it had, in effect, operated since 1946, and second, that the whole Army structure should be "functional." Two new functional commands, the Army Materiel Command (AMC) and the Combat Developments Command (CDC), were created on the same level as USCONARC and most of the operating functions of the Army Staff and the old line Technical Services were parcelled out among the three commands. The AMC was responsible for the Army's materiel operations, including research and development, testing, procurement, production, supply distribution and maintenance. It absorbed the materiel functions and most of the installations of six of the technical services--Quartermaster, Chemical, Signal, Engineer, Ordnance and Transportation (most medical matters remained under The Surgeon General). The CDC was charged with developing the doctrine on how the Army would fight and the weapons and equipment it would need. Each of the new commands took over certain of USCONARC's responsibilities: CDC its combat developments function, and AMC and CDC shared the role in materiel development and test and evaluation. On the other hand, USCONARC's control over activities and installations in CONUS was strengthened. USCONARC was given "command" of the six ZI armies and the Military

District of Washington and all US troops located in CONUS except those expressly assigned to other agencies by DA. The tactical role of USCONARC included the requirement to plan for and support civil authorities in domestic emergencies, and those missions relative to defense, other than air defense, of the CONUS and military participation in civil defense.

The CG, USCONARC, executed his functions through the structure of six ZI armies and the Military District of Washington. This structure underwent some changes in the decade between 1962 and 1972. The number of ZI armies was reduced to four and MDW was placed directly under DA. In 1964, all Army recruiting activities were centralized under the US Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) and the command was assigned to USCONARC as a Class I activity. On 1 July 1966, however, HQDA assumed direct command of USAREC.

In 1962, USCONARC acquired control of most of the Army Service Schools, and command and control of other former Technical Service installations, in connection with its logistical support mission for units in training.

Since one of the goals of the reorganization was to divorce the Army Staff from operations, identifiable operating functions (mostly in DCSLOG and OCRD) were transferred to the new commands. In addition, ODCSOPS was split and staff supervision over the raising and training of Army forces was transferred to an Assistant Chief of Staff for Force Development (ACSFOR). A Chief of Reserve Components, with greater directive authority, replaced the Assistant Chief of Staff in this area. By 1965, all the Technical Service Chiefs, except The Surgeon General and the Chief of Engineers, had disappeared as Special Staff officers. In 1964, some of the operating functions of the Signal Corps also were placed under another new command, the US Army Communications Command.

The Chief of NGB and the Chief, Army Reserve, were placed under the general staff supervision of the Chief, Office Reserve Components, with the Chief, NGB retaining direct access to the Chief of Staff, Army. USCONARC was directed by its new charter, in 1963, to "command, support and supervise the training of Ready Reserve units and individuals of the Army Reserve," and to establish training criteria for, and to inspect and supervise the training of, the Army National Guard units within the CONUS. In 1967, the command and control of all US Army Reserve individuals was transferred from USCONARC to the Army Administration Center, St. Louis, Missouri. This was a move to

centralize administration of the Individual Ready Reserve Pool. Also in 1967, the US Army Corps (Reserve) Headquarters were inactivated, in an economy move that eliminated an intermediate echelon between Army Area Headquarters and the Sector commands. At the same time, Army Reserve Commands (ARCOM) were organized within the Army Reserve structure and were charged with training and readiness responsibilities.

The general system of mobilization planning and execution of the fifties continued into the sixties--basic plans were drawn at DA level, in consonance with JCS plans and USCONARC was responsible for execution. The general theme of mobilization in both the fifties and sixties was for a war in Europe. The involvement in Vietnam produced only a partial mobilization, with the call-up of reserves not coming until 1968. The final selection of units to be mobilized was done entirely at DA level, after determination of the scope of mobilization was made by the President and Secretary of Defense.

In theory, the reorganization of 1962 centralized the responsibility for training under USCONARC, including control of all Service Schools in CONUS with the exception of the Army War College, US Military Academy, US Military Academy Preparation School, the Army Security Agency School, the Logistics Management Center, Medical Field Service School and Judge Advocate General schools. A major problem created by the reorganization of 1962 was that many of the schools which USCONARC controlled also played an important part in the development of doctrine, and doctrine was the responsibility of the Combat Developments Command.

Deployment planning, like mobilization planning, was concentrated at DA level and was carried on in consonance with the contingency plans of the JCS and those of the Unified Commands. Execution of deployments was the task of USCONARC, in coordination with AMC (which was responsible for certain logistics tasks) and the various joint agencies charged with military transportation. In the case of deployments to Vietnam, COMUSMACV would request a certain number of "type" Army units. JCS would review the request and after their approval and that of OSD, the requirement was passed on to the Army. DA then tasked USCONARC to nominate specific units, based on the information provided by the Army Readiness Reporting System which was instituted in 1963.

The combat development function was to be centralized in the newly created CDC. In practice, CDC became closely involved in the work of

ACSFOR in developing the Army's force structure. The major role in both testing and evaluation passed to the AMC.

The major innovation of the MacNamara regime was the introduction of the Program Package System, a method of estimating defense needs as the basis of function, rather than service, and the system of Planning, Programming and Budgeting that required preparation of Five-Year Defense Programs. However, in the presentation of the budget to Congress, the program package estimates had to be converted into conventional categories of the performance budget. This led to a degree of double budgeting.

Post-Vietnam Adjustments. In 1972-73, the Army underwent another reorganization in an effort to modernize, streamline and reorient the command and control structure to a new set of circumstances. The circumstances were the end of war in Vietnam, shift to an All-Volunteer Army, reductions in strength, and the increasing impact of inflation on personnel and materiel costs.

The reorganization eliminated both USCONARC and CDC as major commands and divided their functions between two new commands--US Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). AMC's functions remained relative unaffected except in the area of test and evaluation, but the command underwent extensive internal reorganization and its name was changed to the US Army Readiness and Materiel Development Command (DARCOM). FORSCOM was to supervise the unit training and combat readiness of all Army units, including the USAR and ARNG, and to exercise command of all operational divisions and Strategic Army Force units, as well as all USAR units in CONUS. TRADOC was to direct all individual training and education and the development of doctrine, organization and materiel requirements and manage the Army ROTC program. Other changes included the establishment of a US Army Health Services Command to act as a single manager for Army medical activities in the United States. Under the reorganization, DA Headquarters was to play a lesser role in operations and was to confine itself to broad programs, policy, priorities, allocation of resources and the coordination of activities of the three major commands. The size of the Army Staff was reduced by half. A reorganization that became effective in 1974 eliminated the positions of Chief of Reserve Components, the Assistant Chiefs of Staff for Force Development and Communications-Electronics, as well as a number of Special Staff positions. The Office of the Chief of Research and Development became the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development and



Acquisition, with broadened functions that included the whole life-cycle of equipment. The functions of the Secretary of the General Staff and the Assistant Vice Chief of Staff were combined into a single Director of the Army Staff. ODCSOPS resumed the role in force planning it had before the formation of ACSFOR.

FORSCOM inherited the command of most USCONARC units and installations, as well as responsibility for assistance in domestic emergencies and the USCONARC role in Unified Commands. In mid-1971, there was a complete realignment of the Unified Command structure. Included was the transfer of area responsibility from USSTRICOM to other geographically oriented Unified Commands. Consequently, the USSTRICOM was inactivated, on 31 December 1971, and was replaced by the US Readiness Command (USREDCOM). This command became responsible for joint training of assigned forces, development of deployment plans and recommendations to JCS for joint doctrine. FORSCOM became the Army component to USREDCOM and to the Atlantic Command (LANTCOM). FORSCOM was responsible for conducting operations for CONUS defense (less aerospace defense).

The new command structure eliminated one control layer by removing the CONUSA from the chain of command of Active Army forces and from installation management. CONUSA were to concentrate primarily on RC, although they were to continue to plan for mobilization, coordinate support for domestic emergencies and carry out other selected area responsibilities.

With the elimination of the Chief, Office of Reserve Components (CORC) from the General Staff, responsibilities for plans and policies affecting the USAR and ARNG were placed directly on the Chief, Army Reserve and Chief, NGB. The major responsibility for the RC was vested in FORSCOM. The FORSCOM commander was to command all USAR units and be responsible for the readiness of the ARNG, utilizing the three CONUSA, nine Readiness Regions, and twenty-eight Readiness Groups in carrying out its responsibilities.

Overall mobilization planning remained a responsibility for the JCS. Within the Army Staff, ODCSOPS became the principal General Staff element involved in mobilization planning. Detailed planning rested with FORSCOM and CONUSA. Planning for mobilization beyond the call-up of RC appears to have become moribund, in view of the demise of Selective Service and the current "short war" concepts.

In general terms, the reorganization of 1973 divided the

responsibility for training, giving TRADOC jurisdiction over individual training and assigning FORSCOM responsibility for unit training. TRADOC's mission included the development and management of training programs in training centers, most Army schools and the ROTC program. The excepted schools included the Army War College and the US Military Academy, and certain schools giving professional and technical training. TRADOC was also charged with the development of training doctrine and training support for individual training in units. Insofar as possible, TRADOC sought to integrate its training and education functions with its combat developments functions. In carrying out its combat developments functions, TRADOC associated branch schools with combat development agencies. Other former CDC agencies and activities were consolidated into three functional centers--Combined Arms Center, Administration Center and Logistics Center. At HQDA, the Concepts Analysis Agency, responsible to DCSOPS, assumed the responsibility for mid-range and long-range combat development and force concept studies. These served as a framework for TRADOC's near-range work. In the materiel realm, DARCOM continued as the Army's primary developer and was responsible for research, development, testing, acquisition and distribution of most materiel systems.

The basic steps in the Army budget cycle remained much the same through the seventies as they had been since MacNamara introduced the Planning, Programming and Budgeting system. In terms of the flow of funds to installations, the philosophy became to "pass funds through command channels and make the commanders responsible for their control."

#### Objective of the Study

The objective of this study was to provide recommendations to improve the Total Army's(2) CONUS command and control structure to perform missions during peacetime, wartime and throughout the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. The recommended structure should:

1. Assure proper command and control of Army units.
2. Provide for orderly and rapid transition from peacetime to

---

(2) The term "Total Army" is the all-inclusive description for the Army's Active and Reserve Components (the Army National Guard and the Army Reserve).

wartime operations.

3. Appropriately utilize the RC chain of command.
4. Continue to stimulate AC interest in the readiness and training of RC units.
5. Provide for mobilization and deployment planning.
6. Provide the command and control basis for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization.

#### Scope of the Study

The study group examined the CONUS command and control organizations of the Total Army from the HQDA level down to, at least, the brigade level. Additionally, the study group identified many non-organizational issues relating to the Army's capability to successfully make the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. These issues are addressed in Chapters 3 and 7.

#### Assumptions

This study was conducted with two underlying assumptions:

1. The current Major Army Command (MACOM) design(3) (STEADFAST) is sound and will be retained. The type and number of MACOM under HQDA is accepted as the minimum necessary for effective CONUS command and control, and is not a subject for review by ACCS-82. However, MACOM headquarters and their subordinate structures were reviewed for possible elimination of duplication and layering, streamlining, and improvement of the command and control capability to transition from peacetime to wartime operations. Results of this review provide for the transfer of functions between MACOM, or the recommended addition of MACOM with dedicated, continuing pre- and post-mobilization missions (e.g., installation management or RC command).

2. The command and control structure must satisfy mobilization requirements of a short or no-notice conventional conflict in NATO Europe. The RC constitutes the major effort in mobilization and is, for the most part, targeted for NATO. A lesser contingency, followed

---

(3) See page 2-(27) for a description of the current MACOM design.

by a major NATO conflict, is a more effective scenario for the purpose of force sizing. However, the "cold-start" major NATO conflict is considered more traumatic and demanding for the CONUS command and control structure and mobilization base.

#### Constraints

This study was conducted within five constraints:

1. The study addressed only the CONUS command and control structure. This was interpreted to include those headquarters and/or units outside of CONUS for which a CONUS MACOM had command authority (e.g., headquarters in Puerto Rico, for which FORSCOM is responsible, were addressed). The study group considered the design of the CONUS command and control structure as it was influenced by the needs of the overseas commander upon full mobilization.

2. Proposed improvements to the current command and control structure must be evolutionary and accomplished in a manner that minimizes the adverse impact of turbulence.

3. Army National Guard peacetime command and control as prescribed in the U. S. Constitution and Titles 10 and 32 of the U. S. Code was recognized.

4. Changes to designated management headquarters are subject to the provisions of AR 570-8, Army Management Headquarters Activities (AMHA), which implements DOD Dir 5100.73, Department of Defense Management Headquarters. This requires OSD approval of proposed revisions to specified DOD Management Headquarters and Support Activities and to Management Headquarters functions.

5. A short time frame was available to complete the study (nine months).

#### Conduct of the Study

The overall technique for conducting the study is described below:

1. Problem Definition. Available background material reflected serious shortcomings in the Army's CONUS command and control structure, particularly as it related to accommodating the demands of mobilization and deployment. The study group further developed this basic problem area into discrete issues that were addressed in

detail. The study group then developed the CONUS command and control structure which best provided for efficient management and appropriate readiness during peacetime and for effective transition from peacetime to wartime operations.

## 2. Research and Data Collection.

a. Historical Research. The study group examined related command and control studies, using the work that resulted in Operation STEADFAST in 1973, and the CINCUSAREUR OPLAN 4102 Time-Phased Force Deployment List (TPFDL), as the point of departure. This examination included, but was not limited to, the Army Command and Control Master Plan (AC2MP), the December 1977 FORSCOM Command Relationship Study; the April 1978 FORSCOM RC Management Study; the 1976 HQDA Interim Draft Report - Army Force Integration Study (AFIS); and the report of the OSD-sponsored task force that conducted, in 1978, a Review of Guard and Reserve (ROGAR). The rationale within OSD Decision Package Set 059 of 19 November 1977 (as amended) was also addressed. The Army's after-action reports for mobilization exercises, in 1976 and 1978 (MOBEX 76 and MOBEX 78) were examined to identify problem areas involving command and control. Reports of investigations by the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Army Audit Agency (AAA), and the Army Inspector General (TIG) were examined to identify shortfalls in the existing command and control organization. Additionally, the command and control structures for management of the RC of other services (USN, USMC, USAF) were examined. A complete listing of references is contained in Annex I.

b. Selected commanders and key staff members, both past and present, of current organizations were interviewed by the study group to obtain their insights concerning the current structure and alternatives which had been previously considered. Appropriate HQDA staff elements, the CONUS MACOM (with the exception of MDW), the three Continental US Armies (CONUSA), all Army Readiness Regions (ARR), and a comprehensive sampling of the Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC) and General Officer Commands (GOCOM) were visited during this phase of data collection. Selected National Guard Adjutants General (TAG), State Area Command (STARC) Directors, and commanders of major Army National Guard (ARNG) units were interviewed. A complete listing of trips is contained in Annex F.

3. Base Case. The current command and control organization, i.e., the "base case," was defined during the research and data collection effort. Analysis of the base case identified the defi-

ciencies to be resolved.

4. Development of Alternatives. The study group developed alternatives for CONUS command and control to insure wartime effectiveness while striving for maximum peacetime efficiency. The alternatives were formulated to keep organizational turbulence to a minimum, provide for integration of AC and RC forces, and to not unreasonably alter resource requirements. Alternatives were based on streamlining (but not necessarily requiring reduction of resources) of the present Total Army CONUS command and control structure. Each alternative developed which met the general objectives of the study was analyzed and evaluated against a set of measures of effectiveness.

a. From mid-December 1978 through mid-February 1979, all members of the study group provided possible alternative organization descriptions to a group work committee. The work committee examined 36 proposals and assessed their potential for best achieving selected objectives of the study. Additionally, the committee identified discrete features of the proposals for use in developing later alternatives.

b. The work committee, using combinations of the 36 proposals, by selecting desirable discrete features, produced seven alternatives for consideration by the complete study group.

c. The complete study group refined and restructured the alternatives presented by the work committee. The result of this action was the formulation of nine alternative structures.

d. The ACCS-82 Study Advisory Group (SAG) examined the nine structures at its second meeting and recommended that, by eliminating one alternative and combining certain discrete features, ACCS-82 should fully develop seven alternatives for presentation at the initial In-process Review (IPR).

e. As a result of the initial IPR, only four alternatives were retained for complete analysis by ACCS-82.

f. After the feasible alternatives were selected, the resource requirements were determined in detail.

5. Comparison of Alternatives. Each alternative structure that was developed and retained for further study was compared with the

base case and all other retained alternatives. Comparisons were based on quantitative and qualitative measures. The quantitative measures were resource data (funding and manpower). Qualitative measures were more difficult to identify because of the need to subjectively assess which functions were appropriate for each element in the structure, to predict how well the various elements would interact, and to project how well the structure as a whole would be able to perform its missions.

6. Conclusions and Recommendations. The study group developed conclusions based on the analysis of the present structure (base case) and the comparisons of feasible alternatives developed during the study. The manpower and funding requirements developed during the comparison of alternatives are stated in the conclusions of the study. Appropriate recommendations have been made based upon valid findings and conclusions.

7. Preparation of Study Report. A draft report was prepared and staffed with appropriate DA staff agencies and MACOM. Comments received from the staffing action were considered when preparing the final report. Report preparation actions were accomplished in accordance with the milestones contained in the Study Plan at Annex D.

8. Phasing and Milestones.

a. The Study was conducted in five phases. Each phase was based on the primary study activity occurring during that period, although some activities occurred during more than one phase. The five phases and a summary of principal activities were:

(1) Developmental. (13 Nov 78-15 Dec 78) Organization of study group, development of study plan, and initiation of data collection and research on the base case.

(2) Base Case Definition. (16 Dec 78-31 Jan 79) Establish, analyze, and evaluate current command and control structure (existing model) and begin development of alternative structures.

(3) Development of Alternatives. (1 Feb 79-31 Mar 79) Develop and analyze alternative structures. Select feasible alternatives.

(4) Comparison of Alternatives. (1-13 May 79) Refine, evaluate and compare feasible alternatives; develop findings, conclusions and recommendations.

(5) Final Report and Implementation. (14 May-31 July 79) Prepare and staff study group report; prepare plan to implement approved recommendations.

b. Major Milestones were:

- (1) Study Plan to Director of Management - 8 Dec 78.
- (2) SAG Meetings - 8 Jan, 21 Mar and 1 Jun 79.
- (3) IPR - 27 Mar and 12 Jun 79.
- (4) Draft Report to Army staff and MACOM for review - 15 Jun 79.

9. Control Measures.

a. Three SAG and two IPR meetings were conducted at key points during the study process. Each IPR was preceded by a SAG meeting. The initial SAG and IPR meetings were held on 8 January 1979 and 27 March 1979, respectively. Records (minutes) of the SAG and IPR meetings are at Volume III Annex G.

b. SAG membership was at the O-6 level and IPR membership was the directorate level, with representation as shown below.



	<u>IPR</u>	<u>SAG</u>
DAS or VCSA	X	
Management Directorate	X	X
ODCSOPS	X	X
ODCSPER	X	X
ODCSLOG	X	X
OACSAC	X	X
OACSI	X	X
NGB	X	X
OCAR	X	X
OCE	X	X
OTSG	X	X
OTAG	X	X
OCA	X	X
FORSCOM	X	X
TRADOC	X	X
DARCOM	X	X
ACC	X	X
HSC	X	X
INSCOM	X	X
OSD (MRA&L)            (selected meetings)		X
ASA (M&RA)	X	X
ASA (IL&FM)	X	X
PAED	X	X
AAA	(observer)	

10. Implementation. The study group developed an implementation plan, in budget level detail, for the recommended command and control reorganization. The plan is evolutionary and includes a proposed reorganization schedule. A residual element from the ACCS-82 study group, of a size to be determined, will be necessary to manage the implementation of the approved action, at least until HQDA directives are issued to the affected MACOM.

#### Evaluation

The methodology described below was used to evaluate the existing structure and each of the feasible alternatives.

1. The sequence for evaluating the alternatives was:

- a. Development of effectiveness criteria and measures.
- b. Scenario analysis.

c. Assessment of effectiveness.

d. Sensitivity analyses.

Finally, resource requirements and other issues were derived from the analyses of the various alternatives.

2. Development of effectiveness criteria and measures. The objectives of the study (see page 1-19) were used as the basis for evaluating the effectiveness of CONUS command and control organizations. The assessment employed a hierarchy of evaluations ranging from broad to specific factors. The evaluations were: single effectiveness score (broad), effectiveness criteria (intermediate) and effectiveness measure (specific). The detailed evaluation measures, developed from the six basic study objectives, are displayed in Tables II and III, Volume III, Annex D.

3. Scenario Analysis. The key assumption that defines a scenario to evaluate the command and control structure is the condition of a short, or no-notice, conventional conflict in NATO Europe. This scenario places the most demands on the CONUS command and control structure. An appropriate plan and its derivatives were used to analyze the peacetime mobilization and post-mobilization capabilities of the base case and proposed alternatives. For the base case and each alternative, the performance of the command and control organization was analyzed in detail. This was done by specifically addressing each of the measurement elements of the effectiveness criteria, previously defined, against the base case and each alternative.

4. Effectiveness Assessment. A modification of the "Delphi technique" was used to assess the worth of each effectiveness criteria. The modified Delphi technique has been used in other studies.<sup>(4)</sup> This technique is used to develop an evaluation consensus from individual subjective assessments by a panel of personnel experienced in the subject under study. For this study, panels were formed from the complete ACCS-82 Study Group, the DA staff and FORSCOM. Individual assessments were made, after discussions were held, to insure that participants thoroughly understood the analysis and

---

(4) For example, US Department of the Army, A Study of Resource Management on the Army Staff, Final Report, Washington, DC, 14 July 1978.

the specifics of those qualitative and quantitative factors applicable to the base case and to each of the proposed alternatives. Scoring rules were developed for a range of zero ("very poor") to ten ("very good"). Relative weighting of the effectiveness factors was applied as the scores were aggregated to the next-higher level of evaluation (e.g., weighting was applied to effectiveness measures as they were aggregated to effectiveness criteria). The relative weighting of aggregated measures remained the same for each alternative considered, even though the absolute scores (zero to ten) varied. Details of the modified Delphi approach, such as weighting and group scoring rules, are presented in Annex D.

5. Sensitivity Analysis. The alternatives that were retained for detailed study contained various discrete features. These are described and summarized in Chapter 4. The effects that accrued by the application of a discrete feature were explored by applying that feature to each alternative. Each feature was applied singularly and in combination with other discrete features. Variations in assumptions and judgmental decisions made during the analysis were examined to determine their impact on the individual conclusions. Also, the impact of variations within the relative weighting factors were examined and several alternative weighting schemes were considered. The selection of weighting schemes was done by utilizing "off mean" determinations to explore the boundary conditions of the scoring technique.

6. Resource Requirements. For each alternative retained for detailed study, the resources of manpower, dollars, major items of equipment and other one-time costs were examined as incremental changes from the existing structure. The examinations were made in terms of recurring costs (manpower and dollars) and the one-time costs associated with implementing each alternative. Manpower and costs associated with the existing structure were defined to provide the basis for comparison of alternative structures.

7. Additional Issues. The study group considered a wide range of potential issues, both real and perceived, associated with implementing its recommendations. These ranged from consideration of the potential effects on RC and AC career progression inherent in a given alternative, to potential environmental and community impacts of establishment, elimination or relocation of headquarters.

#### Consideration of Ongoing Studies and Actions

The study group recognized other studies and actions in progress during the course of the study. Where appropriate, emerging results of studies and actions being implemented during the study were included during the group's deliberations. Studies and ongoing actions that were considered are listed in Volume III, Annex H.

## CHAPTER 2

### DESCRIPTION OF EXISTING STRUCTURE

#### Department of Defense

The President exercises his constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the United States through the Department of Defense (DOD). All functions of the DOD and its component agencies are performed under the direction, authority and control of the Secretary of Defense (SecDef).(1) The DOD includes the Office of the SecDef (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), the military departments and the military services within those departments, the unified(2) and specified(3) commands and such other agencies as the SecDef establishes to meet specific requirements.

#### Military Departments and Services

The chain of command for purposes other than the operational direction of unified and specified commands runs from the President to the SecDef to the Secretaries of the military departments. The military departments, under their respective Secretaries, perform the following functions:

1. Prepare forces and establish reserves of equipment and supplies for the effective prosecution of war, and plan for the expansion of peacetime components to meet the needs of war.(4)

- 
- (1) See AR 10-1 and DOD Directive 5100.1 for the functions of the DOD and its major components.
  - (2) The US European Command (USEUCOM), for example, is a unified command.
  - (3) The Strategic Air Command (SAC), for example, is a specified command.
  - (4) Title 10 of the United States Code (10 USC) provides the legal basis for mobilization of reserve forces. See, for example, Section 672 for mobilization of Ready, Standby, and Retired Reserve; Section 673 for Presidential authority for mobilization of the Ready Reserve, or a selected portion thereof (50,000 members for not more than 90 days); Section 674 which pertains to mobilization of the Standby Reserve and Section 3500 for mobilization of the Army National Guard.

2. Maintain in readiness mobile reserve forces, properly organized, trained and equipped for employment in emergency.

3. Provide adequate, timely and reliable departmental intelligence for use within the DOD.

4. Organize, train and equip forces for assignment to unified or specified commands.

5. Recommend to the SecDef appropriate logistic guidance for their respective military departments which, if implemented, will result in logistic readiness consistent with the approved strategic guidance, and verify the continuing adequacy of the approved logistic guidance and the resources available to their respective military departments.

6. Prepare and submit to the SecDef budgets for their respective departments; justify before the Congress budget requests as approved by the SecDef and administer the funds made available for maintaining, equipping and training the forces of their respective departments, including those assigned to unified and specified commands. The budget submissions to the SecDef by the military departments shall be prepared on the basis, among other things, of the advice of commanders of forces assigned to unified and specified commands. Such advice, in the case of component commanders of unified commands,(5) will be in agreement with the plans and programs of the respective unified commanders.

7. Conduct research, develop tactics, techniques and organization, and develop and procure weapons, equipment and supplies essential to the fulfillment of the functions hereinafter assigned.

8. Develop, garrison, supply, equip and maintain bases and other installations, including lines of communication, and provide administrative and logistical support for all forces and bases.

9. Provide, as directed, such forces, military missions, and detachments for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interest of the United States.

---

(5) For example, the Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Europe (CINCUSAREUR) is the Army's component commander of the US European Command (USEUCOM), a unified command.

10. Assist in training and equipping the military forces of foreign nations.

11. Assist each other in the accomplishment of their respective functions, including the provision of personnel, intelligence, training, facilities, equipment, supplies and services.

The forces developed and trained to perform the primary functions shall be employed to support and supplement the other Services in carrying out their primary functions, where and whenever such participation will result in increased effectiveness and will contribute to the accomplishment of the overall military objectives. As for collateral functions, while the assignment of such functions may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements.

#### Department of the Army(6)

The Department of the Army is responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war. The Army, within the Department of the Army, includes land combat and service forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein.

Section 3062(a) of Title 10 United States Code states, in part, "It is the intent of Congress to provide an Army that is capable, in conjunction with the other armed forces, of -

(1) Preserving the peace and security, and providing for the defense of the United States, the territories, the commonwealths, and possessions, and any other areas occupied by the United States . . ."

The Department of the Army performs the following functions:

1. To organize, train, and equip Army forces for the conduct of prompt and sustained combat operations on land; specifically, forces

---

(6) See AR 10-5 for a more detailed description of the Department of the Army (DA) and, specifically, for a description of the Headquarters, DA (HQDA).

to defeat enemy land forces and to seize, occupy and defend land area.

2. To organize, train and equip Army air defense units, including the provision of Army forces as required for the defense of the United States against air attack, in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS.

3. To organize and equip, in accordance with the other Services, and to provide Army forces for joint amphibious and airborne operations, and to provide for the training of such forces, in accordance with doctrines established by the JCS.

a. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, doctrines, tactics, techniques, and equipment of interest to the Army for amphibious operations and not provided for by the Navy or the Marine Corps.

b. To develop, in coordination with the other Services, the doctrines, procedures, and equipment employed by Army and Marine Forces in airborne operations. The Army shall have primary interest in the development of those airborne doctrines, procedures and equipment which are of common interest to the Army and the Marine Corps.

4. To provide an organization capable of furnishing adequate, timely and reliable intelligence for the Army.

5. To provide forces for the occupation of territories abroad, to include initial establishment of military government pending transfer of this responsibility to other authority.

6. To formulate doctrines and procedures for the organizing, equipping, training and employment of forces operating on land, except that the formulation of doctrines and procedures for the organization, equipping, training and employment of Marine Corps units for amphibious operations shall be a function of the Department of the Navy.

7. To conduct the following activities:

a. The administration and operation of the Panama Canal.

b. The authorized civil works program, including projects for improvements of navigation, flood control, beach erosion control,



and other water resource developments in the United States, its territories and its possessions.


c. Certain other civil activities prescribed by law.

As a collateral function, the Army is charged to train forces to interdict enemy sea and air power and communications through operations on or from land. As was noted earlier, while this function may establish further justification for stated force requirements, such assignment shall not be used as the basis for establishing additional force requirements.

The organizational structure of the DA is shown below.

Figure 2-1

Organization of the Department of the Army



As was stated in Chapter 1, the focus of ACCS-82 was on, and at levels below, the Major Army Commands (MACOM) shown in Figure 2-1. Before discussing those commands, however, it is appropriate to describe the DA management of its Reserve Components (RC).

#### Management of the Reserve Components(7)

The Army Reserve Forces Policy Committee (ARFPC), composed of five members each from the Active Army, Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR), provides advice to the Secretary of the Army. This committee, and the Assistant Secretary for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, parallels the RC management practices of the DOD and the other Services. The HQDA relationship with the ARNG elements, elaborated below, also parallels the relationships within the Department of the Air Force.

The Chief, Army Reserve, a USAR Major General on an active duty tour, is a member of the HQDA staff; he does not command or control USAR units or individuals. The HQDA relationship with USAR elements will be elaborated below. All USAR units are assigned to US Army Forces Command, which is also described below. The Reserve Component Personnel and Administrative Center (RCPAC), which controls all USAR personnel not assigned to units, is controlled by the Adjutant General (TAG) of the Army: the TAG operates under the staff supervision of the Army's Deputy Chief of Staff Personnel (DCSPER).

Management of the Reserve Components of the other services vary from triple-hatting in the Navy with the Chief, Naval Reserves also serving as the Director, Naval Reserve, and Commander, Naval Reserve Air Forces; to the Marine Corps' RC units being commanded by active Marine officers through the Colonel level of command. Each service is discussed below.

1. The Chief, Naval Reserve, an Active Navy Vice Admiral, is "triple-hatted." He serves on the staff at HQ US Navy and is the Director, Naval Reserve and is the commander, Naval Reserve Air Forces. In these three capacities, this individual commands and controls all Naval Surface Reserve and Surface Support Facilities, all Naval Air Reserve Forces and all Naval Air Stations, Facilities,

---

(7) This section draws heavily on DOD Study Draft "Management of the Reserve Components," 17 April 1978, and oral briefings presented to ACCS-82 by the other Services during the conduct of the study.

Training Units and Combat Support Units. The Naval Reserve Ships and Crafts are commanded by the Commanders-in-Chief of the Atlantic and Pacific Fleets (CINCLANTFLT and CINCPACFLT). The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Manpower, Personnel, & Training) controls the Naval Military Personnel Center which, in turn, controls the Naval Reserve Personnel Center.

2. The Chief, Air Force Reserve, a USAF Major General on active duty, is "dual-hatted." He serves on the staff at HQ US Air Force and controls the Air Reserve Personnel Center and the HQ Air Force Reserve (HQ USAFR). The HQ USAFR commands three Reserve Air Forces (4th, 10th and 14th) which, in turn, command all US Air force Reserve units.

3. The US Marine Corps (USMC) Deputy Chief of Staff, Reserve Affairs, an Active Marine Corps Major General, is "dual-hatted." He serves on the staff at HQ USMC and controls the USMC Reserve Records Center. All USMC Reserve units are assigned to either the 4th Marine Division, the 4th Marine Air Wing or the 4th Service Support Group, all of which report directly to HQ USMC. Active Marine officers command all USMC and USMCR units authorized a Colonel, or higher ranking, commander.

#### Army National Guard Structure

The US Constitution provides that the raising and training of the militia is reserved to the States.(8) The term "National Guard" is a lineal descendant of the term "militia." This term was first used in America in 1824 by a New York militia unit to honor Marquis de Lafayette, a visiting famous French officer. The battalion from which the honor guard was selected was renamed "the Battalion of National Guards" in tribute to Lafayette's command of the Garde Nationale of the French Army in Paris during 1789.(9)

Upon passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 (NDA-1916), the term "National Guard" became the official name of America's organized militia, and its organizational structure was made to conform to that of the Regular Army. The Army National Guard traces its origin back

---

(8) U.S., The Constitution of the United States of America, Clause 16, Section 8, Article I.

(9) LTC Sol Gordon, USAF (Ret) and MAJ Clint Tennill, Jr., ARNG,  
(cont'd on next page)

to the militia ("minutemen") of 1636. Early units of the militia fought with the British during the French and Indian War and later against the British in the Battle for Independence.

While its Federal reserve potential has been strengthened, the National Guard of each State remains constitutionally a State-administered military force. The State mission is to provide protection of life and property and preserve peace, order and public safety. The Federal mission is to provide units with trained personnel and sufficient and suitable equipment, capable and ready for mobilization in time of war or national emergency to support the Active Army and Air Force. Since 1947, the National Guard structure has consisted of both the Army and Air National Guard. The Army National Guard of the United States and the Air National Guard of the United States are Reserve Components of the Army and Air Force respectively. Members of these forces are not in active Federal service, except when ordered thereto in accordance with law, or called to active Federal service in their status as members of the National Guard. When not in active Federal service, these members are administered, armed, equipped and trained in their status as members of the National Guard of the several States.(10)

The Governor of each State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands is the commander and chief of all National Guard units not in active Federal service within the respective jurisdiction. Command is normally exercised by the Adjutant General or other designated military official of the State, Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or the Virgin Islands. The President of the United States is the Commander in Chief of the National Guard of the District of Columbia. Command is exercised through the Secretary of Defense and the Commanding General of the District of Columbia National Guard as provided in Executive Order No. 11485, 1 October 1969 (34 FR 15411).

1. National Guard Bureau (NGB).(11) Following the establishment of the Federal Government in 1792, the militia remained under complete States' control until enactment of the Dick Bill in 1903. This congressional action caused the Federal Government to be responsible for the supervision of training, equipment and pay of the National

---

National Guard Almanac (5th ed.; Washington: Uniformed Services Almanac, Inc., 1979), p. 55.

(10) National Guard Bureau, Fact Sheet (Number 101-76, April 1976).


(11) See AR 130-5 for the organization and functions of the National Guard Bureau.

Guard. Due to the administrative burden placed upon the, then, War Department, an agency was created in 1908 to administer militia affairs. After the NDA-1916, the Division of Militia was redesignated the Militia Bureau and in 1933 the name changed to the National Guard Bureau. During 1916, the antecedent unit of the present-day Air National Guard was formed with separate status as a component later established by the National Security Act of 1947. With the formation of separate components, the NGB continued to be a Bureau of the Department of the Army, and became an agency of the Department of the Air Force. The Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 designated the NGB as a Joint Bureau of the Departments of the Army and Air Force.

a. The mission of the NGB is to participate with the Army and Air Force staffs in the formulation, development and coordination of all programs, policies, principles, concepts and plans pertaining to or affecting the National Guard. NGB develops and administers the detailed operating programs that are required for the operation of the Army National Guard and the Air National Guard, based on programs, policies and guidance from the Department of the Army and the Department of the Air Force. The NGB participates with and assists the States, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands in the organization, maintenance and operation of the National Guard units thereto so as to provide trained and equipped units capable of immediate expansion to wartime strength, and available for service in time of war or national emergency to augment the Active Army and Air Force.

b. The NGB is both a staff and operating agency. The Chief, NGB reports through the Chief of Staff Army, and through the Chief of Staff Air Force to the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force respectively and is the principle staff advisor on National Guard affairs. As an operating agency, the NGB is the channel of communication between the States and the Department of the Army and Air Force. Figure 2-2 shows these relationships.


Figure 2-2  
National Guard Management Structure



c. The NGB does not have command authority. In peacetime, National Guard units are under the command of the Governors of the States. However, the Army and Air Force Chiefs of Staff and the Chief of NGB do exercise control over the National Guard. This is accomplished through inspections and training supervision exercised by the active services, by the authority to withdraw federal recognition of units performing unsatisfactorily, through the allocation of financial and logistical support to units of the National Guard, and through the authority of the Chief, NGB to develop and publish regulations governing the National Guard when not in federal service.

d. The organizational structure of the NGB reflects its unique joint status. As shown in the Figure 2-3, the Chief, NGB has two principal assistants: the Director of the Army National Guard and the Director of the Air National Guard.

Figure 2-3  
National Guard Bureau



Seven joint offices, Administrative Services, Human Resources, Legal Advisor, Military Support, Policy and Liaison, Technician Personnel and Public Affairs advise and assist the Chief, NGB on both Army and Air matters.

e. The major functions of the NGB are to:

(1) Administer approved departmental policies, directives, regulations and agreements pertaining to the National Guard (except for training directives covered in (2) below).

(2) Submit recommendations to the appropriate Department concerning the training of the National Guard and promulgates approved training directives.

(3) Prepare and justify, as appropriate, estimates of Federal funds necessary for the support of the National Guard. Administers approved financial programs established by the Departments for the National Guard, maintains necessary fiscal control to accomplish this function.

(4) Perform administrative functions pertaining to the acquisition, supply, maintenance and accountability of Federal property issued to the National Guard in accordance with departmental policies and regulations pertaining thereto.

(5) Extend and withdraw Federal recognition of officers and units of the National Guard pursuant to the law and standards of the respective Departments.

(6) Assist the several States in matters pertaining to the National Guard.

(7) Maintain the office of record for Department of the Army with respect to matters relating to the Army National Guard not in active Federal service, and performs a similar function for the Department of the Air Force with respect to the Air National Guard not in active Federal service. Establish procedures to insure the maintenance of necessary basic data concerning the history and operations of the National Guard.

(8) Perform such other functions as may be prescribed by the Secretary of the Army or the Secretary of the Air Force.

f. The Chief, NGB is appointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, from a list of National Guard officers recommended by their respective Governors. He is appointed for a four-year term and he may succeed himself. The grade authorized for the position is lieutenant general.

g. The Secretary of the Army appoints the Director, Army National Guard from a list of officers of the active National Guard recommended by their respective Governors and the Chief, NGB. His term of office is four (4) years and he may succeed himself. The grade authorized for the position is major general.

h. The Secretary of the Army appoints the Deputy Director, Army National Guard utilizing the same procedures as specified for



the Director of the Army National Guard. The Grade authorized is brigadier general.

2. State Adjutants General. Federal Law (32 U.S.C. 314(a)) requires each State and territory, Puerto Rico, the Canal Zone and the District of Columbia to have an adjutant general. His duties are prescribed by the laws of that jurisdiction. The exact title of the individual depends upon the laws of the local jurisdiction. For example, his title is Chief of Staff to the Governor in New Jersey and New York; and his title is Commanding General in California, Rhode Island, and the District of Columbia. In most instances the Adjutant General is appointed by the Governor. In one State (South Carolina) the office of Adjutant General is elective (general electorate), in another (Vermont), selection is by an election in the State legislature; in the District of Columbia and Virgin Islands, the position is appointed by the President of the United States. The Adjutant General heads the State Military Department which may be an independent department or a subordinate element of another department such as a Department of Public Safety or Defense. The Adjutant General is required by law (32 U.S.C. 314(d)) to furnish such reports as may be required by the Secretaries of the Army and Air Force. He is also charged, under 32 U.S.C. 709 (c) with the administration of the National Guard technician program. In addition, he performs such other duties as may be required by State constitution and laws, and directives of the Commander-in-Chief (i.e., Governors, The President or the SecDef, as appropriate). Those Adjutants General who meet the criteria established by Federal law and regulations may be federally recognized in the grade to which they are appointed under local law, not above major general, except in the Virgin Islands, where the grade may not be above brigadier general.(12)

3. State Area Command (STARC). As defined in AR 135-300, a STARC is a mobilization entity within the ARNG State headquarters and headquarters detachment that is ordered to active duty when ARNG units in that State are alerted for mobilization. It provides for command and control of mobilized ARNGUS units from home station until arrival at mobilization station. It is also responsible for planning and executing military support for civil defense and land defense plans under the respective area commander.

a. The principal references establishing the STARC, its

---

(12) National Guard Bureau, Fact Sheet (Number 109-76, November 1976).

mission and responsibilities are:

(1) AR 135-300, Mobilization of Reserve Component Units and Individuals, 15 May 1978.

(2) FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan, 6 Feb 78.

(3) NGB letter to all State Adjutants General, subject: Revision of State HHD TDA -- State Area Command (STARC), 17 May 1978.

(4) NGR 10-2, State Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, Army National Guard, 5 April 1976.

b. The official directive establishing the STARC was the 17 May 1978 NGB letter to all States. This letter provided guidance for the development of the STARC mobilization Table of Distribution and Allowance (TDA). Guidance permitted each State to develop its STARC to adequately manage its unique State and Federal missions. The broad functional areas were defined, but the exact numbers and types of personnel were determined by State requirements and troop density.

c. Pre-mobilization responsibilities:

(1) The commander, STARC serves as the executive agent for the State Adjutant General on all matters pertaining to mobilization.

(2) Organize, train and prepare for activation of the STARC to accomplish its mobilization missions.

(3) Each State has a Plans, Operations and Military Support Officer (technician position) in the technician manning document. This position is compatible with the requirement for mobilization planning for the STARC.

(4) Prepare a mobilization plan following the standard format of the basic FORSCOM mobilization plan.

(5) Mobilization planning by the STARC includes the mobilization plans of the State's ARNG units to insure that plans are complete, updated and exercised.

(6) Pre-attack planning for Land Special Security Force (LSSF) and Military Support to Civil Defense (MSCD) must be conducted.

(7) Prepares and publishes training and coordination instructions for planning LSSF, MSCD, war or other mobilization missions.

(8) Conducts tests of unit alert and mobilization plans. AR 135-300 requires Area Commanders and State Adjutants General to insure that each mobilization entity periodically conducts tests of its mobilization and alert plans for completeness and accuracy. An annual alert test is specified by the FORSCOM Reserve Component Mobilization Plan (RCMP).

(9) For State responsibilities, the STARC commands, controls and supervises units employed in support of civil authorities in the protection of life and property and the preservation of peace, order and public safety under competent orders of State authorities.

d. Post-mobilization responsibilities:

(1) Exercises OPCON over mobilized ARNG units. Continues to coordinate with and be responsive to The Adjutant General on all aspects related to mobilization.

(2) Reports directly to respective CONUSA Commander.

(3) Provides required support and implementing instructions to mobilized ARNG units to accomplish required administrative, logistical and personnel processing from time of alert to arrival at mobilization station.

(4) Responsible for movement of mobilized units from home station to mobilization station, or from home station to port of embarkation.

(5) Coordinates the submission of reports to mobilization stations and other headquarters as required for all mobilized units.

(6) Coordinates with United States Property and Fiscal

Officer (USPFO) and State Maintenance Officer the logistical support requirements for mobilized units.

(7) Assists units with dependent processing.

(8) Exercises operational employment over units of all services in joint operations supporting LSSF and MSCD missions.

(9) Responsible for cross-leveling personnel and equipment in accordance with existing directives.

(10) Provides for 24-hour operations during periods of emergency and until the situation no longer requires it.

(11) Is the channel of communications between mobilized units and CONUSA, Mobilization Stations (MS), Support Installations (SI), and Coordinating Installations (CI).

(12) Integrates and assigns personnel activated from the inactive ARNG.

(13) Responsible for post attack damage assessment.

(14) Supports post mobilization training being conducted at home stations as appropriate.

4. National Guard Technicians.(13) These technicians, as federal employees, provide the day-to-day continuity in the operation and training of the Army and the Air National Guard. Originally classified as state employees paid from federal funds, technicians were allocated to the several States, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, and the District of Columbia for administration, management and supervision by the State Adjutants General. Technicians were then, and continue to be, allocated primarily in support of particular weapons systems and National Guard units federally recognized within each state.

In 1968, the President signed into law The National Guard Technician Act of 1968, Public Law 90-486. This legislation provided for the conversion of all National Guard technicians to federal employees' status on 1 January 1969. Technicians became employees of the

---

(13) National Guard Bureau, Fact Sheet (Number 110-77, November 1977).

Department of the Army or Department of the Air Force as appropriate. The administration of the program was retained by the State Adjutants General through the Chief, National Guard Bureau. Technicians acquired the same rights, privileges and benefits as other federal employees with a few unique exceptions provided in the law. Recognizing the need to continue the emphasis on the National Guard as primarily a military organization, Congress provided in the legislation that technicians, except those five percent designated as non-dual status: (1) must be members of the National Guard as a condition of civilian employment; (2) must be promptly separated from technician employment upon loss of such membership in the National Guard; (3) compensatory time is authorized in lieu of overtime pay because of the irregular hours of duty technicians are required to work; (4) and, most important, (5) recognizing the state characteristics of the National Guard, the administration and management of technicians would continue, by law, to be the responsibility of the State Adjutants General. The National Guard Bureau, as a federal activity, continues to be the appropriate channel of communication between the Departments of the Army and the Air Force and the states concerned on all National Guard matters.

Today's National Guard technicians include: an Administrative Supply Technician (AST) for every company sized unit; a Command Administrative Assistant (CAA) for battalion size and higher headquarters; full time mechanics and maintenance technicians for Organizational Maintenance Shops (OMS); and at the state level, the employees of the U.S. Property and Fiscal Officer (USP&FO), the staff administrative, supply and training personnel of the Adjutant General's Office, and those technicians assigned to the sections for Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA).

All technician positions are classified in accordance with U.S. Civil Service standards based on the duties and responsibilities required of incumbents to perform the federal mission. Position descriptions, although similar to those of other federal employees are unique in that they identify many of the diverse duties technicians must perform within the military organization to which assigned, including military membership qualifications and requirements. The positions are designed to relate to specific military functions in compliance with the technician legislation, which states that the concept of the technician program is that the technician will serve concurrently in three different ways: (a) perform full-time civilian work in their units; (b) perform military training and duty in their units; and

(c) be available to enter active federal service at any time their units are called. The salaries for technicians are paid in accordance with the appropriate grade on the General Schedule or area wage schedule, as with other federal civilian employees, and the laws and regulations governing pay of civilian employees are applied in the technician program.

As new procedures, weapon systems or other developments continue to occur, the technician program is continually updated to assure that there are technicians trained and capable of maintaining the operational readiness of the National Guard. In cooperation with the military technical training activities and other agencies, technicians receive the necessary formal or on-the-job training along with other National Guard personnel to assure the continuity of operations and training.

Additionally, The National Guard Professional Education Center located at Camp Robinson, Little Rock, Arkansas, has been established to provide technician training unique to the National Guard and which cannot be provided by any other source. This, along with the continuous on-the-job proficiency training required of all personnel, will continue to provide current and future resources capable of performing the military mission assigned to the National Guard. As the primary workforce for the day-to-day operations and training of the National Guard, the technician program has been developed with the objective of providing operationally-ready units to support the Army and the Air Force now and immediately upon mobilization.

#### United States Army Reserve (USAR)

1. The mission of the USAR is to meet HQDA mobilization requirements:

a. In accordance with DA mobilization plans, units will be provided that are of prescribed strength, that are in a proper state of training, and that have sufficient equipment to be deployed, or to support mobilization requirements with a minimum of post mobilization training time.

b. By providing trained individual officer, warrant officer and enlisted reinforcements to replace unit losses, provide fillers for deploying units, and provide personnel for activating AUS units.

2. The USAR is a statutory Federal force comprised of three categories of individuals - the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve and the Retired Reserve.

a. The Ready Reserve consists of USAR Troop Program Units (TPU), which are organized and manned in accordance with standard Army TO&E and TDA, and the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR), which are individuals that are not assigned to TPU but belonging to the USAR due to a statutory obligation or for personal preference.

b. The Standby Reserve consists of the Standby Control Group and the Inactive Control Group. The Standby Control Group consists of the active members of the Standby Reserve and the Inactive Control Group consists of members of the Standby Reserve on the inactive status list. Standby Reservists may be assigned to the Inactive Control Group for a period of up to three years while reaching a personal decision on whether he desires to return to active status in the Ready Reserve, transfer to the Retired Reserve (if qualified) or discharge.

c. The Retired Reserve consists of individuals who have completed the period of service required for retirement, have voluntarily requested such assignment and are otherwise eligible.

3. The USAR force structure consists of 3250 USAR units. All Army branches are represented in this force. The USAR chain of command for this force consists of 44 Major US Army Reserve Commands (MUSARC), 17 General Officer Command (GOCOM) and 82 group headquarters. A MUSARC is an ARCOM or GOCOM directly subordinate to a CONUSA. GOCOM MUSARC consist of Training Divisions, Maneuver Area Commands (MAC), composite and functional headquarters. Non-MUSARC GOCOM consists of separate combat brigade headquarters and functional headquarters.

4. Command channels for the Ready Reserve are:

a. CONUS: CG FORSCOM, CG CONUS Army, and USAR command structure.

b. OCONUS: OCONUS area commander, appropriate Army component commander and USAR command structure.

c. Nonunit personnel (except as indicated in d, e, and f

below): CDR Reserve Components Personnel and Administration Center (RCPAC).

- d. Mobilization designees: MOBDES proponent agency and RCPAC.
- e. Control group (ROTC): CG, TRADOC, and CDR, ROTC Region.
- f. Control Group (Delayed Entry): CG USAREC.
- g. US Army Administrative Support Detachment (RCPAC AUG): CG, RCPAC, and The Adjutant General.
- h. Selective Service elements: Director of Selective Service.
- i. Reinforcement training units (RTU): Active component headquarters to which assigned.

5. Responsibilities of these commanders are:

a. CG FORSCOM commands the CONUSA, all assigned USAR troop program units (except Selective Service (USAR AUG) and US Army Administrative Support Detachments (RCPAC AUG), RTUs, and MOBDES detachments) in CONUS, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Alaska, (including Johnston Island and Guam), the Virgin Islands, and the Canal Zone. CG FORSCOM also is responsible for the training of non-unit personnel (other than MOBDES) when ordered to ADT or AT within CONUS.

b. CG TRADOC is responsible for individual training and schooling, training support of USAR schools, management of the Army ROTC program, and control of the ROTC Control Group.

c. CG RCPAC, in consonance with policies and guidance furnished by HQDA, exercise command and control over all IRR members, including those assigned to RTU and the RCPAC AUG GP. CG RCPAC is also responsible for the OPMS-USAR and EPMS-USAR.

6. Area commanders of USAR units:

- a. Area commands having USAR command responsibility include:
  - (1) Each CONUS Army.



- (2) US Army Europe and Seventh Army.
- (3) 172d Infantry Brigade, Alaska.
- (4) US Army Western Area Command.
- (5) 193d Infantry Brigade, Canal Zone, PR.
- (6) Each ARCOM (See paragraph e below).

b. Area commanders command USAR troop program units, RTU, and MOBDES detachments within their area of jurisdiction, except that the US Army Element Selective Service System Organization (USAR AUG) is commanded by the Director of Selective Service. The US Army Administrative Support Detachment (RCPAC AUG) is under the command of RCPAC.

c. Where organic elements of a TOE unit are located in more than one area of command, the area commander who commands the headquarters element of that unit will also command the subordinate elements unless otherwise directed by HQDA. CG FORSCOM will direct the administration, support, and supervision of IDT.

d. Oversea area commanders command USAR units in their area in accordance with applicable regulations pertaining to the USAR and any Status of Forces Agreements between the United States and the foreign government.

e. ARCOM commanders' areas of command are as follows:

(1) Except as indicated in (2) below, ARCOM commanders command all USAR troop program units (except Selective Service detachments) and attached individuals, RTU, and MOBDES detachments within their geographic area of responsibility, and assigned area maintenance support activities. ARCOM boundaries are prescribed by, and will not be modified without specific approval of HQDA.

(2) Units within an ARCOM area, but not commanded by that ARCOM, include units assigned directly by a GOCOM which is not assigned to that ARCOM, or to another TOE headquarters recognized under c above.

7. Chief, Army Reserve. The Chief, Army Reserve (CAR) is the

adviser to the Chief of Staff on Army Reserve matters. The CAR has responsibility for all matters pertaining to the development and maintenance of the Army Reserve. A summary of major USAR activities shows that the CAR -

a. Participates with other Army Staff agencies in the formulation and development of Department of the Army policies, programs, and actions affecting the Army Reserve.

b. Advises all other elements of the Army Staff on Army Reserve matters.

c. Exercises staff supervision as to timeliness and adequacy of implementation and execution of approved plans, policies, and programs pertaining to the Army Reserve.

d. Is the Budget Program and Appropriations Director of RPA, OMAR, and MCAR.

e. Is the Program Element Director of the USAR portion of Major Program 5 of the FYDP.

f. Is responsible for development and maintenance of Annex II, USAR Unit Allocation of the Reserve Component Troop Basis of the Army.

g. Directs, relocations, activations, reorganizations, redesignations, and inactivations of all USAR units within CONUS and the oversea commands. Allocates USAR units to communities in accordance with DOD directives.

h. Assists in the development of and recommends policy and plans for mobilization and demobilization, to include procedures and priorities for ordering USAR units to active duty.

i. Recommends policies in coordination with ODCSOPS and ODCSPER, standards for training US Army Reserve Troop Program units and unit members, and members of the Individual Ready Reserve.

j. Assists in program development and selection of USAR units and individuals for OCONUS training programs.

k. Assists in development and planning of USAR force require-

ments.

l. Recommends changes to the DA Master Priority List (DAMPL), and audits and reviews all USAR MTOE/TDA.


m. Programs and distributes funds in accordance with priorities established by HQDA, in support of the affiliation program.

n. Establishes policy, priorities, and plans pertaining to requirements, site selection, construction, and use of facilities for the USAR.

o. Establishes programming and budgeting for the USAR Technician Program.

p. Develops plans, programs, and in conjunction with ODCSPER, policies relative to procurement of USAR officers for active duty in a statutory tour and Special Active Duty for Training status.

8. The organizational structure of Chief, Army Reserve is shown below.



### Major Army Commands (MACOM)

There are fourteen MACOM commanders who report directly to the Chief of Staff, Army. Ten of these MACOM headquarters are located in CONUS even though several of them have a worldwide functional mission. MACOM headquartered in CONUS include:

1. Army Communications Command.
2. Criminal Investigation Command.
3. Corps of Engineers.
4. Forces Command.
5. Health Services Command.
6. Intelligence and Security Command.
7. Materiel Development and Readiness Command.
8. Military District of Washington.
9. Military Traffic Management Command.
10. Training and Doctrine Command.

Each of these MACOM's missions, as they pertain to CONUS command and control, will be discussed in subsequent paragraphs.

### United States Army Communications Command (USACC)

The USACC is responsible for planning, engineering, installing, operating and maintaining Communications-Electronics (CE) and Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities and providing associated services in support the U.S. Army and Defense Communication Systems worldwide.

1. Planning is accomplished at HQ USACC. Insofar as practical, operational and other "doer" functions are assigned to subordinate commands.

2. Responsibility for engineering and installation of C-E and Air Traffic Control (ATC) facilities has been centralized, with minor

exceptions, in the US Army Communications-Electronics Engineering Installation Agency (USACEEIA).

3. Responsibility for operating and maintaining worldwide C-E and ATC facilities is assigned to subordinate signal commands that have geographic areas of responsibility--5th Signal Command in Europe, USACC-Japan and 1st Signal Brigade in the Pacific, and 7th Signal Command in CONUS.

4. 7th Signal Command is organized to provide C-E support to CONUS-based MACOM. The diversified missions of the supported MACOM do not lend to providing C-E staff support from a single USACC element located at a distant station, as in the case of HQ 7th Signal Command at Fort Ritchie, MD, supporting HQ FORSCOM at Fort McPherson, GA, or HSC at San Antonio, TX. Consequently, 7th Signal Command exercises command and control of base communications primarily through MACOM-level subordinate commands (e.g., USACC-FORCES, USACC-TRADOC, USACC-DARCOM) which are aligned and collocated with the supported commanders in order to provide optimum support for the varied missions of the supported commands. Commanders of these intermediate elements serve in dual-status as C-E officers on the supported commander's staff. The proven effectiveness of single management and control of C-E at the MACOM headquarters is attributable to the existence of these dual-status commanders. Dual status commanders direct C-E staff functions for the MACOM and command subordinate units responsible for base communications operations and maintenance at 90+ installations. Experience has proven this to be a manageable span of control.

5. The organizational structure of ACC is shown below:

AD-A114 108

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF (ARMY) WASHINGTON D C  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82 (ACCS-82), VOLUME I, EXECUT--ETC(U)  
SEP 79 D L WILSON

F/G 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

2 of 4  
214-108





Figure 2-5  
Organization of Army Communication Command



#### United States Army Criminal Investigation Command

The Commander, United States Army Criminal Investigation (USACIDC), a Major General, is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, Army who issues to the CG, USACIDC directives, authorities, policies, planning and program guidance, priorities, resource allocations and other matters of command direction. USACIDC was activated as a major command effective 17 Sep 71.


The concept of the USACIDC is to provide a unified Army organization, under one responsible official who will exercise centralized command, authority, direction, and control of worldwide Army criminal investigation activities. The CG, USACIDC provides CID support to the law enforcement needs of commanders and officials at all echelons of the Department of the Army and is responsible for investigating all serious Army-related crimes. Only in time of war or under emergency conditions, and with approval of HQDA, will operational control of CID

or USACIDC elements be assumed by or assigned to other Army commanders.

To accomplish its worldwide support mission, USACIDC operates on a regional basis with three CONUS regions, two OCONUS regions, and the Washington, DC, district. Three Criminal Investigation Laboratories which support on an area basis, are located in Europe, the Pacific, and in CONUS.

The Crime Records Center, the Army office of Record and Holding files, is located in Baltimore, MD. A graphic depiction of USACIDC is at Figure 2-6.

Figure 2-6  
Criminal Investigation Command



The mission of USACIDC is to:

1. Conduct and control all Army investigation of serious crimes, and less serious crimes upon request or as necessary to effect Army law



enforcement.

2. Provide CID services to all US Army elements.
3. As directed, conduct sensitive or special interest investigations.
4. Provide or conduct protective service operations for DOD and DA.

#### United States Army Corps of Engineers (USACE)

1. On 18 April 1979, the Secretary of the Army approved the establishment of a new MACOM entitled U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USACE); it was activated on 16 June 1979. This new organization encompasses that segment of the Corps of Engineers engaged in military construction and civil works programs that are under direct command of the Chief of Engineers.

2. The USACE consists of command and support elements of the Office of the Chief of Engineers, the worldwide engineer divisions and districts, the engineer research and development laboratories and other related field agencies. Combat and construction engineer units, facility engineers, topographic elements and engineers assigned to other MACOM are excluded from the new command. USACE was organized within existing resources and did not require additional manpower authorizations nor headquarters relocations. The OCE elements performing Army Staff functions remain collocated with command and support elements.

3. The civil works function of the USACE continues to maintain its separate identity for resource acquisition, allocation and accounting purposes. The approximately 33,000 personnel spaces assigned to the civil works functions, though integral to the USACE command, are not accountable in the Army's end strength.

4. The rationale behind establishment of a USACE command includes:

a. Recognition of a de facto situation which presently has the military construction and civil works functions operating essentially in a MACOM-like structure.

b. A better understanding of the Corps of Engineers missions,

functions, and capabilities and development of procedures which should lead to more efficient utilization of USACE resources and capabilities by the Army. An established Engineer command should lead to increased readiness and facilitate the rapid transition from peacetime to wartime Engineer support during mobilization.


c. Actual and perceptive integration of the military construction and civil works personnel and skills into the Army's missions.

d. Improved coordination with other MACOM and the DA Staff. Expected improvements include better planning for and response to contingencies, responsiveness to readiness problems stemming from facilities constraints, participation in Army's program development and better coordination of the construction-operation-maintenance cycle for Army facilities worldwide.

5. The Chief of Engineers serves in a dual capacity as Commanding General, USACE and Army Staff Engineer.

6. The organizational structure of USACE is shown below.

Figure 2-7  
Organization of USACE



### United States Army Health Service Command (HSC)

The US Army Health Services Command (HSC) is a MACOM commanded by a Major General, US Army Medical Corps. As a MACOM, HSC's mission is to:


1. Provide health services for the Army in the Continental United States (CONUS), Canal Zone, Alaska, Hawaii, Johnston Island, Guam, and Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands (TTPI) and, as directed by the Chief of Staff, United States Army, for other departments, agencies, and organizations.

2. Provide medical professional education and training for Army Medical Department personnel and, as required or directed, for other Army personnel, members of other Services or Federal agencies, and authorized foreign national personnel within policies established by HQDA.

The mission will be performed through the following organizations, activities, and installations (See Figure 2-8):

1. Eight Medical Centers (Major Teaching US Army Hospitals).
2. Twenty-eight Medical Department Activities (US Army Hospitals).
3. The Academy of Health Sciences, US Army.
4. US Army Garrison, Ft Detrick, MD.
5. Environmental Hygienic Agency.
6. USA Health Care Systems Support Activity.
7. Four Regional Dental Activities.
8. USA Patient Admin System and Biostat Activity.

**Figure 2-8**  
**Organizational Activities and Installations**  
**Commanded by HSC**



Relationships. The CG HSC is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, US Army. Directives, authorities, policies, planning and program guidance, approved programs, priorities, resource allocations, and other matters of command direction are issued to the CG HSC by CSA.

CG HSC and TSG have a unique relationship. TSG has Army Staff responsibility for developing, organizing, and, on a continuing basis, providing technical supervision of Army health services as an Army-wide health services system. The CG HSC commands, manages, and operates those health services activities that are not functionally appropriate for direct management or control by a HQDA staff agency and are not appropriate for assignment to another Army command.

**United States Army Intelligence and Security Command**


The United States Army Intelligence and Security Command (INSCOM) is

a major command (MACOM) of the United States Army. The INSCOM commander, a Major General, is under the supervision of the Chief of Staff, United States Army.

INSCOM was formed on 1 Jan 77 when the former Army Security Agency was redesignated INSCOM. The US Army Intelligence Agency (USAINTA), formerly subordinate to the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Army, was concurrently reassigned to INSCOM. From 1 Oct 77 to 30 Nov 78, USAINTA was officially designated as HQ, INSCOM, Ft Meade. Effective 1 Dec 78, the HQ, INSCOM, Ft Meade title was eliminated and that portion of INSCOM located at Ft Meade is considered only as a geographically separated element of INSCOM. There are two deputy commanders. The Deputy Commander for Security and Production is located at Arlington Hall Station and the Deputy Commander for Intelligence is located at Ft Meade.

In CONUS, the INSCOM Commander has jurisdiction over two installations; Arlington Hall Station and Vint Hill Farms, VA. Six Field Stations are maintained OCONUS, of which one is an INSCOM installation. There are military intelligence groups supporting CONUS, Europe, Korea, Japan, and the Canal Zone. The field organization of INSCOM is at Figure 2-9.

Figure 2-9  
Intelligence Force Structure: INSCOM Field



To support the Army, the INSCOM Commander has a worldwide mission encompassing the three disciplines of intelligence: Human Intelligence (HUMINT); Signals Intelligence (SIGINT); and Photographic Intelligence (PHOTINT).

1. The mission of INSCOM is to:

a. Conduct intelligence, counterintelligence (CI), and electronic warfare (EW) operations in support of the Army at Echelons Above Corps (EAC).

b. Conduct SIGINT operations as a member of the United States SIGINT system.

c. Conduct HUMINT and PHOTINT operations in general support of the Army and other authorized US intelligence community collection requirements.

d. Conduct Army-wide signal security (SIGSEC) support operations.

e. Analyze, produce and disseminate all-source counterintelligence and general intelligence (less medical) and provide all-source threat analysis support to the Army.

2. The Commander, INSCOM, has principal responsibility for the following functions:

a. Intelligence collection.

b. Foreign intelligence and CI production.

c. CI, operations security, and SIGSEC support.

d. Special operations.

f. EW.

United States Army Materiel Development  
and Readiness Command (DARCOM)

The U.S. Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) is the Army's research and development, and wholesale logistics agency. Broadly stated, its missions are:

1. To perform assigned materiel functions of the Department of the Army including research and development; product improvement; human factors engineering; test and evaluation; procurement and production; product assurance; new equipment training; scientific and technical intelligence production; international logistics programs - and storage, distribution, transportation, maintenance, demilitarization, and disposal for the Continental United States wholesale supply and maintenance systems as well as for systems overseas.

2. To develop and provide managerial and related logistics management services to the United States Army and other United States and foreign customers in response to objectives and specific requirements established by Headquarters, Department of the Army.


3. To command such subordinate commands, installations, and activities as may be assigned by Headquarters, Department of the Army - to include planning, programming, coordinating, and supervising the use of resources for the accomplishment of DARCOM's basic and support missions, functions, and responsibilities.

4. To provide worldwide technical and professional guidance and assistance to customers in the planning and conduct of logistics support activities for Army materiel.

These missions translate into the functions listed in AR 10-11 and shown in Chapter 1, Volume II of this report. To perform its functions, the Commanding General, DARCOM Commands through subordinate commands organized according to commodity grouping and categorized as R&D and Materiel Readiness Commands.



Figure 2-10  
Organization of Materiel Development and Readiness Command



\*Note: MIRCOM and MIRADCOM were combined 1 July 1979. These categories generally reflect the division of DA staff supervision of DARCOM activities between the DCSLOG and the DCSRDA. The DARCOM commander is assisted by a deputy commanding general (DCG) for Materiel Readiness and a DCG for Materiel Development.

The DARCOM R&D commands are charged with the research and development, operational test and evaluation, acquisition, and initial logistic support of materiel approved for procurement by DA.

When development is complete and materiel is adopted by the Army the DARCOM materiel readiness commands (MRC) assume wholesale logistic responsibility for the materiel. The MRC perform, for their commodities, the functions of National Inventory Control Point, National Maintenance Point, requirements computation, procurement direction, distribution, and disposal.

The DARCOM R&D commands and MRC in turn command the arsenals, plants, depots, and laboratories that produce or procure the materiel necessary to support the Army in the field.

In addition major Project Managers and a variety of highly specialized/technical activities report directly to HQ DARCOM. DARCOM's role in wholesale logistics is described in greater detail in the logistics management section of this chapter.

#### Military District of Washington (MDW)

The US Army Military District of Washington is a MACOM commanded by a Major General.

As a MACOM, MDW's area of geographical jurisdiction includes the District of Columbia; Arlington and Fairfax Counties and the cities of Alexandria, Falls Church, and Fairfax in Virginia; Montgomery and Prince Georges Counties in Maryland; and any other specific areas as directed by HQDA. Walter Reed Army Medical Center, Arlington Hall Station and Fort Belvoir are assigned to other commands and are excluded from the jurisdiction of the CG, MDW.

The MDW includes Fort McNair, Fort Myer, Cameron Station, and Davison US Army Airfield. MDW activities are also located at the Pentagon, Hoffman, Forrestal and Half Street Buildings.

The mission of the Military District of Washington is to:

1. Command all US Army troop units located within the assigned geographical area except those expressly assigned by HQDA to another command or agency.

2. Command subordinate installations and activities as assigned by HQDA; plan, program, coordinate requirements and supervise use of resources, for accomplishing MDW basic and support missions, functions, and responsibilities.

3. Plan for and execute those missions peculiar to the needs of the Seat of Government, as assigned by HQDA, and provide for the security and defense of designated DOD facilities.

Organizations commanded by CG, MDW include:

1. Headquarters and headquarters support activities:

- a. Headquarters, MDW, Fort McNair (HQ MDW).
- b. Department of the Army Support Activities (DASA), Pentagon.
- c. Headquarters and Installation Support Activity (HISA), Fort McNair.

2. Field operating activity TDA organizations:

- a. United States Army Garrison (USAG), Fort McNair.
- b. United States Army Garrison (USAG), Fort Myer.
- c. United States Army Garrison (USAG), Cameron Station.
- d. United States Army Service Center for the Armed Forces (USASCAF), Pentagon.
- e. Davison US Army Airfield (DUSAA), Fort Belvoir.
- f. United States Army Element, Armed Forces Police Detachment (AFPD), Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC.
- g. Joint Personal Property Shipping Office, Washington, DC, (JPPSOWA), Cameron Station.
- h. United States Army Transportation Agency (White House) (USATA(WH)).

1. Augmentation, 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 3d Infantry (The Old Guard), Fort Myer.

3. Subordinate command TOE units.


a. The United States Army Band (Pershing's Own) (TUSAB), Fort Myer.

b. 1st Battalion (Reinforced), 3d Infantry (The Old Guard), Fort Myer.

c. 561st Military Police (MP) Company, Fort Myer.

Location of MDW activities, organizations, and units; and their major functions are depicted on Figure 2-11.

Figure 2-11  
Military District of Washington Geographical Area



\*Denotes tenant activities.

\*\*Walter Reed Medical Center, Arlington

Wall Station, and Fort Belvoir are excluded from the jurisdiction of the CG, MDW.

### Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC)


The Military Traffic Management Command (MTMC) is both an Army major command and one of the three DOD Transportation Operating Agencies (TOA). In the latter role, MTMC is the executive agent in fulfilling the Secretary of the Army's responsibilities as the single Manager for Military Traffic Management.

Headquarters, MTMC, located at Bailey's Crossroads, VA, commands through four subordinate elements. Two area commands, Eastern Area (Bayonne, NJ) and Western Area (Oakland, CA) command the CONUS military ocean terminals and outports. The Transportation Terminal Group, Europe (Rotterdam, the Netherlands) commands the major common user ports in Central Europe and the Transportation Terminal Units at minor ports in Europe and the Mediterranean. The Transportation Engineering Agency, Newport News, VA, has no subordinates.

Installations used by MTMC activities and subordinate commands, e.g., the ocean terminals are commanded directly through the MTMC chain of command.

The organizational structure of MTMC is shown below:

Figure 2-12  
Organization of MTMC



### United States Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC)

The commander of TRADOC is responsible to HQDA for development of training programs and conduct of combat developments.

1. The TRADOC mission is to:

a. Develop and manage training programs and supervise the training of individuals of the Army and authorized foreign nationals.

b. Conduct all combat developments not assigned by HQDA to other commands and agencies and, as the Army's principal combat developer, guide, coordinate, and integrate the total combat development of the Army.

c. Command organizations and installations as assigned by HQDA and, through assigned installations, provide administrative, logistical, and other support services to elements and agencies of DA, DOD, and other government agencies which are tenants or designated satellites of TRADOC installations.

2. The CG TRADOC has principal responsibility for the following functions:

a. Training:

(1) Initial Entry Training of all enlisted personnel entering the active component and the Reserve Components.

(2) Manages the principal Army school system, including C&GSC, branch schools, specialist schools, officer candidate schools and other special schools.

(3) Prepares for publication and distribution programs, literature and instructional materials for individual training and appropriate instructional materials to all Army schools, training centers, and specialist training agencies.

(4) Commands and manages the Reserve Officer Training Corps and National Defense Cadet Corps activities including units and regional organizations as authorized by HQDA.

(5) Programs and supervises the operation of the Training Aids Center System in support of all CONUS commands.

b. Combat Developments:

(1) Conducts conceptual and analytical studies to support the development of doctrine, materiel requirements, organizations and designated functional systems in accordance with DA force development planning guidance.

(2) Provides guidance to and tasks other Army commands and agencies for their contribution to the overall combat development effort.

(3) Conducts field experiments and participates in other force development tests, experiments, and evaluations conducted to support and validate concepts and studies to support the development of doctrine, materiel requirements, organizations and functional systems.

(4) Monitors development testing, participates as tasked by HQDA in operational testing of materiel systems for which US Army Operational Test and Evaluation Agency is responsible, and plans for and conducts operational testing of other designated materiel systems.

(5) Integrates combat development proposals, recommendations, and products from the Army commands and agencies into the overall combat development effort.

c. Major Army Commander:

(1) Supervises TRADOC installations to assure that full and equitable support is provided, on an area support basis, to all assigned or attached units and activities and all tenants and authorized satellite activities.

(2) Plans, programs, allocates, establishes policies for, and supervises use of TRADOC resources for accomplishing TRADOC basic and support missions, functions, and responsibilities; budgets and funds for financial resources as specified in the AR 37 series.


(3) Monitors the distribution of TRADOC resources which are centrally managed by HQDA and its agencies; becomes involved in centrally managed distribution systems only to the extent necessary to correct basic deficiencies or adjust overall priorities.

(4) Prepares and executes plans for mobilization in

accordance with the Force Mobilization Planning Guidance Annex, Army Strategic Capabilities Plan.

3. The organization structure of TRADOC is shown below:

Figure 2-13  
Organization of TRADOC





United States Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)

FORSCOM, a major U.S. Army Command, was organized in 1973, with the implementation of the recommendations of STEADFAST.

1. Missions of the Commander FORSCOM are to:

- a. Serve as the CINC Army Forces, Readiness Command and, for planning purposes, as CINC Army Forces Atlantic.
- b. Command three CONUSA and all assigned Active Army and US Army Reserve troop program units in CONUS (to include AK, Johnston Island, Guam, Virgin Islands and the Canal Zone; and supervise the training of the Army National Guard.
- c. Organize, equip, station, train and maintain the combat readiness of assigned units with priority to those units in support of contingency plans and in accordance with DAMPL.
- d. Provide, through assigned installations, administrative, logistical and other support and services to elements of DA, DOD and other Government agencies as are tenants or satellites of FORSCOM installation.
- e. Plan for and execute assigned domestic emergency missions. These missions include peacetime emergencies and those resulting from general war.

2. Functions of the Commander FORSCOM include those related to the roles of Army Component Commands, Major Army Command, and command of USAR troop program units and supervision of Army National Guard training; as follows:

a. As Army Component Commander:

(1) Functions as DA coordinating authority in support of deployment plans and operations of CINCUSREDCOM and the contingency plans and operations of CINCLANT. Provides a general reserve of combat - ready forces to USREDCOM as directed by JCS and current DA directive. Provide forces for the reinforcement of other unified commands and forces to joint training exercises. Assists in development of joint doctrine.

(2) Provides Army component planning assistance to CINCLANT and when directed by CSA, provide Army forces to US Atlantic Command.

(3) Provide Army component functions for US SOUTHCOM and ALCOM by FORSCOM subordinate units (193d Inf Bde and 172d Inf Bde respectively).

b. As Major Commander. The 27 functions of the Commander FORSCOM as a Major Army commander as prescribed by AR 10-42 are grouped and summarized as follows:

(1) Operational functions.

(a) Organize, station, equip and train assigned US Army units to insure their readiness for assigned missions.

(b) Provide troop unit support to Army service schools, Army training centers and ROTC encampments.

(c) Provide intelligence support to senior and subordinate headquarters IAW DA plans and regs.

(d) Act as DA executive and coordinating authority for:

1 CONUS defense (less aerospace), military support of civil defense, survival and reconstitution activities related to CONUS defense, and chemical and nuclear accident and incident control.

2 Plan for and execute specified tasks with geographical orientation, including support of civil authorities and FOA's of the Chief of Engineers, for domestic emergencies or natural disasters, support othe programs oriented toward the civilian populace and support of other Federal agencies.

3 Prepare and execute plans for mobilization of Army Reserve component units in CONUS including PR, VI, AK and HA IAW Vol II of the Army Capabilities Plan.

(e) Operates the CONUS troop staging facilities.

(f) Participate in combat developments and materiel developments when designated by DA as the user; advise and assist CDR, DARCOM, TRADOC and HSC and to DA and DOD agencies; and as directed support field experiments, field evaluations, development tests and operational tests.

(g) Maintain DA master file of standard unit movement data and standard unit reporting procedure for Army units to support requirements of ACP and JOPS.

(h) Operate Army Explosive Ordnance Disposal Program in CONUS.

(i) Conduct general and special inspections of ARNG and USAR units, USP&FO, and state maintenance officers in CONUS.

(j) Collect, process and transmit data reported under Joint Reporting Structure on all organizations assigned to FORSCOM and TRADOC.

(k) Operate a data processing installation in support of WWMCCS.

(l) Provide Army Air Defense forces to CINCONAD as directed by CSA.

(m) Supervise and direct the operation of assigned Army National Crime Information Center terminals to provide support within geographical areas.

(2) Training Functions.

(a) Supervise the application of unit training criteria, standards and evaluation methodology to all assigned and attached Active Army and USAR units; establish training criteria for and provide advice and assistance in the training of the ARNG.

(b) Identify FORSCOM units in which individual training will be conducted in the AIT-in-Unit and OJT programs as directed by DA and coordinated with TRADOC, and supervise the conduct of this training.

(c) Supervise the conduct of in-unit training of

non-unit Ready Reserve personnel who are assigned or attached to Active Army or USAR units of FORSCOM or to ARNG units for annual training or duty.

(d) Direct the Army-wide competitive marksmanship program.

(3) Logistical functions.

(a) Supervise FORSCOM installations to insure that full and equitable support is provided, on an area basis, to all assigned and attached units and activities, and all tenants and authorized satellite activities.

(b) Maintain DA master data file of standard equipment characteristics for Army TOE equipment.

(c) Conduct the FORSCOM procurement program as a head of procuring activity.

(4) Personnel and administrative functions.

(a) Provide broad supervision of the Army Reserve Technician Program.

(b) Provide, by attachment, as requested by other major Army commanders, for the exercise of court-martial jurisdiction and the general administration of military justice to include related administrative actions and nonjudicial punishment, over units, activities, and personnel located on FORSCOM installations, and over US Army personnel located at other CONUS installations and activities. The commander, who will exercise jurisdiction, is authorized to publish necessary orders announcing attachment to his command.

(c) Assist CG, MDW in planning and executing State funerals within CONUS.

(5) Resources allocation functions.

(a) Budget and fund for the support provided to Army Reserve Component units.

(b) Monitor the distribution of FORSCOM resources that are centrally managed by HQDA and its agencies, and become involved in centrally managed distribution systems only to the extent necessary to correct basic deficiencies or adjust overall priorities.

(c) Provide resources, within availability, to the FOA's of the Chief of Engineers as required for carrying out his statutory responsibilities and assigned emergency missions including responsibility for providing assistance during natural disasters.

c. As Commander of the USAR and Supervisor of Army National Guard Training Activities -

(1) Command the USAR Troop Program units not otherwise assigned by authority of HQDA.


(2) Supervise and inspect the training of the ARNG.

(3) Execute domestic emergency plans and operations.

(4) Coordinate specified civil-military programs.

3. The organizational structure of FORSCOM is shown below.

Figure 2-14  
Organization of FORSCOM




#### 4. Corps.

a. There are two active corps subordinate to HQ FORSCOM--the III Corps at Ft Hood, Texas and the XVIII Airborne Corps at Ft Bragg, North Carolina. Each corps headquarters is under the direct command of the HQ FORSCOM and executes mission tasks accordingly. Corps commanders are also major installation commanders and report directly to CG, FORSCOM. The preponderance of tasking to the corps commanders is through this channel. (See paragraph 5, below, for installation missions and functions.) Additionally, the corps deal directly with US Readiness Command (USREDCOM) for Joint Exercises, with US Army, Europe (USAREUR) and NATO's Northern Army Group (NORTHAG) for Combined Exercises and wartime planning and with Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) to coordinate testing programs.

b. Command relationships and organizational structure of the corps is as shown in Figure 2-15.

Figure 2-15

#### CORPS COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS AND ORGANIZATION



#### 5. Installations.

a. Mission. Installations are responsible for commanding and supporting assigned and attached MACOM units, activities and sub-installations. Additionally, the installation commander must

organize, train and equip all assigned and attached units and individuals. Installations will provide for the operation, safety, security, administration, education and training, procurement support, service, maintenance and supply of all individuals, units and activities assigned, attached or under the command of the installations prescribed by AR 10-10, AR 210-10, and appropriate regulations providing policy for installation area coordination. Base operations and other support to DA, DOD, and other Government activities which are tenants of, supported by or satellited on the installation must be provided. The installation commander must plan, program, allocate and supervise the use of resources and facilities for accomplishing basic and support missions, functions and responsibilities. Additionally, commanders must program, budget and fund as specified in the AR 37- series, "Financial Administration."

b. Normal functional responsibilities for directorates are as follows:

(1) Comptroller or Director, Resource Management. This directorate encompasses the normal comptroller functions discussed in AR 5-2 and FM 101-5, excepting ADP management. Typical functions are: accounting policy; internal review; management analysis and engineering; command management improvement programs; statistical reporting; program review and analysis; statistical graphic services; budgeting and programing; finance, accounting, and disbursing of public funds; auditing and, optionally, when as a resource management organization as approved by the MACOM commander, manpower management or force development; and other related functions such as reports control.

(2) Directorate of Personnel and Community Activities. This directorate encompasses normal G-1/S-1 functions (FM 101-5). Typical functions in personnel and administrative activities are: military personnel administration; civilian personnel administration, when not established as a separate staff office by the commander or MACOM; personnel security clearances, when not assigned to DSEC; education and career development; race relations/equal opportunity; headquarters administrative requirements and procedures; mail and messenger services; and when not designated, a personnel staff office, equal employment opportunity. If the EEEO and the CPO are positioned under the DPCA, both retain direct access to the commander. Typical functions in community activities are: exchanges, clubs, and open messes; other nonappropriated funds activities; safe-

ty; recreational services; morale, welfare, and community services for personal development; drug and alcohol abuse prevention and control; dependent schools; adult education schools; military police activities.

(3) Directorate of Plans and Training. This directorate encompasses normal G-3/S-3 functions. Typical functions are: plans; operations; training force development; unit readiness objectives and levels; range operations; museum (may be under a school or other organization, depending on the nature of the museum); aviation; CBR activities; assigned training aids activities (Educational TV and Category I training film activities that are integral to schools remain on the school TDA if the TDA's are separate); and establishing unit priorities. The directorate may provide CRCS when separate element is not warranted.

(4) Directorate of Security. This directorate encompasses normal G-2/S-2 functions. Typical functions are: security clearances; access to classified or restricted areas and activities; classified or restricted areas surveys and inspections; intelligence information; weather service; maps and aerial photograph policy. (This directorate does not include physical security of material and facilities which are normal military police activities under staff supervision of DPCA or DCAS.)

(5) Directorate of Industrial Operations. Typical functions are: general supply; general maintenance; general support services not assigned elsewhere (includes food service operations not assigned to HQ Comdt); transportation servicers; administrative motor pools; logistical support plans; housing; purchasing and contracting (P&C) activities (includes the coordinating functions of P&C needs for installation, but not the P&C activities and responsibilities of the appointed P&C officer. The P&C officer is appointed by and responsible to the appropriate head of a procuring activity (HPA) for activities in accordance with Army Procurement Procedure (APP) and Armed Services Procurement Regulation (ASPR). P&C officer is placed under DIO for local supervision and administrative support but not for operational management).

(6) Directorate of Facilities Engineering. Typical functions are: installation engineering projects and services; environmental affairs and environmental management program; master planning and construction program; execution, inspection, supervision, and



acceptance of engineering contracts; real estate acquisition, management, and disposal; construction contract proposals and specifications; operation and maintenance of utilities; maintenance and/or repair of real property and facilities; minor construction; fire prevention and protection; supply and storage of items peculiar to facilities engineering, maintenance, and construction functions; maintenance of installed property; and natural resources management.

(7) Directorate of Communications-Electronics. Typical functions include: supervision and operation of telecommunications center, radio operations (including MARS); radio frequency management; telephone facilities installation, operation, maintenance, and customer accounts; installation and maintenance of television outside cable; air traffic control.

(8) Directorate of Health Services. The DHS performs installation staff functions associated with providing or arranging for health services essential to maintaining the health of uniformed service members, and, within capability, other authorized beneficiaries located within the installation's designated geographical area of responsibility; appropriate health care training of troops; and health care aspects of emergency planning.

(9) Directorate of Dental Services. The DDS performs installation staff functions associated with providing or arranging for dental services essential to maintaining dental health of uniformed services members and, within capability, other authorized beneficiaries located within the installation designated geographical area of responsibility.

(10) Coordinator of Reserve Component Support (CRCS).

(a) All installations that have responsibilities for directly supporting Reserve Component units or personnel are required to establish an office or to designate an individual responsible for coordinating Reserve Component support. It is not required that the coordinating office manage the support, although this may be the most effective and economically feasible arrangement. However, the office must be capable of coordinating the planning for support and providing information to the appropriate units to obtain support. At any installation where the support responsibilities do not warrant a separate office, responsibility for coordination may be assigned to the DPT as a dual responsibility.

(b) At all installations, the reserve support coordination, or advisory, office will be displayed separately in directories, locator files, installation telephone books, and organizational charts to ensure that reserve users can readily identify and locate the office. Prominent signs should be provided. The objective is ready assistance to the reserve organization.

6. Continental United States Armies (CONUSA).

The CONUSA is a major subordinate command of FORSCOM and, as such, it is the first level of command devoted completely to Reserve Component Management. The CONUSA will:

a. Command:

(1) All assigned USAR troop program units (TPU), reinforcement training units, mobilization designee detachments, and attached Army Units.

(2) The Army Readiness Regions (ARR).

(3) Mobilized Reserve Component units from effective date of mobilization until their arrival at the mobilization station or port of embarkation.

(4) The State Area Command (STARC) when called to Federal active duty.

b. Supervise the training of all RC units within its geographic area of responsibility.

c. Prepare and execute plans for emergency peacetime and wartime missions in accordance with applicable CINCREDCOM, HQDA and FORSCOM plans (e.g., Disaster Relief, Nuclear/Chemical Accident/Incident Control, Land defense of CONUS, Military Support of Civil Defense (MSCD), and Continuity of Operations (COOP)), and other actions to accomplish geographically oriented activities.

d. Prepare and execute plans for mobilization of Reserve Component units in accordance with the FORSCOM Mobilization Plan.

e. Interact with HQ FORSCOM, installations, and MUSARC in USAR resource management.

f. Supervise the Army Reserve Technician (ART) Program and distribute manpower spaces to subordinate MUSARC in support of the program.

g. Supervise retention programs for maintenance of USAR units strength within assigned geographical area.

h. Conduct general and special inspections of ARNG and USAR units, US Property and Fiscal Offices, State Maintenance Offices, and State Aviation Offices.

i. Coordinate and arrange for required administrative and logistical support for assigned units.

7. Army Readiness Region.

Army Readiness Regions (ARR) are AC organizations that were established during the STEADFAST Reorganization of 1973. The primary mission of the ARR is to assist RC units, within specified geographic areas, in establishing, achieving and sustaining unit and individual readiness. The nine ARR are subordinate commands of the three CONUSA (4 ARR in First Army, 3 ARR in Fifth Army and 2 ARR in Sixth Army). Each ARR headquarters, commanded by a Major General, is authorized approximately 50 personnel. The ARR headquarters, by design, do not contain certain staff and support elements normally provided to an Army organization. The ARR were established to provide concentrated AC resources for improving the readiness of the RC through dedicated training assistance programs.

a. The ARR headquarters perform, fundamentally, two broad functions:

(1) Coordination of support for the RC (this includes commanding all AC personnel assigned to the ARR), and

(2) Evaluation of RC unit readiness (this includes post-mobilization certification of units for deployment).


b. The ARR accomplish their mission through three organizational elements:

(1) The Operations Division at the ARR headquarters. This division has three branches: Readiness Coordinators, a Plans (or

(2) Readiness Groups (RG). There are 28 RG, each headed by a Colonel. The RG execute the plans for training and assisting the RC units, primarily through branch-related or functional assistance teams. Authorized strengths of RG range from 50 to nearly 200 personnel, based upon the number and types of RC units supported.

(3) **Advisors and Advisor/Augmentees.** Advisor teams of officers and enlisted personnel are assigned at various RC levels of command, from State Headquarters and MUSARC down to selected units. At the MUSARC there are "Advisor/Augmentee" positions for AC personnel who accomplish day-to-day tasks in administration, training management and logistics. There are Senior Army Advisors (SRAA), who are Colonels, at the State and MUSARC level: the SRAA report to the ARR headquarters and they, in turn, command the personnel on the advisory teams within the chain of command of the unit to which the SRAA is assigned. Advisory, and Advisor/Augmentee, complements, by ARR, vary in authorized strength from 160 to nearly 250 personnel: authorizations are based upon the number and type of units supported and certain selected readiness requirement factors (high priority units, remoteness of units from RC parent headquarters, etc.).

### ARR Boundries; ARR and RG Locations



7. Major US Army Reserve Command (MUSARC). A MUSARC is in an Army Reserve Command (ARCOM) or a General Officer command (GOCOM) that reports directly to a Continental Army (CONUSA).

a. The mission of an ARCOM commander is to:

Command all USAR troop program units (except selective service; units assigned directly to a GOCOM which is not assigned to an ARCOM; or units assigned directly to an Active Component headquarters), reinforcement training units, mobilization designee detachments within the geographic area of responsibility, and those Area Maintenance Support activities assigned.

b. The mission of a GOCOM commander designated as a major US Army Reserve Command is to command, administer and supervise training, and to obtain and maintain mobilization readiness in all organic, attached, and/or assigned units.

c. MUSARC functions include:

- (1) Financial Management
- (2) Force Development
- (3) Training Supervision
- (4) Intelligence and Security Management
- (5) Materiel Readiness Management
- (6) Personnel Management and Administration

#### Systems Supporting the Current Structure

##### 1. Personnel Management.

a. Introduction. The current personnel management system focuses on the life cycle functions of procurement, education and training, distribution, sustainment and separation. Although each component performs the same functions, the policies are different in many respects because of a variety of applicable federal statutes. The differences will be discussed in detail in subsequent paragraphs.

b. Procurement.

(1) Officer:

(a) Active Army procurement is through the precommissioning programs of the USMA, ROTC, OCS and direct appointments.

(b) USAR procurement is through the ROTC program OCS(RC), officers leaving active duty and direct appointments.

(c) ARNG procurement is a function of each State. They run state OCS programs and also obtain some ROTC graduates, officers leaving active duty, and direct appointments.

(2) Enlisted:

(a) USAREC handles the Active Army procurement program by recruiting CONUS wide from the civilian community. Applicants select from various enlistment options designed to match the potential enlistee's qualifications and preference to the Army's needs in a specific MOS.

(b) USAR recruiting is also conducted by USAREC utilizing full time USAR recruiters assigned to USAREC. Recruitment is usually for a specific assignment to a local unit at or near the potential enlistees' hometown. USAR units also get some service members who have completed their active duty contractual agreement but still have a remaining service obligation.

(c) ARNG recruiting is the responsibility of each State. The NGB supports the recruiting effort through funding and program and policy development. USAREC provides technical advice, advertising and training assistance in support of the ARNG recruiting program.

c. Education and Training.

(1) Officer' education and training opportunities are geared toward meeting Army requirements and individual professional development with the progression from all officers attending a Basic Course to most attending a career course, a smaller number attending C&GSC and only a few attending SSC level of schooling. RC officers educational opportunities parallel those of his AC counterpart and

are designed to meet the promotion schooling requirements as well as individual professional development.

(2) Enlisted training and education is conducted at five levels. Basic training (BT) and advanced individual training (AIT) or one station unit training (OSUT) provide initial entry training (IET). The four subsequent levels are primary, basic, advanced and senior non-commissioned officer schools. The primary course is designed to develop individual NCO skills in the grades of E4 and E5; the basic course at the E6 level; the advanced course toward the E7 level; and the senior level toward the E8 and E9 level. RC enlisted personnel progress through the same levels of training but generally at a slower pace due to the personnel being available only on a part-time basis.

d. Distribution.

(1) Active Component.

(a) Officer distribution is in accordance with an Office Distribution Plan (ODP) which is reviewed by the VCSA. It is designed to ensure that MACOM receive at least a share of every shortfall specialty. ODP is based upon the Personnel Priority Model (PPM) which reflects priorities established by ODCSOPS.

(b) Enlisted distribution is managed centrally by MILPERCEN in accordance with requirements established by approved authorizations. MILPERCEN fills request for personnel by using an automated system (CAP III) which ensures equitable distribution to MACOMs based on approved priorities as established by ODCSOPS.

(2) RC personnel distribution is controlled by geography, personal circumstances, employment and other civilian considerations. There is no centralized distribution system for either the ARNG or USAR.

e. Sustainment.

(1) The Officer Personnel Management System (OPMS) which includes assignment, promotion, school, and command selections, provide intensive but flexible management of officer careers based on Army requirements and individual preferences in the Active component. OPMS-USAR provides for periodic rotation between units and the IRR

with counterpart training being available for IRR members. The ARNG has adopted a modified version of OPMS for implementation at state level.

(2) The enlisted force is sustained through reenlistment, extensions of enlistments, and enlistment of prior service personnel. The programs are designed to retain those soldiers who meet qualitative standards and they are managed by using the year group (years of service) as the basic management tool. Individuals must attain a certain grade within a requisite cumulative number of years of service or be denied reenlistment. Sustainment in the USAR is basically a local unit problem and it is affected by promotion opportunity, quality of leadership and training and the perception of service in the local unit on the part of the individual Reservist. It is often hampered by excessive tenure of senior NCOs in unit positions as RC qualitative management standards (grade vs years of service) are not as stringent as those the active component counterpart faces. ARNG sustainment actions relate closely with those of the USAR except the individual states exercise certain prerogatives in operating EPMS-NG.

f. Separations. Separations fall into the categories of retirement, voluntary separation (End of Tour of Service or Resignation) or involuntary separation. Retirements, except for RA mandatory retirements, and voluntary separations are based on the desires of the individual concerned. Officer involuntary separations include reduction in force (RIF) to reduce officer strengths, failure of the individual to be selected for promotion (RA or AUS) and show cause actions. RC officers can be involuntarily removed for non selection for promotion or failure to participate satisfactorily. Separation of ARNG officers includes withdrawal of Federal Recognition.

Involuntary enlisted separation are accomplished at various levels of command from GCM level to O5 command level depending on the reason and type of discharge being given. These programs are tied to qualitative management of the force and impact on sustainment and accession programs as they impact on the Army end strength. RC involuntary separation programs are patterned after the AC programs and generally provide the same level of command authority that is exercised by similar AC counterparts.

g. Personnel Management Information Systems.

(1) Active Component. The Standard Installation Division



Personnel System (SIDPERS) is the automated management information system used by the active component. SIDPERS provides basic personnel management information on each soldier on active duty at division/installation level to include individual qualification, promotion, school selection, PCS information from the losing and to the gaining SIDPERS for the strength accounting system. SIDPERS data is input from each CONUS installation Military Personnel Officer (MILPO) and overseas theater to the Officer Master File (OMF) and Enlisted Master File (EMF) at Military Personnel Center (MILPERCEN), a FAO of ODCSPER, HQDA. This exchange of data between individual installation MILPO and MILPERCEN makes centralized personnel management at DA level possible.

(2) The USAR officer and enlisted personnel management information system consists of the Reserve Personnel Information Reporting System (RPIRS) operated at each CONUSA for USAR TPU personnel and The Individual Reserve Personnel Information System (TIRPERSINS) operated at RCPAC for the Individual Ready Reserve (IRR). The RPIRS data is provided to RCPAC for the purpose of combining it with TIRPERSINS to produce an automated composite USAR data base. This composite data base is used for Army wide and OSD reporting purposes as well as for mobilization planning purposes.

(3) The Army National Guard Automated Personnel Reporting System contains the necessary information to enable each State and the NGB to maintain automated records on all ARNG officer and enlisted personnel. Each State has its own computer system which provides the necessary data input for the ARNG master file at the NGB computer center located in the greater Washington area.

#### h. Mobilization Personnel Procedures.

(1) Upon mobilization, the major tasks of the Total Army Personnel Management System are to:

(a) Provide individuals to deploying units within the priorities established by ODCSOPS and approved by CSA.

(b) Access USAR and ARNG individual personnel to the HQDA OMF and EMF for strength accounting and management purposes.

(c) Make provisions for cross-leveling of personnel resources at the lowest level practical in accordance with priorities

established at HQDA.

(2) Strength maintenance in mobilized Reserve Component units becomes the responsibility of the mobilization station commander upon the arrival of the individual unit at his installation. This mobilization personnel distribution is controlled by MILPERCEN in concert with the MILPO located at each mobilization station thru the SIDPERS. Currently, the SIDPERS is not capable of automated accession of personnel information from the USAR and ARNG systems which are furnished to installations by RCPAC and NGB, respectively, after M-Day. Therefore, accessioning of RC personnel reporting to mobilization stations into the SIDPERS data base is a slow and inefficient semi-automated process. This transfer of information process, and the lengthy run time for a SIDPERS cycle cause unacceptable delays in providing unit strength data to MILPERCEN. This delay further exacerbates the problem of personnel distribution and redistribution between units located on the same installation and makes the process completely unresponsive between installations.

#### 1. Summary.

Personnel Management includes the management of individuals from all components through their individual life cycle from procurement through separation.

#### 2. Logistics Management.

a. Logistics is the sum of functions that must be performed in order to support a military force. The principal categories of these functions are: supply, maintenance, transportation, services and facilities.

b. Logistics functions are generally performed and managed at three levels or echelons: wholesale, intermediate, and direct support/user (retail).

c. As a rule, wholesale logistics functions are performed in CONUS. The Army's wholesale logistics agency is the US Army Materiel Development and Readiness Command (DARCOM) which commands, through its commodity oriented commands, the National Inventory Control Points (NICP), National Maintenance Points (NMP), depots, arsenals, and plants necessary to produce or procure the materiel necessary. The Army does not operate the entire wholesale logistics system. The

General Services Administration (GSA) provides supplies and services that are common to more than one department of the Government, such as office supplies. The Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) processes and distributes materiel common among the military services such as subsistence, bulk petroleum, construction materiel, medical supplies, among others. DLA activities like the Defense Fuel Supply Center and the Defense Personnel Support Center are themselves national inventory control points for the items they manage.

d. The interface between the wholesale and retail levels of the logistic system is the intermediate echelon. In CONUS the intermediate echelon is at the post, camp and station (i.e., the installation) level. Overseas or in a theater of operations, the intermediate echelon is at the COSCOM/TAACOM level. At the intermediate level, requisitions are filled from stocks on hand in the local general support level or passed to the appropriate (DARCOM or DLA) NICP.

e. The Direct Support/User Echelon or retail level includes the units and organizations in the field that provide direct logistics support and the units that consume the support.

f. The echelons of logistics apply to all the logistics functions. Maintenance, services, and facilities tend to remain in Army channels throughout the logistics spectrum. Supply and transportation, especially at the wholesale level, cross service lines and also include DOD agencies.

g. Major commands of the Army function in the logistics arena as both operators and users. Overseas commands operate their own logistics organizations and networks in the manner of the theater Army with the interface with the wholesalers occurring at the Materiel Management Centers (MMC) of the COSCOM and/or TAACOM. FORSCOM, TRADOC and other CONUS MACOM enter the wholesale portion of the system through the installations they command. The Installation Supply Divisions (ISD) support all units and activities on the post and in the areas for which they have responsibility. MACOM establish, consistent with DOD and Army regulations, logistic policies and procedures applicable within their commands. TRADOC, in addition, develops, through its schools and the Logistics Center, logistics doctrine for the present and the future.

h. The operation of the logistic system, particularly the supply function, is almost fully automated. In the Active Component,

using units obtain support from their Direct Support or General Support (DSU/GSU) activity which then request replenishment through the intermediate level. The DS/GS level uses computer system known as DLOG (Division Logistics) for divisional units or DSU/GSU for non-divisional units. The intermediate system is SAILS, Standard Army Intermediate Logistics System, which operates both in CONUS at the installation level and overseas at the MMCs. SAILS interfaces with DOD Automatic Addressing System which routes the requisitions to the appropriate NICP whether it be a DARCOM, GSA or another service. Army standard supply systems use the prescribed common codes and formats of DOD directives to permit entry into non-Army wholesale activities. The NICP and depots use computer programs and that receive the requisitions, identify and locate the item, and direct shipment. In the Reserve Components the system is essentially the same except that manually prepared requisitions are prepared by the user and submitted, in the case of the USAR, through the ARCOM/MUSARC to the active supporting installation ISD where the requisitions are placed upon the wholesaler via SAILS. In the National Guard, the state USPFO functions is the intermediate level and inserts NG requisitions into the wholesale system.

i. The logistics systems are intended to work the same way in war as they do in peace. DA, however, is examining the simplification of SAILS for wartime application. Wartime will greatly intensify the volume of requirements to the point where existing ADPE may not be able to cope. DA is working to upgrade the computer support used for logistics systems.

j. Logistics is managed in several ways. Funding constraints and priorities as expressed in the DAMPL are the most obvious. Funding discipline is imposed through the allocation of operation, maintenance and stock funds. Users are thereby constrained in the amount of goods and services they may obtain. DAMPL priorities under the DOD Common Uniform Movement and Materiel Issue Priority System (UMMIPS) used by the automated systems outlined above.

k. Within HQDA, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics (DCSLOG) is the principal advisor to the Chief of Staff on logistics matters and is responsible for general staff supervision of the Army's logistic organization and system and establishes policy. The DCSLOG does not, however, work in a vacuum. Other DA staff offices have significant responsibilities that affect logistics;

(1) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans is responsible for the development of materiel and force requirements, the establishment of priorities for those requirements, and for user test and evaluation.

(2) The Deputy Chief of Staff for Research, Development, and Acquisition is responsible for staff supervision of materiel development, procurement, and production.

(3) The Comptroller of the Army performs cost analysis and fund control.

(4) The Chief of Engineers oversees engineering, construction and real estate services.

(5) The Surgeon General is responsible for medical materiel management and maintenance.

### 3. Financial Management.

#### a. Introduction.

Financial management support of AC and RC units of the existing CONUS structure is addressed in the following subsections of this section:

- (1) Financial Resource Channels.
- (2) Financial Management - ARNG.
- (3) Installation Financial Support of RC.
- (4) RC Personnel Pay Systems.

The development of financial management support has been a deliberate evolutionary process since STEADFAST, making use of newly developed capabilities of personnel and technology, while providing adequate financial services to the units and forces in being.

#### b. Financial Resource Channels.

- (1) General.

This section addresses the CONUS financial resource management system flow (i.e., allocation and execution, to include programming, budgeting, distribution and obligation of funds). The subject area is limited to CONUS funding channels from HQDA to installation, particularly as those channels operate to provide fund support for US Army Active and Reserve Component troop units in peace, and during the transition (i.e., mobilization) period. The STEADFAST reorganization of 1973 created the current major commands, which are provided funding by HQDA, and which participate in the HQDA PPBS. The installations of the US Army are the user level, at which financial resources are converted into the accomplishment of missions by AC and RC units. The CONUSA play an advisory role in the allocation and redistribution of resources for USAR units.

(2) Installations.

(a) MACOM provide funds direct to CONUS installations for support of units or activities of that MACOM. CONUS installations, especially those of FORSCOM and TRADOC, normally contain units or activities of several MACOM in addition to their parent MACOM.

(b) Installations receive funds from the several MACOM, by numerous and various appropriations and program categories (e.g., Ft Benning receives OMA, OMAR, OMARNG, FHMA, RPA, RDT&E and MCA funds from one or more of 4 MACOM - FORSCOM, TRADOC, HSC, USACC).

(c) Installations receive, account for, and distribute funds and participate in budget formulation of the several MACOM. Staffing and equipment at installation level are adequate to provide the financial support required, i.e., installations have comptroller organizations, with the essential sub-elements of Budget and Finance and Accounting. Installations are responsible for the administrative control of all funds. They also provide Finance and Accounting support for all units and activities assigned to the installation.

(d) OMAR mission and base operations funds are distributed by FORSCOM primarily to FORSCOM and TRADOC installations, for support of USAR units and those AC headquarters which support RC activities (Army Readiness Regions and Readiness Groups).

(e) Installations receive detailed guidance from CONUSA regarding breaking out of funds provided by FORSCOM into individual obligation targets for each MUSARC. CONUSA also review and coordi-

nate budget submissions, reviews and adjustments.

(f) Formal fund control responsibility (RS 3679) is vested at installation level, the final recipient of an official subdivision of funds. A subordinate element or unit, such as a MUSARC could be held responsible, if that unit were adjudged to be the cause of a violation at installation level.

(g) Installations serve many masters because of the multiplicity of MACOM in CONUS and because installations normally receive funds for and provide financial support to elements of several MACOM. Responding to requirements of two or more MACOM does increase and complicate the installations administrative burden in the financial management area. The current fragmentation of flow of resources and command channels results in complex operational problems, increased workload, different operating philosophies, and duplicate reporting requirements at installation level. Installations submit reports to separate MACOM, intended to meet identical requirements at HQDA, but which have significantly different preparation instructions, formats, and assumptions, and all due at about the same time frame. The installation has become the terminus or focus of the stovepipes created by STEADFAST, and this is particularly acute in the financial management area.

(h) Installations are the critical focal point for financial management in CONUS. They are the banker, receiving deposits from all MACOM, and providing withdrawal and accounting services for all operating elements of all MACOM which are assigned to the installation.

### (3) CONUSA

(a) CONUSA are the link in the command chain between FORSCOM and USAR major units, but have a limited financial management role.

(b) The CONUSA role in financial management is limited to review and recommendations regarding USAR unit funding and budgeting, and intervention at FORSCOM headquarters. It has limited decision making authority in the allocation of financial resources. Budget proposals are developed at MUSARC from projected requirements of subordinate units. Coordinating installations construct a full OMAR budget, including all mission requests from assigned MUSARC, and

combine it with the installation base operations requirements, and the support for ARR and RG, for submission to FORSCOM as the installation OMAR budget. CONUSA receive a copy for review and may make recommendations to FORSCOM.

(c) As stated above, OMAR funding flows from FORSCOM to many installations (i.e., funds do not follow the chain of command through CONUSA to major USAR commands). CONUSA do however, provide detailed mission dollar guidance to the installations and to the MUSARC. This directs the installation efforts in breaking out the total OMAR mission dollars received from FORSCOM, into obligation targets for each MUSARC.

(d) CONUSA also make recommendations to FORSCOM to transfer funds between MUSARC, identify where one MUSARC may have excess funds due to program slippage, while another has a requirement for additional funding in order to accomplish its mission.

(e) RPA funding is under greater control of CONUSA, since FORSCOM distributes the funds to only one installation in each CONUSA area. The CONUSA therefore can direct the transfer of RPA targets between MUSARC, and needs to resort to FORSCOM only when requirements or excesses exist which exceed the CONUSA's total RPA funding.

(f) By DA directive, CONUSA were established with minimum staffing essential for command and control of assigned USAR units. In order to keep staffing levels as austere as possible, comptroller organizations were kept small, and were not given the responsibility or capability for actual operational fund control and distribution.

#### (4) Mobilization.

(a) In the event of mobilization, funding channels to MACOMs and installations would continue. Some turbulence is expected as several major installations change parent MACOM from FORSCOM to TRADOC. This occurs as FORSCOM major units deploy and as the installations become training base posts operated by TRADOC.

(b) The peacetime funding channels are complex and therefore may need to be modified for mobilization or general war conditions. As stated earlier, STEADFAST resulted in installations



receiving funds from multiple MACOM e.g., ACC, HSC, TRADOC and FORSCOM.

(c) It may not be practical to accept the delay inherent from the time HQDA releases funds to the time a MACOM allots it to a CONUS installation. Under emergency conditions, the 7-10 day peacetime delay may be intolerable. Furthermore, certain financial reports should be identified for discontinuance as DEFCON conditions escalate. Installation commanders should be provided authority under emergency conditions, to finance all unit/activity costs upon receipt of DA notification of emergency conditions. This may require an open allotment and standby legislation.

c. Financial Management ARNG.

(1) This section addresses types of funds, funds management and funds distribution for Army National Guard units.

(2) Army National Guard Appropriations.

(a) National Guard Personnel, Army. Provides funds for pay and allowances for officer and enlisted training, including drills, annual training and full time training duty. It also covers school and special training and administrative support which includes those funds for pay and allowances for officers on statutory tours of duty with the Bureau, Army Commands and other assignments, and for U. S. Property and Fiscal Officers (USFPO). The NGB also administers, controls and manages the centralized open allotment system to account for pay and allowances for inactive duty training (drills), reserve enlisted program (REP) training, including travel and subsistence; and statutory tours for officers, and related expenses.

(b) Operation and Maintenance, Army National Guard. Provides funds for the operation of training activities and sites, including technician personnel compensation, and supplies and materials. Logistical support covers organizational clothing and equipment, funds for repair parts and maintenance of equipment, POL and transportation and communication services. The National Guard Headquarters and State Command Support activities are funded through this appropriation, as well as limited medical support for ARNG military personnel injured during periods of training.

(c) Military Construction Army National Guard. Pro-


vides major construction funds for the construction of National Guard armories and various buildings and facilities that support the training mission. Also included in the appropriation are funds for minor construction and architectural and engineering fees. For armories, the states provide 25% of the cost of building. The state must provide the land and the value of the land can not go toward the cost of the armory. Other structures and facilities are 100% federally funded.

(3) Flow Charts.

(a) General PPBS Flow Chart - see Figure 2-17. NOTE: ARNG Directorate of NGB operates as the central control for a system of 53 states and territories.

Figure 2-17

ARNG PPBS and Funding




(b) OMARNG - See Figure 2-18. NOTE: Over 97% of OMARNG funds are provided to ARNG/NGB, and subsequently distributed to the states. The remainder is allocated to other commands or agencies by COA (as directed by NGB), for specific purposes in support of ARNG operations.

FIGURE 2-18

FY 1979 Annual Funding Program OMARNG (2065)


As of 23 Feb 1979 (\$000)



(c) NGPA - See figure 2-19. NOTE: ARNG manages an open allotment for IDT pay and allots funds for AT and ADT to the states. Small amounts are allocated directly to other commands or agencies by COA (as directed by NGB), for specific purposes in support of ARNG operations.

FIGURE 2-19

NGPA  
FY 1979 Annual Funding Program  
As of 28 Feb 79 (\$000)



Pay for Inactive Duty Training, i.e., 48 drills and Additional Training Assemblies (ATA's 24, 12, 6 and 2) also Administrative Duty Pay. Pay and allowances, subsistence and travel for Initial Active Duty Training (BT/AIT) and all Active Duty Tours in excess of 179 days which includes Statutory Tours, full-time recruiters, personnel converted to military status from ARNG technician program and others. Includes reimbursement for ARNG personnel officers assigned to Selective Service.

Pay and allowances, subsistence and travel for Annual Training; replacement clothing issued at home station and clothing issued at training centers for personnel on Initial Active Duty Training; pay and allowances and travel for Army Service Schools and Area Schools and Active Duty Tours of Special Training (e.g., Command Post Exercises, Marksmanship program, special medical training, etc.). Includes subsistence for ARNG officers furnished on a reimbursable basis.

New and anniversary payments of reenlistment bonus, enlistment bonus and educational assistance.

Pay and allowances, and travel for Committees and Boards (e.g., Reserve Forces Policy Committee, Armed Forces Policy Board, RC Promotion Boards and Federal Recognition).

Subsistence for ARNG personnel hospitalized at Active Army Installations for injuries sustained during Annual Training.

(4) ARNG Financial Management.

(a) National Level. ARNG operates a financial management system which administers both an operating agency and an accounts office. It receives, controls, and issues funds to the states, oversees state fiscal accounting and reporting, and prepares consolidated reports for Departmental Level. It provides budget guidance to the states, develops and defends the ARNG budget submissions at DA, OSD/OMB and USC. Chief, NGB ARNG is the appropriation director for NGPA, OMARNG and MCARNG. NGB ARNG manages an open allotment to account for IDT, REP and STAT tour pay disbursed by USAFAC. All other NGPA, OMARNG and MCARNG is distributed to the States, or to other commands or agencies.

(b) State Level.

1 USPFO is personally accountable for the control of Federal funds.

2 USPFO operates a central accounting office.

3 Designated AC F&AO make all disbursements and collections for States (per AR 5-9, Chart 11).

" Obligation authority is centralized in the USPFO at state level; targets are distributed to program directors/units, who submit proposals which result in obligations, e.g., requisitions, requests for local procurement, travel, etc.

d. Installation Financial Support of RC.

(1) This section addresses current CONUS installation support for RC units. Current Army practice is for funds to be allocated by FORSCOM to Coordinating Installations (CI). CIs receive detailed guidance from CONUSA in order to break funds out into obligation targets for MUSARC. Thus, the funds flow channel is direct from FORSCOM to installation for the MUSARC, which is outside the command chain of FORSCOM to CONUSA to MUSARC.

(2) General.

(a) This section is limited to support financed by O&M funds. Reserve pay funds and their disbursement, accounting and

management were covered in preceeding sections.

(b) Except for Civilian Personnel Administration and Services, AR 5-9 prescribes DA policies and establishes installation area responsibilities for coordinating and providing intraservice support, by functional type, to Active Army and Reserve Component units, activities and individuals located outside the real property boundaries of installations.

(c) Civilian Personnel Administration and Services are provided in accordance with servicing agreement established by MACOM as set forth in Civilian Personnel Regulation 200.

(d) There are 24 separate area support functions and geographical areas prescribed by AR 5-9.

(e) AR 5-9 is further refined by a joint FORSCOM/TRADOC supplement. The majority of the CI's designated in AR 5-9 are either FORSCOM or TRADOC installations.

(f) AR 5-9 does not bar MACOM from making exceptions to the prescribed geographical functions and boundaries within the MACOMs area of responsibility.

(g) Only two maps/functions in AR 5-9 apply to O&M of the ARNG pre-mobilization (Maps 10 & 11). These maps merely prescribe the installation which will provide F&A services for a given state USP&FO. Otherwise, the USP&FO acts as a CI/SI for ARNG O&M.

(h) Training assistance/support of the RC is not prescribed by AR 5-9, but is a function of the RC management structure and is handled on a case-by-case basis by close coordination among the RC, the CONUSA, the ARR, the RG and the installations/AC units having the capability to support.

(3) Description of the current situation.

(a) It appears that the geographical support coordination areas prescribed by AR 5-9 are cumbersome and inefficient due to the diversity and dispersion of Coordinating/Supporting Installations (CI/SI). For example, under the AR 5-9 concept the twenty MUSARC within the Fifth Army area look to nine coordinating installations (CI) (four TRADOC, five FORSCOM) and eleven supporting instal-

lations (SI) for mission and BASOPS support. The 90th ARCOM which has units located in Texas and Louisiana has Fort Sam Houston as a CI for logistical and administrative support, and units may and do go to Forts Polk, Hood and Bliss (SI) for actual support. Similar situations exist in all CONUSA areas.

(b) That the system is complex, should not be taken initially as a negative comment. The US Army CONUS Base is a complex one and the RC management and command and control structure is even more complex in terms of diverse units, geographical dispersion and crossing of traditional political boundaries. It cannot be expected that a support structure for the USAR can be any less complex, and it must be remembered that the support structure is not designed solely for the USAR.

(c) The following description/analysis of the current system attempts to place it in perspective in the most detail possible using general terms and notional units. Description of the system is exact detail using actual installations, locations and units is not feasible within the space and time constraints of this study.

(4) Funding Distribution for Support of the USAR.

(a) O&M funds of the USAR are provided by the OMAR Appropriation Director. O&M funds for the type support addressed in this study are all allotted to FORSCOM by OCAR. FORSCOM further allots the funds to CI's.

(b) Distribution of FORSCOM OMAR funds by functional budget account is as shown in table 2-1 below.

Table 2-1

FORSCOM OMAR Funds (FY 79 as of 12 Mar 79)

<u>BUDGET ACCOUNT</u>	<u>\$(000)</u>	<u>%</u>
Tech Pay	138941.7	37.5
BASOPS	118138.9	31.8
MUSARC Ops/Tng	51908.1	14.0

(Equip)	(14506.2)	
(POL/Trans)	(3743.4)	
(Aviation)	(7283.9)	
(Org Maint)	(7841.5)	
(Other)	(18533.1)	
ARR Ops	22401.5	6.0
CONUSA Ops	17129.7	4.6
Inst Tng Spt	<u>22483.0</u>	<u>6.1</u>
	371002.9	100.0

(c) The funds indicated under MUSARC Ops/Tng are the only OMAR funds (except Tech Pay in some cases) that are managed by the MUSARC Cdrs. This will be explained in detail in subsequent paragraphs. The amount indicated for Stock Fund purchases of TOE, TDA and CTA initial issue and replacement equipment. A large portion of the other subaccounts is also expended on Stock Fund purchases of supplies. Therefore, it can be seen that purchases of supplies and equipment constitutes the largest portion of the MUSARC Cdrs obligation authority.

(d) The CONUSA/ARR Ops funds are self-explanatory. The Instl Tng Spt funds are expended directly by SI and defray instl costs for recurring type training support such as affiliation travel costs. Tech pay and BASOPS will be covered in subsequent paragraphs.

(5) Description of Area Support Responsibilities/Interface

(a) As stated earlier, there are 24 functions for which AR 5-9 prescribes geographical coordination/support responsibilities.

1 A support installation is simply one that provides intraservice support. It is normally the nearest installation to the supported unit for economy purpose.

2 All installations have responsibilities to some extent for providing off-post intraservice support. A smaller number of installations are selected for some functions to act as CI with



the responsibility to serve as focal point for request for off-post support assistance. The CI then coordinates with the most convenient or capable SI to provide the actual support.

3 Although most of the maps/functions are applicable to the USAR, Map 2 & 8 have the principal impact on USAR O&M. These two provide for logistical, facilities engineering and administrative support coordination-USAR (#2) and disbursing and accounting for USAR technician pay (#8). Another principal impact on USAR O&M is the provision of CPO services. These services are governed by FORSCOM directive and are concentrated at a few FORSCOM installations.

4 None of the maps have any particular correlation with the USAR structure boundaries except that they do not overlap CONUSA boundaries. The boundaries of Map 8 are the same as ARR boundaries since the function also includes pay of ARR and RG military and civilian salaries and benefits. Except for Maps 2 & 8 (and the Maps for USAR military pay not discussed), the consideration of support for the AC must also be taken into account. These other maps/functions are also highly dependent on installation capabilities and are performed on a nonreimbursable basis.

(b) It remains, therefore, that there are only four resource intensive functions that impact on MUSARC day to day operations:

- 1 Provision of CPO services for technicians.
- 2 Provision of BASOPS (facilities engineering).
- 3 Payment of technicians' salaries.
- 4 Provision of other mission related support.

(c) Provision of these services in a typical geographical region of CONUS is further subdivided into at least three more areas each containing a CI/SI designated by Map 2 AR 5-9. The area will normally enclose two or more MUSARC's.

1 Provision of CPO services for technicians is not designated by Map 2, but one installation designated by FORSCOM will service the entire region. CPO support is provided on authority from

FORSCOM direct from the SI to the unit concerned irrespective of MUSARC chain of command.

2 Payment of technician salaries is accomplished by the SI designated on Map 8, AR 5-9. This is generally not the same SI that provides CPO services or the CI that provides other mission support funds to the MUSARC. Salaries are paid direct from the SI to unit technicians based on time cards submitted by units by mail to the SI.

3 BASOPS support is completely decentralized and provided by each of the MAP 2 CI/SI to the USAR centers in their region. The BASOPS dollars flowing from FORSCOM are not solely for the facilities support of the USAR; some are for payment of salaries of CI/SI garrison personnel wholly dedicated to other USAR support.

4 Provision of other mission support. As an exception to AR 5-9, FORSCOM provides funds for this type support under a Single Installation Coordinating Concept (SICC). All such funds for a given MUSARC and its subordinate units go to a single CI nearest the MUSARC headquarters. The MUSARC commander is then given an obligation target and manages the funds. As stated previously, the majority of these funds are for stock fund requisitions/purchases.

a Although the MUSARC commander may retain authority to certify obligation of all his funds and submit requisitions only to the CI, it is typical for some authority to submit requisitions to nearest SI and to make credit card purchases of POL and self service supplies to be delegated to subordinate units. This fact only reflects the realities of the geographic dispersion of the MUSARC units. It makes little sense for a unit in west Texas 40 miles from Ft Bliss to submit a requisition for an off-the-shelf item to a MUSARC commander in San Antonio for further submission to Ft Sam Houston. Credit card type purchases must be decentralized because of their nature, particularly POL. On the other hand, it makes little difference to the unit whether a requisition for a long lead-time item that must be obtained from the NICP is submitted through the MUSARC and CI. Dictated centralization of the system might improve status visibility at the CI, but would totally remove the flexibility intended for the MUSARC.

b Although the MUSARC commander may coordinate support primarily with the CI, he may and does coordinate support

direct with various SI especially for annual training. The CI remains as a single source of expertise and manpower for coordinating mission support if required. To insure positive fund control, FORSCOM requires that the MUSARC commander centralize his obligations through the CI during the last month of the fiscal year (Paragraph B-5f, Appendix B, FORSCOM Reg 37-7).

c The fact that technician salaries are not given as an obligation target to the MUSARC commander through the CI prevents reprogramming within a given budget account except by FORSCOM. However, FORSCOM is currently testing such a system with a few MUSARC's.

d The Single Installation Coordinating Concept (SICC), was initiated by FORSCOM on a test basis in FY 75. The concept originally included BASOPS funds as well as other mission funds, however, difficulties with management and control of BASOPS funds caused these funds to be withdrawn from the concept. The concept proved successful with other mission support and has been institutionalized in the FORSCOM-TRADOC Supplement to AR 5-9 and FORSCOM Reg 37-7, Financial Administration. The concept has resulted in high annual expenditures rates for USAR mission funds and has experienced few RS 3679 violations.

(6) Summary.

(a) Area Support Coordination has little impact on the ARNG prior to mobilization.

(b) Despite AR 5-9 complexity, FORSCOM implementation of the SICC provides the best possible support to the USAR in a flexible manner that is advantageous to the geographic realities of MUS-ARCs situations.

(c) Directed centralization of support to the USAR should be avoided unless forced by C&C structure changes.

(d) AR 5-9 does portray a confusing picture and should be rewritten to reflect realities of changes introduced by FORSCOM.

(e) FORSCOM is continually making improvements to the system as USAR expertise is developed.

e. RC Personnel Pay Systems.

(1) This section addresses pay for RC personnel during peace and the transition to war (mobilization). The Army pay systems are not significantly affected by any structural changes being considered in this C2 study. Enhancement of the pay systems are related to systems and equipment improvement, and availability and qualifications of technical personnel.

(2) Peacetime.

(a) JUMPS-RC, a centralized system operated at USAFAC, pays USAR and ARNGUS drill pay (IDT).

1 AT and ADT was not included under the initial JUMPS-RC, due to equipment and systems capability at USAFAC.

2 AT/ADT payment is decentralized to Active Army Installation Finance and Accounting Offices. Payments are reported to USAFAC for consolidation on a tax master file, facilitating W-2 production.

(b) Unit level Administrative and Supply Technicians (AST) spend considerable time preparing pay documents. (a function of technical specialists at AC installations.) It is costly and inefficient to establish and maintain such proficiency in ASTs; this is compounded by their high turnover, and by other competing requirements for their attention.

(c) Field testing is being conducted in Sixth Army and at Fort McCoy, to develop systems which will improve RC pay administration. Advantages of these proto-type systems include:

1 Reduced pay work load at RC unit level by the AST.

2 Prevention/detection of duplicate payments (one station responsible for all types of RC pay for individuals of an RC unit).

3 Functionally trained full time pay specialists managing pay administration and records.

4 Improved Utilization of RPA funds.

5 Potential for cost and manpower savings by centralizing RC pay administration.

(d) As USAFAC increases its equipment and systems capability, full centralization of RC pay (IDT, AT and ADT) will be feasible.

(3) Mobilization.

(a) Upon mobilization, individual pay accounts are automatically established for active RC personnel on the JUMPS Active Army Master Military Pay File.

(b) At mobilization stations, RC personnel update financial records by making decisions regarding:

1 Allotments.

2 Tax exemptions.

3 Eligibility/application for BAQ and BAS.

(c) USAFAC has the (ADP) capacity to accept the influx to JUMPS-AA of all mobilizing reservists and all draftees up to a ceiling expected to cover anticipated strength levels. First priority at USAFAC is for payment of the troops.

(d) Because JUMPS-AA and JUMPS-RC are different systems, USAR financial personnel do not gain maximum training or relevant experience for operating in JUMPS-AA when mobilized, by operating under JUMPS-RC during peace.

(e) COA is considering establishment of entitlement for allowances (quarters and subsistence) and allotment designations in individual JUMPS-RC accounts. This would greatly facilitate the transition from RC to AC status. Allowance eligibility and allotments could be verified during annual training.

(f) A major advance under consideration by COA is the establishment of a single standard Army pay system, with the capability of paying for either RC or AC status. One standard system

would:

- 1 Eliminate conversion from one system in peace (JUMPS-RC) for a part of the Total Army (USAR and ARNGUS) to the Active Army system after mobilization.

- 2 Reduce administrative processing during mobilization.

- 3 Simplify RC financial training and improve relevancy of experience of RC financial personnel.

(g) MOBEX 78 revealed differences in treatment of some data elements (e.g., taxes and years of service) by JUMPS-AA and JUMPS-RC programs. These differences created minor problems which can be corrected with (ADP) program changes. A single standard pay system (para 6 above) would eliminate such problems in the future.

(4) Summary.

(a) Current peacetime systems and procedures are adequate to provide correct and timely pay for RC personnel. Several test projects are under way which should improve both the efficiency and effectiveness of paying RC personnel.

(b) USAFAC has the capability to accommodate all mobilized personnel on JUMPS-Army. Upon mobilization, RC personnel are transferred from the JUMPS-RC to the JUMPS-Active Army pay system. Current enhancement of systems capability at USAFAC should permit further improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of effecting the transition from peacetime (RC) to mobilized (AC) pay systems, by developing JUMPS-RC capability to:

- 1 Absorb AT and ADT.

- 2 Add data regarding allowances and allotments to the individual pay file.

(c) JUMPS-RC and JUMPS-Active Army are compatible, i.e., they are capable of performing in combination, and are capable of orderly, efficient integration and operation.

(d) Continued improvements of centralized pay systems

and procedures should result in reduced administrative burden at RC unit level during peace and in more efficient RC transition to the Active Army payroll upon mobilization. This will be optimized when the Army develops a long range plan to integrate all components into a single master Army pay system, which will pay according to the current status of an individual.

#### 4. Communications/ADP.

a. Communications support to the Army CONUS C2 structure is provided primarily by USACC facilities located at Army installations, MACOM headquarters and HQDA. C2 functions employ a combination of dedicated and common user communications services. C2 headquarters, as communications users, are responsible for defining and validating requirements for communications services. These requirements are placed on the supporting USACC element. The USACC organizational structure in CONUS (under 7th Signal Command) provides a supporting USACC CE element for HQDA, each MACOM, and each installation. New requirements are processed within USACC channels for engineering, costing, and programming resources. Requirements are satisfied by expansion of existing Army services and facilities, installation on new Army facilities, acquisition of commercial services or use of Defense Communication System services.

b. Primary problem areas and deficiencies in the area of communications support of the current C2 structure are discussed in Chapter 3. The following is a summary of those areas directly affecting the C2 structure effectiveness.

(1) Semi-Active, inactive and state operated mobilization stations lack facilities for both secure and non-secure voice, record and data communications. Providing these facilities after M day will take too long. The only apparent solutions to this problem are:

(a) Equip late deploying signal units with sufficient organic equipment and mobilize them early at inactive mob sites.

(b) Organize and equip non-deploying signal units which can mobilize early at these stations.

(c) Stabilize the mob stationing plan and provide funds for pre-engineering and standby contracts for commercial communications equipment and services.

(d) Adjust the mob stationing plan to eliminate the need to use inactive installations prior to M+180.

(2) During mobilization, active installations will experience a severe shortage of CE personnel needed to expand to 24-hour service and satisfy the expected high volume of communications traffic. The loss of STRAF personnel, potential cross-leveling of USACC military personnel into deploying units, and the lack of identified IRR or civilian personnel with requisite skills and security clearances may prevent the expansion of installation level communications support.

(3) The problem in paragraph 4b(1) and (2), above, may seriously degrade the effectiveness of any Army CONUS C2 structure which may be adopted. Both of these problems are being addressed as MOBEX 78 issues.

c. ADP support to the Army CONUS C2 structure is provided by a number of separately managed ADP systems. The primary ADP support systems are discussed below.

(1) The Base Operating System (BASOPS) provides installation level ADP support in CONUS. BASOPS supports primarily Standard Army MIS but also provides additional capacity for local unique and MACOM standard applications. The BASOPS is operated and maintained by the MISO at the installation but system planning, development and expansion is centrally managed by HQDA through the Computer Systems Command. Project VIABLE will replace the current BASOPS ADPE with a new generation of ADPE in the mid-1980's.

(2) MACOM headquarters, in general, have ADP systems which provide combinations of MIS, C2 and mission support services to the MACOM. These ADP systems are operated, maintained and managed by the MACOM under HQDA supervision IAW AR 18-1.

(3) HQDA Staff Support Agencies (SSA) and Field Operating Agencies (FOA) operate a variety of ADP systems supporting HQDA and providing centralized ADP services to MACOM and installations. These systems are developed, operated and maintained by the SSA/FOA under the supervision of their parent ARSTAFF agency IAW AR 18-1.

(4) The Army operates four CONUS WWMCCS sites at HQDA, AWC, MTMC and FORSCOM. Mobilization stations and major deployable units



are provided access to the WWMCCS through the FORSCOM WWMCCS Entry System (WES). Other MACOM are provided access to HQDA WWMCCS computers through the Army WWMCCS Intercomputer Network. Army WWMCCS sites are operated and maintained by the responsible Army command/agency under the supervision of the JCS. WWMCCS development and expansion is under the architectural and engineering supervision of DCA.

d. Primary problem areas and deficiencies in ADP support of the current C2 structure are discussed in Chapter 3. The following is a summary of those areas most directly affecting the C2 structure in CONUS.

(1) Current ADP systems at active installations (BASOPS) are approaching obsolescence and saturation and many inactive, semi-active or state operated mobilization stations do not have ADP support. The lack of adequate ADP support will reduce the quality and timeliness of information available for decision makers during mobilization. This is major problem for any C2 structure adopted.

(2) Current Army Management Information Systems (MIS) supporting installation functions are specifically designed for vertical management systems involving only the installations, MACOM and HQDA (e.g., SALLS, SIDPERS, STANFINS). Decentralization of mobilization C2 functions to any intermediate headquarters between FORSCOM and mobilization stations cannot be fully supported without additional information system development or redesign and expansion of present systems.

(3) While WWMCCS was designed for and dedicated to support C2 applications and is the most useful ADP system during mobilization, it has not yet been extended (via WES) to all mobilization stations. The Army WWMCCS computers are also approaching saturation under estimated mobilization workloads. The WES is also relatively inflexible from the point of view of terminal users and suffers from an absence of dedicated personnel spaces (operators) at terminal locations. Ad hoc terminal operators are not adequately trained on the system capabilities and lack local procedures to make the best use of those capabilities.

#### Summary of Organizational Strengths and Weaknesses

Since the organization of CONUS command and control structure in 1973, there have been several attempts to improve the organization as

field experience was gained. A review of these efforts, to include previous studies, and the ACCS-82 group effort to isolate both the good and bad features have revealed significant strengths and weaknesses of the current structure. Significant strengths identified include the provision of dedicated full-time active component support of the Reserve components, efficient peacetime command and control of the Reserve Components, efficient peacetime installation management, and the proper alignment of forces, schools, and combat development activities. Significant weaknesses identified include span of control, mobilization command relationships and responsibilities, lack of valid post mobilization missions for all command and control headquarters, inadequate mobilization planning and inadequate communications and ADP/MIS support for mobilization. Span of control weaknesses identified were excessive span of control for FORSCOM, an insufficient number of corps headquarters to support wartime requirements, and the unnecessary layering and duplication effort in the CONUSA, ARCOM and ARR structure.

The command relationships between the CONUSA, ARR and mobilization station commanders, particularly at non-FORSCOM mobilization stations, are vague and conflicting. This command relationship problem is further exacerbated by excessive organizational turbulence during the transition from peace to war. A significant number of command and control headquarters without a mobilization mission were noted, as well as the lack of sufficient dedicated mobilization planners at all levels of command, and inadequate communications and ADP/MIS support for mobilization. Each of these significant strengths and weaknesses will be further developed in Chapter 3. The comprehensive listing of all strengths and weaknesses of the existing structure (and all alternatives) are addressed in Part B, Section 2 of Chapter 5.

#### Baseline Resources

The manpower and dollar resources required in the CONUS structure are shown in tables 2-2 and 2-3. The data reflected is that allocated for FY 79 to MACOM or other operating agencies (OA) in the Jan 79 HQDA Program - Budget Guidance (PBG).

Table 2-2

HQDA  
FY 79 MANPOWER PROGRAM

	<u>OFFICER</u>	<u>UO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>CIV</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
FORSCOM						
CIV CUTS					(41976)	
FY 79 ES	22226	6339	272301	300866	(-1910)	340932
					40066	
TRADOC						
CIV CUTS					(34306)	
FY 79 ES	10893	1062	44452	56407	(-928)	89785
					33378	
DARCOM						
CIV CUTS					(108395)	
FY 79 ES	2954	228	6695	9877	(-3151)	115121
					105244	
HSC						
CIV CUTS					(21927)	
FY 79 ES	9222	53	16368	25643	(-322)	47248
					21605	
ACC						
CIV CUTS					(-9441)	
FY 79 ES	1036	288	16219	17543	(-215)	26769
					9226	
OTHERS						
					(98805)	
					(-912)	
	27081	4378	332905	364364	97893	462257
					(314850)	
TOTAL						
CIV CUTS					(-7438)	
FY 79 ES	73412	12348	688940	774700	307412	1082112

Table 2-3

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
FY 79 APPROPRIATIONS DATA  
(\$000)

	TOTAL	OMA	OMAR	OMARNG	FHMA	RPA	NGPA	PEMA	RDE	MC	OTHER
DA	31015172	9115000	420300	795700	667300	547350	755500	6058059	2635864	874809	9145290
OCAR	1473b		1473	---	---	(318934)	---	---	---	---	---
NGB	5640b		---	5640	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
OSA	491a		491	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
TAG	68261a		6638	10775	---	50848	---	---	---	---	---
TSG	26a		16	---	---	---	10	---	---	---	---
OCE	2494a		1794	700	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
STATES	773410a		---	773410	---	312	---	---	---	---	---
USAREUR	45a		45	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
FORSCOM	1859548b	1205912	379800	4675	130599	138562	---	---	---	---	---
TRADOC	1220177b	1120237	---	---	68235	31705	---	---	---	---	---
DARCOM	2253407c	2233552	6268	---	23587	---	---	---	---	---	---
USACC	441478b	427096	9847	---	4535	---	---	---	---	---	---
HSC	589847b		---	---	1846	6989	---	---	---	---	---
USAREC	13452a		12952	500	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
USAFAC	1075400a		976	---	438498	318934e	755490e	6058059	2635864	874809	9145290
UNDISTRIBUTED	22709711d	3557191	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---

## NOTES:

- a - RC Appropriations Only
- b - TOA (Total Obligational Authority)
- c - TOA Minus PEMA, RDE and AIF
- d - Undistributed for the purposes of this display only
- e - Open allotments disbursed by USAFAC and Field FAO's

## Chapter 3

### DEVELOPMENT OF ISSUES

#### General

1. The study group identified several issues that required resolution in order to meet the objectives of the study. Many issues were directly related to organizational structures. Others were most logically related to those activities of the Army involved with making the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. A third category, labeled "other issues," was used for all the identified problems that did not relate to the two foregoing categories.

2. During the analysis that was conducted to select the ACCS-82 preferred alternative, the study group fully considered the issues and findings presented in this chapter and then related them to the feasible organizational alternatives to arrive at the recommendations contained in Chapter 7. This chapter presents the issues and findings of ACCS-82 in three categories: organizational, transitional and others.

#### Organizational Issues

1. Layering. The Army has been criticized by the GAO(1) and OSD(2) for having unnecessary layering of AC headquarters in the RC management structure between FORSCOM HQ and RC units.

a. Discussion. The study group investigated the relationships between layering--the number of organizational elements within a single, vertical chain of command--and span of control--the number of organizational elements subordinated to a single organization within discrete chains of command stemming from one headquarters. This investigation was necessary to determine whether the existing layers were necessary or unnecessary. Although organization manuals and

- 
- (1) Comptroller General, General Accounting Office (GAO). Can the Army and Air Force Reserves Support the Active Forces Effectively? Report to the Congress of the United States, Washington, DC, 25 April 1979, p.48.
  - (2) Department of Defense. Reserve and Guard Operations, Decision Package Set 059 (DPS 059). Washington, DC, 19 Nov 77.

various other documents describe a structure in which there are two layers between HQ FORSCOM and RC units--CONUSA and MUSARC/TAG--the study group found that in reality there is a third layer--the AAR HQ--in the chain of command. (See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 7, "Army Readiness Region".) The study group also found functional duplications between CONUSA HQ, ARR HQ, RG, and Advisors. Although it could not be conclusively proven that a third layer in the structure is unnecessary, it was concluded that the CONUSA, with adequate additional resources, could perform ARR functions and the ARR HQ could be eliminated with little risk that AC support for the RC would be unacceptably degraded.

b. Finding. One layer of the RC management structure should be eliminated.

2. Installation Management. There are many problems involving post-mobilization management of installations. A separate installation management command (IMCOM), that services selected MACOM, may be advantageous.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 3, "Installation Management Alternatives: A Feasibility Study."

b. Finding. Although a separate IMCOM offers many advantages over the present system for making the transition from peacetime to wartime operations, many other factors, principally resources, mitigate against establishment of an IMCOM now.

3. Corps Headquarters in CONUS. Additional corps headquarters in CONUS would reduce the FORSCOM span of control and assist in meeting wartime command and control requirements.

a. Discussion. There are two AC corps headquarters in CONUS--III and XVIII Airborne. III Corps, at Ft Hood, TX, controls two divisions, one brigade and one major installation. XVIII Airborne Corps, at Ft Bragg, NC, commands one division and a major installation and has training OPCON over a second division. Both corps headquarters control "Corps Troops" (COSCOM, artillery, etc). In addition to the corps headquarters, there are six divisions and two brigades subordinated directly to HQ FORSCOM. Accepted US Army doctrine prescribes attachment of at least five Divisions, plus "corps troops" to each corps headquarters. Although the two CONUS corps headquarters should, in theory, be able to handle the ten CONUS divisions, geography works against this--three of the divisions are

in the Western US--Colorado, Washington and California. III Corps, in Texas, would be overtaxed, from a time-distance standpoint, if these divisions were assigned to it. Assignment of the divisions to XVIII Airborne Corps would also be unwieldly, due to geography. Additionally, current mobilization plans require one corps headquarters that is not in the active force structure. Clearly, activation of a deployable corps headquarters in the Western United States would alleviate some of the HQ FORSCOM span of control problems and it would fulfill requirements for mobilization plans.

b. Finding. Activation of an AC corps headquarters in the Western United States would provide both a needed reduction of the FORSCOM span of control, and an intermediate control headquarters for the 4th, 7th, and 9th Infantry Divisions and also would assist in satisfying wartime force requirements.

4. Span of Control. When considering peacetime and mobilization requirements, some CONUS headquarters may have too many subordinate headquarters for proper exercise of command and control, and some may have too few.

a. Discussion. The span of control of some headquarters in such that command is by exception, rather than the commander directly influencing actions of subordinates through personal contact. Even when considering the principle that organizations commanded by major generals and lieutenant generals need little day-to-day supervision, the number of subordinate headquarters makes "fine-tuning" of mobilization extremely difficult. Two prime examples are that the FORSCOM Commander has 53 subordinate organizations; and upon mobilization the CONUSA Commanders, in addition to the USAR commands, will have command of the STARC, giving them a span of control potentially as unwieldly as that of FORSCOM. During peacetime the CONUSA Commander can satisfactorily manage the assigned subordinate units. Conversely, the XVIII Airborne Corps Headquarters appears to have too few subordinates to effectively use its capabilities.

b. Finding. The span of control of HQ FORSCOM is excessive, especially for effective mobilization. CONUSA span of control is adequate in peacetime, but may be excessive when STARC are activated. Subordination of units to MUSARC and TAG was found to be acceptable. The span of control of HQ XVIII Airborne Corps may be too small to fully utilize the capabilities of that headquarters.

5. Functional Alignment of MACOM and RC. The concept of aligning

non-deploying, or late-deploying, units with the CONUS MACOM to which they will be assigned in wartime appears valid.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 4, "Desirability of MACOM Exercising OPCON or Command Over Functional RC units."

b. Finding. Selected RC units which have post-mobilization missions of employment by CONUS non-FORSCOM MACOM should be under the peacetime operational control (OPCON) of those MACOM for mobilization planning and training supervision. Command of these RC units, less the specified OPCON, should be retained by FORSCOM (USAR units) and the Governors (ARNG units). The HQ FORSCOM SUIP and WARMUP programs offer excellent vehicles for identifying candidate units to implement this concept. All OPCON relationships will be clarified by a memorandum of understanding (MOU) which may be tailored to the needs of each individual MACOM and the nature of the RC units support mission(s). The personnel spaces recommended by ACCS-82 should be interpreted as a starting point, or "floor", not as a "ceiling". Additional manpower spaces for each MACOM HQ must be justified on the basis of the MOU, the number of units controlled, and manpower surveys.

6. ARCOM Command and Control Capability. The ARCOM headquarters do not appear to be properly staffed to exercise the full range of command and control over the diverse specialties of their assigned units.

a. Discussion. The GAO has reported that ARCOM headquarters cannot effectively command and control their subordinate units.(3)

b. Finding. The TDA of ARCOM HQ are properly designed to provide those headquarters with the capability to exercise the full range of command and control. However, ACCS-82 found that the experience of incumbents in ARCOM staffs, plus the limited training time available to the RC, produced situations in which the ARCOM's ability to exercise the full range of command and control--especially planning and supervision of training--is questionable. The problem is not so much one of the individuals' abilities but, instead, appropriate distribution of branch-peculiar expertise within the ARCOM

---

(3) Comptroller General, General Accounting Office (GAO), Op. cit., p. 49.



staff in relationship to branch designation of subordinate units.

7. AC Command of AC and RC Elements. Headquarters composed primarily of AC personnel may be able to effectively command and control both AC and RC elements.

a. Discussion. This concept has intuitive appeal--one of the recognized problems that RC units have is lack of training time. A full-time AC headquarters should offset that problem. Commanders of AC units, however, may view the problem differently. The Total Army concept is based on ready, early deploying AC forces, with follow-on RC elements deploying later (this statement, however, should not be interpreted to negate the requirements for "high-priority," early deploying RC units). The AC commander of both AC and RC units would have "split" interests--keeping his AC units ready to deploy rapidly and paying attention to the needs of his RC units. There is no consensus in the Army's leadership concerning this issue--in fact, opinions range to both extremes of "pure" and "mixed" AC/RC commands.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 studies indicated the feasibility of this concept, if there is proper command emphasis on the requirements of the structure and adequate staffing. However, when the realities of stationing of AC and RC units are considered, plus the early deployment requirements placed on AC commanders, this concept could be difficult to execute.

8. "Pure" USAR Chain of Command. A USAR-only chain of command, linking HQDA with USAR units, may be desirable.

a. Discussion. See volume III, Annex F, Appendix 5, "US Army Reserve Command."

b. Finding. Establishment of a "pure" USAR command would result in reduced AC/RC integration and, thus, a weakening of the Total Army concept; it would increase the wartime span of control for HQ FORSCOM; it would reduce AC support for RC training and readiness; and there would be organizational turbulence over a three-to-five year period, involving concomitant degradation of RC readiness.

9. Wartime Effectiveness Versus Peacetime Efficiency. Aligning forces and headquarters for wartime operations may not permit realization of peacetime efficiencies.

a. Discussion. The ideal organizational structure for the Army

would include grouping all units under the wartime headquarters with which they would deploy and fight. The headquarters would train, supervise and manage their subordinates and have them ready to deploy at a moment's notice. In reality, however, this nation would be hard-pressed to afford such a force. Our national strategy relies upon an appropriate mix of AC forces--tasked to be ready for short-notice deployment--and RC forces--tasked to be ready for deployment at time-phased intervals. The AC forces are stationed at less than 50 major installations, but the RC forces are in thousands of cities or towns throughout the nation. Stationing of RC units reflects tradition, local desires and environmental considerations, but largely--in this era of volunteer armed forces--the ability to recruit and retain personnel from the local areas dictates location.

b. Finding. The realities of stationing and force structure, in conjunction with changing requirements due to force modernization (especially weapons systems development) and modifications to strategy, create a situation wherein it is extremely difficult to efficiently align peacetime forces for wartime operations. However, ACCS-82 believes that improvements to the existing structure are possible.

10. MACOM Interface Problems. Interface of MACOM for mobilization and deployment planning is inadequate.

a. Discussion. MOBEX 78 disclosed that while TRADOC, FORSCOM, HSC and the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, each had requirements for facilities at Ft Dix, NJ, their plans were not coordinated. Other interface problems also exist. It must be recognized that inter-MACOM coordination, and coordination outside DA (i.e., involving other Services and other governmental agencies), is difficult for any single MACOM.

b. Finding. The current system, in which a MACOM (FORSCOM) is the DA agent for mobilization and deployment planning, leads to problems of coordination between lateral and higher military headquarters, other Services and other governmental agencies.

11. Capability to Accomplish CONUS Contingency Missions. A sufficient number of headquarters must be available to accomplish CONUS contingency operations after deployments begin.

a. Discussion. Planning for CONUS contingency operations has been relegated to a position below planning for deployment of forces.

This is not consistent with the Army's primary mission, indeed its reason for existence, which is defense of the CONUS (less aerospace defense). As a consequence, the requirement for area-oriented commands to control CONUS contingency operations is often overlooked. The current structure below FORSCOM has the CONUSA and STARC to accomplish such missions. The ARR and ARCOM, to a limited degree, have also been used for such operations. The delegation from FORSCOM to three CONUSA is manageable. At CONUSA level, however, there is a requirement for interface with other governmental agencies (see the discussion contained in Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 12, "Missions/Functions of FEMA, FPA and CDA"). Although some planning and coordination is accomplished at the national level, there is little joint planning and coordination between military commands and civil regional agencies. Utilization of the STARC concept during the past year was a step in the right direction; however, the CONUSA, which will control the STARC when they are activated, have had little experience working directly with the STARC. There is some question as to whether CONUSA can control all the STARC in their areas, considering time-distance factors and the possible chaotic conditions that would exist if STARC were activated during a mobilization accompanied by a severe civil emergency.

b. Finding. The Army's capability to handle CONUS contingencies is dependent upon adequate non-deploying command and control headquarters.

12. Requirements for Flexibility. There must be a designed capability in the command and control system to permit handling of unanticipated requirements.

a. Discussion. A review of the Army's experience in making the transition from peacetime to wartime operations, and recent exercises such as MOBEX 76 and 78, indicate that actual operations usually vary significantly from plans. Additionally, the Army has centralized certain operations (personnel, logistics, funding) to a great degree to achieve peacetime efficiencies. The systems supporting these centralized operations tend to become overwhelmed by the sheer volume of transactions involved in mobilization.

b. Finding. There should be a capability to decentralize the execution of mobilization, and authority must be delegated to permit commanders at various levels to cope with the unexpected.

13. Span of Interest. Broad, divergent and demanding missions for a

single commander adversely affect his capability to exercise proper command and control.

a. Discussion. The problem described here is that of a commander whose interests are divided into two or more directions. A commander who is responsible for force deployment, peacetime command, mobilization and deployment planning, operating an installation and providing RC support cannot, logically, be as effective as a commander who concentrates on only one or two major tasks.

b. Finding. (Findings for Organizational Issues 2-5, 7-9, 11-13 and 15 are related to this issue). The current structure does not present difficulties regarding span of interest. However, one ACCS-82 alternative (Alternative 4) has significant span of interest implications with problems as described in a. above.

14. Standardization of CONUSA Procedures. Actions affecting the RC should be standardized throughout FORSCOM.

a. Discussion. The RC structure of approximately 6500 units, distributed throughout the US, is either commanded or supervised for training and readiness by HQ FORSCOM through three CONUSA. Unless there is a high degree of standardization between the CONUSA, RC units may be confused by conflicting instructions and may be inaccurately evaluated due to the application of varying standards and procedures. Further, the RC structure is mobilized at 50 installations commanded by five MACOM. Inconsistencies of procedures at these installations would further aggravate the problems presented above.

b. Findings.

(1) The operating procedures and instructions for mobilization and deployment vary from CONUSA-to-CONUSA and installation-to-installation.

(2) RC unit commanders indicated, during interviews with the ACCS-82 staff, that CONUSA do not uniformly apply evaluation standards (FORSCOM Pam 135-3, FORSCOM Reg 350-2, AR 220-1) to RC units.

(3) RC units that must cross CONUSA boundaries during mobilization are confused by conflicting instructions and procedures between CONUSA and installations.

15. CONUSA Peacetime Relationships with Installations. What are the requirements and capabilities for CONUSA to monitor the status of installation resources during peacetime?

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 19, "Command and Control: RC Units and Installations."

b. Finding. ACCS-82 studies confirmed the STEADFAST reorganization principles which removed CONUSA from the installation management chain of command. Control of personnel and logistics management is centralized at HQDA; MILPERCEN and DARCOM activities act as HQDA agents to provide services to installations. No intermediate headquarters between HQDA (or its actions agencies) has the capability to direct installation cross-leveling or drawdown actions: delegation of this authority to intermediate headquarters could very well be counterproductive to the overall DA operations. Intermediate headquarters should "flag" problems up the chain of command to insure that proper management is focused on solving the problem. Organizational structures and reporting systems are in-being to accomplish a portion of this task. Further, reinforcement of the existing chain of command could be achieved by providing CONUSA the sufficient ADPE/MIS and manpower to monitor AC and RC personnel and logistic status at mobilization stations within their respective areas.

16. Functional RC Commands. Functional RC commands may offer advantages over commands established largely on a geographic basis.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 8, "Functionalization of the USAR."

b. Finding. Existing RC commands frequently do not have the time or staff expertise to provide required assistance to all subordinate units. Yet, time and distance factors mitigate against nationwide RC functional commands. More importantly, however, the concept of functional commands conflicts with the Army's doctrine of composite service support and may operate in opposition to the HQ FORSCOM "SUIP" and WARMUP" programs.

17. Elimination of Battalion-Level and Flight Facility Advisors. Manpower spaces dedicated to battalion-level and flight facility advisors may be better utilized elsewhere. Elimination of these advisors may require more complete use of the RC chain of command.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 15, "Requirements for Battalion and Flight Facility Advisors."

b. Findings.

(1) USAR commanders generally confirm the issue as written; however, ARNG commanders generally oppose the loss of battalion-level advisors. ACCS-82 studies indicate that battalion-level advisors are generally underemployed, duplicate somewhat the ARR and RG activities, often perform tasks that should be performed by unit technicians and frequently become enmeshed in the units' chain of command. The ACCS-82 studies found that the advisory system above the battalion level is appropriate and can adequately support units at, and below, battalion-level.

(2) ACCS-82 found that not all flight facility advisors appear to be essential.

18. Excessive RC Administrative Workload. The administrative workload of RC units is excessive for the assets available to accomplish the work. As a consequence, both "extra duty" (non-paid) and training time are used to accomplish administration.

a. Discussion. RC units, especially below battalion level, have an administrative workload which equals or exceeds that of their AC counterparts. Units with structure strength of less than 50 are not authorized an administrative supply technician (AST) and must be satellited on other units for day-to-day administrative support. Particularly for those units, weekend training time is devoted to accomplishing administrative matters. In some organizations weekly work sessions of four hours each, in a non-paid status, are required to accomplish work which cannot be done during IDT. Available assistance is frequently underutilized. Inspections, from DA to ARCOM level, demand too much of the available time because of their frequency.

b. Finding. The information in "a" above was obtained during interviews with unit commanders and technicians. In contrast to that, a 1978-79 investigation by the Army Audit Agency (AAA)(4) found that: sufficient personnel resources in company-size units are gen-

---

(4) Army Audit Agency (AAA). Report of Audit: Administrative Workload in the Reserve Components, Washington, 16 April 1979.

erally allocated to handle the RC administrative workload; the workload does not adversely affect the capability of units to train effectively; Administrative Supply Technicians (AST) are not supervised adequately; consolidation of administration is feasible and should be done; productivity of AST could be improved by identifying and using more efficient work methods and their productivity and efficiency could be improved through better training programs; benefits from automated personnel systems are not fully realized; increased ARNG use of AFEES would decrease AST workload and provide additional benefits for the Army; only a relatively low number of reports are required by HQDA, NGB, FORSCOM and CONUSA--reporting requirements below these levels are relatively uncontrolled and reports unnecessarily pass through three levels of review; the substantial amount of paperwork processed to document the fact that some prior service personnel are not participating satisfactorily as unit members is not productive. In addition to the foregoing AAA findings, ACCS-82 identified certain administrative requirements placed upon the RC units that appear to be unnecessary. For instance, it appears that Annual General Inspections of RC units are conducted too frequently; further, maintaining current POR qualifications for individuals, considering an average annual turn-over of one-third of the personnel, does not seem to be productive except in high-priority units where these actions should be continued.

19. Inappropriate Staffing of RG. The Army's Readiness Groups (RG) may be inappropriately staffed.

a. Discussion. Due to changes in Army training programs (ARTEP, etc), training aids (TEC, etc), and improvement and expansion of affiliation and association programs, RG may be staffed improperly. Initial staffing of RG was based on unit density, by branch, with little regard to other assistance being available. Over time, training programs have become less complicated and training aids have improved. RG have undergone very few changes and are essentially organized as they were at the beginning of the STEADFAST program.

b. Finding. A 1979 General Accounting Office report(5) cited apparent overstaffing at one RG, due to support being provided to RC units via the Affiliation Program. However, many RG chiefs told ACCS-82 that their RG were understaffed in selected areas of func-

---

(5) Comptroller General, General Accounting Office (GAO), op. cit., pp. 42-45.

tional expertise (signal, food service, medical, and others). ACCS-82 found that HQ FORSCOM should conduct manpower surveys of RG to determine appropriate staffing levels.

20. Proponency for Mobilization and Deployment Planning. Responsibility for mobilization and deployment planning is not uniformly, consistently and adequately defined in the Army command and control structure.

a. Discussion. There is no single manager for mobilization planning in the Army. FORSCOM has been designated as the DA executive agency for mobilization planning, with the resulting perception that FORSCOM is responsible for all CONUS mobilization planning. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 6, "Analysis of Army Force Mobilization Planning/Execution."

b. Finding. There is a requirement for an Army-wide mobilization planning system. The current designation of HQ FORSCOM as the HQDA "Executive Agent" for mobilization of RC units is inappropriate and creates confusion. Since mobilization planning involves other services, other governmental agencies and all MACOM, HQDA should retain "Executive Agent" responsibilities and accomplish the central role of developing guidance and overseeing total Army mobilization planning. Development of an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) will provide a basis for HQDA to assume full responsibility for mobilization and for assigning specific mobilization missions and planning responsibility to subordinate agencies and MACOM.

#### Transition Issues

1. DELETED.

2. STARC Organization and Missions. States are applying different interpretations to directions concerning organization and mission assignments for STARC. Control of STARC may present span of control problems for higher headquarters.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 20, "State Area Command (STARC) - Missions, Responsibilities and Capabilities."

b. Finding. The findings for Organizational Issues 4, 11, 12, 13 and 20 apply to this issue. ACCS-82 found that planning and organizational progress for STARC vary widely from state-to-state.



Roles, functions and capabilities of STARC are not uniform nor have they, generally, been thoroughly examined.

3. Lack of ADP/MIS Master Plan for RC. There is no Automatic Data Processing/Management Information System Master Plan that combines AC and RC requirements.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 21, "ADPE, MIS and Communications."

b. Finding. The findings for Transitional Issues 6, 18, and 22 also apply to this issue. ACCS-82 confirmed the lack of comprehensive ADP/MIS master planning for the RC. This results in ADP planning and operational incompatibility between RC elements and between RC and AC elements (and, thus, a lack of capability to plan for integrating AC and RC command and control systems). As a result, a variety of makeshift "solutions" are being continued by RC units, CONUSA and FORSCOM. Many software programs have been, and are being, developed for use with mini-computers, obsolete ADPE and Army standard systems.

4. Lack of ADP Capabilities. Current functional processes and their supporting MIS are not well structured to facilitate termination of non-essential ADP requirements during mobilization. Current installation ADPE is both saturated and approaching obsolescence.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 21, "Installation Level ADP Support During Mobilization", page F-21-8.

b. Finding. The findings of Transitional Issues 3 and 5 apply to this issue. ACCS-82 confirmed installation level ADPE capacity must be matched to mobilization workload through a combination of new, modern ADPE, redesigned MIS and modified functional processes which eliminate non-essential functions. ADP support capability for inactive, semi-active and state operated mobilization stations must be established in peacetime. The Army must adopt organizations which will facilitate a more fully integrated management of automation and communications networks supporting command and control and management/support processes.

5. Inadequate Communications. Some headquarters and installations have inadequate communications capabilities. Some headquarters that have a requirement to enter the WWMCCS cannot do so.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 21, "ADPE, MIS and Communications."

b. Finding. The findings for Transitional Issues 3 and 4 apply to this issue. ACCS-82 confirmed two basic problem areas involving communications.

(1) Problem areas in expansion of CONUS communications for mobilization are well defined in MOBEX 78 issues.

(2) Resolution of communications problems in supporting mobilization will require investment of resources in personnel programs, equipment and facilities for semiactive and inactive mobilization stations and increased dependence on commercial services.

6. Incompatible ADPE. There are ADPE interface problems caused by issuing different models of ADPE to AC and RC headquarters.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 21, "ADPE, MIS and Communications."

b. Finding. The finding for Transitional Issue 3 applies to this issue. ACCS-82 confirmed that many interface problems for RC-RC and RC-AC systems are caused by incompatible MIS (software) and incompatible equipment (hardware). The result (based upon MOBEX 78 experiences) is that many RC units in peacetime and, more importantly, after mobilization, cannot operate in standard Army command and control and management information systems (FORSTAT reporting via the WWMCCS and MIS transactions via SIDPERS, SAILS, and STANFINS).

7. Affiliation Program. Expansion of the Army's Affiliation Program (AR 11-19), especially to combat service support units, appears to be advisable.

a. Discussion. The Affiliation Program is designed to improve operational readiness of RC units required to support mobilization contingencies. The AC assists and supervises equipping, training and overall readiness of the affiliated RC unit. RC units organic to a mobilization entity are expected to mobilize and deploy with their sponsor AC unit.

b. Finding. The Affiliation Program has proven to be a success in increasing AC involvement with RC counterparts. Despite its suc-

cess, the Affiliation Program has not been materially expanded since it began in 1974. However, HQDA (DAMO-OD) is currently taking steps to expand the Affiliation Program. Thus far, the Affiliation Program has been largely limited to combat units. Combat support and combat service support RC units could definitely benefit from affiliation with like-type AC units.

8. Gaining Command. Immediate implementation of the Gaining Command Program concept appears to be advisable.

a. Discussion. FORSCOM is presently engaged in two major studies related to the Gaining Command concept which involves D to D+60 units that deploy to the USAREUR Corps and COMMZ HQ. The Support Unit Improvement Program (SUIP) includes combat service support units and the Wartime Mission/Utilization Program (WARMUP) includes combat and combat support units. Unit commanders will become familiar with all plans, requirements, and readiness conditions prior to mobilization. The program could easily be extended to those units whose mobilization mission is in CONUS.

b. Finding. Organizational Issue 5 applies to this issue. ACCS-82 found that the Gaining Command concept offers great potential for reducing turbulence during the transition from peacetime to wartime operations. Many RC units are logical candidates for inclusion in the Gaining Command program with CONUS MACOM. The HQ FORSCOM SUIP and WARMUP programs provide excellent potential to assist in expanding the Gaining Command Program.

9. Post-Mobilization Employment of the IRR. There is confusion about how IRR personnel should, or will, be employed in the event of mobilization.

a. Discussion. The IRR is currently programmed to: fill AC and RC units prior to deployment; provide replacements for combat losses; and provide personnel to form new units.

b. Finding. Some units and installations believe, and rely on the assumption, that IRR personnel will be provided to them after mobilization. MOBEX 78 experiences, however, indicate that the most appropriate use of IRR personnel is to replace USAREUR's battle losses.

10. Installation Capabilities and MACOM Assignment. Installations do not appear to have sufficient assets to handle mobilization and

post-mobilization requirements. Inter-MACOM reassignment of installations following mobilization will be disruptive.

a. Discussion. Most installations are understaffed and on many installations military manpower "borrowed" from TOE units is required for normal day-to-day operations. Unprogrammed, or short-notice, loss of those assets would severely hamper operations. Many installations visited by ACCS-82 were not optimistic that manpower shortages could be readily filled following deployment of the TOE units. See also Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 3, "Installation Management Alternatives: A Feasibility Study."

b. Finding. The findings for Organizational Issues 2, 12 and 15 and Transitional Issues 3, 4, 5 and 9 apply to this issue. Installations are understaffed in peacetime to handle mobilization requirements in terms of personnel and facilities. The projected post-mobilization reassignment of installations from FORSCOM to TRADOC, or vice versa, serves to complicate the problem. Capability to fill Mob TDA with qualified personnel is questionable: there are projected shortages of bulk-fill and specific skills within specific geographic areas. There are too few USAR Garrisons (USARG) for the mobilization requirement. There are serious questions about the soundness of current plans for employing USARG (e.g., should USARG replace current command structures, or should they fill in shortages for the structures?).

11. Lack of Dedicated Planning Resources. At every command level there are insufficient resources allocated to mobilization and deployment planning.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 6, "Analysis of Army Force Mobilization Planning/Execution."

b. Finding. ACCS-82 found that soundness of planning, based upon guidance from higher headquarters, was generally good at the unit level, but becomes progressively worse as one moves up the chain of command. Headquarters personnel are "consumed by their In-Boxes." Personnel who should be deeply and almost exclusively involved in planning are too easily and readily diverted to activities other than planning. Installations seldom have more than one person devoted exclusively to planning: on many installations there are none. At HQDA, MACOM, CONUSA, MUSARC and State Headquarters, planning is subordinated to day-to-day requirements. The result is, understandably, poor planning. ACCS-82 found that many problems of mobilization and

deployment could be resolved by sound peacetime planning.

12. Valid Post-Mobilization Missions. All headquarters should have valid post-mobilization missions: those without such missions should be eliminated from the force structure.

a. Discussion. Although the Army's primary interests have involved deploying units, a mobilization mission in CONUS is essential for many units. Certain functions such as training, physical security, and logistical operations must be initiated and continued in CONUS to support oversea operations. All Army units should have a mission which supports the defense of this country: units which do not have such a mission are an unsupportable luxury in today's Army.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 confirmed that many headquarters have not been assigned valid, long-term post-mobilization missions: these include ARCOM and ARR. Further, the GAO concluded (during a 1978-79 investigation) that nearly one-quarter of the RC units do not have valid post-mobilization missions. ACCS-82 also found that some confusion exists regarding the definition of a valid mission; the study group concluded that both deployment and "employment"--i.e., CONUS missions in support of the mobilization base--missions are valid. Subsequent to the GAO investigation an analysis was made of the Army's force structure. As a result of this analysis it is the HQDA (DAMO) position that all but six units in the force structure have valid post-mobilization missions: the six remaining units will be eliminated or converted to meet existing valid force requirements.

13. Mobilization Exercises. The program for RC unit-level and headquarters mobilization exercises/rehearsals is inadequate.

a. Discussion. The Army's first mobilization exercises of significant scale or duration were conducted in 1976 (MOBEX 76)--maneuvers and CPX prior to MOBEX 76 were conducted to fulfill other objectives. The Army identified significant shortfalls in mobilization planning during the conduct of MOBEX 76 and 78. Plans for mobilization exercises at the RC unit-level, however, are generally made only in reaction to directives originating at HQDA and FORSCOM levels for major exercises. Based upon the results of a pilot program conducted under FORSCOM's supervision in 1978, it appears that many benefits can be gained by establishing a comprehensive program for mobilization exercises--the program, to be effective, should include AC/RC headquarters down through MUSARC/TAG (STARC) levels, RC units and active and state-operated mobilization stations.

b. Finding. RC units should be more involved in mobilization exercises, ranging from CPX-type operations to "load-out" rehearsals of mobilization plans. Care must be taken, however, to not overburden battalion and lower units with such exercises--once each two-to-three years is probably appropriate. Command and control headquarters, such as ARCOM, divisions and STARC, should participate in some type of mobilization exercise annually.

14. Direct Deployment. Deployment of selected RC units directly from home stations may be desirable.

a. Discussion. Depending on the degree of intensity of a conflict, which would require a deployment accelerated before the programmed schedule, selected units may need to deploy from home station, bypassing the scheduled mobilization station. Such deployment may in fact provide significant overall potential for improving the Army's force-generation capability.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 found that direct deployment is desirable, since it offers the potential for being more responsive, more flexible and less demanding of installation resources than the current system. Feasibility of direct deployment has not been confirmed. ARNG units have conducted direct deployment exercises on a limited basis (Exercise RAMDEP). Chief, Army Reserve has indicated a desire for USAR units to participate in such exercises.

15. Uncovered POMCUS. There is confusion concerning disposition of "uncovered POMCUS," i.e., the materiel left behind by units that deploy to Europe to fall-in on POMCUS.

a. Discussion. HQDA policy for disposition of uncovered POMCUS is clear-cut, but not understood or agreed to by all concerned. Further, it is very doubtful that sufficient resources are allocated to implement the DA policy (uncovered selected RICC-1 POMCUS items are DARCOM assets and all other uncovered POMCUS items are installation assets). DARCOM provides shipping or cross-leveling instructions to installations for the selected RICC-1 items. Fundamental problems involve a lack of installation manpower to implement the DA policy; FORSCOM's desire to respond as an operator to DARCOM requirements rather than having the installations respond as "mini-depots;" HQDA (DALO) and DARCOM desire to retain centralized control of logistic assets to meet world-wide requirements; and unrealistic equipment condition code requirements for shipping.

b. Finding. HQDA has established a POMCUS disposition policy which is not accepted by all MACOM. HQDA should resolve all differences without delay.

16. Early-Mobilizing/Late-Deploying RC Units. Use of early-mobilizing, but late-deploying units may alleviate problems of installations involving manpower shortfalls. However, use of such units may exacerbate the problems of available facilities at installations.

a. Discussion. Some installations, particularly those where TOE units are assigned, have utilized both AC units and individuals to offset manpower shortfalls. Upon deployment of those AC units, the installations will be severely handicapped. Early-mobilizing/late-deploying RC units to replace the AC units now engaged in installation support roles would alleviate these problems at selected installations.

b. Finding. Findings for Organizational Issue 5 and 20 and Transitional Issues 7-10, 12 and 14 apply to this issue. ACCS-82 found that many MACOM are potential claimants for early-mobilizing/late-deploying units. MACOM desire to use these units to solve projected labor-force shortfalls during the transition period. The study group also found, however, that "requirements" were not well defined nor, necessarily supported by "hard" facts. The HQDA staff (DAMO) has recognized the necessity of documenting requirements for expanding the mobilization base and is developing a program (called MOBFORM) to include these requirements in the Total Army Analysis.

17. Role of Advisors During Mobilization. There is confusion concerning the role of advisors to RC units during the mobilization process.

a. Discussion. See Annex F, Appendix 17, "Mobilization Missions for ARR and their Subordinate Elements."

b. Finding. Instructions provided to AC advisors to RC units concerning their actions upon mobilization are vague, not understood and not uniform. ACCS-82 found that most advisors "assume" they will accompany their units to the mobilization stations, but are uncertain about what they would do after arrival. CONUSA instructions appear to be based upon unilateral assumptions, or are non-existent. Additionally, instructions for the post-mobilization disposition of personnel assigned to ARR HQ and RG are unclear.

18. Incompatibility of AC/RC Systems. Certain RC management systems are incompatible with AC systems: this would cause problems upon mobilization.

a. Discussion. When RC units are mobilized, all will be supported by AC systems. Inadequate emphasis is presently placed on implementing automated systems down to the lowest practical level. To the maximum extent possible, RC units should be required to make maximum use of current AC systems to insure a smoother transition when mobilized. Actions should be taken at HQDA level to further integrate AC systems into the RC.

b. Finding. Findings for Transitional Issues 3, 6 and 22 also apply. ACCS-82 confirmed that there are different systems for RC and AC management: personnel, logistics and finance. Some efforts have been made to address these problems, notably the US Army Finance and Accounting Center (USAFAC) master data tapes and SIDPERS-RC. However, all systems are not currently compatible.

19. Movement Planning. Current movement plans, both intra-CONUS and inter-theater, cannot be executed in their current form.

a. Discussion. Inter-theater movement planning has been based on notional ("type") unit movement characteristics and computer generated supply/resupply/replacement personnel data, rather than on data reflecting actual movement requirements. OPLAN data bases, upon which movement planning are based, are not thoroughly reviewed and are not "maintained", i.e., updated to reflect changes in forces or materiel movement requirements, although FORSCOM has been active in developing the capability to provide actual movement data for units. Intra-CONUS movement planning is based on the Intra-CONUS Movement Report (INCONREP), a first generation, stand-alone card system that is not fully automated and is difficult to update. Unit movement planning in the RC is not uniform and could pose problems during mobilization. Installation Transportation Offices (ITO) are understaffed for handling mobilization requirements.

b. Finding. Movement planning is fragmented and based on inaccurate data. To alleviate movement planning problems, many of which cross command and service lines, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, on 27 March 1979 approved the establishment of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) to be responsible for mobilization deployment planning, including intra-CONUS movements, in support of OPLANs. The Army should fully support the JDA.



20. Defining "Ready for Deployment." There is confusion concerning the criteria of readiness for deployment.

a. Discussion. All commanders and supervisors must be aware of the requirements for deployment readiness and the same standards must apply "across-the-board." Defining the readiness criteria is, basically, a "two-player" operation--(1) the supported CINC must describe his minimum acceptable standards (e.g., will he accept REDCON 3 units in order to meet deployment schedules, or will he accept slipping of deployment schedules to allow increases of REDCON?), then (2) HQDA must determine the Army's capability to support the CINC (e.g., distribution of available resources). The result of this process, which will logically be interactive as desires and capabilities are matched, will be a clear-cut definition of "ready for deployment."

b. Finding. ACCS-82 confirmed the MOBEX 78 finding that there is confusion about what criteria should be used to determine readiness for deployment. ACCS-82 does not agree with the portion of the MOBEX 78 after-action report which recommends that determination of this criteria should be developed by HQ FORSCOM. Since there are Army-wide implications involving distribution of HQDA-controlled personnel, logistics and financial assets, development of the criteria should be accomplished at HQDA.

21. Authority for Cross-leveling of Assets. There is confusion concerning authority of commanders, at various levels, to cross-level personnel and logistic assets to meet deployment schedules.

a. Discussion. ACCS-82 Organizational Issues 12 and 15 and Transitional Issues 4, 14, 16, 17 and 19 apply to this issue. ACCS-82 confirmed that commanders are confused about their authority to reassign personnel and redistribute materiel to meet deployment schedules. Generally, the HQDA-centralized management system places installation commanders in the decision chain for these actions, but removes all intermediate commanders. For example, the Commander, First Army has no inherent authority to "draw-down" a unit located at Fort Drum to assist a unit getting ready to deploy from Fort Dix.

b. Finding. Commanders' authority concerning asset distribution/redistribution upon mobilization must be clearly defined. The chain of command should have authority and be involved in assisting earlier deploying units to meet their deployment requirements.

22. RC Pay Systems. Current individual administrative processing

requirements for pay documentation upon mobilization could be reduced or eliminated.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 13, "Adequacy of RC Pay Systems".

b. Finding. Transitional Issues 3 and 18 also apply to this issue. ACCS-82 confirmed that there are minor differences between AC and RC pay systems (JUMPS-ARMY and JUMPS-RC). Although USAFAC has developed a system that permits automated conversion of the data to the JUMPS-ARMY system, data elements for RC members' entitlements for BAQ, BAS, and allotments must be developed after individuals report to the mobilization station. The COA is considering development of a single Army pay system which would eliminate the requirement for conversion upon mobilization.

23. RC Funding During the Transition. Peacetime funding channels and responsibilities for RC units are ill-defined for the transition period (as described by AR 135-300).

a. Discussion. Funding channels must be responsive to the needs of receiving units. Procedures should allow for rapid release of funds when requirements are known. It may not be practical to accept the current 7-10 day delay between the time HQDA releases funds until MACOM allocates them to CONUS installations.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 confirmed that the somewhat complex and unwieldy peacetime RC funding channels may need modification to adequately support mobilization. It appears that certain financial control reports should be identified for discontinuance and emergency condition financial authority be provided as the Army begins the transition period.

24. Training Base Expansion. More detailed planning for expansion of the training base is required.

a. Discussion. Based on existing plans, the training base expansion requirements should be clearly defined, thus enabling consolidation of those requirements. Once adequately defined, planning should be completed to enable the Army to meet the requirements.

b. Finding. Projected training requirements to support full and total mobilization are not well defined. As a result, the capability to meet training requirements is uncertain.

25. Roles of USAR Training Division HHC. Roles of the USAR Training Divisions are different when they arrive at FORSCOM and TRADOC installations.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 9, "Garrisons, Training Divisions and USAR Schools During Mobilization."

b. Finding. USAR Training Divisions arriving at FORSCOM and TRADOC installations face different problems. For those arriving at FORSCOM installations the mission is relatively clearcut; establish and operate a training center. The Training Division HHC that arrive at TRADOC installations where training centers are already established, need to be intergrated with, or replace, the existing training center infrastructure.

#### Other Issues

1. "One-Stop" Support for the RC. Is it feasible/desirable to organize "one-stop" support installations for RC support?

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 10, "Installation Area Support."

b. Findings.

(1) Organization of total "one-stop" support installations for RC support is neither feasible or desirable.

(2) Area support coordination has little impact on the ARNG prior to mobilization.

(3) Despite charges of AR 5-9 complexity, FORSCOM implementation of the Single Installation Coordinating Concept (SICC) provides the best possible support to the USAR in a flexible manner that is advantageous to the geographic realities of MUSARC's situations.

(4) AR 5-9 does portray a confusing picture to the inexperienced and should be rewritten to reflect the realities of changes introduced by FORSCOM.

(5) FORSCOM is continually making improvements to the system as USAR expertise is developed.

2. RCPAC Functions. There appears to be capability at RCPAC to pro-

vide additional assistance to the RC.

a. Discussion. RCPAC could assume some of the functions presently being accomplished at CONUSA. Particularly, centralization of unit vacancy promotions at RCPAC would result in more equitable unit assignment and promotion practices and an economy of spaces.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 found that RCPAC could, with minor organizational modifications, greatly assist RC elements and CONUSA.

3. Resource Allocation Channels. Resource allocation does not follow the chain of command.

a. Discussion. A primary feature of the STEADFAST reorganization was the use of installations as the focal point for all funding regardless of the assignment of the funded activity or the appropriation under which it is funded. This system resulted in significant manpower savings since it precluded the need for large Comptroller or Finance and Accounting organizations at the various levels of command. This system removed CONUSA from the USAR funding channel. Major USAR commands (MUSARC) are funded directly from FORSCOM through a single Coordinating Installation (CI).

b. Finding. ACCS-82 concluded that while resource allocation does not completely follow the chain of command, it is basically an effective and efficient system. It is doubtful that the Army could afford sufficient resources to support a system wherein all resources follow the chain of command. Additionally, such a system would not be as responsive as the current system.

4. Quality of AC Personnel Supporting the RC. RC commanders believe that the assignment of high-quality AC personnel to RC support duties has been the key element of STEADFAST's success with the RC. However, AC personnel assigned to RC support duties perceive such assignments as harmful to their careers and they try to avoid such assignments.

a. Discussion. The fact that high-quality AC personnel have been assigned to RC duty is probably the single-most readiness-enhancing factor of the STEADFAST program, perhaps even exceeding the contributions made by AC headquarters being devoted exclusively to RC management. While such assignments are currently perceived by AC personnel as less-than-career-enhancing, as more senior officers are exposed to RC duties and become familiar with the responsibilities

inherent in those assignments, the perception should change.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 found that the quality of AC personnel working with RC units is uniformly high. Most RC commanders commented on the higher quality of AC personnel assigned to RC duty since 1975. The study group also found, however, that the AC personnel working with the RC units perceived that assignment as hurting their careers.

5. Distribution of RC Maintenance Workload. RC maintenance, at the DS/GS levels, should be accomplished at the nearest AC, ARNG, or USAR facility.

a. Discussion. The Army's maintenance costs could probably be reduced if the maintenance facility nearest each unit, without regard to whether it is AC, ARNG or USAR, were used. However, the resulting rescheduled workloads could result in questionable justification for retaining specific USAR Area Maintenance Support Activities (AMSA) and ARNG Organizational Maintenance Shops (OMS). This, in turn, could result in the loss of training opportunities for maintenance units associated/located with AMSA and OMS.

b. Finding. The GAO recommended(6) that DS/GS maintenance for units could be more efficiently accomplished by scheduling work at the Army facility nearest the units. Although ACCS-82 generally supports this concept, the study group recognized that there are many facets to this problem that were not described by the GAO's report.

6. Current Strategy/Guidance. HQDA provides guidance that is not attuned to national strategy.

a. Discussion. During the study group's research of applicable literature, many HQDA documents (AR, Cir, PAM, and other directives) were found which did not support national strategy based upon short-warning times. Many post-mobilization procedures are prescribed that required lengthy periods for accomplishment. For example, POR/POM procedures are too time consuming for RC units.

b. Finding. The Army Staff should review documents which provide guidance for mobilization/post-mobilization operations with a view towards alignment with current short-warning strategy.

---

(6) Comptroller General, General Accounting Office, op.cit1, p. 109.

7. Use of Recent Retirees in RC Units. Use of recent retirees in non-deploying RC units may provide a potential for increasing the readiness of those units.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 18, "Reserve Component Forces of Selected Foreign Nations."

b. Finding. Both the FRG and Israel, countries with a great perceived threat, use retired personnel as active reservists. A similar program for the US Army appears to offer significant potential for improving RC readiness.

(1) It provides the RC units experienced personnel.

(2) It transmits AC expertise and standards to the RC.

(3) It provides the potential for increased RC unit strength and, thus, readiness.

(4) It is cost-effective, since the retiree would be working (from the Army's standpoint) for only the difference between retired and active pay (50 to 25 percent).

8. Tax Benefits for RC. Would tax benefit programs serve as an incentive to being a member of the RC?

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 18, "Reserve Component Forces of selected Foreign Nations."

b. Finding. The United Kingdom and many States in the US provide tax benefits as an incentive for RC membership. Such programs may provide the potential for improving RC recruiting and retention.

9. Compo-4 Units. Could planning for Compo-4 units be improved?

a. Discussion. Compo-4 units are those units in the force structure as recognized requirements, but unmanned due to peacetime strength ceilings and other factors. Under the current system, these units are merely identified by HQDA (DAMO) for planning purposes, but no agency is given further responsibility for them. The MACOM, which offer a decentralized vehicle for executing mobilization plans, could be required to develop plans for activating, organizing, training and deploying Compo-4 Units.

b. Finding. Virtually no planning is accomplished to accommodate Compo-4 units. Numerous advantages should accrue from pre-assignment of Compo-4 Units to specific MACOM. This would provide a significant improvement over the current system.

10. RC Leaders Training. Reports concerning the status of RC unit training consistently cite "poor junior leadership" as a fault.

a. Discussion. RC junior leaders have only 38 days official contact with the Army per year. This limited period does not allow the time for personal professional development that is enjoyed by the AC junior leader.

b. Finding. Junior and intermediate level leaders of RC units lack military experience due to time constraints. Even though ACCS-82 found that most RC leaders spend more than twice their 28 "paid" days with their units annually, this still does not equate to the exposure/experience gained by AC officers of comparable rank. A vehicle such as a self-paced home study program for RC commanders would contribute to personal professional development of the RC commander.

11. Missions for Maneuver Area Commands (MAC). Post-mobilization missions for MAC are not articulated in sufficient detail.

a. Discussion. The MAC (two in the structure) have a unique capability that should be fully utilized for post-mobilization operations. These organizations' sole missions are the development and conduct of brigade or higher level CPX, FTX, etc. Proper utilization of the MAC could significantly expedite the preparation of brigades/divisions for deployment.

b. Finding. ACCS-82 found that post-mobilization missions for the MAC are somewhat vague. Additionally, MAC and AC units could derive mutual benefits from closer cross-utilization during peacetime.

12. Inspector General (IG) Activities. RC units do not derive full benefit from the IG system.

a. Discussion. ACCS-82 Organizational Issue 18 pertains to this issue.

b. Findings. IG activities within the RC structure are not con-

sistent with those of the AC structure. There is no RC representation at the various AC levels of command that control and monitor the RC. Six states do not have an ARNG IG. AGI of RC units do not include contact with troops and commanders, since the AGI are usually limited to weekdays. Therefore, in reality, the IG is inspecting the Unit Technician's activities. AGI reports on ARNG units are routinely forwarded direct to HQDA; this is inconsistent with AC procedures.

13. Post-mobilization Individual Training Programs. Current individual training programs are designed for peacetime efficiency.

a. Discussion. Service school and training center staffs are kept to a minimum and the student pipeline is minimized by insuring that only rudimentary skills are taught to new soldiers. Many of the skills for the soldiers' MOS are taught in units. After mobilization, units will not have time available to conduct individual training programs.

b. Finding. Subsequent to mobilization, individual replacements should be fully MOS-qualified before arrival in units.

14. Poor Exercise Scheduling. Recent practices of scheduling major mobilization exercises at the end of the Fiscal Year cause conflicts for installations and units.

a. Discussion. MOBEX 76 and 78 were conducted near the end of fiscal years, resulting in problems at ADPE support for the exercises and normal end-of-the-year fiscal account and report closings. Consequently, each installation was confronted with "real world" problems in providing proper support to both endeavors.

b. Finding. Major mobilization exercises have been conducted near the end of fiscal years, resulting in less than optimum ADPE support because of competition with normal fiscal report requirements.

15. ADPE for RC COSCOM/TAACOM. RC COSCOM/TAACOM do not have automatic data processing equipment (ADPE).

a. Discussion. ADPE is essential for the Materiel Management Centers (MMC) to function. Since the MMC is the intermediate level interface with the National Inventory Control Points (NICP) of the wholesale logistics system, lack of ADPE, systems software and



trained personnel in the RC COSCOM/TAACOM prior to mobilization will preclude commands from accomplishing their mission.

b. Finding. DA DCSLOG has developed an initiative to obtain CS3 ADPE for the RC COSCOM/TAACOM.

16. Planning Beyond the Program Force. There is insufficient planning for expansion of the Army beyond the program (full mobilization) force levels.

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 11, "Planning Requirements for Total Mobilization".

b. Finding. ACCS-82 found that HQDA does not plan for or identify initial incremental requirements for the transition from full to total mobilization.

17. Validity for Requirement for FORSCOM Forms 1-R/2-R Reporting. Is the requirement (FORSCOM Pam 135-3) for evaluating RC training by means of FORSCOM Forms 1-R/2-R valid?

a. Discussion. See Volume III, Annex F, Appendix 7, "Army Readiness Regions."

b. Finding. There is no system similar to 1-R/2-R evaluations to evaluate the training of AC units. Continued use of this RC-peculiar evaluation system does not appear to be advisable.

## Chapter 4

### DESCRIPTION OF ALTERNATIVES TO EXISTING STRUCTURE

This chapter contains executive summaries of the alternatives developed by ACCS-82. A complete description of and supporting rationale for each alternative are contained in Volume II of this report. These four basic alternatives and two variations are the result of a lengthy study process which included research of various documents, visits to Army headquarters and units, visits with other Services and interviews with past and present commanders and staff officers in the Army's command and control structure. Many of the discrete features represented in these alternatives can be found in numerous publications and staff papers; it is almost impossible to give credit to the originator of any particular feature. The genesis of the alternatives that are summarized in this chapter is discussed at the end of this chapter.

#### Discrete Features

Each of the alternatives contain at least one major organizational change and several other discrete features that do not involve organizational changes. The rationale for the discrete features is found in Chapter 3 of Volume I or in Volume II. The discrete features and their use in various alternatives are:

1. USAR functional commands. The feasibility of restructuring the USAR into functional commands was examined only in Alternative 1.

2. CONUSA elimination. Two alternatives provide for the elimination of one or more CONUSA. In Alternative 3B, Fifth Army is eliminated but is not replaced by another, similar headquarters. However, in Alternative 4, all three CONUSA are eliminated and their missions are given to five corps headquarters.

3. ARR elimination. ARR headquarters are eliminated in Alternatives 2, 2A, 2B, 3, 3A, 3B and 4. In Alternatives 2, 2A and 2B ARR functions are transferred to CONUSA. A new AC/RC headquarters performs ARR functions in Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B. Five corps headquarters perform ARR missions in Alternative 4.

4. ARCOM elimination. Alternative 1 reorganizes two ARCOM into functional headquarters, MEDCOM and PERSCOM. In Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B, all 19 ARCOM are replaced by 11 AC/RC headquarters.

5. AC corps activation. One additional AC corps headquarters is activated to command AC units in CONUS in Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A and 3B. In Alternative 4, three additional corps are activated which, with the current two corps, will command AC and RC units on an area basis; each of these five corps is provided an area-oriented element to assist the corps in RC management.

6. New headquarters. Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B contain new headquarters, Readiness and Mobilization Commands (REDMOB), for which there is no similar organization in the current structure.

7. MACOM limited OPCON of RC units. Alternatives 2B, 3A, 3B and 4 provide for MACOM to have peacetime limited OPCON of certain RC units for training and mobilization planning.

8. Mobilization planning improvement. Alternatives 2, 2A, 2B, 3, 3A, 3B and 4 provide for a special group at HQDA to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System; each of these alternatives also provides additional mobilization planning assets at FORSCOM, CONUSA and mobilization stations.

9. OPCON of MS for mobilization planning. This OPCON feature is contained in Alternatives 2, 2A, 2B, 3A, 3B and 4. In Alternatives 2, 2A and 2B, the CONUSA have the OPCON; in Alternative 4, the corps have the OPCON; in Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B, the REDMOB have the OPCON. In addition, the REDMOB have OPCON for coordination of mobilization execution.

10. Battalion-level advisors. These advisors are eliminated in Alternatives 2, 2A, 2B, 3, 3A, 3B and 4.

11. PIRC reduction. In Alternatives 3, 3A, 3B and 4 those training divisions in First Army which received additional manpower spaces under PIRC will lose those spaces as well as the training mission for which the spaces were provided.

12. Roundout/affiliation program. Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B provide additional manpower assets to AC corps and divisions to assist in the management of the roundout/affiliation program.

## ALTERNATIVE 1

### Executive Summary:


1. Short Description. Restructure USAR into functional commands; convert selected ARCOM to functional headquarters.

2. Characteristics.

- a. HQDA. No change.
- b. FORSCOM. No change.
- c. Other MACOM. No change.
- d. CONUSA. No change.
- e. ARR HQ. No change.
- f. RG. No change.

g. MUSARC - ARCOM/GOCOM. Selected ARCOM are eliminated and replaced by functional commands. The 90th ARCOM is converted to a Medical Command (MEDCOM) and the 123d ARCOM is converted to a Personnel Command (PERSCOM). The remaining 17 ARCOM are assigned a post mobilization mission of commanding selected installations. Three GOCOM MUSARC, the 300th Military Police Command (MPCOM), the 412th and 416th Engineer Commands (ENCOM) are used to functionalize USAR MP and Engineer units.

h. Organization Diagram.



### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.\*

	AC	RC		CIV	
		FT	FT	DAC	ART
NET CHANGE	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>+135</u>	<u>0</u>	<u>0</u>

\*Includes increase/decrease of -0- AC General Officers, and increase of 2 RC GOs.

#### b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line) \$146,828.7

Annual Operating Costs (Alternative) \$147,220.7

(Incremental Cost) + \$392.0

One time Implementation Cost -0-

### 4. Comparison w/Base Case.

#### ADVANTAGES

o Enhanced functional training and operations.

o Reduction in the functional training spectrum of the remaining ARCOM will focus greater attention on the training of other units.

o Two new units are formed; no units are relocated. The command structure doesn't change; the USAR structure changes only the extent of functionalization. Hence, there is minimal turbulence.

o Two ARCOM with no well-defined post mobilization are eliminated and replaced by TOE functional formations. They are deployed if required or assigned functional missions.

o Provides valid post mobilization structure.


AD-A114 108

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF (ARMY) WASHINGTON D C  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82 (ACCS-82). VOLUME I. EXECUT--ETC(U)  
SEP 79 D L WILSON

F/G 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

3-4  
2-4-79



#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Current Army doctrine is not along the functional lines of Tech services, but along composite lines as in SUIP/WARMUP.

- o The perceived unnecessary layering of command and control in RC management is not altered.

- o Would create vertical peacetime chains of command without planned wartime application.

- o Complicates intra-CONUS jurisdictions and further increases CONUSA span of control.

- o Functionalization cannot be applied to all troop program units.

- o Would cause some turbulence, but for marginal gains.



C-O-R-R-I-G-E-N-D-U-M

1. Space Requirements.

a. A space requirement of 1010 military spaces for the Corps Signal Brigade has been used throughout the analysis and evaluation of organizational alternatives.

b. During coordination of the draft report, FORSCOM proposed that this requirement could be reduced to 691 spaces. This proposal was staffed and agreed to by the ARSTAFF.

c. Although 691 is the recognized requirement, entries on the following pages have not been changed from 1010 to 691. This would be a relative change in each alternative that would not affect relative evaluation and ranking.

2. Dollar Costs. Dollar costs stated for each alternative represent a total systems cost (including military personnel salaries and full equipment procurement) for comparative purposes only. Actual impact on the Army Budget to implement a given alternative would be considerably less depending on manpower and equipment traffic established.

## ALTERNATIVE 2

### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. Inactivate ARR; organize one additional AC corps; provide dedicated mob planners to HQDA, CONUSA and all mobilization stations.

### 2. Characteristics.

a. HQDA. A dedicated staff group is formed for up to two years to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). Manpower spaces for the AMPS group are from current HQDA authorized or overstrength positions.

b. FORSCOM. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to HQ FORSCOM.

c. CONUSA. Increase strength to provide personnel for: readiness evaluation and coordination functions previously performed by ARR; additional DCG for functions previously performed by ARR commanders; and for OPCON for mobilization planning (for RC units) of all mobilization stations.


d. AC Corps. Organize one additional AC corps. Assign most AC units to the three corps. Majority of the new corps support elements are in the RC. Dedicated personnel assets provided to administer and enhance the expanded affiliation program.

e. Installation. Additional dedicated mob planning assets are provided for most mobilization installations. Those installations with peak mobilization loads of 20,000 personnel or greater are authorized two dedicated mobilization planners.

f. ARCOM/MUSARC. ARCOM are given post mob mission to prepare to form the base for new combat divisions and command of selected mobilization stations.

g. GOCOM/RG/Units. Battalion level advisors are eliminated.

h. Organization Diagram.



### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.\*

	<u>AC</u>	<u>RC FT</u>	<u>DAC</u>
Inactivate ARR	- 339	-15	-97
Eliminate En Advisors	- 161		
Added CONUSA RCD/DCG**	+ 128		+20
Added CONUSA Mob Planners	+ 9		+ 3
Added FORSCOM Mob Planners	+ 3		
Added Corps HHC	+ 329		
Added Corps Signal Bde	+1010		
Added Corps Affiliation Mgrs	+ 3	+ 6	
Added BASOPS			+33
Mobilization Station Planners	+ 23		+41
Net Impact	+1005	- 9	+ 0
(Net Impact without Signal Add on)	- 5	- 9	-39

\*No net change in GO spaces.

\*\*Readiness Coordinator Division and Deputy Commanding General Sections.

#### b. Costs

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line) \$146,828.7

Annual Operating Costs (Alternatives) \$158,773.3

(Incremental Cost) +\$11,944.6

Annual Operating Costs w/o  
Signal Add on \$144,610.8

One time Implementation Cost \$ 57,340.3

#### 4. Comparison with Base Case.

##### ADVANTAGES

- o Reduces unnecessary layering between CONUSA, ARR and RG.
- o Reduces FORSCOM AC span of control.
- o Provides additional required corps headquarters and enhances

readiness of assigned units.

- o Provides a more effective use of AC command and control structure.

- o Affiliation program for all RC units designated to round out the new corps.

- o Provides valid defined post mobilization mission to all headquarters.

- o Provides additional dedicated assets to each level of command for mobilization planning.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Increases CONUSA functions.

- o May create perception of reduced AC support to RC units.

- o Depth and detail of knowledge of RC units by AC coordinators may be reduced.

- o Requires additional resources to activate the corps HHC and required signal support.

## ALTERNATIVE 2A

### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. Inactivate ARR; limited OPCON of selected RC units given to MACOM; provide dedicated mob planners to HQDA, CONUSA and all mobilization stations.

### 2. Characteristics.

a. HQDA. A dedicated staff group is formed for up to two years to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning Systems (AMPS). Personnel spaces for the AMPS group are from current HQDA authorized or overstrength positions.

b. FORSCOM. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to HQ FORSCOM. Selected MACOM assume limited operational control (OPCON) of specified RC units for mobilization planning, training supervision and evaluation. The OPCON relationship exists between selected RC non-deploying or late deploying units and the MACOM to which they are first assigned or attached upon mobilization. The MACOM, in this OPCON, are viewed as gaining commands.


c. CONUSA. Increase strength to provide: personnel for readiness evaluation and coordination functions previously performed by ARR; additional DCG for functions previously performed by ARR commanders; and OPCON for mobilization planning (for RC units) of all mobilization stations.

d. Installation. Additional dedicated mob planning assets are provided for most mobilization installations. Those installations with peak mobilization loads of 20,000 personnel or greater are authorized two dedicated mobilization planners.

e. ARCOM/MUSARC. ARCOM are given post mob mission to prepare to form the base for new combat divisions and command of selected mobilization stations.

f. GOCOM/RG/Units. Battalion level advisors are eliminated.

g. Organization Diagram.



### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.\*

	<u>AC</u>	<u>RC FT</u>	<u>DAC</u>
Inactivate ARR	-339	-15	-97
Eliminate Bn Advisors	-161		
BASOPS decrease			-19
Added CONUSA RCD/DCG	+128		+20
Added CONUSA Mob Planners	+ 9		+ 3
Added FORSCOM Mob Planner	+ 3		
Added to MACOM for Tng OPCON		+ 8	
Mobilization Station Planners	+ 23		+41
Net Impact	-337	- 7	-52

\*No net change in GO spaces.

#### b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs (Alternatives	<u>\$135,348.6</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>-\$11,480.1</u>
One time Implementation Cost	<u>\$951.0</u>



#### 4. Comparison with Base Case.

##### ADVANTAGES

- o Reduces unnecessary layering between CONUSA, ARR and RG.
- o Reduction in resources (manpower and equipment).
- o Establishes MACOM training OPCON for selected RC units and MACOM.
- o Establishes functional training relationships through assignment of RC units to mobilization MACOM for peacetime OPCON.
- o Improves doctrinal supervision of training divisions, reception stations and USAR schools thru limited OPCON to TRADOC.
- o Provides valid defined post mobilization mission to all headquarters.
- o Provides additional dedicated assets to each level of command for mobilization planning.

##### DISADVANTAGES

- o Increases CONUSA functions.
- o May create perception of reduced AC support to RC units.
- o Depth and detail of knowledge of RC units by AC coordinators may be reduced.
- o May cause a perceived degradation of USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises OPCON.

## ALTERNATIVE 2B

### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. Inactivate ARR; organize one additional AC corps; provide dedicated mob planners to HQDA, FORSCOM, CONUSA and all mobilization stations; limited OPCON of selected RC units given to MACOM.

### 2. Characteristics.

a. HQDA. A dedicated staff group is formed for up to two years to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning Systems (AMPS). Personnel spaces for the AMPS group are from current HQDA authorized or overstrength positions.

b. FORSCOM. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to HQ FORSCOM. Selected MACOM assume limited OPCON of specified RC units for mobilization planning, training supervision and evaluation. The OPCON relationship exists between selected RC non-deploying or late deploying units and the MACOM to which they are first assigned or attached upon mobilization. The MACOM, in this limited OPCON, are viewed as a gaining command.

c. CONUSA. Increase strength to provide: personnel for readiness evaluation and coordination functions previously performed by ARR; additional DCG for functions previously performed by ARR commanders; and OPCON for mobilization planning (for RC units) of all mobilization stations.


d. AC Corps. Organize one additional AC corps and assign most AC units to the three corps. Majority of the corps support elements of the new corps are in the RC. Dedicated personnel assets are provided to administer and enhance the expanded affiliation program.

e. Installation. Additional dedicated mob planning assets are provided for most mobilization installations. Those installations with peak mobilization loads of 20,000 personnel or greater are authorized two dedicated mobilization planners.

f. ARCOM/MUSARC. ARCOM are given post mob mission to prepare to form the base for new combat divisions and command of selected mobilization stations.

g. GOCOM/RG/Units. Battalion level advisors are eliminated.

h. Organization Diagram.



### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.\*

	<u>AC</u>	<u>RC FT</u>	<u>DAC</u>
Inactivate ARR	- 339	-15	-97
Eliminate En Advisors	- 161		
Added CONUSA RCD/DCG	+ 128		+20
Added CONUSA Mob Planners	+ 9		+ 3
Added FORSCOM Mob Planner	+ 3		
Added to MACOM for Tng OPCON		+ 8	
Added Corps HHC	+ 329		
Added Corps Signal Bde	+1010		
Added Corps Affiliation Mgrs	+ 3	+ 6	
Added BASOPS			+33
Mobilization Station Planners	+ 23		+41
Net Impact	+1005	- 1	0
(Net Impact Without Signal Add on)	- 5	- 1	-39

\*No net changes in GO spaces.

#### b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs (Alternatives	<u>\$159,014.1</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>+\$12,185.4</u>
Annual Operating Cost w/o Signal Add on	<u>\$144,851.6</u>
One time Implementation Cost	<u>\$57,355.8</u>

#### 4. Comparison with Base Case.

##### ADVANTAGES

- o Reduces unnecessary layering between CONUSA, ARR and RG.
- o Reduces FORSCOM AC span of control.
- o Provides additional required corps headquarters and enhances

readiness of assigned units.

- o Provides a more effective use of AC command and control structure.
- o Affiliation program for all RC units designated to round out the corps.
- o Establishes MACOM limited OPCON for selected RC units.
- o Establishes functional training relationships through assignment of RC units to mobilization MACOM for peacetime limited OPCON.
- o Improves doctrinal supervision of training divisions, reception stations and USAR schools thru limited OPCON to TRADOC.
- o Provides valid defined post mobilization mission to all headquarters.
- o Provides additional dedicated assets to each level of command for mobilization planning.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Increases CONUSA functions.
- o May create perception of reduced AC support to RC units.
- o Depth and detail of knowledge of RC units by AC coordinators may be reduced.
- o Requires additional resources to activate the corps HHC and required signal support.
- o May cause a perceived degradation of USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises OPCON.

## ALTERNATIVE 2

### Variations Comparative Analysis

1. General. Alternative 2 satisfies a variety of criticisms of the current STEADFAST structure in addition to adding one required additional corps in CONUS. Alternative 2 will, among other things: reduce the duplication of effort between CONUSA, ARR and RG; improve mobilization planning and execution capability; reduce FORSCOM span of control; and improve the affiliation program for all RC units designated to roundout the new corps. In addition, there is justification for including other CONUS MACOM in addition to FORSCOM, in the business of RC unit training.

Alternative 2A was developed to add this feature plus reduce the manpower required for the added corps hq and signal units.

Alternative 2B was developed to add the training OPCON feature to Alternative 2.

2. Comparative Analysis. Alternatives 2A and 2B both contain the feature of OPCON of RC units to other MACOM for training. This feature is clearly one which when added to Alternative 2 represents an improvement.

The activation of a third AC corps in CONUS, attachment of most AC units to the three CONUS corps and expansion of the affiliation program to RC combat service and combat service support units that roundout the new AC corps greatly improves the AC management structure and will improve RC readiness. It reduces the FORSCOM span of control and provides an additional corps headquarters which is needed to meet contingency needs. This concept also makes full use of the III and XVIII Corps by assigning all major AC FORSCOM units to the three corps.

### 3. Conclusions.

a. OPCON for training of selected RC units to other MACOM is feasible and promises to benefit both the RC unit and the gaining MACOM.

b. Activation of a third AC corps will improve the AC management and improve RC readiness but will require an increase in AC spaces.

c. Preferred alternative is alternative 2B followed by 2 and then 2A.

4. Recommendations.

a. Implement alternative 2B.

b. Give no further consideration to Alternative 2A.

C-O-R-R-I-G-E-N-D-U-M

1. Space Requirements.

a. A space requirement of 1010 military spaces for the Corps Signal Brigade has been used throughout the analysis and evaluation of organizational alternatives.

b. During coordination of the draft report, FORSCOM proposed that this requirement could be reduced to 691 spaces. This proposal was staffed and agreed to by the ARSTAFF.

c. Although 691 is the recognized requirement, entries on the following pages have not been changed from 1010 to 691. This would be a relative change in each alternative that would not affect relative evaluation and ranking.

2. Dollar Costs. Dollar costs stated for each alternative represent a total systems cost (including military personnel salaries and full equipment procurement) for comparative purposes only. Actual impact on the Army Budget to implement a given alternative would be considerably less depending on manpower and equipment traffic established.



### ALTERNATIVE 3

#### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. Inactivate ARR; inactivate ARCOM; organize 11 readiness and mobilization commands (REDMOB).

2. Characteristics.

a. HQDA. A dedicated, staff group will be formed for up to two years to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). Personnel spaces for the AMPS group will be from current HQDA authorized or overstrength positions.

b. FORSCOM. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to HQ FORSCOM.

c. Other MACOM. No change.

d. CONUSA. No major changes to missions; additional mobilization planning assets are provided to each CONUSA.

3. Corps/Division. Each AC corps and division headquarters is provided two additional manpower assets to manage the roundout/affiliation program.

f. ARR. ARR headquarters are inactivated, and ARR functions are transferred to the REDMOB. ARR spaces are used to offset REDMOB full-time space requirements. Battalion-level advisors are eliminated; remaining advisors are assigned to the REDMOB.

g. RG. Assigned to the REDMOB. In Sixth Army area some RG branch-related positions are changed to correspond to type units to be supported in the new REDMOB areas. No changes to RG in the First and Fifth Army areas.

h. ARCOM. The ARCOM is inactivated and most ARCOM functions are transferred to the REDMOB. ARCOM full-time and part-time spaces are used to offset REDMOB full-time and part-time space requirements respectively. USAR command and control structure below ARCOM level is preserved in First and Fifth Armies. Some changes are required in Sixth Army area because the new REDMOB boundaries divide three ARCOM areas.


i. Other MUSARC and GOCOM. Retain other MUSARC except MAC as GOCOM under the REDMOB. CONUSA will continue to command MAC. Other MUSARC and GOCOM will command those units that are normally a part of its functional or doctrinal organization. Those training divisions in First Army area that received additional manpower spaces under the Program to Improve Reserve Components (PIRC) will lose those spaces as well as the training functions for which the spaces were provided. USAR units attached to the training divisions under PIRC will be reassigned to the REDMOBs.

j. REDMOB. Organize eleven REDMOB under the three CONUSA to: command all USAR units on an area basis; command RG; command RC advisors and augmentees; supervise and inspect ARNG training; exercise OPCON of MS in assigned area for mobilization planning and coordination of execution; evaluate RC unit readiness; provide training assistance to the RC; command designated installations on mobilization; command mobilized STARC in assigned area; prepare and execute domestic contingency and MSCD plans as directed; and coordinate, within assigned area, all intraservice support provided by supporting installations IAW AR 5-9 to the RC. REDMOB commander is an AC MG who is also designated a deputy CONUSA commander within assigned area. REDMOB commander has a USAR MG and an ARNG BG as deputy commanders. A USAR BG is provided as a Chief of Staff. An AC O-6 is the assistant Chief of Staff. REDMOB staff has both AC and RC personnel. RC portion of the staff is primarily USAR; ARNG personnel are assigned to assist the commander in executing his mission as it pertains to the ARNG.

k. Coordinating Installations (CI). Current CI that are responsible IAW AR 5-9 for coordinating intraservice support with supporting installations (SI) for the RC lose this CI responsibility to the REDMOB. This does not change the current funding and accounting support provided by CI. Change AR 5-9 as required.

l. Installations. Most installations will be provided at least one dedicated mobilization planner. Those installations with peak mobilization loads of 20,000 personnel or greater will be authorized two dedicated mobilization planners. DRC collocated with REDMOB will be reduced to a minimum staffing level (1 Off, 1 EM, 2 Civ); other DRCs will have no more than 9 personnel.

m. Organization Diagram.



### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.\*

	AC	RC		CIV	
		FT	PT	DAC	ART
Mob Planners	+ 37			+ 36	
Roundout/affiliation	+ 24				
Inactivate ARR	-339	-15	0	- 97	
Inactivate ARCOM	-215		-3129	- 22	-384
Organize REDMOB	+628	+55	+1467	+119	+384
DRC and PIRC	- 48			- 36	
Instal BASOPs				- 15	
Eliminate Bn Advisors	-161				
Net Impact	- 74	+40	-1662	- 15	0

\* Includes an increase of 2 AC and 11 ARNG GO and a decrease of 16 USAR GO.

#### b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs (Alternative)	<u>\$141,026.5</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>- \$5,802.2</u>
One Time Implementation Cost	<u>\$3,989.6</u>

### 4. Comparison with Base Case.

#### ADVANTAGES

- o Provides valid, defined post-mob mission to all headquarters.
- o Reduces unnecessary layering.
- o Some USAR resource savings possible for application against other requirements.
- o Requires no additional full-time manpower spaces.
- o Increases dedicated AC command and control structure for USAR.

- o Increases AC/RC integration.
- o Reduces duplication.
- o Reduces CONUSA span of control in peacetime and wartime.
- o Improves the area command and control structure in CONUS.
- o Enhances potential for improving mobilization and deployment planning.
- o Provides additional assets for mobilization planning at installations, CONUSA, FORSCOM and HQDA.
- o Enhances total mobilization capability.
- o Simplifies procedures for RC units to obtain installation support IAW AR 5-9.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Appears to be an AC takeover of the USAR command structure at a lower level.
- o Creates turbulence (28 inactivation, 11 activations) in the structure during reorganization.
- o Possible degradation of AC GO attention ARNG.
- o Provides broad span of control for REDMOB.
- o Reduces the number of senior, USAR officer positions.
- o Reduces the number of USAR command positions.
- o Possible loss of USAR personnel.
- o Possible loss of DAC and ART personnel.

## ALTERNATIVE 3A

### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. Inactivate ARR; inactivate ARCOM; organize 11 readiness and mobilization commands (REDMOB); activate one additional AC corps headquarters; assign peacetime limited OPCON of selected RC units to MACOM.

### 2. Characteristics.

a. HQDA. A dedicated staff group will be formed for up to two years to develop and implement an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS). Manpower spaces for the AMPS group will be from current authorized or overstrength positions.

b. FORSCOM. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to HQ FORSCOM.

c. Other MACOM. Exercise limited OPCON of selected RC non-deploying or late-deploying units. Selected MACOM receive small increase in staff personnel to assume the OPCON functions.

d. CONUSA. Each CONUSA is provided two additional mobilization planners.

e. AC Corps/Division. Organize one additional AC corps and attach most AC units to the three corps. Majority of the corps support elements will be provided by the RC. These RC elements will have a peacetime roundout/affiliation relationship with the corps similar to the current combat unit roundout/affiliation program between RC and AC units. AC signal units are needed to support tactical training for the corps and subordinate headquarters; the minimum AC signal unit requirement is for two battalions, the corps command operation battalion and the corps radio battalion, with a total ALO 3 strength of 1010. Each of the three corps as well as the nine AC divisions will be provided two additional manpower spaces to assist in managing the roundout/affiliation program.

f. ARR. ARR headquarters are inactivated, and ARR functions are transferred to the REDMOB. ARR spaces are used to offset REDMOB full-time space requirements. Battalion-level advisors are eliminated; remaining advisors are assigned to the REDMOB.

g. RG. Assigned to the REDMOB. In Sixth Army area some RG branch-related positions are changed to correspond to type units to be supported in the new REDMOB areas. No changes to RG in the First and Fifth Army areas.

h. ARCOM. The ARCOM is inactivated and most ARCOM functions are transferred to the REDMOB. ARCOM full-time and part-time spaces are used to offset REDMOB full-time and part-time space requirements respectively. USAR command and control structure below ARCOM level is preserved in First and Fifth Armies. Some changes are required in the Sixth Army area because of new REDMOB boundaries divide three ARCOM areas.

i. Other MUSARC and GOCOM. Retain other MUSARC except MAC as GOCOM under the REDMOB. CONUSA will continue to command MAC. Other MUSARC and GOCOM will command those units that are normally a part of its functional or doctrinal organization. Those training divisions in First Army area that received additional manpower spaces under the Program to Improve Reserve Components (PIRC) will lose those spaces as well as the training functions for which the spaces were provided. USAR units attached to the training divisions under PIRC will be reassigned to the REDMOB.


j. REDMOB. Organize eleven REDMOB under the three CONUSA to: command all USAR units on an area basis; command RGs; command RC advisors and augmentees; supervise and inspect ARNG training; exercise OPCON of MS in assigned area for mobilization planning and coordination of execution; evaluate RC unit readiness; provide training assistance to the RC; command designated installations on mobilization; command mobilized STARC in assigned area; prepare and execute domestic contingency and MSCD plans as directed; and coordinate, within assigned area, all intraservice support provided by supporting installations IAW AR 5-9 to the RC. REDMOB commander is an AC MG who is also designated a deputy CONUSA commander within assigned area. REDMOB commander has a USAR MG (PDS) and an ARNG BG (PDS) as deputy commanders. A USAR BG (PDS) is provided as a Chief of Staff. An AC O-6 is the assistant Chief of Staff. REDMOB staff has both AC and RC personnel. RC portion of the staff is primarily USAR; ARNG personnel are assigned to assist the commander in executing his mission as it pertains to the ARNG.

k. Coordinating Installations (CI). Current CI that are responsible IAW AR 5-9 for coordinating interservice support with supporting installations (SI) for the RC lose this CI responsibility

to the REDMOB. This does not change the current funding and accounting support provided by CI. Change AR 5-9 as required.

1. Installations. Most installations will be provided at least one dedicated mobilization planner. Those installations with peak mobilization loads of 20,000 personnel or greater will be authorized two dedicated mobilization planners. DRC spaces at REDMOB locations will be reduced.

m. Organization Diagram.





### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower. \*

<u>Action</u>	<u>Military Full-time</u>		<u>Part-time</u>	<u>Civilian</u>	
	<u>AC</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>RC</u>	<u>DAC</u>	<u>ART</u>
MACOM staffing for OPCON		+ 8			
FORSCOM mob planners	+ 3				
CONUSA mob planners	+ 6				
Activate corps Hq and signal units	+1339				
Corps/division roundout/ affiliation	+ 26				
Organize 11 REDMOB	+ 628	+55	+1467	+119	+384
Inactivate ARR	- 339	-15		- 97	
Inactivate ARCOM	- 215		-3129	- 22	-384
Eliminate Bn-level advisors	- 161				
DRC reduction	- 36			- 36	
Installation mob planners	+ 28			+ 36	
Instal BASOPS				+ 37	
PIRC reduction	- 12				
Net Impact	+1267	+48	-1662	+ 37	0
(Net Impact without Signal Add on)	+ 257	+48	-1662	- 2	0

\* Includes the following general officer summary:

<u>Activations/inactivations</u>	<u>AC</u>			<u>USAR</u>		<u>ARNG</u>
	<u>0-9</u>	<u>0-8</u>	<u>0-7</u>	<u>0-8</u>	<u>0-7</u>	<u>0-7</u>
Inactivate ARCOM				-19	-19	
Inactivate ARR		- 9				
Activate Corps Hqs	+ 1	+ 1	+ 1			
Activate REDMOB		+11		+11	+11	+ 11
TOTALS	+ 1	+ 3	+ 1	- 8	- 8	+ 11

Possible USAR GO Backfills (not included in manpower summary)

	<u>0-8</u>	<u>0-7</u>
Tng Div Dep/Cdr		+12
TAACOM, TC Bde and COSCOM		
positions		+ 3
CA Cmd Cdr and Dep/Cdr	4	4
MOBDES Installation Cdr	2	
CONUSA Deputy for USAR		
affairs	<u>3</u>	
TOTALS	9	19

b. Costs.	(\$000)
Annual Operating Costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs (Alternative)	<u>\$163,064.6</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>+\$16,235.9</u>
Annual Operating Costs w/o Signal Add on	<u>\$147,504.8</u>
One time Cost	<u>\$ 60,302.7</u>

4. Comparison with Base Case.

ADVANTAGES

- o Provides valid, defined post mob mission to all headquarters.
- o Reduces unnecessary layering.
- o Some USAR resource savings possible for application against other requirements.
- o Increases dedicated AC command and control structure for USAR.
- o Increases AC/RC integration.
- o Reduces duplication.
- o Reduces CONUSA span of control in peacetime and wartime.

- o Improves the area command and control structure in CONUS.
- o Enhances potential for improving mobilization and deployment planning.
- o Provides additional assets for mobilization planning at installations, CONUSA, FORSCOM and HQDA.
- o Establishes functional training relationships through assignment of RC units to mobilization MACOM for limited OPCON during peacetime.
- o Improves doctrinal supervision of training divisions, reception stations and USAR schools through limited OPCON to TRADOC.
- o Reduces FORSCOM span of control.
- o Provides required corps headquarters.
- o Enhances readiness assigned units.
- o Enhances total mobilization capability.
- o Simplifies procedures for RC units to obtain installation support IAW AR 5-9.
- o Provides a more effective use of AC command and control structure.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Appears to be an AC takeover of the USAR command structure at a lower level.
- o Creates turbulence (28 inactivations, 13 activations) in the RC management structure during reorganization.
- o Possible degradation of AC GO attention of ARNG.
- o Provides broad span of control for REDMOB.
- o Reduces the number of USAR command positions.
- o Reduces the number of senior, USAR officer positions.

- o Possible loss of USAR personnel.
- o Possible loss of DAC and ART personnel.
- o May degrade USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises limited OPCON.
- o Requires additional resources to activate the corps headquarters and required signal support.

### ALTERNATIVE 3B

#### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. Alternative 3A modified by eliminating Fifth Army.

2. Characteristics (those which differ from Alternative 3A).

Fifth Army is inactivated and its manpower spaces are used to increase staffs of First and Sixth Armies and to offset space requirements for the AC corps, with supporting signal units, to be activated.

Organization and responsibilities of REDMOB will not be changed. The geographic area of responsibility for the REDMOB will not be changed. The CONUS will be divided between the First and Sixth Armies along REDMOB boundaries. Two other considerations influence the division of CONUS between the two CONUSA - authorized strength of RC units and time-distance factors.

Current approximate strength of RC units in each CONUSA area is shown below.

	1A	5A	6A
ARNG	200,000	135,000	76,200
USAR	117,400	90,100	42,800

The best balance in both ARNG and USAR strength is achieved by combining the Fifth and Sixth Army areas as shown below.

	1A	6A
ARNG	200,000	211,200
USAR	117,400	132,900
TOTAL	317,400	344,100

However, time-distance considerations do not favor extending the Sixth Army area to include the entire Fifth Army area.

The Sixth Army area currently extends from California to the Kansas-Missouri border and from Mexico to Canada. It is a large area with a lesser density of RC units than either Fifth or First Army. This difference in density precludes dividing the CONUS into halves which are about equal in RC strength and time-distance factors.

(Combining First Army and Fifth Army areas would result in about a 9 to 3 imbalance of RC unit strength.) Therefore, the division of the CONUS into two CONUSA areas will be a compromise between RC unit strength and time-distance factors.

The addition of REDMOB VI area to First Army and REDMOB V and VII areas to Sixth Army does not greatly extend the overall breadth of the Sixth Army area. It does provide about a 4.5 to 3 division of RC unit strength between the two CONUSAs. If REDMOB V and VI areas are added to First Army and REDMOB VII area is added to Sixth Army, the overall breadth of the Sixth Army area is not changed; but the ratio of RC unit strength is about 7.5 to 3. If REDMOB VI and VII areas are added to First Army and REDMOB V area is added to Sixth Army, then the Sixth Army area's overall breadth is increased slightly but the ratio of RC unit strength is about 7 to 3. Addition of only REDMOB V area to First Army was not considered since the area is separated from the First Army area by REDMOB VI area.

Therefore, the best division of CONUS, considering RC unit strength ratios and time-distance factors, is the one which combines the REDMOB VI area with the First Army area REDMOB V and VII area. The resulting approximate RCU unit strength is shown below.

	1A	6A
ARNG	253,500	167,600
USAR	146,600	103,700
TOTAL	400,100	271,300

While the Sixth Army area is the largest, time-distance factors are ameliorated somewhat by the fact that many of the states have RC units concentrated in only a few cities. Whereas, in the East, RC units are located in numerous cities throughout each state. The resulting division of CONUS between the two remaining CONUSA is shown below.

The imbalance of RC unit strength can be offset partially by increased staffing of First and Sixth Armies computed as a function of RC unit strength. Some Fifth Army spaces will be used to offset space requirements for this increased staffing. However, many of these spaces will be used to offset requirements for the third AC corps. The current staffing of the CONUSA and their ratios of staffing strength to RC unit strength is as shown:

	1A	5A	6A
Staff Strength	590	480	438
RC Unit Strength (approx)	317,000	225,000	119,000
Ratio (approx)	.0018	.0021	.0035

The Sixth Army ratio is nearly twice that of First Army and is not justified based on time-distance factors alone. Therefore, this imbalance will not be retained in augmenting the two CONUSA staffs. Instead, the First Army's lower ratio will be used as a guide.

The CONUSA staffing guide (DA Pam 570-553) generally does not provide staffing levels as a function of RC unit strength or of any other workload factor. Instead, it provides, for most staff sections, three manpower levels--maximum, intermediate, minimum. The maximum figures, if used, would staff a CONUSA at 708, which is 118 above the current First Army level. If the current First Army ratio is used to compute the staff strength based on the expanded CONUSA area, then the First Army staff would increase to 736, which is 28 (4%) above the maximum staffing guide level. Although the maximum staffing guide level is not considered to be a true upper limit, it will be the level used for First Army staffing. It is close to the 736 figure, and a proportional increase in CONUSA staffing fails to consider that the number of supervisory positions does not need to be increased proportionally. The Sixth Army staff will be increased to 481, which results from applying the resultant ratio of First Army staffing to RC unit strength to the increased Sixth Army RC unit strength.

### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.

	Military AC	Full- time RC	Part- time RC	Civilians DAC      ART	
Net Impact of Alt 3A	+1267*	+48	-1662	+ 37	0
Inactivate 5A	- 226**	-13		-256***	
Increase 1A staff	+ 58			+ 60	
Increase 6A Staff	+ 21			+ 22	
Net Impact	+1120	+35	-1662	-137	0
(Net Impact without Signal Add on)	+ 110	+35	-1662	-176	0

\* Includes an increase of 5 AC and 11 ARNG general officers and a decrease of 16 USAR general officers.

\*\* Includes a decrease of 2 AC general officers.

\*\*\* Includes the two additional mob planners provided to 5A in alternative 3.

#### b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual Operating Costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs (Alternative)	<u>\$155,486.7</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>+\$ 7,842.7</u>
Annual Operating Costs w/o Signal Add on	<u>\$141,890.9</u>
One Time Implementation Cost	<u>\$ 61,498.8</u>

### 4. Comparison with Base Case.

#### ADVANTAGES

- o Provides valid, defined post mob mission to all headquarters.
- o Reduces unnecessary layering.



- o Some USAR resource savings possible for application against other requirements.

- o Increases dedicated AC command and control structure for USAR.

- o Increases AC/RC integration.

- o Reduces duplication.

- o Reduces CONUSA span of control in peacetime and wartime.

- o Improves the area command and control structure in CONUS below CONUSA level.

- o Enhances potential for improving mobilization and deployment planning.

- o Provides additional assets for mobilization planning at installations, CONUSA, FORSCOM and HQDA.

- o Establishes functional training relationships through assignment of RC units to mobilization MACOM for limited OPCON during peacetime.

- o Reduces FORSCOM span of control.

- o Provides required corps headquarters.

- o Enhances readiness of AC units assigned to the corps.

- o Enhances total mobilization capability.

- o Simplifies procedures for RC units to obtain installation support IAW AR 5-9.

- o Provides a more effective use of AC command and control structure.

- o Improves doctrinal supervision of training divisions and USAR schools through limited OPCON to TRADOC.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Appears to be an AC takeover of the USAR command structure at

a lower level.

- o Creates turbulence (28 inactivations, 11 activations) in the RC management structure during reorganization.

- o Possible degradation of AC GO attention of ARNG.

- o Provides broad span of control for REIDMOB.

- o Reduces the number of USAF command positions.

- o Reduces the number of senior, USAR officer positions.

- o Possible loss of USAR personnel.

- o Possible loss of DAC and ART personnel.

- o May cause a perceived degradation of USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises limited OPCON.

- o Corps will not be able to conduct CPX or FTX without borrowed equipment until the phased, signal activation program is completed.

- o Increases the geographic area of responsibility for the two remaining CONUSA.

- o Degrades the area command and control structure at the CONUSA level.

- o May result in reduced attention to the RC by senior AC general officers and their staffs.

- o Requires additional resources to activate the corps hqs and required signal support.

## ALTERNATIVE 3

### VARIATIONS COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

1. General. Alternative 3 satisfies a variety of criticisms of the current STEADFAST structure. The key feature in the alternative is the REDMOB concept. However, other discrete features were included in the alternative to satisfy a variety of other criticisms; these other features are independent of the REDMOB concept. Alternative 3 should improve, among other things: the peacetime RC management structure; mobilization planning and execution capability; the post-mobilization, CONUS, area-oriented command and control structure; AC support to the RC; and the ability of the CONUS command and control structure to make the transition from peace to war, to include the expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization. However, the alternative does not contain any features which improve the AC management structure under FORSCOM. Changes in the AC structure could be made independently of, or concurrently with, implementation of the REDMOB concept. In addition, there is justification for including other MACOM, in addition to FORSCOM, in the business of RC unit training. Thus, Alternative 3A was developed to include a feature to improve the management of AC forces and to draw on the expertise of other MACOM for RC training. Alternative 3B was developed to determine if the strengthening of the intermediate level of command below CONUSA resulted in underutilization of the three CONUSA.

#### 2. Comparative Analysis.

##### a. Limited OPCON of RC units to other MACOM. (Alt 3A and 3B).

This feature clearly is one which, when added to Alternative 3, represents an improvement. The ARCOM were criticized for not being capable of influencing the training of subordinate units. REDMOB, with 44% of the staff being either AC military or civilian and with an AC commander, should be able to accomplish the training function of command for subordinate units. However, the training for selected non-deploying and late-deploying RC units can be improved further by involving other MACOM. These MACOM can provide a level of everyday expertise in their functional areas that can not be fully provided by the REDMOB without prohibitively high staffing levels. In addition, the added staffing would still not be as good as using personnel from the MACOM who are involved almost daily with the ever-

changing doctrine and procedures of the MACOM's functional areas. An "expert" assigned to the REDMOB might not be able to remain fully up-to-date. Also, there are intangible benefits for the RC unit that is involved in peacetime training and association with its wartime command. Finally, the limited OPCON arrangement will reduce somewhat the REDMOB's span of interest for selected RC units.

b. Organizing a third AC corps. (Alt 3A and 3B).

The REDMOB organization does nothing to improve the management of AC units. However, the activation of a third AC corps in CONUS and the attachment of most AC units to the three CONUS corps greatly improves the AC management structure. It greatly reduces the FORSCOM commander's peacetime span of control and provides an additional corps headquarters which is needed to meet wartime needs. This concept also makes full use of the III and XVIII Corps by increasing the number of AC divisions and other units; currently these two corps are underutilized. Use of the three corps to command AC units offers potential to enhance the readiness of assigned AC units and the readiness of those RC support units which are designated to roundout or affiliate with the new corps.

c. Elimination of Fifth Army. (Alt 3B).

This feature addresses a perceived weakness in Alternative 3 and Alternative 3A, the underutilization of the three CONUSA once the REDMOB are organized and fully-operating. In the base case, the CONUSA each have large commands in terms of subordinate units, total strength and geographic area of responsibility. The CONUSA must exercise USAR command through subordinate USAR headquarters which are primarily staffed by part-time personnel with civilian careers who can not all be expected to be thoroughly proficient in their military jobs. In addition, the CONUSA must supervise and inspect ARNG training and must provide training assistance to ARNG and USAR units using the ARR/RG/advisors. The CONUSA also lack an intermediate, area-oriented command which can be used to assist the CONUSA in exercising the full range of its responsibilities; presently, subordinate headquarters (ARCOM, MUSARC and ARR) each assist the CONUSA in meeting some, but not all, of its responsibilities. Below CONUSA level, responsibilities become fragmented. During mobilization, this situation is exacerbated. CONUSA responsibilities for mobilization as well as CONUS, area-oriented missions (domestic emergencies, land defense, LSSF and MSCD) are beyond its capabilities with current staffing.

The REDMOB concept brings some order to the chaos of responsibilities which have been given to the CONUSA. The REDMOB will be able to manage, on an area basis, all the functions of command in support of the total CONUSA mission. During mobilization, the REDMOB will command the STARC for the CONUSA as well as coordinate the execution of mobilization within its assigned area.

This strengthened level of command below the CONUSA does not necessarily mean that three CONUSAs are not needed. Nearly all of the CONUSA functions in the Base Case are unchanged by the REDMOB concept. It is possible that CONUSA staffing could be reduced, but the reduction can not be determined without experience with the REDMOB organization.

Elimination of Fifth Army increases the geographic span of control for the two remaining CONUSA. During peacetime, the two CONUSA could possibly manage; but, during wartime, the coordination of area missions among REDMOB, the management of mobilization, and the continuing mission of organizing and training units will likely exceed the capability of two CONUSA.

In addition, the elimination of a CONUSA will reduce the frequency of contact between the senior AC general officers and RC general officers. The professional experience and leadership provided by CONUSA commanders is universally recognized as valuable; but it is impossible to quantitatively measure.

### 3. Conclusions.

a. Limited OPCON of RC units to other MACOM is feasible and promises to benefit both the RC unit and the "gaining MACOM."

b. Activation of a third AC corps will improve the AC management but will require a large number of AC spaces. Over 50% of the manpower spaces for the AC corps headquarters can be offset by other reductions within Alternative 3A while nearly 85% can be offset by other reductions in Alternative 3B. Remaining corps headquarters and signal battalions' manpower spaces would have to be programmed by HQDA.

c. Fifth Army should not be eliminated initially because of uncertainties about the capabilities of the two remaining CONUSA to exercise effective command over the large geographic areas during peacetime and wartime. Once experience is gained in operating with

the REDMOB, a manpower survey of the CONUSA should be made to determine if any reduction in staffing is justified.

d. Preferred alternative is Alternative 3A.

4. Recommendations.

a. Implement Alternative 3A.

b. Periodically survey the three CONUSA to determine adequacy of staffing and appropriateness of functions being performed.

c. Conduct a detailed manpower survey of the CONUSAs 18-24 months after all REDMOB are operational to determine if CONUSA staffs should be reduced.

C-O-R-R-I-G-E-N-D-U-M

1. Space Requirements.

a. A space requirement of 1010 military spaces for the Corps Signal Brigade has been used throughout the analysis and evaluation of organizational alternatives.

b. During coordination of the draft report, FORSCOM proposed that this requirement could be reduced to 691 spaces. This proposal was staffed and agreed to by the ARSTAFF.

c. Although 691 is the recognized requirement, entries on the following pages have not been changed from 1010 to 691. This would be a relative change in each alternative that would not affect relative evaluation and ranking.

2. Dollar Costs. Dollar costs stated for each alternative represent a total systems cost (including military personnel salaries and full equipment procurement) for comparative purposes only. Actual impact on the Army Budget to implement a given alternative would be considerably less depending on manpower and equipment traffic established.

#### ALTERNATIVE 4

##### Executive Summary.

1. Short Description. This alternative represents a wartime alignment which eliminates CONUSA and ARR; organizes five corps hqs with deployable and non-deployable elements; and assigns limited peacetime OPCON of selected RC non-deploying or late-deploying units to MACOM based on wartime mission.

##### 2. Characteristics.

- a. HQDA. DA staff increased for mobilization planning.
- b. FORSCOM. No change.
- c. Other MACOM. Exercise limited OPCON of selected non-deploying or late-deploying RC units. Selected MACOM receive small increase in personnel to assume the OPCON functions.
- d. CONUSA. Eliminate. Most functions are assumed by 5 Corps with TDA elements.
- e. ARR. Eliminate. Most functions are assumed by 5 Corps with TDA elements.
- f. RG. Assign to corps on an area basis.
- g. ARCOM. Assign to corps. Selected ARCOM have post mobilization mission to assume command of designated mobilization stations.
- h. Other MUSARC. Eliminate spaces devoted to the command and control of units which are not a part of the MUSARC functional command. Training divisions (less MTC) with reception stations are placed limited OPCON to TRADOC; other non-deploying and selected late-deploying RC units are under command of functional or area command with limited OPCON to MACOM based on wartime mission.
- i. Corps HQ. Organize five corps headquarters with a deployable corps HHC and a non-deployable TDA augmentation element dedicated to RC management and peacetime readiness for rapid mobilization (PERFORM) on an area basis. Retain III and XVIII Corps and




establish three additional corps hqs. Corps hqs will contain AC and RC personnel. Corps commands AC units, USAR units, and RG. Corps PERFORM augmentation assists in performance of former CONUSA and ARR functions. Corps has responsibility for review/concurrence of all installation mobilization plans from installations in the corps area. Corps will be provided an AC MG, DCG, and RC BG for the area mission.

j. CS and CSS. Two RC COSCOM in CONUS identified to augment OCONUS (NATO) SUPCOM in the event of mobilization. They are under command of CONUS corps during peacetime. Corps subordinate units (RC) are under development by FORSCOM in the support unit improvement program (SUIP) and wartime mission/utilization program (WARMUP).

k. Installations. Slight manpower increase for mobilization planning.

# 1. Organization Diagram.



### 3. Resource Summary.

#### a. Manpower.\*

	AC	RC		CIV	
		FT	PT	DAC	ART
Eliminate CONUSA	- 696	- 45		-792	
Eliminate ARR	- 339	- 15		- 97	
Eliminate Bn Advisors	- 161				
Reduce Install DRC	- 20			- 18	
MACOM staff increase		+ 8			
Install MOB planners	+ 42			+ 22	
Add 3 corps HHC	+ 559	+118	+382		
Add 5 corps TDA	+ 700	+ 76		+885	
Add Sig Bde elements	+1010				
Increase BASOPS	+ 54				
Net Impact	+1149	+142	+382	0	
(Net Impact without Signal Add on)	+ 121	+142	+382	0	

\* The above figures include a decrease of one AC general officer (MG) and an increase of five RC general officers (BG) in the PDS category.

#### b. Costs.

(\$000)

Annual operating costs (Base Line)	<u>\$146,828.7</u>
Annual operating costs (Alternative)	<u>\$165,374.3</u>
(Incremental Cost)	<u>+\$18,545.6</u>
Annual Operating Costs w/o Signal Add on	<u>\$151,647.2</u>

One time implementation costs

71,309.7

4. Comparison with Base Case.

ADVANTAGES

- o Reduces unnecessary layering by eliminating ARR and CONUSA.
- o Reduces FORSCOM span of control by attaching all AC divisions and brigades to corps headquarters.
- o Enhances integration and AC and RC at corps headquarters and by corps organization.
- o Improves mobilization and deployment planning and the ability to make the transition from peace to war by concentrating responsibility for guidance and approval at corps hqs.
- o Establishes functional training relationships through assignment of RC units to mobilization MACOM for limited OPCON during peacetime.
- o Reduces duplication between RG-ARR and CONUSA.
- o Clarifies command responsibilities as USAR units are in command structure of wartime organization.
- o Improves doctrinal supervision of training divisions, separate USAR training brigades and USAR schools through limited OPCON to TRADOC.
- o Enhances move toward centralized USAR personnel management.
- o Enhances readiness potential for RC through doctrinal (wartime) organization.
- o Centralizes readiness, mobilization and deployment planning under a tactical (doctrinal) headquarters while allowing decentralized execution.
- o Reduces number of non-deployable headquarters in the structure.
- o Provides for expansion from full to total mobilization.

- o Provides command environment for increased mutual support of RC-AC.

- o Provides valid, defined post-mobilization mission to all headquarters.

- o Provides additional assets for mobilization planning at HQDA and installations.

- o Provides required corps headquarters and enhances readiness of assigned units.

- o Provides a more effective use of AC command and control structure.

#### DISADVANTAGES

- o Increases corps area of interest to include both AC and RC units.

- o Creates reorganizational turbulence.

- o Requires increased resources.

- o May cause a perceived degradation of USAR school support to units and individuals as TRADOC exercises OPCON.

- o May cause a perceived reduction of dedicated AC support to RC as the CONUSA and ARR are replaced by corps headquarters with TDA (PERFORM) augmentation.

- o Creates misconception by subordinate units that corps are deployable in pre-determined configuration.

- o Holds potential for diversion of AC assets to RC.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF ALTERNATIVES

From mid-December 1978 through mid-February 1979 all members of the study group provided possible alternative organization descriptions to a 3-man work committee of the group. The work committee examined 36 proposals and assessed their potential for best achieving selected objectives of the study. Additionally, the committee identified discrete features of the proposals for use in developing later alter-

natives. The work committee, using combinations of the 36 proposals, or by selecting desirable discrete features, produced seven alternatives for consideration by the complete study group.

Conceptual alternatives considered by the work committee, but discarded or consolidated with others prior to presentation to the complete study group included the following (only primary features are described).

1. Creation of an Army Reserve Command (ARC): commands all USAR units and personnel through three subordinate commands: Training, Forces and Mobility. ARC would have training and mobility supervisory authority over ARNG. CONUSA, ARR, RG and advisor structure eliminated.

2. Activate two USAR corps and one additional AC corps. All RC units (less Tng Div and MAC) assigned to USAR corps - they are supervised by FORSCOM DCG (RC). All non-deploying RC units "associated"--gaining command concept--with wartime parent MACOM. USAR Training Division and MAC assigned to TRADOC. Eliminate ARR and RG.

3. Activate four RC corps to command all USAR units (less Tng Div and USAR schools); possibly activate one additional AC corps to command AC divisions. Organize ARCOM functionally. USAR Training Division and schools assigned to TRADOC.

4. FORSCOM assumes command of all installations, probably through Installation Management command (IMCOM). Activate one additional corps; all AC divisions assigned to AC corps. CONUSA assigned to HQDA (direct). ARR eliminated; missions assumed by ARCOM.

5. Replace two CONUSA (First and Sixth) with corps; eliminate Fifth Army and move III corps to Ft. Sam Houston. Activate IMCOM to command all installations. Assign USAR Training Divisions to TRADOC; all other USAR units assigned to corps. Eliminate ARR and RG. Expand affiliation/association programs.

6. Eliminate ARR. Add one DCG (RC) and one DCG (Installation Management and Mob (IM&M)) to each CONUSA. HQDA controls installation management through CONUSA DCG (IM&M).

7. Eliminate CONUSA. Activate one AC corps (at Presidio of San Francisco). Assign all AC and RC units and installations to the corps. Eliminate the ARR.

8. Establish RC functional commands (MEDCOM, PERSCOM, etc.). Assign functional commands to functional MACOM. Eliminate CONUSA. Assign USAR Training Division to TRADOC. All other RC units assigned to corps.
9. Activate IMCOM to command all installations and non-deploying RC units. Activate one additional AC corps. Assign all USAR schools and Reserve Training Units (RTU) to TRADOC. Eliminate all CONUSA and ARR. Assign all units to the corps.
10. Replace the three CONUSA with three (additional) corps; assign all RC units to the newly-formed corps. Eliminate ARR.
11. Eliminate CONUSA, ARR and RG. Activate IMCOM; IMCOM commands all installations and ARCOM. Assign USAR Training Division, Schools, MAC and MTC to TPADOC. Assign all USAR hospitals and hospital commands to HSC. Assign remaining USAR units to corps.
12. Replace the three CONUSA with three corps. Provide an "area command" for each of the five corps.
13. Eliminate CONUSA, ARR and some ARCOM. Assign Training Division and schools to TRADOC. Activate three corps. Organize each of the five corps with three DCG: Corps Troops, COSCOM and Area/Installation Command. Assign all AC units, the remaining USAR units and all installations to the corps.
14. Eliminate CONUSA, ARR and ARCOM. Activate three corps. Provide for all five corps; corps troops-combat and combat support units, COSCOM - CSS units, CONUSA area command - installations USAR Training Division, garrisons, USAR schools, etc: assign all units to corps.
15. Eliminate ARR and RG. Activate "Regiments" in each state. Each regiment has: state USAR command (commanded by CONUSA), state HHD (ARNG) (commanded by Governors) and State Support Group (ARR, RG, Advisor elements and RC recruiting elements) (Commanded by CONUSA).
16. Activate one additional CONUSA and one additional corps. Combine ARR and RG, new element called RC Advisory and Support Command (RCASC). RCASAC in chain of command between CONUSA and MUSARC or between MUSARC and units. New corps commands 4th, 7th and 9th Divisions.
17. Eliminate FORSCOM, increase the REDCOM/ARRED staff (at REDCOM

location). TRADOC commands all "troop" installations. ARRED commands all AC units through corps, all RC units through CONUSA.

18. Eliminate ARR. Assign RG to CONUSA.

19. Activate one additional corps (West Coast) to command AC divisions. Assign USAR Training Divisions and schools to TRADOC. Eliminate ARR. Activate one Tng and Mob command per CONUSA to command USAR and installations and to coordinate with ARNG. USAR form functional commands and ARCOM are eliminated.

20. Merge ARR, RG and USAR Training Divisions into Training Command; assign Training Command to CONUSA.

21. Preceding option, plus activate a FORSCOM housekeeping command (CONUS Ops Command) to command only former FORSCOM installations and RC units.

22. Same as alternative 12 and eliminate ARR.

23. Same as preceding option except the installations are assigned to OCE Division Engineer headquarters.

24. Activate USAR command with three corps and one Training Base Command (TBC). All USAR Training Divisions assigned to TBC. All other USAR units assigned to USAR corps.

25. Eliminate CONUSA, three ARR and all RG. Six remaining ARR increased to command USAR units, perform mobilization and planning and post-M-Day mobilization and deployment OPCON of installations.

26. Preceding option, modified by: retention of CONUSA which command ARR and installations.

27. Eliminate ARR. Add DCG (Installations) to DARCOM. All installations assigned to DARCOM.

28. Assign MUSARC TO ARR.

29. Same as option 12 plus elimination of ARR, RG, and ARCOM, and assignment of USAR Training Divisions to TRADOC.

30. Eliminate ARR, assign USAR Training Divisions and MAC to TRADOC.



31. Add one AC corps to command 4th, 7th and 9th Divisions.
32. Same as Alternative 24 but: less the Training Base Command, plus convert all CONUSA to deployable (M+90 to 180) corps, reduce ARR to minimum admin support element for RG, assign RG to corps. This structure would have USAR structure parallel ARNG structure.
33. Eliminate FORSCOM. Establish Housekeeper Command to command FORSCOM and TRADOC installations and Army Reserve Command (ARRES). Eliminate CONUSA and ARR; establish "sub-ARRES" to command USAR units and STARC (when activated). Establish one additional AC corps; all AC units and RG under AC corps; XVIII Airborne Corps becomes ARRED. Centralize mobilization planning at HQDA.
34. Eliminate CONUSA, establish in their places three RC corps under commander USAR (dual-hat CAR). AC MACOM become "gaining commands" for mobilization and deployment. Note: This is an adaptation of the USAF RC management system.
35. Eliminate CONUSA, ARR and RG. Establish three additional AC corps. All AC units and USAR deployable units assigned to a corps (integrate AC/RC manning of corps headquarters); ARNG deployable units "earmarked" for assignment to a corps ("gaining command"). All non-deployable USAR units assigned to wartime employing MACOM; "earmark" similarly the ARNG like-units ("gaining command" concept). Establish HouseCom under TRADOC to command all installations, less HSC and DARCOM installations. Designate Leavenworth as School Com (under TRADOC) and assign to it all Service Schools, Training Divisions, USAR Schools and MAC.
36. Eliminate CONUSA: form from 1st Army - Forces Deployment Command to command all non-corps deployable units and to handle deployment and planning therefore; from 5th Army form CONUS Operations Command to command all installations and conduct all mobilization planning; from 6th Army form an additional AC corps. All ARNG deployable units would mobilize under a corps or the Forces Deployment Command. Assign or earmark non-deploying RC units as in Alternative 35.

The work committee, using combinations of the 36 proposals, and by selecting desirable discrete features, produced seven alternatives for consideration by the complete study group. The complete study group refined and restructured the alternatives presented by the work committee. The result of this action was the formulation of nine

alternative structures. The ACCS-82 Study Advisory Group (SAG) examined the nine structures at its second meeting and recommended that, by eliminating one alternative and combining certain discrete features, ACCS-82 should fully develop seven alternatives for presentation at the initial In-process Review (IPR).

1. The alternative eliminated featured reorganization of the USAR within the state political boundaries and elimination of ARCOM, ARR and RG.

2. The alternatives combined featured elimination of CONUSA, ARCOM and ARR and assignment of AC and RC units to corps; one alternative had five corps and the other six-to-eight corps.

As a result of the initial IPR four alternatives were retained for complete analysis by ACCS-82. During the development of these alternatives, an examination was made of the variations of Alternatives 2 and 3 described earlier in this chapter.

## Chapter 5

### ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES

Several evaluation methods were employed to test the adequacy and compare the effectiveness and efficiency of the current organizational structure (the base case) and all alternatives considered. Subsequent sections of this chapter address each methodology and its application. Although these methods were discussed previously in chapter one, a brief sketch of each method follows:

1. Effectiveness Evaluation: During the study effort, a group of five study group members (the "Red Team") performed a lengthy, indepth critique of alternatives, developed primary strengths and weaknesses of each command and control configuration, identified discrete features which could be isolated and combined with other alternatives, and related the strengths and weaknesses to specific features of alternatives. Finally, the features of each alternative were related to their ability to satisfy the principle effectiveness factors.

2. Effectiveness Assessment: Effectiveness factors, criteria, and detailed measures were derived from the objectives of the study. Several evaluation teams and assessment iterations were employed to determine relative weights for effectiveness factors and to score the alternatives and variations thereof with respect to the effectiveness measures. Sensitivity analysis took place during effectiveness evaluation as the independent, discrete features were identified and measured. Prior to completion of the final report, additional analyses were conducted to determine the sensitivity of results to changes in relative weighting of the effectiveness measures. Scenario Analyses for all command and control configurations were conducted to predict the effectiveness of the organizational alternatives under conditions of partial and total mobilization.

3. Economic Analysis: Economic evaluation was performed to determine the changes in annual operating costs associated with each alternative or variation being considered and the one-time costs of implementing each alternative.

#### Effectiveness Evaluation

General. The Effectiveness Analysis addressed the overall effectiveness of the base case and each alternative in meeting the command

and control requirements of peacetime and full mobilization as a prelude to total mobilization. The analysis was performed in two parts. First, the major strengths and weaknesses of the base case and each alternative were assessed and summarized. Second, the impact of the strengths and weaknesses on the Effectiveness Measures was assessed for the base case and the alternatives. The second part of the analysis identified the discrete features that could be applied to each alternative.

#### Summary of Major Strengths and Weaknesses

Common Strengths and Weaknesses of the Base Case and all alternatives.

##### 1. Common Strengths.

a. Current programs of "Affiliation" and "Training Association" of AC and RC units have significantly enhanced RC unit training quality. These programs should be expanded and emphasized wherever possible, regardless of future changes in the command structure.

b. The FORSCOM Support Unit Improvement Program (SUIP) and the Wartime Unit Mission/Utilization Program (WARMUP) will further enhance RC unit preparedness for wartime missions. These programs can, and should, be pursued under any command and control structure adopted.

##### 2. Common Weaknesses.

a. Current ADP systems at active installations are approaching obsolescence and saturation. Many inactive, semi-active or State-operated mobilization stations do not have ADP support. The lack of adequate ADP support will reduce the quality and timeliness of management information available for decision makers during mobilization. This is a major problem for any command and control structure adopted.

b. The shortage of communications personnel at active mobilization stations and the lack of CE facilities at semi-active, inactive and State-operated mobilization stations will seriously degrade the performance of any command and control structure during mobilization.

c. The current structure has a shortage of five USAR garrisons required to operate semi-active and State-operated mobilization stations during mobilization. The lack of such garrisons reduces the viability of using those installations during the M to M+90 period, since the expanded garrison operations must be provided by acquiring personnel for the mobilization TDA.

d. Current Army Management Information Systems (MIS) supporting installation functions are specifically designed for vertical management systems involving only the installation, MACOM and HQDA (e.g., SAILS, SIDPERS, STANFINS). Decentralization of mobilization command and control functions to any intermediate headquarters between FORSCOM and mobilization stations cannot be fully supported without additional MIS development or redesign and expansion of present systems.

#### Strengths and Weaknesses Common to Alternatives 2, 3 and 4

##### 1. Common Strengths.

a. Alternatives 2, 2A, 3, 3A, 3B and 4 all provide manpower at HQDA for development of an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) which will integrate all areas of mobilization planning (e.g., RC unit mobilization, training base expansion, logistics base expansion, etc), improve the interface between mobilization and deployment planning and integrate current and budget year planning with the POM process.

b. Additional mobilization planning assets are provided to installations and to intermediate commands between FORSCOM and mobilization stations (i.e., CONUSA and corps in Alt 2; CONUSA and REDMOB in Alt 3; and corps in Alt 4).

c. Intermediate headquarters below FORSCOM are assigned specific responsibility and authority for review and approval of all installation plans for mobilizing RC units. This both improves installation planning and decentralizes a major FORSCOM responsibility.

2. Common Weaknesses. The removal and reutilization of battalion-level advisors reduces the AC support at the RC unit level. This may be perceived as degrading AC support to the RC.

### The Existing Structure ("The Base Case")

#### 1. Strengths.

a. The current structure contains sufficient non-deploying headquarters for command and control of mobilization and expansion (CONUSA, ARR, ARCOM, STARC), but specific missions have not been defined or assigned.

b. There are sufficient headquarters for peacetime command, control and management of RC units. (CONUSA, MUSARC, ARR).

c. There is adequate and effective dedicated AC support of RC provided by the CONUSA, ARR, and RC.

#### 2. Weaknesses.

a. There are insufficient resources allocated to mobilization planning at all echelons of the CONUS command and control structure.

b. There is no formal Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS).

c. Many installations could change MACOM during mobilization, since major FORSCOM units at nine installations deploy and the major unit mobilizing at the installation will be assigned to another MACOM (change is from FORSCOM to TRADOC).

d. There are insufficient USAR garrisons in the structure to support all semi-active and State-operated mobilization stations during mobilization.

e. There is a shortage of corps headquarters required for full mobilization.

f. Many headquarters have no valid, long-term, post-mobilization mission (e.g., ARCOM, ARR, RG).

g. There are parallel management headquarters in the structure. While formal command passes from CONUSA to MUSARC to Units, many command functions are exercised through the CONUSA and ARR to Unit chain.

h. FORSCOM has a very broad span of control, especially during mobilization. The problem is primarily in the AC span of control, which includes all FORSCOM installations, corps and AC divisions and separate brigades not collocated with a parent corps.

i. Current CONUS corps headquarters capability is underutilized for peacetime command and control. Currently, corps command only collocated divisions, corps units, and installations at which the corps are located.

j. There are no integrated AC/RC headquarters. The existing structure provides only advisors or liaison officers and some RC statutory tour officers as augmentees within AC headquarters and advisors/augmentees within RC headquarters.

Alternative 1 (Base case with some functionalization of USAR structure).

1. Strengths.

a. All strengths of the base case apply to Alt 1, with the following additional strengths.

b. USAR functional training (Engineer, Medical, Military Police and Personnel Service) should be improved by new functional MUSARC. ARCOM can focus training management on a lesser number of functional and combat areas.

c. Post-mobilization missions have been assigned to more peacetime headquarters (ARCOM have been assigned the mission of installation command).

d. The turbulence of installation command changes upon mobilization could be reduced, since ARCOM would be designated for command of specific installations, and would be planning and training in peace for this post-mobilization role.

e. Minimal reorganizational turbulence will be created, since the only command and control changes will be the transfer of Medical, MP, Engineer or Personnel Services units to functional MUSARC.

2. Weaknesses.

a. All weaknesses of the base case apply to Alt 1, with the

following additional weaknesses.

c. The functional USAR structure may conflict with relationships created by SUIP or WARMUP. USAR units under the functional MUSARC must look to the MUSARC for training guidance, doctrine and training supervision, while SUIP and WARMUP will establish overlapping training associations between these units and other commands, based on wartime alignments. Additionally, SUIP and WARMUP associations follow the Army doctrine of composite units, whereas Alt 1 is branch-oriented.

c. Training management is complicated by the fact that the functional commands have CONUS-wide jurisdiction which cuts across area-oriented command and training assistance relationships of CONUSA and ARR.

d. Two functional MUSARC (MEDCOM and PERSCOM) are created for which there are no established requirements under either full or total mobilization.

e. The creation of a MEDCOM creates additional requirements for senior medical personnel for which there are already critical shortages.

f. No provision is made for HQDA assets to develop an Army Mobilization Planning System.

g. There is no integrated AC/RC headquarters in the structure.

Alternative 2 (One additional AC corps headquarters and elimination of ARR).

1. Strengths.

a. There are sufficient non-deployable headquarters retained for command and control of mobilization and expansion. (CONUSA, ARCOM and STARC are retained).

b. There are sufficient headquarters retained for peacetime command and control of RC units (CONUSA, and MUSARC are retained).

c. The deployable corps headquarters required for full mobilization is established.



d. Decentralization of deployment planning supervision for AC units is facilitated by placing all major deployable AC units under corps command and control in peacetime.

e. Turbulence during mobilization is reduced by assigning ARCOM post-mobilization missions of installation command after AC divisions or corps deploy. Peacetime planning and training by designated ARCOM for this mission will further enhance the smooth transition of installation command.

f. A parallel (duplicative) RC management channel is eliminated by removing the ARR, through which some CONUSA command functions are currently exercised over RC units.

g. The FORSCOM span of control is reduced by placing all major deployable AC units under corps headquarters. Corps peacetime command and control capability is more fully utilized.

h. All headquarters remaining in the peacetime structure are assigned wartime missions. Some ARCOM are designated to command installations (full mobilization) and other ARCOM will prepare to form combat divisions (total mobilization). ARR, which had no validated, long-term, post-mobilization mission (in the base case) are eliminated.

i. Implementation and management of the FORSCOM SUIP and WARMUP programs are facilitated by assigning all major deployable AC units to the three corps during peacetime.

j. The additional corps HHC is an AC headquarters with RC affiliation and association relationships expanded considerably over the base case programs.

## 2. Weaknesses.

a. The CONUSA capability to perform mobilization execution missions is reduced by eliminating the ARR. In the base case the ARR commander became a CONUSA regional Deputy Commander during mobilization.

b. The additional corps will not be capable of early deployment until the needed signal units are activated, equipped and trained.

c. Dedicated AC support to the RC is reduced by elimination of the ARR. Portions of the ARR assets are reallocated to the CONUSAs, to AC mobilization planning, and to the AC corps.

d. The structure does not contain any integrated AC/RC headquarters. The CONUSA are AC headquarters commanding RC MUSARCS.

Alternative 2A (Eliminates AR and provides peacetime OPCON of selected USAR Units to CONUS MACOM. NOTE: Additional AC corps is not provided).

1. Strengths - See Alt 2 para 1 - delete c, d, g, i and j; add the following: establishes gaining command (OPCON for training) relationships during peacetime which will tend to reduce turbulence during mobilization.

2. Weaknesses - See Alt 2 para 2 - delete b; add the following:

a. The FORSCOM span of control is not improved.

b. Does not provide the additional deployable corps headquarters required for mobilization.

Alternative 2B (One additional AC corps; elimination of ARR; OPCON or selected USAR units to CONUS MACOM).

1. Strengths - same as Alt 2, plus: Establishes OPCON for training relationship during peacetime (gaining command during wartime) between selected USAR units and CONUS MACOM.

2. Weaknesses - same as Alt 2.

Alternative 3 (Eliminate ARR and ARCOM and establish REDMOB).

1. Strengths.

a. CONUSA capability to perform mobilization execution missions is increased by replacing nine ARR and 19 ARCOM with eleven subordinate REDMOB. Each REDMOB is a larger, more capable headquarters than was either the ARR or the ARCOM, individually or collectively.

b. Planning and execution of domestic contingency missions is improved by providing a stable, area-oriented command and control

structure under FORSCOM (CONUSA to REDMOB to STARC).

c. Turbulence during mobilization is reduced by assigning REDMOB post-mobilization mission to command host installations after AC divisions or corps deploy. Assumption of command should be smoother, since REDMOB will not move upon mobilization.

d. All peacetime headquarters have wartime missions. The ARR and ARCOM, which have no valid long-term, post-mobilization missions (in the base case) are eliminated.

e. Parallel USAR management headquarters (ARR and ARCOM) are replaced by single chain of command from CONUSA to REDMOB to units.

f. USAR GOCOM (formerly MUSARC) functions and coordination is simplified by combining the ARR, coordinating installation (CI) and CONUSA command supervision into the REDMOB.

g. The number of dedicated AC command and control headquarters is increased by establishment of eleven REDMOB with increased aggregate full time manpower.

h. An integrated AC/RC headquarters is established as a major subordinate command of the CONUSA.

## 2. Weaknesses.

a. The additional deployable corps headquarters required for full mobilization is not provided in the structure.

b. FORSCOM span of control is not reduced. Major deployable AC units not collocated with a corps are still commanded by FORSCOM. Corps peacetime command and control capabilities are not fully utilized.

c. The REDMOB has a very wide peacetime span of control. Eleven REDMOB command all units formerly commanded by 19 ARCOM, as well as 25 MUSARC which were formerly commanded by CONUSA.

d. Under this structure, the peacetime command and control capabilities of the three CONUSA are not fully utilized. Each CONUSA commands only three or four REDMOB.

e. Considerable peacetime reorganizational turbulence is created by eliminating 19 ARCOM and nine ARR, activating 11 REDMOB, and realigning USAR units under REDMOB commands.

f. AC general officer attention to the ARNG is reduced by placing AC major generals (REDMOB commanders) in the USAR chain of command.

g. Additional deployable command and control headquarters are not available for total mobilization.

h. The use of, and dependence on, the USAR chain of command is decreased by extending AC command of the USAR to the next level below the CONUSA (Major General level). Under this alternative, the commanders of the REDMOB are AC general officers and command all USAR units.

i. The number of USAR general officer command and senior officer positions is decreased, creating a degradation of RC career development and promotion opportunity for senior USAR officers.

j. There will be a loss of some career reservists in the ARCOM, who will not relocate to REDMOB or other RC unit locations.

Alternative 3A (Eliminate ARR and ARCOM; establish REDMOB; establish one additional AC corps headquarters and assign peacetime OPCON of selected USAR units to gaining command CONUS MACOM).

1. Strengths - same as Alt 3, plus:

a. Provides the additional AC corps headquarters required for full mobilization.

b. Improves FORSCOM span of control by creating an additional corps and assigning AC units to one of the three CONUS corps. This also facilitates decentralization of deployment planning.

2. Weaknesses - See Alt 3, para 2 - delete a and b; add the following: The additional AC corps will not be capable of early deployment until the needed signal units are activated, equipped and trained.

Alternative 3B (Eliminate ARR and ARCOM; establish REDMOB and one additional AC corps headquarters; assigns peacetime OPCON of selected USAR Units to gaining command CONUS MACOM; and eliminate Fifth Army).

1. Strengths - same as Alt 3A, plus:

a. Reduces FORSCOM span of command and control from three to two CONUSA; provides potential for more fully utilizing remaining CONUSA capability.

b. Provides some manpower assets to partly satisfy staffing requirements of creating a new corps headquarters with supporting signal elements.

2. Weaknesses - Same as Alt 3A, plus:

Increases the geographic area of concern of the remaining two CONUSA, possibly degrading responsiveness to and awareness of RC problems, and accomplishment of other area command and control responsibilities.

b. Further reduces the attention to the RC by AC general officers and their staffs.

Alternative 4 (Creates five integrated AC/RC corps headquarters commanding all FORSCOM deployable AC units and USAR units; eliminates the CONUSA and ARR and assigns peacetime OPCON of selected USAR units to CONUS wartime gaining MACOM).

1. Strengths.

a. The structure contains sufficient non-deployable headquarters for command and control during mobilization and expansion. (CONUSA replaced by five area commands; 19 ARCOM and 53 STARC are retained).

b. The structure contains sufficient headquarters for peacetime command and control of RC units. (Five corps; ARCOM/MUSARC and STARC retained.)

c. The structure provides a required deployable corps headquarters for full mobilization.

d. Decentralization of deployment planning supervision is facilitated by placing all major deployable AC and RC units under corps command and control during peacetime.

e. Turbulence during mobilization is reduced by assigning ARCOM the mission to command installations after AC divisions and corps deploy. Peacetime planning and training of designated ARCOM will enhance the smooth transition of installation command.

f. A parallel (duplicative) management channel is eliminated by removing the CONUSA and ARR and providing a single chain of command from FORSCOM to corps to MUSARC to USAR units.

g. FORSCOM span of control is reduced by placing all USAR and major deployable AC units under the five corps.

h. All headquarters in the structure have a wartime mission. ARR, which did not have a valid, long-term post-mobilization mission (in the base case), are eliminated and ARCOM are assigned missions for installation command and/or forming new divisions.

i. Decentralization of FORSCOM SUIP and WARMUP management (to the corps) is facilitated by assigning all major deployable AC and USAR units to corps during peacetime.

j. Potential for improving the readiness of non-deploying RC units is enhanced by establishing a gaining command relationship (OPCON for training supervision and evaluation) between CONUS MACOM and the selected USAR units.

k. Some command and control headquarters are provided for total mobilization (two late deploying corps HHC; and ARCOM to form new divisions).

l. AC/RC integration is increased by five integrated AC/RC headquarters (corps) established as major subordinate commands of FORSCOM.

m. Peacetime command and control of both AC and RC by major integrated headquarters may facilitate and encourage the development of compatible or common AC and RC management systems and MIS.

## 2. Weaknesses.

a. The additional early deploying corps headquarters will not be deployable until required signal units are activated, equipped and trained.

b. Internal turbulence may be experienced within the corps headquarters while separating the non-deployable area command element from the deploying corps headquarters during mobilization.

c. Corps headquarters may have an over-extended span of interest. During peacetime, they will be involved in war planning, mobilization planning, deployment planning, domestic contingency planning, installation management/command, RC management and administration, command and control of both USAR and FORSCOM AC units, and training supervision and assistance for the ARNG. This problem is compounded during mobilization by the corps headquarters preparation for its own deployment.

d. Significant peacetime reorganizational turbulence will be created by elimination of CONUSA and ARR and realignment of both AC and RC units under integrated corps headquarters.

e. Dedicated AC support and attention to the RC will be reduced by elimination of the three CONUSA and nine ARR and placing all USAR units and RC under integrated AC/RC corps. There may be diversion of AC general officer attention from the ARNG because the AC corps commander will command both AC and USAR units.

Impact of Strengths and Weaknesses of Command and  
Control Configuration on Effectiveness Measures

General.

Six principle effectiveness measures, discussed in the next section (Effectiveness Assessment) of this chapter, were developed to test the adequacy of any command and control configuration to meet the objectives of the study. In this section, the results are presented of relating the applicable strengths and weaknesses of each command and control configuration to the effectiveness measures, thus determining which specific features of an alternative satisfy that effectiveness measure. In order to summarize and to conserve space, the significant components of an effectiveness measure, and the relationship of each command and control configuration is presented in a table or matrix, followed by a comparative analysis and conclusion.

1. Effectiveness Measure #1--Mobilization and Deployment Planning and an Orderly and Rapid Transition from Peace to War.

a. Relationship of significant strengths and weaknesses ("S" and "W") of each configuration to this effectiveness measure:

<u>Strengths/Weaknesses</u>	<u>ALTERNATIVES</u>								
	BC	1	2	2A	2B	3	3A	3B	4
Improve mobilization and deployment planning capability	W	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Sufficient non-deployable RC command and control HQ for management during peace, mob and expansion	S	S	S	S	S				S
Reduce turbulence during mobilization	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Decentralize review and approval of instal mob plans for RC units	W	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Provide deployable corps for full mobilization	W	W	S	W	S	W	S	S	S
Capability to decentralize mobilization/contingency execution below FORSCOM	W	W	W	W	W	S	S	S	S
Capability of additional deployable corps to deploy			W		W		W	W	W
Shortage of USARG for semi-active and state-operated mob stations	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
ADP & Commo workload capability	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W
MIS Support to decentralization of mob command and control functions	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W



<u>Strengths/Weaknesses(cont'd)</u>	BC	<u>ALTERNATIVES</u>							
		1	2	2A	2B	3	3A	3B	4
Overextended span of interest for corps			S		S		S	S	W

b. Comparative Analysis. The base case and Alternatives 1, 2, 2A, 2B, and 4 have sufficient non-deployable RC command and control headquarters available for management during peace, mobilization and expansion. All alternatives reduce installation turbulence during the transition by assigning a command and control headquarters to command installations. Alternatives 2 through 4 provide manpower assets at HQDA to develop an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS); provide assets at commands below FORSCOM to perform mobilization planning and assign decentralized responsibility and authority for review and approval of the installations' mobilization plans for RC units to intermediate headquarters below FORSCOM. Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A, 3B, and 4 provide a required deployable AC corps headquarters to meet full mobilization and facilitate decentralization of deployment planning to the corps. Alternatives 3, 3A, and 3B increase the CONUSA capability to perform mobilization execution responsibilities by eliminating nine ARRs and establishing larger headquarters in the 11 REDMOBs and provide a stable area-oriented structure under FORSCOM (CONUSA-REDMOB-STARC) which improves execution of domestic contingencies. Alternate 4 provides the same capability by eliminating the nine ARRs and establishing five much larger corps headquarters with a stable non-deployable element within the corps headquarters. The base case and Alternative 1 will have considerable turbulence during mobilization caused by many installations and RC units changing MACOM. Alternative 4 may overextend the corps span of interest and may create internal turbulence during mobilization when separating the non-deploying area element from the deploying corps headquarters. In Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A, 3B and 4, the additional early deployable corps would not be deployable until signal units are activated, equipped and trained.

c. Conclusions.

(1) The features of a command and control system that best provide for mobilization and deployment planning and an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war are:

(a) Provide dedicated assets at all levels and the necessary guidance to prepare mobilization and deployment plans.

(b) Reduce organizational turbulence (installations changing MACOM during mobilization).

(c) Provide required command and control structure for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war.

(2) All Alternatives, except Alternative 1, provide the dedicated planning assets required to satisfy (a) above, however, Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B provide planning assets to a headquarters (REDMOB) whose sole purpose is support of the RC. This provides eleven headquarters dedicated to the RC, as opposed to the three dedicated CONUSA and three AC-oriented corps in Alternatives 2 and 2B and the five AC/RC-oriented corps in Alternative 4. The structural feature that best provides for mobilization planning is the RC dedicated HQ (REDMOB/CONUSA) of Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B. The feature that best facilitates deployment planning is the placing of all deployable units under corps command and control as found in Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A, 3B and 4. Alternatives 2 and 2B are the alternatives that provide both AC-oriented corps and RC-dedicated CONUSA to best satisfy (a) above.

(3) All alternatives provide a command and control headquarters to take command of those FORSCOM installations that would otherwise be reassigned to TRADOC during mobilization (section (c) above). In the case of 1, 2, 2A, 2B, and 4, ARCOM headquarters are assigned to take command of designated mobilization stations. In the case of Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B, REDMOB headquarters are assigned to take command of designated mobilization stations.

(4) Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A and 4 provide the features required to satisfy (c) above. They eliminate those RC headquarters with no wartime mission, improve the FORSCOM span of control, establish a wartime alignment of major units to the corps during peacetime, and decentralize and simplify deployment. Alternative 4 may have an overextended span of interest which could impact on its ability to provide for an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war.

2. Effectiveness Measure #2--An Efficient and Streamlined AC and RC Structure to Assure Proper Command and Control of Army Units in Peace and War.

a. Relationship of significant strengths and weaknesses

("S" and "W") of each command and control configuration to this effectiveness measure:

<u>Strengths/Weaknesses</u>	<u>ALTERNATIVES</u>								
	BC	1	2	2a	2b	3	3a	3b	4
Reduce unnecessary layering	W	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Reduce FORSCOM span of control	W	W	S	W	S	W	S	S	S
Better utilization of corps command and control capability			S		S		S	S	S
Eliminate HQs with no war-time mission or assign mission to all HQ	W	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Create command and control headquarters not required for mobilization		W							
Simplifies MUSARC coord functions						S	S	S	
Overextends span of interest of corps commander									W
Reorganizational turbulence	S	S	S	S	S	W	W	W	W
Capability of MIS to support decentralization below MACOM level	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W	W

b. Comparative Analysis. All alternatives, except Alternative 1, eliminate a management layer and either assign valid missions or eliminate those headquarters with no valid, long-term wartime mission, while only Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A, 3B, and 4 improve the FORSCOM span of control and make better use of the CONUS corps command and control capabilities in peacetime. Conversely, the Base Case, Alternatives 1, 2A and 3, do nothing to improve the FORSCOM span of control or to better utilize the CONUS corps peacetime command and control, and Alternatives 3 and 3A also underutilize the CONUSA span of control. The Base Case and Alternatives 1, 2, 2A and 2B cause no, or minimal, reorganizational turbulence, while Alternatives 3, 3A, 3B and 4 cause significant reorganizational turbulence. The base case and Alternative 1 retain a parallel RC management headquarters layer, while Alternative 1 creates some headquarters unneeded in mobilization plans and may establish a requirement for more senior medical personnel than are available. The base case also fails to provide valid mobilization missions for many headquarters. Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B simplify MUSARC management and coordination functions by consolidation at REDMOB in place of multiple requirements for coordination with CONUSA, CI, and ARR. None of the alternatives provide the automated MIS necessary to decentralize mobilization execution below MACOM level. Alternative 4 may over-extend the corps commander's span of interest by requiring him to focus on mobilization, deployment, and CONUS post-mobilization missions.

c. Conclusions: The dominant criteria of an effective and streamlined structure to assure proper command and control of Army units in peace and war are best satisfied by:

(1) Proper span of control and utilization of command and control headquarters in peace and war, best exhibited in Alternative 3A and, to a lesser degree, in Alternatives 2 and 4.

(2) Elimination of unnecessary layering and assignment of wartime missions, best exhibited by Alternatives 3, 3A, 3B and 4, and to a lesser degree by Alternatives 2, 2A, and 2B.

(3) Adequate command and control structure to manage AC and RC in peace is best exhibited in Alternative 3A, followed by 2B.

3. Effectiveness Measure #3--AC Commitment to Training and Readiness of RC Units in Peace.

a. Relationships of significant strengths and weaknesses ("S" and "W") of each command and control configuration to this effectiveness measure:

<u>Strengths/Weaknesses</u>	<u>ALTERNATIVES</u>									
	BC	1	2	2A	2B	3	3A	3B	4	
Current affiliation relationships	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	
SUIP/WARMUP enhances Tng and Readiness for war	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S		
Reduce unit level support by elim Bn advisors			W	W	W	W	W	W	W	
Reduce AC G.O. attention to ARNG.						W	W	W	W	
Reduce dedicated support (ARR)			W	W	W	W	W	W	W	
Reduce dedicated support (CONUSA)								W	W	
Effective dedicated support to RC	S	S								
Improve RC functional training		S								
Structure conflicts with SUIP/WARMUP		W								
Complicates CONUS peacetime (tng) mgmt		W								
Facilitates decentralization (SUIP/WARMUP) to corps			S		S			S	S	
Increases dedicated AC support to RC						S	S			
Establishes gaining cmd/OPCON (MACOM/RC unit)				S	S	S	S	S	S	

b. Comparative Analysis. All command and control configurations under consideration continue the benefits of the Affiliation Program and improve RC readiness through development of the SUIP/WARMUP programs. The functional commands established in Alternative 1 conflict with effective implementation of SUIP/WARMUP, overly extend responsibility, CONUS-wide, and conflict with responsibility for training and management assigned to other headquarters on an area basis (i.e., CONUSA and ARR). The base case and Alternative 1 provide adequate and effective dedicated training support to RC units. AC training support to RC units is reduced by elimination of battalion advisors in Alternatives 2 through 4; in all versions of Alternatives 3 and 4 by focusing the (AC GO) commanders' attention on assigned USAR units, diminishing attention to ARNG; and in all versions of Alternatives 2 and 4, and to a lesser degree in 3B, by decreasing the number of AC headquarters dedicated to RC management support and training assistance. Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B increase AC-dedicated command and control headquarters support by creating 11 REDMOB of greater assigned strength than the nine ARR and 19 ARCOM. Decentralization (e.g., of implementation of SUIP/WARMUP) is facilitated by assigning all AC units to AC corps in Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A, 3B and 4. Functional training may improve as a result of the functional commands established in Alternative 1. Alternatives 2A through 4 increase RC readiness by creating a gaining command relationship (OPCON for training) between CONUS MACOM and non-deploying RC units.

c. Conclusion: The paramount determinant of enhancing AC commitment to training and readiness of RC units in peace is improving dedicated training support, which in turn improves RC training. Association of RC and AC units could improve training and readiness, however, a key factor in such association is the number of AC units available, and is common to all alternatives. Association of RC non-deploying units with gaining MACOM (by OPCON for training) provides the potential to enhance the training and readiness of those units. The retention of three CONUSA and the creation of 11 REDMOB larger in size and number than the current ARR are the features of Alternatives 3, 3A, and to a lesser extent, Alternative 3B, which have the greatest impact on all RC units for improving dedicated training support, and thus best satisfying this effectiveness measure. The association feature of creating a gaining command (OPCON for training) relationship between CONUS MACOM and USAR non-deploying units (found in Alternatives 2 through 4) provides the potential to improve the training and readiness status of such units but has lesser impact than the dedicated training support feature of Alternative 3.

4. Effectiveness Measure #4--Command and Control Base for Expansion to Meet the Needs of Total Mobilization for War.

a. Relationship of significant strengths and weaknesses ("S" and "W") of each command and control configuration to this effectiveness measure:

<u>Strengths/Weaknesses</u>	<u>ALTERNATIVES</u>								
	BC	1	2	2A	2B	3	3A	3B	4
Availability of non-deployable HQ for Command and Control for expansion	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Assets at HQDA to develop Army mob system	W	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Assets at commands below FORSCOM to perform mob planning	W	W	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Provides deployable HQ for total mobilization	W	W	S	S	S	W	W	W	S

b. Comparative Analysis. The base case and Alternatives 1, 2, 2A, 2B and 4 have available additional non-deployable RC command and control headquarters for total mobilization (expansion). Alternatives 2 through 4 provide manpower assets at HQDA to develop an Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) and assets at commands below FORSCOM to perform mobilization planning; the base case and Alternative 1 do not. Alternatives 2, 2A, 2B and 4 provide deployable headquarters for total mobilization, the base case and Alternatives 1, 3, 3A and 3B do not.

c. Conclusions. The paramount feature of this effectiveness measure is the provision of command and control headquarters for use as a basis for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization for war. Alternatives 2, 2A, 2B and 4 do this. Alternatives 2, 2A and 2B assign designated ARCOM the post-mobilization mission of forming division headquarters. Alternative 4 has two late-deploying corps for total mobilization. These are the only alternatives that explicitly provide units for total mobilization.

5. Effectiveness Measure #5--Integration of AC and RC and Appropriate use of the RC Chain of Command in Peace.

a. Relationship of significant strengths and weaknesses ("S" and "W") of each command and control configuration to this effectiveness measure:

Strengths/Weaknesses	ALTERNATIVES								
	BC	1	2	2A	2B	3	3A	3B	4
Provides integrated AC/RC headquarters	W	W	W	W	W	S	S	S	S
Continues current affiliations and association programs	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S
Expands affiliation and association			S		S		S	S	S
Decreased use of RC chain of command and loss of USAR GO commanders						W	W	W	
Potential loss of USAR career reservists						W	W	W	

b. Comparative Analysis. All alternatives will provide for Affiliation and Association programs. However, Alternatives 2, 2B, 3A, 3B and 4 expand the programs to combat support and combat service support units by aligning RC Corps Artillery and COSCOM with the new corps. Alternatives 3, 3A, 3B and 4 establish a level of integrated AC/RC headquarters while the base case, Alternatives 1 and 2, fail to do so. Alternatives 3, 3A, and 3B extend AC command of USAR units downward one command level and decrease the use of the RC chain of command. They also eliminate 19 USAR GO command positions and may cause the loss of career Reservists from the inactivated headquarters who cannot find or relocate to another unit vacancy.

c. Conclusion. The dominant factor of this effectiveness measure is the peacetime integration of AC and RC personnel into command and control headquarters without causing undue diminution of the authority of the RC chain of command. This is best accomplished by the five corps featured in Alternative 4. Alternatives 3, 3A and 3B also satisfy this factor through the 11 REDMOB, but their strength is



somewhat offset by the decreased use of the RC chain of command and potential loss of career Reserve personnel.

6. Effectiveness Measure #6--Management Capabilities of the Total Army in Peace, the Transition and War.

a. No matrix was prepared for strengths and weaknesses of this measure, since only one strength pertaining to one alternative was identified.

b. Comparative Analysis. The management areas which were addressed under this Effectiveness Measure were personnel, logistics, financial and communications/ADP. While there are many strengths and weaknesses in Total Army management capabilities, none have been identified which are useful in discriminating between the alternative command and control structures considered in this analysis. The features in the various alternatives do not significantly enhance or degrade personnel, logistics or financial management. Communications/ADP support capabilities are not significantly affected by Alternatives 1, 2, 2A, 2B, 3A or 3B. In Alternative 4, the peacetime command and control and management of both AC and RC forces by integrated corps headquarters may facilitate and motivate the future development of common or more compatible AC and RC MIS. As this result is achieved, peacetime ADP support, especially during the transition to war, will be improved.

c. Conclusion. No dominant features of the alternatives were identified which significantly modify the Total Army management capabilities in peace, the transition and war. The motivation provided by Alternative 4 for future development of common, or more compatible, RC and AC MIS is a significant potential benefit from the point of view of ADP support. Realization of this benefit, however, would not occur for several years after establishment of the corps, and may not occur at all.

Effectiveness Assessment

General. The assessment of effectiveness was accomplished using a modification of the "Delphi technique." This technique was applied to each alternative and modifications thereof for those effectiveness measures established to represent the desired characteristics of the CONUS command and control structure. The relative weightings of the effectiveness measures were assessed independently of the assessment

of each alternative. The full ACCS-82 study group made up the panel for all the effectiveness assessments. Separate panels, representing the Army Staff and FORSCOM, validated the ACCS-82 team assessments for the primary alternatives. The results are tabulated in the form of the mean score assessed for each effectiveness measure, as well as the weighted score for each effectiveness measure. Sensitivity analyses examined the effects of modifications to the primary alternatives in terms of the incremental change in assessment accrued by the particular modification. The effect of alternate scenarios of partial and total mobilization on the assessment of the alternatives was also determined. In addition, the sensitivity of the assessment results to alternate relative weightings of the effectiveness measures were obtained.

#### Methodology

##### 1. Modified Delphi Technique.

a. The Delphi technique is a procedure for developing a consensus of forecast in a specific area from a panel of experts in that area. Previous studies within the Army to evaluate new organizations have used the Delphi technique and variants thereof as the means of organizational evaluation. The study "A Delphi Study: Assessing Army Reorganization - CONUS - 73"(1) concluded that the Delphi technique is appropriate for developing measures of assessing government organizations.

b. Individuals scored qualitative and quantitative factors that describe the various command and control organizations under evaluation. For the Modified Delphi approach taken in this study, a study team review of the results of the initial scoring was accomplished. Those individual scores which varied widely from the mean scores of the panel were orally defended and the panel was given the opportunity to discuss the intent of differing scores. This process exposed the panel to key points that may have been considered by only one or two members and to the logic of those who appeared to be better informed.

##### 2. Effectiveness Criteria/Measures. The specific objectives of

---

(1) Vinson, Newell E. A Delphi Study Assessing Army Reorganization-CONUS 73. Army Study 5037. Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Fort McNair, Wash, DC, Undated.

ACCS-82 were redefined in terms of the desired characteristics for the CONUS command and control organization. These became the main criteria to assess the effectiveness of the proposed command and control organizational alternatives. The effectiveness criteria are listed in Table 5-1. They are further defined by a series of effectiveness measures and sub-measures as presented in Inclosure 2, Annex D, Vol III. Inclosure 3, Annex D, Vol III provides even further definition of the effectiveness criteria and effectiveness measures in terms of a series of Effectiveness Information Factors (EIF). The EIF were identified for each of the major alternatives being assessed and they were provided to all who participated in the evaluation.

3. Assessment Procedure. The objective of the evaluation was to obtain consensus of individual subjective assessments by a panel of personnel knowledgeable regarding the subject of this study. Each individual assessed each alternative in the measured areas on the basis of a score of zero (very poor) to ten (very good). A separate assessment was made to establish the relative weighting of the main criteria, and within each criteria the effectiveness measures and submeasures. The scoring rules are further defined in Annex D, Vol III. Inclosure 4 of Annex D, Vol III provides a sample scoring table. By applying the appropriate weighting to the score (zero to ten basis) for each effectiveness measure, and then summing the weighted scores, a single effectiveness score was obtained for each alternative. These individual assessments were based on reports, presentations, and discussions. Each panel was provided in-depth information on the effectiveness criteria and measures thereof, and the characteristics and features of the base case and each proposed alternative. The written material provided to each participant on the alternative organizations and the (EIF) were the primary references. Copies of the EIF material are available in the ACCS-82 study files.

4. Evaluation Teams. The 18 members of the ACCS-82 study group formed the principal panel that was used to establish the relative weights and to assess the effectiveness of all the alternatives, variations thereof and sensitivity and scenario analyses. By virtue of their background and efforts on the study, each member was considered better informed than outside personnel about the characteristics and features of each of the alternatives being evaluated. As a check, separate panels from the Army staff (14 members) and FORSCOM (11 members) evaluated the Base Case and the four primary alternatives, for both the relative weighting process and the scoring for each individual effectiveness measure.

TABLE 5-1

**EFFECTIVENESS MEASURES**

1. Mobilization and deployment planning and an orderly and rapid transition from peace to war.
  - a. Peace
    - (1) Improve mobilization and deployment planning capability.
    - (2) Improve domestic contingency planning/execution capability.
    - (3) Improve installation planning capability.
  - b. Transition
    - (1) Provide required C&C structure.
    - (2) Reduce organizational turbulence.
    - (3) Provide for the expansion of the mobilization base.
    - (4) Improve mobilization execution capability.
  - c. War
    - (1) Improve deployment capability.
    - (2) Provide required deployable C&C structure.
    - (3) Provide required CONUS C&C structure.
    - (4) Provide for expansion of the mobilization base.
2. An efficient and streamlined AC and RC structure to assure proper command and control of Army units in peace and war.
  - a. Peace
    - (1) Reduce unnecessary layering.
    - (2) Reduce unnecessary duplication of functions.
    - (3) Improve span of control.
    - (4) Provide authority commensurate with responsibility.
    - (5) Command responsibilities more clearly defined.
    - (6) Provide adequate C&C structure to manage AC and RC
  - b. War
    - (1) Reduce unnecessary layering.
    - (2) Improve span of control.
3. AC commitment to training and readiness of RC units in peace.
  - a. Improve AC training assistance.
  - b. Improve association of RC and AC.
  - c. Improve training.
4. Command and control base for expansion to meet the needs of total mobilization.
  - a. Provide required command and control structure for total mobilization.
  - b. Improve planning and execution capability for total mobilization.
5. Integration of AC and RC and appropriate use of the RC chain of command in peace.
  - a. Appropriate use of RC chain of command.
  - b. Provide for proper integration of AC and RC units in a command.
  - c. Provide for proper integration of AC and RC personnel in C&C HQ's.
6. Management capabilities of the Total Army in peace, the transition and war.
  - a. Improve personnel management capability during the continuum.
  - b. Improve logistical management capability during the continuum.
  - c. Improve financial management capability during the continuum.
  - d. Improve COMM/ADP support capability during the continuum.

### Effectiveness Assessments

1. Relative Weighting. The weighting process was validated through comparison of the results of the iterative assessments and by comparisons of the assessments between the separate teams (i.e., the ACCS-82 study, the Army Staff, and FORSCOM). The nomenclature for each effectiveness measure is as defined in Table 5-1, and is required when referring to the tabulated results within this chapter. Tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 present the results of the relative weighting of the effectiveness measures by the teams from ACCS-82, the Army Staff, and FORSCOM, respectively. These results indicate that the variations in weighting between the first and the second iteration approximated the same magnitude for all teams. Variations of weighting between iterations within each team were nominally one or two percent for the major criteria, with isolated reassessments of four percent. These were absolute changes and not percentage changes based on the first assessment. Comparing the final weightings of the Army Staff and FORSCOM teams relative to ACCS-82, there are variations for major criteria, of up to six percent (again, in the absolute sense). These variations are not deemed particularly significant and confirm the validity of using these relative weighting data in the overall assessment of each alternative.

TABLE 5-2

## ACCS-82 RELATIVE WEIGHTING, PERCENT

EFFECTIVENESS <sup>1/</sup> MEASURE	FIRST WEIGHTING		SECOND WEIGHTING	
	MEAN	STD DEV	MEAN	STD DEV
1	29.7		30.3	
a	35.5	8.1	35.2	6.0
(1)	47.7	15.5	48.8	9.6
(2)	21.3	6.4	19.2	8.2
(3)	30.9	8.5	31.9	8.7
	<u>100%</u>	10.7	<u>100%</u>	9.3
b	35.5	9.6	35.6	7.8
(1)	32.0	9.0	30.3	9.1
(2)	17.9	11.8	16.2	8.1
(3)	19.5	8.9	20.4	7.8
(4)	30.7	13.9	33.1	10.8
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
c	28.9	11.8	29.1	10.6
(1)	<u>100%</u>	11.6	<u>100%</u>	10.8
(2)	26.4	10.5	26.8	11.6
(3)	25.9	8.3	26.9	7.4
(4)	19.0	8.7	19.1	8.1
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
2	21.6	8.1	25.5	6.3
a	61.0	13.7	60.6	14.0
(1)	13.8	8.5	14.3	8.1
(2)	14.9	6.6	16.6	7.0
(3)	14.8	5.3	14.8	5.9
(4)	13.7	7.3	10.5	4.0
(5)	15.7	7.2	12.9	7.2
(6)	27.0	13.6	30.9	13.8
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
b	39.0	13.7	39.4	14.0
(1)	<u>100%</u>	14.5	<u>100%</u>	11.8
(2)	46.4	14.5	44.1	11.8
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
3	15.3	5.0	13.6	4.4
a	45.7	13.7	30.8	8.1
b	54.3	13.7	31.1	10.2
c	2/	2/	38.1	10.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
4	12.3	5.4	10.6	4.5
a	46.3	16.5	42.1	12.5
b	53.7	16.5	57.9	12.5
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
5	8.8	4.3	8.3	2.9
a	33.7	18.3	34.4	17.2
b	33.3	11.1	32.6	10.6
c	33.0	15.9	32.9	13.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
6	12.3	5.9	11.7	4.9
a	26.0	7.8	25.3	8.0
b	29.8	8.0	32.1	5.6
c	15.7	6.5	12.8	3.3
d	28.5	15.4	29.9	10.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	

<sup>1/</sup> See Figure 5-1 for nomenclature (code) for Effectiveness Measure.<sup>2/</sup> Not included in first weighting.

TABLE 5-3

## ARMY STAFF RELATIVE WEIGHTING, PERCENT

EFFECTIVENESS <sup>1/</sup> MEASURE	FIRST WEIGHTING		SECOND WEIGHTING	
	MEAN	STD DEV	MEAN	STD DEV
1.	33.3	12.7	32.1	9.4
a	27.9	9.9	32.8	8.9
(1)	56.7	13.5	53.2	13.2
(2)	19.7	5.7	17.9	17.5
(3)	23.7	10.3	28.9	11.8
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
b	32.4	8.6	31.1	8.1
(1)	27.7	9.0	27.4	9.7
(2)	14.7	5.0	14.8	8.3
(3)	17.6	10.2	19.5	7.9
(4)	40.1	10.7	38.3	12.3
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
c	39.7	10.2	36.0	10.9
(1)	<u>100%</u>	10.4	<u>100%</u>	11.2
(2)	27.9	11.7	26.9	11.1
(3)	15.3	9.9	17.4	8.1
(4)	17.2	8.3	18.9	9.0
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
2	24.7	7.0	22.5	8.2
a	50.4	13.7	55.7	10.9
(1)	13.3	5.4	17.4	6.4
(2)	12.3	4.3	13.8	5.7
(3)	15.7	8.7	16.0	7.0
(4)	19.1	12.0	17.3	10.2
(5)	15.3	5.4	12.6	4.1
(6)	23.1	13.0	22.9	12.4
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
b	49.6	13.7	44.3	10.9
(1)	<u>100%</u>	11.7	<u>100%</u>	12.2
(2)	55.2	11.7	56.8	12.2
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
3	13.2	8.0	12.4	5.9
a	22.6	15.7	18.4	10.8
b	38.9	17.6	40.7	16.5
c	38.6	12.1	40.9	14.7
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
4	6.7	3.1	8.1	3.6
a	38.1	9.1	41.0	7.7
b	61.9	9.1	59.0	7.7
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
5	9.9	5.1	10.6	5.3
a	35.6	17.6	28.9	18.7
b	40.6	14.8	44.3	20.2
c	23.9	8.1	26.8	9.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
6	12.8	6.3	14.3	5.7
a	24.9	10.8	22.4	9.0
b	34.9	10.8	27.9	7.2
c	16.0	5.9	14.2	5.4
d	24.3	10.7	35.4	11.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	

<sup>1/</sup> See Figure 5-1 for nomenclature (code) for Effectiveness Measure.

TABLE 5-4

## FORSCOM RELATIVE WEIGHTING, PERCENT

EFFECTIVENESS <sup>1/</sup> MEASURE	FIRST WEIGHTING		SECOND WEIGHTING	
	MEAN	STD DEV	MEAN	STD DEV
1	27.6	12.9	29.9	9.1
a	37.0	16.2	36.2	14.4
(1)	50.0	12.3	47.4	8.6
(2)	22.4	8.3	22.0	7.7
(3)	27.4	8.8	30.6	9.1
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
b	30.4	9.3	32.7	9.0
(1)	27.7	24.6	25.0	8.1
(2)	17.2	8.7	18.6	6.0
(3)	22.7	12.3	25.9	7.7
(4)	32.2	14.8	30.5	6.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
c	32.4	15.0	31.1	11.1
(1)	<u>100%</u>	27.7	<u>100%</u>	27.7
(2)	20.9	11.1	22.7	9.8
(3)	30.0	24.0	29.1	23.9
(4)	21.3	9.2	20.5	8.8
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
2	20.0	11.4	19.7	4.5
a	60.0	14.8	56.4	6.7
(1)	14.0	7.6	14.1	6.7
(2)	14.2	8.0	14.5	6.4
(3)	11.9	7.2	11.4	7.1
(4)	16.9	11.4	16.1	8.5
(5)	17.3	3.5	17.5	13.5
(6)	25.5	14.8	26.5	13.4
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
b	40.0	14.8	43.6	6.7
(1)	<u>100%</u>	37.2	<u>100%</u>	38.6
(2)	62.7	12.9	61.4	10.5
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
3	11.1	4.7	11.5	4.0
a	28.6	16.7	28.6	10.0
b	28.0	15.7	28.9	10.6
c	43.3	25.7	42.5	14.0
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
4	16.4	7.0	15.5	5.7
a	54.5	16.5	55.5	14.9
b	45.4	16.5	44.5	14.9
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
5	9.6	3.6	9.2	3.3
a	30.9	16.2	30.9	16.3
b	37.2	7.8	37.3	7.9
c	31.8	11.0	31.8	11.0
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	
6	15.0	7.0	14.2	5.9
a	26.8	3.3	26.4	6.0
b	30.0	7.4	30.5	8.5
c	17.0	8.1	16.2	8.0
d	26.0	8.6	26.1	8.4
	<u>100%</u>		<u>100%</u>	

<sup>1/</sup> See Figure 5-1 for nomenclature (code) for Effectiveness Measure.



2. Standard Deviation. Analysis of the standard deviation relationship, Table 5-5, for each team shows a definite decrease from the first to the second assessment for relative weighting. This confirmed that the iterative procedure accomplished its purpose in approaching consensus.

TABLE 5-5  
STANDARD DEVIATION, RELATIVE WEIGHTING

	MEAN STANDARD DEVIATION <sup>1/</sup>	
	FIRST WEIGHTING	SECOND WEIGHTING
ACCS-82	10.5	9.0
ARMY STAFF	9.9	9.7
FORSCOM	11.8	9.2

<sup>1/</sup> Mean of the (42) standard deviations of the effectiveness measure assessments, percent.

3. Alternative Assessments. Definitions of the Base Case and the four primary alternatives have been previously described. The effectiveness of each alternative was assessed by all three evaluation teams and these results are presented in Tables 5-6, 5-7, and 5-8 for ACCS-82, the Army Staff, and FORSCOM, respectively. In each case the weighting applied to the assessed score for each effectiveness measure was the second relative weighting by the respective evaluation teams (Tables 5-2, 5-3, 5-4). Subtotals are shown for each of the major criteria to provide a basis for comparing that particular attribute across the alternatives. The total score is the overall assessment by an evaluation team for that particular alternative.

TABLE 5-6  
EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, ACCS-82

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3		ALT 4		
		MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	
1	30.3											
a	35.2											
(1)	48.8	.052	4.3	.224	4.3	.224	6.8	.354	8.1	.422	7.9	.411
(2)	19.2	.020	5.0	.102	5.0	.102	7.0	.143	8.0	.164	8.0	.164
(3)	31.9	.034	3.0	.102	2.9	.099	5.9	.201	7.1	.242	6.8	.231
	99.9											
b	35.6											
(1)	30.3	.033	5.4	.176	5.3	.173	5.3	.173	6.9	.226	6.9	.226
(2)	16.2	.017	3.1	.054	2.6	.045	3.4	.059	3.5	.061	5.4	.094
(3)	20.4	.022	3.7	.081	3.7	.081	4.3	.095	5.1	.112	6.6	.145
(4)	33.1	.036	4.2	.150	4.2	.150	4.0	.143	6.2	.221	6.3	.225
	100.0											
c	29.1											
(1)	21.2	.024	4.1	.098	4.1	.098	5.1	.122	4.8	.115	4.7	.113
(2)	26.8	.024	5.8	.137	5.7	.135	7.3	.173	5.8	.137	7.4	.175
(3)	26.9	.024	5.0	.119	4.8	.114	4.9	.116	5.9	.140	6.4	.152
(4)	19.1	.017	2.0	.034	2.1	.035	4.3	.072	2.6	.044	5.4	.091
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		1.278		1.257		1.652		1.883		2.027
2	25.5											
a	60.6											
(1)	14.3	.022	4.1	.091	4.1	.091	7.4	.164	6.3	.139	7.6	.168
(2)	16.6	.026	3.6	.092	3.6	.092	6.9	.177	7.1	.182	7.1	.182
(3)	14.8	.023	3.7	.095	3.1	.071	6.6	.151	6.4	.146	7.4	.169
(4)	10.5	.016	4.8	.078	4.4	.078	5.1	.083	5.3	.086	6.4	.104
(5)	12.9	.020	4.3	.086	4.2	.084	6.1	.122	6.8	.136	7.0	.140
(6)	30.9	.048	5.3	.253	5.7	.272	7.2	.344	6.9	.329	7.6	.363
	100.0											
b	39.4											
(1)	44.1	.044	4.1	.182	4.1	.182	6.9	.306	7.7	.341	7.7	.341
(2)	55.9	.056	3.4	.191	2.9	.163	5.3	.298	6.6	.371	7.1	.399
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		1.057		1.032		1.643		1.731		1.866
3	13.6											
a	30.8	.042	7.2	.302	7.2	.302	6.9	.289	7.7	.323	7.5	.314
b	31.1	.042	6.4	.271	6.3	.266	7.5	.317	7.6	.321	8.4	.355
c	38.1	.052	6.4	.332	7.1	.368	7.1	.368	7.9	.409	7.9	.409
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.904		.936		.974		1.053		1.079
4	10.6											
a	42.1	.045	4.1	.183	4.9	.219	4.4	.196	5.5	.245	6.5	.290
b	57.9	.061	2.5	.153	2.6	.130	4.1	.252	5.6	.344	6.4	.393
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.336		.378		.448		.589		.683
5	8.3											
a	34.4	.029	5.5	.157	5.9	.168	5.5	.157	4.7	.134	5.8	.166
b	32.6	.027	3.3	.089	3.3	.089	5.2	.141	4.7	.127	6.1	.165
c	32.9	.027	3.7	.101	3.8	.104	3.6	.098	6.7	.183	6.4	.175
SUB-TOTAL	99.9			.347		.362		.396		.444		.505
6	11.7											
a	25.3	.030	4.5	.133	5.5	.163	4.6	.136	6.4	.189	6.0	.178
b	32.1	.038	3.8	.143	3.8	.143	4.8	.180	5.6	.210	4.6	.173
c	12.8	.015	6.0	.090	6.0	.097	6.0	.090	6.9	.103	6.3	.094
d	29.9	.035	3.0	.105	3.1	.108	3.0	.105	4.3	.150	4.9	.171
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		.471		.511		.511		.654		.616
TOTAL				4.393		4.476		5.624		6.354		6.775

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1

\*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE

\*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-7

## EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, ARMY STAFF

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3		ALT 4		
		MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	
1	32.1											
a	32.8											
(1)	53.2	.056	2.6	.146	2.9	.162	4.5	.252	6.0	.336	8.4	.471
(2)	17.9	.019	3.1	.058	3.4	.064	4.6	.087	6.2	.117	8.4	.158
(3)	28.9	.030	1.6	.049	2.1	.064	4.1	.125	5.2	.158	7.8	.237
	100.0											
b	31.1											
(1)	27.4	.027	2.7	.074	2.8	.077	4.2	.115	5.1	.140	7.5	.205
(2)	14.8	.015	2.0	.030	3.6	.053	4.4	.065	5.0	.094	6.6	.098
(3)	19.5	.019	3.6	.070	4.0	.078	4.3	.084	5.4	.105	7.9	.154
(4)	38.3	.038	3.0	.115	3.5	.134	3.8	.145	5.6	.214	7.6	.291
	100.0											
c	36.0											
(1)	36.8	.043	3.2	.136	3.6	.153	4.7	.200	5.5	.234	8.0	.340
(2)	26.9	.031	2.6	.081	3.3	.103	4.9	.152	5.2	.099	8.1	.252
(3)	17.4	.020	3.0	.060	3.8	.076	4.7	.095	4.9	.099	8.1	.163
(4)	18.9	.022	2.9	.064	3.3	.072	4.5	.094	5.6	.094	7.6	.165
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		.862	1.036		1.417		1.625		2.534	
2	22.5											
a	55.7											
(1)	17.4	.022	2.7	.059	3.6	.079	5.2	.122	4.1	.089	7.9	.172
(2)	13.8	.017	2.7	.047	2.9	.050	6.6	.114	6.1	.115	8.4	.145
(3)	18.0	.020	2.1	.042	2.1	.042	5.8	.116	4.7	.094	7.9	.158
(4)	17.3	.022	2.6	.056	3.1	.067	5.6	.111	4.1	.089	7.2	.156
(5)	12.6	.016	2.2	.035	2.9	.046	6.1	.096	5.6	.092	8.4	.133
(6)	30.9	.029	2.9	.083	3.3	.095	5.6	.161	5.4	.165	8.0	.237
	100.0											
b	44.3											
(1)	43.2	.043	2.4	.103	2.5	.108	5.7	.245	5.5	.237	7.9	.340
(2)	56.8	.057	2.1	.119	2.1	.119	5.5	.111	5.1	.089	8.1	.059
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		.544	.605		1.288		1.150		1.793	
3	12.4											
a	18.4	.023	5.1	.116	5.9	.135	6.3	.144	5.7	.130	7.2	.164
b	48.7	.050	5.1	.057	5.9	.098	7.1	.098	6.1	.088	7.9	.139
c	43.9	.051	5.3	.069	5.6	.064	6.8	.045	6.3	.030	7.7	.091
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.643	.716		.647		.757		.953	
4	8.1											
a	41.0	.033	3.0	.100	4.8	.159	5.8	.193	5.4	.179	7.6	.252
b	39.0	.048	1.8	.086	2.6	.124	5.9	.062	5.5	.063	7.6	.063
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.186	.284		.475		.442		.616	
5	10.6											
a	28.9	.031	4.5	.138	4.7	.144	5.5	.168	4.5	.138	7.1	.218
b	44.3	.047	3.0	.141	3.4	.160	5.3	.049	4.9	.030	7.6	.057
c	26.8	.028	3.7	.105	3.8	.108	4.7	.134	6.1	.173	8.4	.239
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.384	.412		.551		.541		.813	
6	14.3											
a	12.4	.032	3.1	.099	5.2	.167	4.2	.135	5.6	.179	7.2	.231
b	27.9	.040	3.1	.124	3.8	.152	4.9	.195	5.9	.245	6.9	.275
c	14.2	.020	3.9	.079	4.8	.097	4.9	.099	5.4	.110	5.3	.108
d	35.4	.051	2.6	.132	2.7	.137	2.6	.132	5.2	.063	7.2	.064
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.434	.552		.561		.788		.978	
TOTAL			3.072		3.605		5.139		5.303		7.687	

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1

\*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE

\*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-8  
EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, FORSCOM

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3		ALT 4		
		MAS**	WS***	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	
1	29.9											
a	36.2											
(1)	47.4	.051	4.1	.110	4.1	.110	5.7	.192	6.9	.154	6.2	.138
(2)	32.0	.024	4.8	.114	4.8	.114	5.9	.140	6.8	.162	6.2	.144
(3)	30.6	.033	3.2	.106	3.2	.106	5.1	.169	6.4	.112	6.0	.199
	100.0											
b	32.7											
(1)	25.0	.024	4.4	.108	4.4	.108	5.1	.125	6.1	.149	5.9	.144
(2)	18.6	.018	3.9	.071	3.7	.058	4.4	.080	4.9	.089	4.5	.087
(3)	25.9	.025	4.2	.106	4.2	.106	4.6	.116	6.0	.152	6.9	.175
(4)	30.5	.030	3.7	.110	3.7	.110	4.1	.122	6.2	.185	5.7	.170
	100.0											
c	31.1											
(1)	27.7	.026	5.0	.129	5.0	.129	5.6	.144	5.6	.144	5.5	.142
(2)	22.7	.021	4.9	.103	5.3	.117	5.8	.122	5.1	.108	6.0	.127
(3)	29.1	.027	4.3	.116	4.3	.116	4.6	.124	6.1	.165	6.9	.160
(4)	30.5	.019	3.0	.057	2.9	.055	4.4	.084	4.2	.080	5.5	.105
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			1.232		1.225		1.520		1.800		1.768
2	19.7											
a	58.4											
(1)	14.1	.016	3.2	.050	3.2	.050	6.5	.102	5.7	.089	6.5	.102
(2)	14.5	.016	3.5	.056	3.5	.056	6.4	.105	7.0	.113	6.7	.104
(3)	11.4	.013	3.5	.044	3.1	.039	6.3	.080	5.3	.060	7.1	.090
(4)	16.1	.018	4.4	.079	4.4	.079	4.7	.084	5.2	.093	6.3	.111
(5)	17.5	.019	4.0	.070	4.3	.084	6.4	.124	6.9	.134	7.2	.140
(6)	26.0	.029	4.2	.124	4.6	.135	6.0	.177	6.2	.183	6.4	.157
	100.0											
b	43.6											
(1)	38.6	.033	3.4	.113	3.4	.113	6.2	.120	6.9	.129	7.1	.135
(2)	61.4	.053	3.5	.185	3.1	.163	5.3	.180	6.1	.132	5.8	.166
	100.0			1.728		1.720		1.355		1.242		1.282
SUB-TOTAL	100.0											
3	11.5											
a	28.6	.033	6.1	.120	6.1	.120	6.3	.120	6.7	.120	6.5	.124
b	26.9	.033	5.9	.146	5.5	.183	6.7	.123	6.9	.129	6.7	.123
c	42.5	.049	6.0	.193	5.8	.183	6.8	.132	7.0	.142	6.7	.132
	100.0			.690		.667		.762		.792		.764
SUB-TOTAL	100.0											
4	15.5											
a	55.5	.066	4.8	.413	4.8	.413	5.4	.465	6.5	.559	5.5	.473
b	44.5	.069	3.6	.298	3.6	.298	5.4	.372	6.5	.448	5.8	.400
	100.0			.661		.661		.837		1.007		.873
SUB-TOTAL	100.0											
5	9.2											
a	38.9	.028	5.3	.151	5.1	.145	5.3	.151	5.0	.142	5.8	.165
b	37.3	.034	4.1	.141	4.1	.141	5.6	.192	5.3	.182	6.0	.206
c	31.0	.029	4.4	.129	4.5	.132	4.8	.140	6.3	.184	5.9	.173
	100.0			.428		.417		.483		.508		.544
SUB-TOTAL	100.0											
6	14.2											
a	26.4	.037	4.4	.165	4.7	.176	4.6	.172	5.5	.206	5.3	.199
b	30.5	.043	4.2	.182	4.2	.182	5.1	.221	5.7	.247	5.5	.234
c	16.0	.023	5.4	.124	5.6	.127	5.5	.127	5.9	.136	5.5	.127
d	26.1	.037	3.8	.141	3.8	.141	3.8	.141	5.9	.219	5.0	.200
	100.0			.612		.628		.661		.807		.764
SUB-TOTAL	100.0											
TOTAL				4.343		4.318		5.418		6.157		5.994

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1  
 \*\* MEAN ASSESSED SCORE  
 \*\*\* WEIGHTED SCORE

For comparison, the overall scores for each alternative, for each evaluation team, are shown in Table 5-9. While there are differences in the worth attributed to the various alternatives between the evaluation teams, these differences should be viewed in proper context. (i.e., For the lowest scoring alternative, the Base Case, the Army Staff scored it as "poor" while the other two teams scored it as "fair to poor." For the highest scoring alternative, Alternative 4, the Army Staff scored it as "good" while the other two teams scored it as "fair to good.") Whether these differences in assessment are significant is itself a subjective decision. Considering the spread in the assessments given the various alternatives, the Army Staff had the largest, while the other two teams showed reasonable agreement with each other. A point of significance is that the ACCS-82 team, in all cases, assessed each alternative relative to the Base Case in-between the assessed ratios of the Army Staff and FORSCOM. This last point, together with the agreement on the relative weighting shown between the three teams, establishes the validity of accepting the assessments of the ACCS-82 team as the principal evaluator for the additional assessments performed.

TABLE 5-9  
SUMMARY EFFECTIVENESS, PRIMARY ALTERNATIVES

	ACCS-82		ARMY STAFF		FORSCOM	
	SCORE	RATIO <sup>1/</sup>	SCORE	RATIO <sup>1/</sup>	SCORE	RATIO <sup>1/</sup>
BASE CASE	4.39	1.00	3.07	1.00	4.34	1.00
ALT #1	4.48	1.02	3.61	1.18	4.32	1.00
ALT #2	5.62	1.28	5.14	1.67	5.42	1.25
ALT #3	6.35	1.45	5.30	1.73	6.16	1.42
ALT #4	6.78	1.54	7.69	2.50	5.99	1.38

<sup>1/</sup> To the Base Case.

## Sensitivity Analyses

### 1. Modified Alternatives.

Several key features were determined as being desirable within any command and control organization and were added as modifications to the primary alternatives (described in Chapter 4). These modified alternatives were evaluated separately. The evaluation results for these modified alternatives are provided in Table 5-10. Table 5-11 summarizes the scores for all the alternatives and identifies the key modifications that apply to each. The incremental change between Alternatives 2 and 2B may be overstated, as Alternative 2B was scored at a later date than Alternative 2. A conclusion that might be drawn is to not overemphasize the absolute value of the numerical scores themselves, but to consider the trends shown in the differences of the scores. These trends can be considered as valid representations of the relative worth attributed to each feature or significant variant within an alternative command and control organization. Alternatives 2B and 3A are shown to be the top modifications to their primary alternatives, based on the effectiveness scores shown in Table 5-11. Alternatives 2B, 3A and 4 each scored higher than 6.0 and were selected for further evaluation in the final analyses. The effectiveness assessments for these selected alternatives are consolidated in Table 5-12. These provide the basis for comparison for the further sensitivity analyses.

### 2. Relative Weighting.

a. Additional sensitivity analyses examined the effects of variations in relative weighting on the assessments of the selected alternative. A selected major effectiveness criterion was given an arbitrarily excessive increase in its relative weighting to determine its impact on the assessments of the command and control alternatives. These were compared to the base assessments of the ACCS-82 study team (Table 5-12) and to the relative ranking between alternatives. The varying results from arbitrarily overweighting other major effectiveness criteria, in turn, provided further comparisons. These analyses verified the validity of the assessment procedure under wide variations in the importance attached to the various effectiveness criteria.

b. The results shown in Table 5-13 are the assessments for the selected alternatives under the assumption that the relative weighting of the effectiveness measures are heavily weighted towards

TABLE 5-10

## EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, MODIFIED ALTERNATIVES

EFFECTIVENESS* MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING			BASE CASE MODIFIED		ALT 2A		ALT 2B	
				MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US
1	30.3								
a	35.2								
(1)	48.8	.052		6.6	.344	6.8	.354	7.2	.375
(2)	19.2	.020		6.7	.137	6.9	.141	7.2	.147
(3)	31.9	.034		5.7	.194	5.7	.194	6.5	.221
	99.9								
b	35.6								
(1)	30.3	.033		5.7	.186	4.9	.160	6.3	.206
(2)	16.2	.017		3.1	.054	3.3	.058	5.1	.089
(3)	20.4	.022		3.9	.086	4.1	.090	5.3	.117
(4)	33.1	.036		4.3	.154	3.7	.132	5.9	.195
	100.0								
c	29.1								
(1)	27.2	.024		4.2	.101	4.3	.103	5.3	.127
(2)	26.8	.024		6.0	.142	5.1	.144	7.1	.168
(3)	26.9	.024		5.1	.121	4.5	.107	5.3	.126
(4)	19.1	.017		2.2	.037	3.8	.064	4.6	.077
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		1.555		1.547		1.846	
2	25.5								
a	40.6								
(1)	14.3	.022		4.4	.097	7.4	.164	4.6	.102
(2)	16.6	.026		3.7	.095	6.9	.177	7.6	.195
(3)	14.8	.023		3.5	.088	4.3	.098	6.9	.158
(4)	10.5	.016		5.0	.081	5.2	.084	5.6	.091
(5)	12.9	.020		4.4	.088	5.9	.118	6.5	.129
(6)	30.9	.048		5.4	.258	6.0	.286	7.1	.339
	100.0								
b	39.4								
(1)	44.1	.044		4.1	.182	6.7	.297	7.2	.319
(2)	55.9	.056		3.6	.202	4.2	.216	5.8	.256
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		1.083		1.460		1.459	
3	13.6								
a	30.8	.042		7.5	.314	6.9	.289	7.6	.313
b	31.1	.042		6.7	.283	6.7	.283	7.9	.334
c	38.1	.052		6.9	.358	6.9	.358	7.8	.404
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.955		.930		1.057	
4	10.6								
a	42.1	.045		4.1	.183	4.1	.183	5.2	.232
b	57.9	.061		3.6	.221	4.0	.245	5.2	.319
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.404		.428		.551	
5	8.3								
a	34.4	.029		6.0	.171	5.9	.168	6.2	.177
b	32.6	.027		3.3	.089	4.1	.111	5.7	.154
c	32.9	.027		3.8	.104	3.8	.104	4.0	.109
SUB-TOTAL	99.9			.364		.383		.440	
6	11.7								
a	25.3	.030		4.7	.139	4.7	.139	4.9	.145
b	32.1	.038		3.9	.146	4.4	.165	4.7	.177
c	12.8	.015		6.2	.093	6.2	.093	6.1	.091
d	29.9	.035		3.0	.105	2.9	.101	3.3	.115
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.1		.483		.499		.528	
TOTAL				4.844		5.248		6.081	

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1  
 \*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE  
 \*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-10 (CONT)

## EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, MODIFIED ALTERNATIVES

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	ALT 3A		ALT 3A****		ALT 3B		ALT 4****		
		MAS**	WS***	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	
1	30.3									
a	35.2									
(1)	48.8	.052	8.3	.432	8.3	.432	7.4	.385	7.8	.406
(2)	19.2	.020	8.1	.166	8.1	.166	7.1	.145	6.8	.169
(3)	31.9	.034	7.1	.242	7.4	.252	6.7	.228	7.0	.233
	99.9									
b	35.6									
(1)	30.3	.033	7.5	.245	7.4	.242	6.4	.209	7.0	.229
(2)	16.2	.017	4.3	.075	5.1	.089	3.8	.066	5.6	.093
(3)	20.4	.022	5.4	.119	6.0	.132	4.7	.103	6.6	.145
(4)	33.1	.036	6.5	.232	6.6	.236	5.5	.196	6.1	.216
	100.0									
c	29.1									
(1)	27.2	.024	5.3	.127	5.5	.132	5.1	.122	5.4	.130
(2)	26.8	.024	7.1	.168	7.1	.168	6.8	.161	7.7	.166
(3)	26.9	.024	6.1	.145	6.3	.149	4.9	.116	6.4	.152
(4)	19.1	.017	3.1	.052	4.2	.071	2.7	.045	5.3	.089
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		2.002		2.068		1.779		2.050
2	25.5									
a	60.6									
(1)	14.3	.022	6.1	.135	6.8	.150	6.1	.135	7.6	.168
(2)	16.6	.026	7.1	.182	7.1	.182	7.3	.187	7.2	.185
(3)	14.8	.023	7.5	.172	6.7	.153	6.4	.146	7.4	.169
(4)	10.5	.016	5.7	.092	5.8	.094	5.5	.089	6.7	.107
(5)	12.9	.020	7.2	.144	7.1	.142	7.3	.146	7.1	.145
(6)	30.9	.048	7.5	.358	7.6	.363	7.3	.349	7.3	.349
	100.0									
b	39.4									
(1)	44.1	.044	7.6	.337	7.4	.328	7.7	.341	7.8	.346
(2)	55.9	.056	7.3	.410	7.2	.400	6.7	.376	7.1	.377
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		1.829		1.816		1.769		1.959
3	13.6									
a	30.8	.042	7.9	.231	8.3	.348	7.3	.306	7.4	.310
b	11.1	.042	8.1	.443	8.0	.333	7.5	.309	8.5	.365
c	39.1	.052	7.9	.409	8.2	.425	7.3	.378	7.8	.404
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			1.083		1.111		.993		1.078
4	10.6									
a	42.1	.045	6.0	.268	5.8	.259	5.1	.228	6.8	.302
b	57.9	.061	5.7	.350	6.4	.393	5.2	.319	6.9	.423
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.618		.652		.547		.727
5	8.3									
a	34.4	.029	4.7	.134	7.2	.206	4.7	.134	6.1	.174
b	32.6	.027	5.1	.138	4.9	.133	4.8	.130	6.8	.189
c	32.9	.027	6.2	.169	6.4	.175	5.9	.161	6.7	.183
SUB-TOTAL	99.9			.441		.513		.425		.541
6	11.7									
a	25.3	.030	6.5	.192	6.0	.178	6.5	.192	6.2	.184
b	32.1	.038	5.7	.214	5.6	.210	5.6	.210	4.8	.180
c	12.8	.015	7.0	.105	6.8	.102	6.1	.091	6.3	.094
d	29.9	.035	4.3	.150	4.3	.150	4.1	.143	4.7	.164
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.1		.662		.640		.638		.623
TOTAL				6.635		6.800		6.150		6.877

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1  
 \*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE  
 \*\*\* WS=WEIGHTED SCORE  
 \*\*\*\* SECOND ASSESSMENT FOR 1975 ALTERNATIVE



TABLE 5-11

SUMMARY EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENTS

<u>ALTERNATIVE</u>	<u>EFFECTIVENESS SCORE</u>	<u>KEY MODIFICATIONS</u>
BASE CASE	4.39	
BASE CASE, MODIFIED	4.84	Base Case plus planners at HQDA and installations.
ALT #1	4.48	Base Case plus functionalization of USAR structure.
ALT #2	5.62	Base Case plus (1) additional AC Corps, and elimination of ARR.
ALT #2A	5.25	ALT #2 less the added Corps plus OPCON of selected RC units to CONUS MACOM.
ALT #2B	6.08 <sup>1/</sup>	ALT #2 plus OPCON of selected RC units to CONUS MACOM.
ALT #3	6.35	Base Case less ARR, less ARCOM plus establish (11) REDMOB.
ALT #3A	6.64 <sup>1/</sup> 6.80 <sup>1/</sup>	ALT #3 plus (1) additional AC corps plus OPCON of selected RC units to CONUS MACOM.
ALT #3B	6.15	ALT #3A less (1) CONUSA.
ALT #4	6.78 <sup>1/</sup> 6.88 <sup>1/</sup>	Base Case less CONUSA's, less ARR's plus (5) integrated AC/RC corps HQs plus OPCON of selected RC units to CONUS MACOM.

<sup>1/</sup> These alternatives assessed at same time, after more complete understanding of their functioning. Note increased scores for alternatives #3A and #4 when reassessed.

TABLE 5-12

## EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, SELECTED ALTERNATIVES

EFFECTIVENESS* MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2B		ALT 3A		ALT 4		
		MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	
1	30.3											
a	35.2											
(1)	48.8	.052	4.3	.224	4.3	.224	7.2	.375	8.3	.432	7.8	.406
(2)	19.2	.020	5.0	.102	5.0	.102	7.2	.147	8.1	.166	8.0	.164
(3)	31.9	.034	3.0	.102	2.9	.099	6.5	.221	7.4	.252	7.0	.238
	99.9											
b	35.6											
(1)	30.3	.033	5.4	.176	5.3	.173	6.3	.206	7.4	.242	7.0	.229
(2)	16.2	.017	3.1	.054	2.6	.045	5.1	.089	5.1	.089	5.6	.098
(3)	20.8	.022	3.7	.081	3.7	.081	5.3	.117	6.0	.132	6.6	.145
(4)	33.1	.036	4.2	.150	4.2	.150	5.4	.193	6.6	.236	6.1	.218
	100.0											
c	29.1											
(1)	27.2	.024	4.1	.098	4.1	.098	5.3	.127	5.5	.132	5.4	.130
(2)	26.8	.024	5.8	.137	5.7	.135	7.1	.168	7.1	.168	7.7	.182
(3)	26.9	.024	5.0	.119	4.8	.114	5.3	.126	6.3	.149	6.4	.152
(4)	19.1	.017	2.0	.034	2.1	.035	4.6	.077	4.2	.071	5.3	.089
SUR-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		1.278		1.257		1.846		2.068		2.050
2	25.5											
a	60.6											
(1)	14.3	.022	4.1	.091	4.1	.091	4.6	.102	6.8	.150	7.6	.168
(2)	16.6	.026	3.6	.092	3.6	.092	7.6	.195	7.1	.182	7.2	.185
(3)	14.8	.023	3.7	.085	3.1	.071	6.9	.158	6.7	.153	7.4	.169
(4)	10.5	.016	4.8	.078	4.8	.078	5.6	.091	5.8	.094	6.3	.102
(5)	12.9	.020	4.3	.086	4.2	.084	6.5	.130	7.1	.142	7.1	.142
(6)	30.9	.048	5.3	.253	5.7	.272	7.1	.339	7.6	.363	7.3	.349
	100.0											
b	39.4											
(1)	44.1	.044	4.1	.182	4.1	.182	7.2	.319	7.4	.328	7.8	.346
(2)	55.9	.056	3.4	.191	2.9	.163	5.8	.326	7.2	.404	7.1	.399
SUR-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		1.057		1.032		1.659		1.416		1.459
3	13.6											
a	30.8	.042	7.2	.302	7.2	.302	7.6	.318	8.3	.348	7.4	.310
b	31.1	.042	6.4	.271	6.3	.266	7.9	.334	8.0	.338	8.6	.364
c	38.1	.052	6.4	.332	7.1	.368	7.8	.404	8.2	.425	7.8	.404
SUR-TOTAL	100.0			.904		.936		1.057		1.111		1.074
4	10.6											
a	42.1	.045	4.1	.183	4.9	.219	5.2	.232	5.8	.259	6.8	.303
b	57.9	.061	2.5	.153	2.6	.160	5.2	.319	6.4	.393	6.9	.423
SUR-TOTAL	100.0			.336		.378		.551		.652		.727
5	8.3											
a	34.4	.029	5.5	.157	5.9	.168	6.2	.177	7.2	.206	6.1	.174
b	32.6	.027	3.3	.089	3.3	.089	5.7	.154	4.9	.133	6.8	.184
c	32.9	.027	3.7	.101	3.8	.104	4.0	.109	6.4	.175	6.7	.183
SUR-TOTAL	99.9			.347		.362		.440		.513		.541
6	11.7											
a	25.3	.030	4.5	.133	5.5	.163	4.9	.145	6.0	.178	6.2	.184
b	32.1	.038	3.8	.143	3.8	.143	4.7	.177	5.6	.210	4.8	.180
c	12.8	.015	6.0	.090	6.5	.097	6.1	.091	6.8	.102	6.3	.094
d	29.9	.035	3.0	.105	3.1	.108	3.3	.115	4.3	.150	4.7	.164
SUR-TOTAL	100.0	100.1		.471		.511		.528		.640		.623
TOTAL				4.393		4.476		6.081		6.800		6.877

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1

\*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE

\*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-13

## SENSITIVITY, PLANNING/MOBILIZATION WEIGHTING

EFFECTIVENESS* MEASURE		RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2B		ALT 3A		ALT 4	
			MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US
1	70.0											
a	20.0											
(1)	48.8	.068	4.3	.294	4.3	.294	7.2	.492	8.3	.567	7.8	.533
(2)	19.2	.027	5.0	.134	5.0	.134	7.2	.194	8.1	.218	8.0	.215
(3)	31.9	.045	3.0	.134	2.9	.130	6.5	.290	7.4	.330	7.0	.313
	99.9											
b	70.0											
(1)	30.3	.148	5.4	.882	5.3	.787	6.3	.935	7.4	1.099	7.0	1.039
(2)	16.2	.079	5.1	.246	2.6	.206	5.1	.405	5.1	.405	5.6	.445
(3)	20.4	.100	3.7	.370	3.7	.370	5.3	.530	6.0	.600	6.6	.660
(4)	33.1	.162	4.2	.681	4.2	.681	5.4	.876	6.6	1.070	6.1	.989
	100.0											
c	10.0											
(1)	27.2	.019	4.1	.078	4.1	.078	5.3	.101	5.5	.105	5.4	.103
(2)	26.8	.019	5.8	.109	5.7	.107	7.1	.133	7.1	.133	7.7	.144
(3)	26.9	.019	5.0	.094	4.8	.090	5.3	.100	6.3	.119	6.4	.121
(4)	19.1	.013	2.0	.027	2.1	.028	4.8	.062	4.2	.056	5.3	.071
SUR-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		2.969		2.905	4.117		4.702		4.632	
2	5.0											
a	60.6											
(1)	14.3	.004	4.1	.018	4.1	.018	4.6	.020	6.8	.029	7.6	.033
(2)	16.6	.005	3.6	.018	3.6	.018	7.6	.038	7.1	.046	7.2	.046
(3)	14.8	.004	3.7	.017	3.1	.014	6.9	.041	6.7	.038	7.4	.033
(4)	10.5	.003	4.8	.015	4.8	.015	5.6	.018	5.8	.018	6.3	.020
(5)	12.9	.004	4.3	.017	4.2	.016	6.5	.025	7.1	.028	7.1	.028
(6)	30.9	.009	5.3	.050	5.7	.053	7.1	.066	7.6	.071	7.3	.068
	100.0											
b	39.4											
(1)	44.1	.009	4.1	.036	4.1	.036	7.2	.063	7.4	.064	7.8	.068
(2)	55.9	.011	3.4	.037	2.9	.032	5.8	.064	7.2	.079	7.1	.078
SUR-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		.207		.202	.325		.356		.364	
3	10.0											
a	30.8	.031	7.2	.222	7.2	.222	7.6	.234	8.3	.256	7.4	.228
b	31.1	.031	6.4	.199	6.3	.196	7.9	.246	8.0	.249	8.6	.267
c	38.1	.038	6.4	.244	7.1	.271	7.8	.297	8.2	.312	7.8	.297
SUR-TOTAL	100.0			.665		.688	.777		.817		.793	
4	5.0											
a	42.1	.021	4.1	.086	4.9	.103	5.2	.109	5.8	.122	6.8	.143
b	57.9	.029	2.5	.072	2.6	.075	5.2	.151	6.4	.185	6.9	.200
SUR-TOTAL	100.0			.159		.178	.260		.307		.343	
5	5.0											
a	34.4	.017	5.5	.095	5.9	.101	6.2	.107	7.2	.124	6.1	.105
b	32.6	.016	3.3	.054	3.3	.054	5.7	.093	4.9	.080	5.8	.111
c	32.9	.016	3.7	.061	3.8	.063	4.0	.066	6.4	.105	6.7	.110
SUR-TOTAL	99.9			.209		.219	.265		.309		.326	
6	5.0											
a	25.3	.013	4.5	.057	5.5	.070	4.9	.062	6.0	.076	6.2	.078
b	32.1	.016	3.8	.061	3.8	.061	4.7	.075	5.6	.090	4.8	.077
c	12.8	.006	6.0	.038	6.5	.042	6.1	.039	6.8	.044	6.3	.040
d	29.9	.015	3.0	.045	3.1	.046	3.3	.049	4.3	.064	4.7	.070
SUR-TOTAL	100.0	100.1		.201		.219	.226		.274		.266	
TOTAL			4.410		4.411		5.970		6.765		6.724	

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1

\*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE

\*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

planning/mobilization. In this case, Effectiveness Measure 1 is weighted at 70 percent of the total and, within Effectiveness Measure 1, the transition period is weighted at 70 percent of the time continuum of peace, transition, and war. To accommodate to this arbitrary increased weighting, the weights given the other effectiveness measures were necessarily reduced. The results compared to those under the ACCS-82 relative weighting (Table 5-12) indicate the Base Case score remained about the same while the other alternatives scored marginally lower. Under these weightings Alternative 3A scores slightly better than Alternative 4 while the other alternatives retain their relative rankings.

c. The results shown in Table 5-14 reflect weighting organizational efficiency (Effectiveness Measure 2) at 60 percent (80 percent of which is peacetime weighting). An additional 15 percent weighting is allocated for AC/RC integration and the appropriate use of the RC chain of command in peacetime (Effectiveness Measure 5). All assessment scores showed only slight changes from those of Table 5-12 and all alternatives retained their same relative ranking.

d. The effects of emphasizing the AC commitments to training and readiness of the RC (Effectiveness Measure 3) by allocating this measure a relative weighting of 60 percent of the total are shown in Table 5-15. Since AC commitment is an important factor within each alternative, each showed an increased score. Alternative 3A, which emphasizes AC commitment to the RC, scores the highest among the alternatives, but not significantly higher than Alternative 4 and only marginally higher than Alternative 2B.

e. The sensitivity to allocating excessive weighting for expanding the command and control base to meet the needs of total mobilization (Effectiveness Measure 4) is shown in Table 5-16. Here, Effectiveness Measure 4 is weighted at 70 percent of the total while Effectiveness Measures 1 and 2 are weighted at 10 and 5 percent, respectively. Further, within Effectiveness Measures 1 and 2, 80 percent of their overall respective weightings of 10 and 5 percent are allocated to the wartime period. All alternatives have reduced scores under this weighting scheme, from those shown in Table 5-12, since none really plan for total mobilization. Alternative 4 degrades the least because of the potential of two extra Corps Hqs in the structure beyond Alternatives 2B and 3A. Relative rankings between alternatives remain the same.

TABLE 5-14

## SENSITIVITY, ORGANIZATIONAL EFFICIENCY WEIGHTING

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2H		ALT 3A		ALT 4	
		MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US
1	5.0										
a	35.7										
(1)	48.8	.009		4.3	.037	4.3	.037	7.2	.062	8.3	.071
(2)	19.2	.003		5.0	.017	5.0	.017	7.2	.024	8.1	.027
(3)	31.9	.006		3.0	.017	2.9	.016	6.5	.036	7.4	.042
	99.9										
b	35.6										
(1)	30.3	.005		5.4	.029	5.3	.029	6.3	.034	7.4	.040
(2)	16.2	.003		3.1	.009	2.6	.007	5.1	.015	5.6	.016
(3)	20.4	.004		3.7	.013	3.7	.013	5.3	.019	6.0	.022
(4)	35.1	.006		4.2	.025	4.2	.025	5.4	.032	6.6	.039
	100.0										
c	29.1										
(1)	27.2	.004		4.1	.016	4.1	.016	5.3	.021	5.5	.022
(2)	26.8	.004		5.0	.023	5.7	.022	7.1	.028	7.1	.030
(3)	26.9	.004		5.0	.020	4.8	.019	5.3	.021	6.3	.025
(4)	19.1	.003		2.0	.006	2.1	.006	4.6	.013	4.2	.012
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0									
2	60.0										
a	80.0										
(1)	34.3	.069		4.1	.281	4.1	.281	4.6	.316	6.8	.467
(2)	16.6	.080		3.6	.287	3.6	.287	7.6	.606	7.1	.566
(3)	14.8	.071		3.7	.263	3.1	.220	6.9	.490	6.7	.476
(4)	10.0	.050		4.8	.292	4.8	.292	5.8	.292	6.3	.318
(5)	12.4	.062		4.3	.266	4.2	.260	6.0	.402	7.1	.440
(6)	30.9	.148		5.3	.286	5.7	.295	7.1	.453	7.6	.512
	100.0										
b	20.0										
(1)	44.1	.053		4.1	.217	4.1	.217	7.2	.381	7.4	.392
(2)	55.9	.067		3.4	.228	2.9	.195	5.8	.309	7.2	.403
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0									
3	5.0										
a	30.8	.015		7.2	.111	7.2	.111	7.6	.117	8.3	.128
b	31.1	.016		6.4	.100	6.3	.098	7.9	.123	8.0	.124
c	38.1	.019		6.4	.122	7.1	.135	7.8	.149	8.2	.156
SUB-TOTAL	100.0										
4	5.0										
a	42.1	.021		4.1	.086	4.9	.103	5.2	.109	5.8	.122
b	57.9	.029		2.5	.072	2.6	.075	5.2	.151	6.4	.185
SUB-TOTAL	100.0										
5	15.0										
a	34.4	.052		5.5	.284	5.9	.304	6.2	.320	7.2	.372
b	32.6	.049		3.3	.161	3.3	.161	5.7	.279	4.9	.240
c	32.9	.049		3.7	.183	3.8	.188	4.0	.197	6.4	.316
SUB-TOTAL	99.9										
6	10.0										
a	25.3	.025		4.5	.114	5.5	.139	4.9	.124	6.0	.152
b	32.1	.032		3.8	.122	3.8	.122	4.7	.151	5.6	.180
c	12.8	.013		6.8	.077	6.5	.083	6.1	.078	6.8	.087
d	29.9	.030		3.0	.090	3.1	.093	3.3	.099	4.3	.129
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.1									
TOTAL				4.302		4.368		6.120		6.773	

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1  
 \*\* MAS MEAN ASSESSED SCORE  
 \*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-15

## SENSITIVITY, AC COMMITMENT WEIGHTING

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3		ALT 4		
		NAS**	US***	NAS	US	NAS	US	NAS	US	NAS	US	
1	5.0											
a	35.2											
(1)	48.8	.009	4.3	.037	4.3	.037	7.1	.062	8.4	.071	7.8	.067
(2)	19.7	.003	5.8	.017	5.8	.017	7.2	.024	8.1	.0	8.0	.0
(3)	31.9	.006	2.0	.017	2.9	.016	6.5	.036	7.4	.042	7.0	.034
	99.9											
b	35.6											
(1)	30.3	.005	5.4	.029	5.3	.029	6.3	.034	7.4	.040	7.0	.038
(2)	16.7	.003	3.1	.009	2.6	.007	5.1	.015	5.1	.015	5.6	.014
(3)	28.4	.004	3.7	.013	3.7	.013	5.3	.019	6.8	.022	6.6	.024
(4)	33.1	.006	4.2	.025	4.2	.025	5.4	.032	6.6	.039	6.1	.036
	106.0											
c	29.1											
(1)	27.2	.004	4.1	.016	4.1	.016	5.3	.021	5.5	.022	5.4	.021
(2)	26.8	.004	5.8	.023	5.7	.022	7.1	.028	7.1	.028	7.7	.030
(3)	26.9	.004	5.0	.026	4.8	.019	5.3	.021	6.3	.025	6.4	.025
(4)	19.1	.003	2.0	.006	2.1	.006	4.6	.013	4.7	.012	5.3	.015
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		.211		.207		.305		.341		.338
2	10.0											
a	60.6											
(1)	14.3	.009	4.1	.036	4.1	.036	4.6	.040	6.8	.059	7.6	.066
(2)	16.6	.010	3.6	.036	3.6	.036	7.6	.076	7.1	.071	7.2	.072
(3)	14.8	.009	3.7	.033	3.1	.028	6.9	.062	6.7	.060	7.4	.066
(4)	14.5	.008	4.8	.031	4.8	.031	5.6	.036	5.8	.037	6.3	.040
(5)	12.9	.008	4.3	.034	4.2	.033	6.5	.051	7.1	.056	7.1	.056
(6)	30.9	.019	5.3	.099	5.7	.107	7.1	.133	7.6	.142	7.3	.131
	100.0											
b	39.4											
(1)	44.1	.017	4.1	.071	4.1	.071	7.1	.125	7.4	.129	7.8	.136
(2)	55.9	.022	3.4	.075	2.9	.064	5.8	.128	7.2	.159	7.1	.154
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		.414		.405		.650		.712		.729
3	60.0											
a	30.8	.185	7.2	1.331	7.2	1.331	7.6	1.404	8.3	1.544	7.4	1.368
b	31.1	.187	6.9	1.194	6.3	1.176	7.9	1.474	8.0	1.493	8.6	1.605
c	38.1	.229	6.4	1.463	7.1	1.623	7.8	1.783	8.2	1.875	7.8	1.783
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			3.988		4.129		4.662		4.901		4.755
4	10.0											
a	42.1	.042	4.1	.173	4.9	.206	5.2	.219	5.8	.244	6.8	.286
b	57.9	.058	2.5	.145	2.6	.151	5.2	.301	6.4	.331	6.9	.406
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.317		.357		.520		.615		.686
5	10.0											
a	34.4	.034	5.5	.189	5.9	.203	6.2	.213	7.2	.248	6.1	.210
b	32.6	.033	3.3	.108	3.3	.108	5.7	.186	4.9	.160	6.8	.222
c	32.9	.033	3.7	.122	3.8	.125	4.0	.132	6.4	.211	6.7	.220
SUB-TOTAL	99.9			.419		.436		.531		.618		.652
6	5.0											
a	25.3	.013	4.5	.057	5.5	.070	4.9	.062	6.0	.076	6.2	.078
b	32.1	.016	3.8	.061	3.8	.061	4.7	.075	5.6	.090	4.8	.077
c	12.8	.006	6.0	.038	6.5	.042	6.1	.039	6.8	.044	6.3	.040
d	29.9	.015	3.0	.045	3.1	.046	3.3	.044	4.3	.064	4.7	.070
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.201		.219		.226		.274		.266
TOTAL			5.550		5.752		6.893		7.461		7.426	

\* NOMINATOR (CLOD) AT FIGURE 5-1

\*\* BASELINE ADJUSTED SCORE

\*\*\* WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-16

## SENSITIVITY, TOTAL MOBILIZATION WEIGHTING

EFFECTIVENESS MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2B		ALT 3A		ALT 4	
		MAS**	WS***	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	MAS	WS	MAS	WS
1	10.0										
a	5.0										
(1)		48.8	.002	4.3	.010	4.3	.010	7.2	.018	8.3	.020
(2)		19.2	.001	5.0	.005	5.0	.005	7.2	.007	8.1	.008
(3)		31.9	.002	3.0	.005	2.9	.005	6.5	.010	7.4	.012
		99.9									
b	15.0										
(1)		30.3	.005	5.4	.025	5.3	.024	6.3	.029	7.4	.034
(2)		16.2	.002	3.1	.008	2.6	.006	5.1	.012	5.1	.012
(3)		20.4	.003	3.7	.011	3.7	.011	5.3	.016	6.0	.018
(4)		33.1	.005	4.2	.021	4.2	.021	5.4	.027	6.6	.033
		100.0									
c	80.0										
(1)		27.2	.022	4.1	.089	4.1	.089	5.3	.115	5.5	.120
(2)		26.8	.021	5.8	.124	5.7	.122	7.1	.152	7.1	.152
(3)		26.9	.022	5.0	.108	4.8	.103	5.3	.114	6.3	.136
(4)		19.1	.015	2.0	.031	2.1	.032	4.6	.070	4.2	.064
SUB-TOTAL		100.0		4.36		4.29		5.71		6.09	
2	5.0										
a	20.0										
(1)		14.3	.001	4.1	.006	4.1	.006	4.6	.007	6.8	.010
(2)		16.6	.002	3.6	.005	3.6	.005	7.6	.013	7.1	.012
(3)		14.8	.001	3.7	.005	3.1	.005	6.9	.010	6.7	.010
(4)		10.5	.001	4.8	.005	4.8	.005	5.6	.006	5.8	.006
(5)		12.9	.001	4.3	.006	4.2	.005	6.5	.008	7.1	.009
(6)		30.9	.003	5.7	.016	5.7	.016	7.1	.022	7.6	.023
		100.0									
b	80.0										
(1)		44.1	.018	4.1	.072	4.1	.072	7.2	.127	7.4	.131
(2)		50.9	.022	3.4	.076	2.9	.065	5.8	.130	7.2	.161
SUB-TOTAL		100.0		193		182		322		362	
3	5.0										
a	30.0										
(1)		31.1	.016	6.4	.100	6.3	.098	7.9	.123	8.0	.124
(2)		38.1	.019	6.4	.122	7.1	.135	7.8	.149	8.2	.156
SUB-TOTAL		100.0		1332		1396		1388		1408	
4	70.0										
a	42.1										
(1)		57.9	.005	4.1	1.008	4.9	1.444	5.2	1.532	5.8	1.789
(2)				2.0	1.013	2.6	1.054	3.2	1.108	4.4	1.594
SUB-TOTAL		100.0		2.222		2.498		3.640		4.303	
5	5.0										
a	34.4										
(1)		32.6	.016	5.5	.095	5.9	.101	6.2	.107	7.2	.124
(2)		32.9	.016	3.7	.061	3.8	.063	4.0	.066	6.4	.105
SUB-TOTAL		99.9		1.209		1.218		1.265		1.309	
6	5.0										
a	25.3										
(1)		62.1	.016	4.5	.057	5.5	.070	4.9	.062	6.0	.076
(2)		12.8	.006	3.8	.061	3.8	.061	4.7	.075	5.6	.090
(3)		29.9	.015	6.6	.038	6.5	.042	6.1	.039	6.8	.044
(4)				3.0	.045	3.1	.046	3.3	.049	4.3	.064
SUB-TOTAL		100.0		1.201		1.219		1.226		1.274	
TOTAL				3.593		3.089		5.413		6.265	

\* NOMINATOR (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1

\*\* BASELINE ASSESSED SCORE

\*\*\* UNWEIGHTED SCORE


AD-A114 108

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF (ARMY) WASHINGTON D C  
ARMY COMMAND AND CONTROL STUDY - 82 (ACCS-82). VOLUME I. EXECUT--ETC(U)  
SEP 79 D L WILSON

F/O 15/7

UNCLASSIFIED

4 of 4  
214 OF



END  
DATE  
FILMED  
DTIC



f. The overall results of the sensitivity analyses to relative weighting indicate that the rankings between alternatives remained substantially the same throughout. The conclusion is drawn that the effectiveness assessment results are independent of variations in the relative weighting allocated to any one major effectiveness measure. Considerations such as resource requirements, risks, and political sensitivities are added to the effectiveness assessments before arriving at the final recommended alternative. These are presented in Chapter 6.

### 3. Scenario Analyses.

a. The existing command and control structure (Base Case) and each of the proposed organizational structures (Alternatives 1, 2, 3 and 4) were evaluated to determine their effectiveness under two alternative mobilization requirements; partial and total mobilization. The key assumption used to define and describe the scenarios was the condition of a short, or no-notice, conventional conflict in NATO Europe. This general scenario places the most demands on the CONUS command and control structure. An appropriate plan and its derivatives were considered in describing the scenarios of partial and total mobilization.

b. Under current law, the President may augment the active force by ordering up to 50,000 Selected Reservists to active duty for up to 90 days. One of the objectives for possible use of this 50,000 authority has been determined to be the enhancement of the capability of the training and support base. This possible event, plus the call-up of additional RC units, was used as the basis for the partial mobilization scenario evaluated in this study. The details of these Army requirements(2) (3) are classified and copies are available in the files of the ACCS-82 study.

The total mobilization scenario and requirements used to examine the sensitivity of the alternative command and control organizations include those additional force requirements beyond those for full mobilization. These requirements are fully described in a DCSOPS

---

(2) Department of Defense (OASD(MRA&L)); "Report on the Plans to Order to Active Duty 50,000 Selected Reservists; (U) Washington: 1979 (SECRET).

(3) Army Command and Control Study-82 (ACCS-82). Scenario Analysis (U) Unpublished paper, 21 May 1979 (SECRET).

Memo, 2 Feb 79.(4) This is a classified document and is available in the ACCS-82 study files.

c. During the evaluation, specific descriptions of the mobilization scenarios were furnished each ACCS-82 team member. The assessments under the conditions for those two alternative scenarios showed changes to only selected effectiveness measures. For the case of partial mobilization these were Effectiveness Measure 1, "Mobilization and Deployment Planning and an Orderly and Rapid Transition from Peace to War," and Effectiveness Measure 2, "An Efficient and Streamlined AC and RC Structure to Assure Proper Command and Control of Army Units in Peace and War." Under the scenario for total mobilization, the assessments were the same two effectiveness measures as for partial mobilization, plus Effectiveness Measure 4, "The Command and Control Base for Expansion to Meet the Needs of Total Mobilization." These assessments are provided in Tables 5-17 and 5-18 for partial mobilization and total mobilization, respectively. They include the scores for those unchanged effectiveness measures from the full mobilization scenario.

---

(4) US Department of the Army. Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans. "Army Command and Control Study - 1982 "(ACCS-82)-- INFORMATION MEMORANDUM" (U) Washington: 2 Feb 79 (SECRET)

TABLE 5-17

## EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, PARTIAL MOBILIZATION

EFFECTIVENESS# MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3		ALT 4		
		MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	
1	30.3											
a	35.2											
(1)	48.8	.052	4.2	.219	4.2	.219	6.4	.333	8.0	.416	7.9	.411
(2)	19.2	.020	5.3	.109	5.3	.109	7.4	.152	8.2	.166	8.1	.166
(3)	31.9	.034	2.9	.099	2.9	.099	6.2	.211	7.4	.252	7.0	.238
	99.9											
b	35.6											
(1)	30.3	.033	5.6	.183	5.6	.183	5.5	.180	7.2	.235	7.0	.229
(2)	16.2	.017	3.4	.059	3.1	.054	3.8	.066	3.6	.063	5.4	.094
(3)	20.4	.022	4.4	.097	4.5	.099	5.3	.117	5.9	.130	7.2	.158
(4)	33.1	.036	4.8	.171	4.8	.171	4.9	.175	6.5	.232	6.8	.243
	100.0											
c	29.1											
(1)	27.2	.024	4.5	.108	4.5	.108	5.7	.137	5.4	.130	5.3	.127
(2)	26.8	.024	6.1	.144	6.1	.144	7.6	.180	6.1	.144	7.7	.182
(3)	26.9	.024	5.1	.121	5.1	.121	5.0	.119	5.9	.140	6.9	.164
(4)	19.1	.017	3.1	.052	3.3	.056	5.3	.089	3.8	.064	5.8	.094
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		1.362		1.362	1.757		1.974		2.116	
2	25.5											
a	60.6											
(1)	14.3	.022	4.3	.095	4.3	.095	7.4	.164	6.4	.141	7.4	.164
(2)	16.6	.024	3.6	.092	3.6	.092	6.9	.177	7.1	.182	7.4	.190
(3)	18.8	.023	3.6	.082	3.3	.075	6.5	.149	6.4	.146	7.4	.169
(4)	10.5	.016	4.9	.080	4.9	.080	5.2	.084	5.6	.091	6.3	.102
(5)	12.9	.020	4.3	.086	4.3	.086	6.3	.126	6.9	.138	7.0	.140
(6)	30.9	.048	5.3	.253	5.6	.267	7.3	.349	6.6	.315	7.5	.358
	160.0											
b	39.4											
(1)	44.1	.044	4.1	.182	4.1	.182	7.1	.315	7.8	.346	8.3	.368
(2)	55.9	.056	3.4	.191	2.9	.163	5.6	.315	6.5	.365	7.1	.399
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		1.061		1.040	1.677		1.724		1.889	
3	13.6											
a	30.8	.042	7.2	.302	7.2	.302	6.9	.289	7.7	.323	7.5	.314
b	31.1	.042	6.4	.271	6.3	.266	7.5	.317	7.6	.321	8.4	.355
c	38.1	.052	6.4	.332	7.1	.368	7.1	.368	7.9	.409	7.9	.409
SUB-TOTAL	100.0		.904		.936		.974		1.053		1.079	
4	10.6											
a	42.1	.045	4.1	.183	4.9	.219	4.4	.196	5.5	.245	6.5	.290
b	57.9	.061	2.5	.154	2.6	.160	4.1	.252	5.6	.344	6.4	.393
SUB-TOTAL	100.0		.336		.378		.448		.589		.683	
5	8.3											
a	34.4	.029	5.5	.157	5.9	.168	5.5	.157	4.7	.134	5.8	.166
b	32.6	.027	3.3	.089	3.3	.089	5.2	.141	4.7	.127	6.1	.165
c	32.9	.027	3.7	.101	3.8	.104	3.6	.098	6.7	.183	6.4	.175
SUB-TOTAL	99.9		.347		.362		.396		.444		.505	
6	11.7											
a	25.3	.030	4.5	.133	5.5	.163	4.6	.136	6.4	.189	6.0	.178
b	32.1	.038	3.8	.143	3.8	.143	4.8	.180	5.6	.210	4.6	.173
c	12.8	.015	6.0	.090	6.5	.097	6.0	.090	6.9	.103	6.3	.094
d	29.9	.035	3.0	.105	3.1	.108	3.0	.105	4.3	.150	4.9	.171
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.1		.471		.511	.511		.654		.616	
TOTAL			4.481		4.589		5.764		6.438		6.882	

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1  
 \*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE  
 \*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

TABLE 5-18

## EFFECTIVENESS ASSESSMENT, TOTAL MOBILIZATION

EFFECTIVENESS# MEASURE	RELATIVE WEIGHTING	BASE CASE		ALT 1		ALT 2		ALT 3		ALT 4		
		MAS**	US***	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	MAS	US	
1	30.3											
a	35.2											
(1)	48.8	.052	3.9	.203	3.9	.203	5.9	.307	7.1	.370	7.4	.385
(2)	19.2	.020	5.1	.104	5.1	.104	6.6	.135	7.7	.158	7.8	.160
(3)	31.9	.034	2.8	.095	2.8	.095	5.9	.201	6.8	.231	6.9	.235
	99.9											
b	35.6											
(1)	30.3	.033	5.1	.167	5.1	.167	5.3	.173	6.7	.219	2.6	.085
(2)	16.2	.017	3.3	.058	2.9	.051	3.9	.068	3.8	.066	5.6	.098
(3)	20.4	.022	3.9	.086	3.8	.084	4.9	.108	5.6	.123	6.6	.145
(4)	33.1	.036	4.4	.157	4.3	.154	4.4	.157	6.1	.218	6.3	.225
	100.0											
c	29.1											
(1)	27.2	.024	4.3	.103	4.3	.103	5.4	.130	5.3	.127	5.9	.142
(2)	26.8	.024	4.4	.104	4.4	.104	5.9	.139	5.3	.125	7.8	.184
(3)	26.9	.024	4.8	.114	4.8	.114	4.6	.109	5.9	.140	6.5	.154
(4)	19.1	.017	2.7	.045	2.8	.047	4.6	.077	3.8	.064	6.1	.103
SUB-TOTAL	99.9	100.0		1.236		1.225		1.605		1.841		1.915
2	25.5											
a	60.6											
(1)	14.3	.022	4.3	.095	4.3	.095	7.3	.161	6.3	.139	7.4	.164
(2)	16.6	.026	3.6	.092	3.6	.092	6.8	.174	7.3	.187	7.3	.187
(3)	14.8	.023	3.4	.078	3.3	.075	6.4	.146	6.1	.140	7.2	.165
(4)	10.5	.016	4.9	.080	4.9	.080	5.2	.084	5.4	.088	6.3	.102
(5)	12.9	.020	4.3	.086	4.3	.086	6.3	.126	6.9	.138	7.2	.144
(6)	30.9	.048	5.1	.244	5.2	.248	6.7	.320	6.4	.304	7.1	.339
	100.0											
b	39.4											
(1)	44.1	.044	3.9	.173	3.9	.173	6.4	.284	7.1	.315	7.4	.328
(2)	55.9	.056	3.5	.197	3.2	.180	5.3	.298	6.5	.365	6.8	.382
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.0		1.043		1.029		1.593		1.676		1.818
3	13.6											
a	30.8	.042	7.2	.302	7.2	.302	6.9	.289	7.7	.323	7.5	.314
b	31.1	.042	6.4	.271	6.3	.266	7.5	.317	7.6	.321	8.4	.355
c	38.1	.052	6.4	.332	7.1	.368	7.1	.368	7.9	.409	7.9	.409
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.904		.936		.974		1.053		1.079
4	10.6											
a	42.1	.045	4.4	.196	4.8	.214	4.9	.219	5.0	.223	6.7	.299
b	57.9	.061	3.0	.184	3.3	.203	4.7	.288	5.9	.362	6.6	.405
SUB-TOTAL	100.0			.380		.417		.507		.585		.704
5	8.3											
a	34.4	.029	5.5	.157	5.9	.168	5.5	.157	4.7	.134	5.8	.166
b	32.6	.027	3.3	.089	3.3	.089	5.2	.141	4.7	.127	6.1	.165
c	32.9	.027	3.7	.101	3.8	.104	3.6	.098	6.7	.183	6.4	.175
SUB-TOTAL	99.9			.347		.362		.396		.444		.505
6	11.7											
a	25.3	.030	4.5	.133	5.5	.163	4.6	.136	6.4	.189	6.8	.178
b	32.1	.038	3.8	.143	3.8	.143	4.8	.180	5.6	.210	4.6	.173
c	12.8	.015	6.0	.090	6.5	.097	6.0	.090	6.9	.103	6.3	.094
d	29.9	.035	3.0	.105	3.1	.108	3.8	.185	4.3	.150	4.9	.171
SUB-TOTAL	100.0	100.1		.471		.511		.511		.654		.616
TOTAL				4.382		4.488		5.587		6.254		6.638

\* NOMENCLATURE (CODE) AT FIGURE 5-1  
 \*\* MAS=MEAN ASSESSED SCORE  
 \*\*\* US=WEIGHTED SCORE

d. Table 5-19 summarizes the assessments for full, partial, and total mobilization. From these results, the conclusion is drawn that there is no significant change to be expected in the response of any alternative to either a partial or total mobilization from those of full mobilization.

TABLE 5-19

SUMMARY EFFECTIVENESS, SCENARIO ANALYSIS

	FULL MOB	PARTIAL MOB		TOTAL MOB	
	SCORE	SCORE	PERCENT <u>1</u> / CHANGE	SCORE	PERCENT <u>1</u> / CHANGE
BASE CASE	4.39	4.48	+2.1	4.38	-0.2
ALT #1	4.48	4.59	+2.5	4.48	+0.0
ALT #2	5.62	5.76	+2.5	5.59	-0.5
ALT #3	6.35	6.44	+1.4	6.25	-1.6
ALT #4	6.78	6.88	+1.5	6.63	-2.2

1/ Percent change from Full Mobilization

## Economic Analysis

### General.

1. This economic analysis is composed of:

a. A comparison of current annual operating costs of all affected activities, with estimates of those that would result after each of the proposed realignments is completely implemented ("steady state").

b. The estimated one-time costs associated with implementing each proposed realignment, including full equipment procurement.

2. All costs are stated in constant FY 79 dollars.

3. Stated costs represent a total system cost for comparative purposes only. Actual impact on the Army budget to implement a given alternative would be considerably less.

a. If all military manpower actions are accomplished within the current Army end-strength, then no increase in the MPA appropriation will be required.

b. Full equipment purchase will most likely not be required.

c. Both operating and investment costs for TOE elements include direct as well as indirect cost estimates. Increased indirect costs (e.g., depot maintenance, MOS training) will probably not be incurred but absorbed in current operating programs.

## Methodology and Rationale

### Current Annual Operating Costs.

1. Current annual O&M costs including civilian salaries are based on FY 79 budget data derived from the FORSCOM Command Operating Program (COP) as of 12 Mar 79 dated 27 Mar 79 (FAPABS MICROFICHE). Where FORSCOM COP data breakout was not at a low enough level for manipulation in the various alternatives, extrapolation was made to the necessary level on a percapita basis as explained in the pertinent Item/Cost Explanation Sheets at the end of this section.

2. All costs for military personnel are based on current

authorizations as stated in the FORSCOM COP or as supplemented by FORSCOM message, AFCS-SCG, 031655Z May 79, subj: Manpower Authorizations. Costs are derived by using average grades of the activity concerned and the Composite Standard Rates for Costing Military Personnel Services effective 1 Oct 78 (HQDA Msg DACA-FAA-G, 022200Z November 78).

#### Annual Operating Costs After Realignment.

1. Military and civilian personnel costs are based on proposed authorizations developed in the detailed section on each alternative in Volume II.

2. Military costs are derived assuming that the current grade structure will remain in effect for TDA headquarters. Costs for TOE elements are derived using average of grades stated in the TOE.

3. Civilian salaries are computed at the Grade of GS-8 step four or the FORSCOM average of \$16,672.

4. Changes in BASOPS costs and personnel are computed using BASOPS Cost Estimating Relationships contained in the FORSCOM Cost Factor Handbook, 23 Mar 78 or the TRADOC Resource Factor Handbook, 14 Sep 78.

5. Other O&M for new TDA organizations which includes travel, TDY, contractual services, supplies, etc., are estimated on a per capita basis from the CONUSA/ARR experience. In doing this, it is assumed that travel and TDY expenses are relative to the number of staff personnel in the RC management structure. In actuality, there may be no appreciable difference in total travel and TDY expenses for any of the proposed RC management structures since the same number of ARNG and USAR units will require inspections and staff visits.

6. Annual O&M for Corps HHC and the Corps Signal Brigade are derived from the HQDA Force Cost Information System.

#### One-Time Costs.

1. Factors and methodology used in computing military and civilian movement expenses, and civilian severance expenses are taken from FORSCOM Cost Planning Factors, 7 Feb 79.

##### a. Assumptions.

(1) Civilian personnel working in eliminated headquarters will be offered the opportunity to transfer with their functions to new headquarters subject to the limits of available authorizations, OPM Procedures and regulations, and Congressional approval in the case of USAR Technicians.

(2) All civilian personnel serving in an eliminated headquarters which is within commuting range of a newly activated headquarters (i.e., same installation or city) will accept transfer to the new headquarters.

(3) Military personnel in the same situation as (2) above will be used to offset requirements in newly activated headquarters thereby minimizing PCS costs.

(4) Percentage factors used to derive number of civilian personnel to be retired, transferred or separated are explained in the pertinent Item/Cost Explanation Sheets at the end of this section.

2. Equipment and Other Investment Costs for TOE Elements are derived from the HQDA Force Cost Information System.

3. No MCA costs have been considered. It is assumed that new activities will use existing facilities.

#### Resource Requirements

Resource requirements for all organizational structures are displayed in 16 tables: the titles and numbers of these tables are:

1. Comparison of Alternatives. (Table 5-20)
2. Current Annual Operating Costs. (Table 5-21)
3. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #1. (Table 5-22)
4. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #2. (Table 5-23)
5. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #2A. (Table 5-24)
6. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #2B. (Table 5-25)
7. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #3. (Table 5-26)



8. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #3A. (Table 5-27)
9. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #3B. (Table 5-28)
10. Estimated Annual Operating Costs for Alt #4. (Table 5-29)
11. One-Time Costs for Alt #2. (Table 5-30)
12. One-Time Costs for Alt #2A. (Table 5-31)
13. One-Time Costs for Alt #3. (Table 5-32)
14. One-Time Costs for Alt #3A. (Table 5-33)
15. One-Time Costs for Alt #3B. (Table 5-34)
16. One-Time Costs for Alt #4. (Table 5-35)

Item/Cost Explanation Sheets

Item/Cost explanation sheets for all organizational structures are displayed in 18 tables. The titles and numbers of these tables are:

1. Derivation of ARR Annual Operating Costs. (Table 5-36)
2. Derivation of ARCOM Annual Operating Costs. (Table 5-37)
3. Derivation of REDMOB Annual Operating Costs. (Table 5-38)
4. Manpower Impact Analysis - Alt #2 and 2A. (Table 5-39)
5. Manpower Impact Analysis Alt #3 and 3A. (Table 5-40)
6. Manpower Impact Analysis Alt #4. (Table 5-41)
7. BASOPS Requirements - Base Case. (Table 5-42)
8. BASOPS Requirements - Alt #2 and 2A & 2B. (Table 5-43)
9. BASOPS Requirements - Alt #3, 3A & 3B. (Table 5-44)
10. BASOPS Requirements Alt #4. (Table 5-45)
11. Military Personnel Movement Costs - Alt #2, 2A & 2B.

(Table 5-46)

12. Military Personnel Movement Costs - Alt #3, 3A & 3B.  
(Table 5-47)

13. Military Personnel Movement Costs Alt #4. (Table 5-48)

14. Civilian Personnel Movement and Severance Costs - Alt #2,  
2A & 2B. (Table 5-49)

15. Civilian Personnel Movement and Severance Costs - Alt #3,  
3A & 3B. (Table 5-50)

16. Civilian Personnel Movement and Severance Costs - Alt #4.  
(Table 5-51)

17. Annual Operating Costs - Corps HHC and Corps Signal Bde  
(Minus) (Table 5-52)

18. Equipment and other Investment Costs - Corps HHC and Corps  
Sig Bde (Minus) (Table 5-53)

TABLE 5-20  
COMPARISON OF ALTERNATIVES

	1	2	2A	2B	3	3A	3B	4
1. MANPOWER (FULL TIME)								
a. SPACES DISLOCATED	-	1956	605	1964	2207	3567	4203	3003
b. SPACES TRANSFERRED	-	960	209	960	2158	2215	3185	1712
c. SPACES ELIM (ADDED)	-	+996	-396	+1004	-49	+1352	+1018	+1291
2. DOLLARS (\$M)								
a. ONE-TIME COSTS	-	57.3	.9	57.3	4.1	60.4	61.5	71.3
(1) MIL PERS MOVEMENT	-	1.8	.7	1.8	1.9	2.9	3.3	2.5
(2) CIV PERS MOVEMENT	-	.1	.1	.1	1.0	1.0	1.4	.7
(3) CIV PERS SEPARATION	-	.1	.1	.1	.7	.7	1.0	.5
(4) OTHER (EQUIPMENT, ADP INVESTMENT ETC.)	-	55.3	-	55.3	.5	55.8	55.8	67.6
b. ANNUAL COST (SAVINGS)	+4.4	+11.9	+11.5	+12.2	-5.8	+16.2	+8.7	+18.6

TABLE 5-21

## ESTIMATED ANNUAL PERSONNEL AND DOLLAR (\$000) REQUIREMENTS BASE CASE FY 79

TOTAL BASE CASE	OFFICER (500)	WARRANT 111	ENLISTED 1672 (60)	TOTAL 3561	CIVILIAN END STRENGTH 2114	RC PART TIME 3129	MILITARY PAYROLL COST 9-501.5	CIVILIAN PAYROLL COST 32490.2	OTHER OPERATING COST 19837.2	NET COST 148838.7
BIRMINGHAM, AL (121st ARCOM) (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	11 (11)		3 (5)	14 (14)	26 (1)	174	829.4 (335.5)	429.3 (12.5)	86.5 (53.2)	1345.2 (419.2)
COLUMBUS, GA 12th ARCOM (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	11 (11)		2 (2)	13 (13)	24 (1)	176	659.3 (335.0)	369.0 (12.5)	56.3 (27.2)	1232.2 (374.7)
COLUMBUS, OH (43d ARCOM) (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	7 (7)		4 (4)	11 (11)	21 (2)	185	754.2 (243.7)	342.8 (25.0)	56.0 (31.5)	1161.2 (350.2)
FITTSBURGH, PA 8th ARCOM (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	48 (2)	11	52 (2)	111 (11)	15 (2)		3-501.1 (155.2)	288.5 (153.9)	430.4 (242.5)	3759.9 (1956.6)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	20 (7)	4	24 (5)	48 (12)	7 (2)	156	1459.9 (715.3)	134.6 (25.0)	187.9 (51.6)	1822.4 (518.7)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	23 (17)	5	28 (22)	56 (43)	11 (5)		1228.2 (885.2)	196.1 (79.4)	174.8 (196.7)	1599.1 (1161.3)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	86 (2)	5	77 (12)	168 (35)	58 (12)	182	4492.4 (996.0)	1046.1 (227.8)	428.8 (285.0)	5567.3 (3411.3)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	53 (11)	4	63 (2)	120 (13)	24 (1)	182	2671.6 (824.8)	455.7 (12.5)	265.0 (27.2)	3411.3 (374.7)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	57 (2)	5	48 (2)	111 (11)	26 (1)		2792.8 (1043.0)	488.1 (266.5)	264.0 (172.8)	3544.9 (1500.7)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	32 (24)	5	34 (47)	74 (76)	11 (30)		1638.8 (2062.7)	281.6 (521.6)	172.8 (322.9)	2094.2 (2907.2)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	17 (7)	5	39 (8)	61 (15)	10 (1)	165	1269.3 (793.4)	192.3 (329.3)	242.5 (80.4)	1764.1 (1503.1)
FT BRAGG, NC (ADJUTANTS/ADVISORS)	27 (27)	5	34 (34)	66 (66)	9 (9)		1447.6 (1447.6)	169.0 (12.5)	145.6 (145.6)	1762.2 (1762.2)

NOTE: A number in parentheses preceding another number indicates a Reservist on Stat Tour or Extended ADT.

It is not included in the number following it. A number in parentheses below another is merely a name entry included in the number above it.

FT JACKSON, SC	33	2	24	59	33	153	1798.6	558.6	201.3	2558.6
120TH ARCOM	10		3	13	22	153	752.1	362.6	52.6	1167.3
(AUGMENTEES/ADV)	(10)		(3)	(13)	(1)		(326.4)	(12.5)	(26.8)	(365.7)
RG JACKSON	23	2	21	46	11		1046.5	196.1	148.7	1391.7
FT KNOX, KY	67	4	74	(2) 145	27		3417.7	376.1	417.3	4211.1
HQ AR VI	22	1	11	(2) 34	13		980.2	181.1	114.0	1275.3
RG KNOX	45	3	63	111	14		2437.5	195.0	303.3	2935.8
FT LANTON, VA (124TH ARCOM)	6		3	9	20	161	664.5	329.3	64.4	1058.2
(AUGMENTEES/ADV)	(6)		(3)	(9)	(1)		(218.1)	(12.5)	(24.8)	
FT MCCON, WI	18		26	44	8		969.0	125.9	137.7	1232.6
RG MCCON	63	3	50	(2) 116	53	190	3366.7	502.2	650.5	4537.5
FT MCNERSON/GILLEN/ATLANTA	24		8	(2) 32	13		981.2	274.5	196.7	1384.4
HQ AR IV	11		4	15	24	190	891.4	39.6	82.3	1613.3
HQ 81ST ARCOM	(11)		(4)	(15)	(1)		(372.0)	(12.5)	(56.7)	(441.2)
(AUGMENTEES/ADV)							1514.1	254.1	371.6	2139.8
FT MEADE, MD	28	3	38	69	16		10886.9	574.9	2149.1	18850.9
HQ USARV	223	8	157	(19) 388	355	174	7605.9	501.6.8	1817.7	14442.4
HQ 156TH	156	3	116	(18) 275	310		932.6	196.1	112.2	1242.1
HQ AR III	23	1	8	(1) 32	11		1555.8	267.4	215.2	2042.4
RG MEADE	33	4	32	69	15	174	792.4	312.6	55.8	1160.8
HQ 97TH ARCOM	11		1	12	19		(316.5)	(12.5)	(24.8)	(353.8)
(AUGMENTEES/ADV)	(11)		(1)	(12)	(1)					
FT LEMIS, VA	31	6	34	71	13		1573.3	238.3	215.2	2026.8
RG LEMIS	34	7	44	85	12		1557.1	236.8	331.3	2419.2
FT RILEY, KS	24	3	24	51	12		1146.5	214.0	164.4	1524.9
FT LEE, VA	203	6	163	(14) 372	303	145	10931.7	5511.5	1928.6	17333.8
FT SAN JOUSTON, TX	132	1	91	(13) 224	256		6222.6	4362.9	1402.2	11887.7
HQ USAFIVE	19	1	9	(1) 29	10		877.1	155.3	107.4	1077.8
HQ AR VII	47	4	59	110	17		2435.0	264.0	369.7	3048.7
RG SAN ANTONIA	5		4	9	20	145	619.0	329.3	69.3	1017.6
HQ 97TH ARCOM	(5)		(4)	(9)	(1)		(709.5)	(12.5)	(27.5)	249.5
FT SHERIDAN	65	4	62	(2) 131	42	159	110.9	675.1	428.8	471.5
HQ AR V	27	1	11	(2) 39	10		144.6	157.4	129.8	1431.8
RG SHERIDAN	33	3	49	85	8		153.2	125.9	246.3	2225.4
HQ 86TH ARCOM	5		2	7	24	159	613.1	391.8	52.7	1057.6
(AUGMENTEES/ADV)	(5)		(2)	(7)	(2)		(172.5)	(25.0)	(22.6)	(220.1)



TABLE 5-22  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #1

	\$000			
	MIL PERS COST	CIV PERS COST	OTHER O&M	TOTAL
CURRENT ANNUAL COST	94501.3	32490.2	19837.2	146828.7
ACTIVATE PERSCOM, MEDCOM; AUGMENT 8 TOE (PDS)	+372.0		+20.0	+392.0
ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL	94873.3	32490.2	19857.2	147220.7

TABLE 5-23  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #2

	<u>\$000</u>			
	<u>MIL PERS COST</u>	<u>CJV PERS COST</u>	<u>OTHER O&amp;M</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Current Annual Cost	94501.3	32490.2	19837.2	146828.7
Inactivate ARR HQS	-9491.5	-1649.6	-1209.8	-12350.9
Eliminate BN Level Advisors	-3675.5		-409.8	-4085.3
Subtotal	-13167.0	-1649.6	-1619.6	-16436.2
Activate Corps HHC	+6700.4		+590.7	+7291.1
Activate Corps Sig Bde (-)	+10634.7 0		+2649.0	+13283.7
MOB Station Planners	+512.9	+943.0	+192.0	+1647.9
Corps Affiliation Program	+243.9		+27.0	+270.9
CONUSA Addbacks	+4196.5	+395.4	+480.0	+5071.9
FORSCOM MOB Planners	+81.3		+9.0	+90.3
Increase BASOPS		+550.2	+174.8	+725.0
Subtotal	+22369.7	+1888.6	+4122.5	+28380.8
Net Change	+9202.7	239.0	+2502.9	+11944.6
Alternative Annual Operating Cost	+103704.0	32729.2	22340.1	158773.3



TABLE 5-24  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #2A

	<u>MIL PERS</u> <u>COST</u>	<u>\$000</u> <u>CIV PERS</u> <u>COST</u>	<u>OTHER</u> <u>O&amp;M</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Current Annual Cost	94501.3	32490.2	19837.2	146828.7
Inactivate ARR HQ	-9491.5	-1649.6	-1209.8	-12350.9
Eliminate BN				
Level Advisors	-3675.5		-409.8	-4085.3
Decrease BASOPS		-316.7	-130.1	-446.8
Subtotal	-13167.0	-1966.3	-1749.7	-16883.0
CONUSA Addbacks	+4196.5	+395.4	+480.0	+5071.9
FORSCOM MOB Planners	+81.3		9.0	+90.3
Training OPCON	+216.8		+24.0	+240.8
Subtotal	+4494.6	+395.4	+513.0	+5403.0
Net Change	-8672.4	-1570.9	-1236.7	-11480.0
Alternative Annual Operating Cost	85828.9	30919.3	18600.5	135348.7

TABLE 5-25  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #2B

	<u>MIL PERS COST</u>	<u>\$ 000 CIV PERS COST</u>	<u>OTHER O&amp;M</u>	<u>TOTAL</u>
Alternative #2 Baseline	103704.0	32729.2	22340.1	158773.3
Training OPCON	+216.8		24.0	+240.8
Alternative Annual Operating Costs	103920.8	32729.2	22364.1	159014.1
Net Change from Base Case	+9419.5	+239.0	+2526.9	+12185.4

TABLE 5-26  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #3

	MIL PERS COST	CIV PERS COST	OTHER O&M	TOTAL COST
CURRENT ANNUAL COST	94501.3	32490.2	19837.2	146828.7
INACTIVATE ARR HQS	- 9491.5	- 1649.6	- 1209.8	- 12350.9
INACTIVATE ARCOMS	-13886.0	- 6769.3	- 1174.0	- 21829.9
(AUGMENTEES/ ADVISORS)	(- 5275.5)	(- 366.8)	(- 617.6)	(- 6259.9)
DRCS REDUCTION	- 693.2	- 600.2	- 187.6	- 1481.0
PIRC REDUCTION	- 307.9	-	- 31.3	- 339.2
ELIMINATE BN	- 3675.5	-	- 409.8	- 4085.3
LEVEL ADVISORS				
DECREASE BASOPS	-	- 250.1	- 200.0	- 450.1
SUBTOTAL	-28054.1	- 9269.2	- 3212.5	- 40535.8
ACTIVATE REDMOBS	+20332.2	+ 8219.3	+ 3668.9	+ 32220.4
FORSCOM MOB PLAN-				
NERS	+ 81.3	+ -	+ 9.0	+ 90.3
CONUSA MOB PLANNERS	+ 162.6	-	+ 18.0	+ 180.6
CORPS R/O-AFFILIA-				
TION	+ 89.2	-	+ 10.4	+ 99.6
DIV R/O-AFFILIATION	+ 446.1	-	+ 52.1	+ 498.2
INSTALLATION MOB	+ 624.5	+ 828.0	+ 192.0	+ 1644.5
PLANNERS				
SUBTOTAL	+21735.9	+ 9047.3	+ 3950.4	+ 34733.6
NET CHANGE	- 6318.2	- 221.9	+ 737.9	- 5802.2
ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL COST	88183.1	32268.3	20575.1	141026.5

TABLE 5-27  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #3A

	MIL PERS COST	CIV PERS COST	OTHER O&M	TOTAL COST
ALTERNATIVE #3 BASELINE	88183.1	32268.3	20575.1	141026.5
ACTIVATE CORPS HHC	+ 6700.4		+ 590.7	+ 7291.1
ACTIVATE CORPS SIG BDE (-)	+10634.7		+ 2649.0	+ 13283.7
ADD'L CORPS R/C AFFILIATION MGRS	+ 44.6		+ 5.2	+ 49.8
TRAINING OPCON	+ 216.8		+ 24.0	+ 240.8
INCREASE BASOPS		+866.9	+ 304.9	+ 1171.8
SUBTOTAL	+17596.5		+ 3573.8	+ 22037.2
ALTERNATIVE ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS	105779.6	33135.2	24148.9	163063.7
NET CHANGE FROM BASE CASE	+11278.3	+645.0	+ 4311.7	+16235.0

TABLE 5-28  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #3B

	<u>MIL PERS COST</u>	<u>\$000 CIV PERS COST</u>	<u>OTHER O&amp;M</u>	<u>TOTAL COST</u>
Alternative #3A Baseline	105779.6	33135.2	24148.9	163063.7
Inactivate USAFIVE BASOPS Decrease	-6288.3	-4262.9	-1408.2 -65.0	-11959.4 -65.0
Subtotal	-6288.3	-4262.9	-1473.2	-12024.4
USAONE Addback	+1906.6	+1000.3	+354.0	+3260.9
USASIX Addback	+690.3	+366.3	+129.0	+1185.6
Subtotal	+2596.9	+1366.6	+483.0	+4446.5
Net Change from #3A	-3691.4	-2896.3	-990.2	-7577.9
Alternative Annual Operating Costs	102088.2	30238.9	23158.7	155485.8
Net Change from Base Case	+7586.9	-2251.3	+3321.5	+8657.1

TABLE 5-29  
ESTIMATED ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS  
ALT #4

	MIL PERS COST	\$000 CIV PERS COST	OTHER O&M	TOTAL COST
Current Annual Cost	94501.3	32490.2	19837.2	146828.7
Inactivate CONUSA	-19526.1	-13169.1	-4603.7	-37298.9
(USAONE)	(-7605.9)	(-5018.8)	(-1817.7)	(-14442.4)
(USAFIVE)	(-6226.6)	(-4262.9)	(-1402.2)	(-11891.7)
(USASIX)	(-5693.6)	(-3887.4)	(-1383.8)	(-10964.8)
Inactivate ARR HQS	-9491.5	-1649.6	-1209.8	-12350.9
Eliminate BN	-3675.5		-409.8	-4085.3
Level Advisors				
Reduce DRCS	-374.6	-300.1	-99.0	-773.7
Subtotal	-33067.7	-15118.8	-6322.3	-54508.8
Activate ALO 3	+7051.4		+519.4	+7570.8
CORPS HHC				
Activate TWO	+7356.4		+451.6	+7808.0
Cadre CORPS HHC				
Activate FIVE Corps	+20978.2	+15214.9	+5053.7	+41246.8
Area Elements				
Activate Corps Sig	+10634.7		+2649.0	+13283.7
Bde (-)				
Training OPCON	+216.8		+24.0	+240.8
MOB Planners	+936.8	+505.5	+166.8	+1609.1
Increase BASOPS	+710.7		+685.6	+1396.3
Subtotal	+47885.0	+15720.4	+9550.1	+73155.5
Net Change	+14817.3	+601.6	+3227.8	+18646.7
Alternative Annual Operating Costs	109318.6	33091.8	23065.0	165475.4

TABLE 5-30  
ONE-TIME COSTS  
ALT #2

1. Military Personnel Movement	<u>\$000</u> 1833.1
2. Civilian Personnel Movement	121.4
3. Civilian Personnel Separation	84.8
4. Investment and Operations	55301.0
5. ADP	<u>          </u>
Total	57340.3

TABLE 5-31  
ONE-TIME COSTS  
ALT #2A

1. Military Personnel Movement	<u>\$000</u> 744.8
2. Civilian Personnel Movement	121.4
3. Civilian Personnel Separation	84.8
4. Investment and Operations	_____
5. ADP	_____
Total	951.0



TABLE 5-32  
ONE-TIME COSTS  
ALT #3

1. Military Personnel Movement	<u>\$000</u> 1891.7
2. Civilian Personnel Movement	961.4
3. Civilian Personnel Separation	678.5
4. Investment and Operations	_____
5. ADP	458.0
Total	3989.6

TABLE 5-33  
ONE-TIME COSTS  
ALT #3A

1. Military Personnel Movement	<u>\$000</u> 2903.8
2. Civilian Personnel Movement	961.4
3. Civilian Personnel Separation	678.5
4. Investment and Operations	55301.0
5. ADP	458.0
Total	60302.7

TABLE 5-34  
ONE-TIME COSTS  
ALT #3B

1. Military Personnel Movement	<u>\$000</u> 3314.9
2. Civilian Personnel Movement	1420.2
3. Civilian Personnel Separation	1004.7
4. Investment and Operations	55301.0
5. ADP	458.0
Total	61498.8

TABLE 5-35  
ONE-TIME COSTS  
ALT #4

1. Military Personnel Movement	<u>\$000</u> 2530.4
2. Civilian Personnel Movement	714.5
3. Civilian Personnel Separation	493.8
4. Investment and Operations	67401.0
5. ADP	170.0
Total	71309.7

TABLE 5-36

## ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET #1

VALUE: ARR CIVILIAN SALARY &amp; OTHER ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS

1. The total operating costs for each ARR is as stated by FAPABS Code 512000.30 on the 12 Mar 79 FAPABS Microfiche.

2. Costs for subordinate ARR elements are derived from total costs on a per capita basis.

3. Derivation of costs (excludes military pay):

	AUTHORIZATIONS			\$000		
	MIL	CIV	TOTAL	TOTAL	CIV SAL	OTHER
ARR I TOTAL	518	76	594	2618.8	1443.0	1175.8
HEADQUARTERS	35	12	47	320.8	227.8	93.0
RG DEVENS	120	24	144	740.7	455.7	285.0
RG SENECA	51	13	64	373.5	246.8	126.8
RG STEWART	76	17	93	506.9	322.8	184.1
ADVISORS/AUG	236	10	246	676.9	189.9	486.9
ARR II TOTAL	384	57	441	1926.2	1070.2	856.0
HEADQUARTERS	36	11	47	297.7	206.5	91.2
RG DIX	74	15	89	454.4	281.6	172.8
RG FT I. GAP	66	9	75	314.6	169.0	145.6
RG OAKDALE	61	14	75	408.5	262.9	145.6
ADVISORS/AUG	147	8	155	451.0	150.2	300.8
ARR III TOTAL	402	70	472	2479.7	1248.1	1231.6
HEADQUARTERS	32	11	43	308.3	196.1	112.2
RG MEADE	69	15	84	486.6	267.4	219.2
RG LEE	51	12	63	378.4	214.0	164.4
RG BRAGG	56	11	67	370.9	196.1	174.8
RG JACKSON	46	11	57	344.8	196.1	148.7
ADVISORS/AUG	148	10	158	590.7	178.4	412.3
ARR IV TOTAL	548	78	626	3975.7	1238.9	2736.8
HEADQUARTERS	32	13	45	403.2	206.5	196.7
RG ATLANTA	69	16	85	625.7	254.1	371.6
RG PATRICK	54	12	66	479.1	190.6	288.5
RG REDSTONE	135	16	151	914.3	254.1	660.2
RG PUERTO RICO	40	5	45	276.1	79.4	196.7
ADVISORS/AUG	218	16	234	1277.3	254.2	1023.1
ARR V TOTAL	517	63	580	2527.6	991.5	1536.1
HEADQUARTERS	39	10	49	287.2	157.4	129.8
RG MCCOY	44	8	52	263.6	125.9	137.7

		AUTHORIZATIONS			\$000	
	MIL	CIV	TOTAL	TOTAL	CIV SAL	OTHER
RG SHERIDAN	85	8	93	372.2	125.9	246.3
RG ST LOUIS	70	11	81	387.6	173.1	214.5
ADVISORS/AUG	219	16	235	874.2	251.8	622.4
ARR VI TOTAL	409	59	468	1957.3	821.9	1135.4
HEADQUARTERS	34	13	47	295.1	181.1	114.0
RG KNOX	111	14	125	498.3	195.0	303.3
RG SELFRIDGE	88	13	101	426.1	181.1	245.0
ADVISORS/AUG	176	19	195	737.8	264.7	473.1
ARR VII TOTAL	361	54	415	1981.3	838.5	1142.8
HEADQUARTERS	29	10	39	262.7	155.3	107.4
RG SAN ANTONIO	110	17	127	613.7	264.0	349.7
RG SILL	67	12	79	403.8	186.3	217.5
ADVISORS/AUG	155	15	170	701.1	232.9	468.2
ARR VIII TOTAL	380	50	430	2430.3	961.6	1468.7
HEADQUARTERS	63	8	71	396.4	153.9	242.5
RG DENVER	48	7	55	322.5	134.6	187.9
RG DOUGLAS	61	10	71	434.8	192.3	242.5
RG RILEY	85	12	97	562.1	230.8	331.3
ADVISORS/AUG	123	13	136	714.5	250.0	464.5
ARR IX TOTAL	386	55	441	2138.0	1008.1	1129.9
HEADQUARTERS	39	9	48	288.0	165.0	123.0
RG LEWIS	71	13	84	435.5	238.3	215.2
RG SAN FRANCISCO	72	12	84	435.1	219.9	215.2
RG LOS ANGELES	78	13	91	471.5	238.3	233.2
ADVISORS/AUG	126	8	134	489.9	146.6	343.3

TABLE 5-37

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 2

VALUE DERIVED: ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS AT ARCOM HQS

1. ARCOM operating costs cannot be identified directly in FORSCOM FAPABS, but are contained within total MUSARC operating costs at a given coordinating installation (CI). CI's fund one or more MUSARCs.

2. The following ARCOM HQs nonpersonnel operating costs are derived on a per capita basis from the total MUSARC operating costs (FAPABS Codes 512000.23, 512000.89, 538991.40, 539994.30, 539994.60) at the ARCOM's CI. The civilian salaries portion of costs for USAR technicians is based on an average FORSCOM salary of \$16672 times number of technicians assigned.

ARCOM	MUSARC PDS	ARCOM HQ PDS	USAR TECHS	\$000 MUSARC COSTS	\$000 ARCOM HQ CIV SAL	\$000 ARCOM HQ OTHER COSTS
63d ARCOM	9085	158	19	1699.9	316.8	29.6
77th ARCOM	18447	192	22	2305.6	366.8	24.0
81st ARCOM	12731	190	23	1713.3	383.5	25.6
83d ARCOM	14950	180	19	2780.3	316.8	33.5
86th ARCOM	26075	159	22	4935.0	366.8	30.1
88th ARCOM	12653	151	19	2294.2	316.8	27.4
89th ARCOM	6259	155	19	1691.4	316.8	41.9
90th ARCOM	8921	145	19	2569.6	316.8	41.8
94th ARCOM	15723	182	21	2042.6	350.1	23.6
96th ARCOM	8248	165	19	1317.3	316.8	26.4
97th ARCOM	10681	174	18	1903.4	300.1	31.0
99th ARCOM	21905	176	23	2381.4	383.5	19.1
102d ARCOM	5860	141	15	1452.9	250.1	40.0
120th ARCOM	9674	153	21	1630.5	350.1	25.8
121st ARCOM	13994	174	25	2674.9	416.8	33.3
122d ARCOM	7150	141	19	1368.3	316.8	27.0
123d ARCOM	8091	156	19	911.9	316.8	17.6
124th ARCOM	11019	161	19	2709.9	316.8	39.6
79th ARCOM	21905	176	23	2381.4	383.5	19.1
TOTAL		3129	384			

3. IDT/AT pay for ARCOM Reservists is computed assuming an average officer grade of O-4 and an average enlisted grade of E-6. Average daily drill pay for these grades as furnished in FORSCOM Cost Planning Factors is \$61 and \$26 respectively. Normal IDT is 48 drills; therefore: 48 (\$61) = \$2928 and 48 (\$26) = \$1248. AT pay is computed from the US Army composite standard rates for Costing Military Personnel Services effective 1 Oct 78. The respective weekly rates for the

appropriate grades are \$521 and \$213. AT is normally a two-week period; therefore, 2 (\$521) = \$1042 and 2 (\$253) = 506.

4. The RPA costs by ARCOM are:

		AUTH		IDT \$000			AT \$000			GRAND
		OFF/W	EN	OFF/W	EN	TOT	OFF/W	EN	TOT	TOTAL \$000
63d	ARCOM	73	85	213.7	106.1	319.8	76.1	43.0	119.1	438.9
77th	ARCOM	82	110	240.1	137.3	377.4	85.4	55.7	141.1	518.5
79th	ARCOM	75	101	219.6	126.0	345.6	78.2	51.1	129.3	474.9
81st	ARCOM	84	106	246.0	132.2	378.3	87.5	53.6	141.1	519.4
83d	ARCOM	79	101	231.3	126.0	357.3	82.3	51.1	133.4	490.7
86th	ARCOM	73	86	213.7	107.3	321.0	76.1	43.5	119.6	440.6
88th	ARCOM	71	80	207.9	99.8	307.7	74.0	40.5	114.5	422.2
89th	ARCOM	71	84	207.9	104.8	312.7	74.0	42.5	116.5	429.2
90th	ARCOM	70	75	205.0	93.6	298.6	72.9	38.0	110.9	409.5
94th	ARCOM	77	105	225.2	131.0	356.5	80.2	53.1	133.3	489.8
96th	ARCOM	75	90	219.6	112.3	331.9	78.2	45.4	123.7	455.6
97th	ARCOM	77	97	225.5	121.1	346.6	80.2	49.1	129.3	475.9
99th	ARCOM	75	101	219.6	126.0	345.6	78.2	51.1	129.3	474.9
102d	ARCOM	65	76	190.3	94.8	285.1	67.7	38.5	106.2	391.3
120th	ARCOM	71	82	207.9	102.3	310.2	74.0	41.5	115.5	425.7
121st	ARCOM	77	97	225.5	121.1	346.6	80.2	49.1	129.3	475.9
122d	ARCOM	68	73	199.1	91.1	290.2	70.9	36.9	107.8	398.0
123d	ARCOM	72	84	210.8	104.8	315.6	75.0	42.5	117.5	433.1
124th	ARCOM	74	87	216.7	108.6	325.3	77.1	44.0	121.1	446.4
TOTALS		1409	1720	4125.7	2146.3	6272.0	1468.2	870.3	2338.5	8610.5



TABLE 5-38

## ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET #3

## VALUE DERIVED: REDMOB ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS

1. Full-time military salaries are derived using average grade of O-4 and E-8 (ARR experience). IDT/AT pay for reservists is based on average grades of O-4 and E-6 (ARCOM experience). Civilian salaries are computed at the FORSCOM average of \$16672.

2. Other O&M costs are based on REDMOB manyears computed as .158 time paid Drill Strength plus full time strength. A percapita cost of \$2.606K is then used (ARR experience).

## 3. REDMOB STRENGTH SUMMARY:

	FULL TIME				RC PDS			CIV		
	OFF	WO	ENL	TDI	OFF	WO	ENL	TOT	DAC	TECH
REDMOB I	48	1	27	76	67	5	88	160	13	43
REDMOB II	42	1	24	67	60	4	78	142	12	38
REDMOB III	37	1	21	59	52	4	68	124	10	32
REDMOB IV	44	1	27	72	61	4	80	145	12	40
REDMOB V	48	1	27	76	67	5	88	160	13	43
REDMOB VI	43	1	24	68	60	4	78	142	12	39
REDMOB VII	37	1	21	59	52	4	68	124	10	32
REDMOB VIII	34	1	20	55	51	4	67	122	9	30
REDMOB IX	30	1	18	49	48	3	62	113	9	28
REDMOB X	34	1	19	54	51	4	67	122	10	31
REDMOB XI	30	1	17	48	48	3	62	113	9	28
TOTAL	427	11	245	683	617	44	806	1467	119	384

## 4. ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS:

	FT MIL \$000	PDS \$000	TOT MIL \$000	CIV SAL \$000	OTHER \$000	NET \$000
REDMOB I	1817.5	440.2	2257.7	933.6	410.0	3601.3
REDMOB II	1599.5	390.9	1990.4	666.9	337.3	2994.6
REDMOB III	1408.5	341.6	1750.1	700.2	314.3	2764.6
REDMOB IV	1709.2	398.4	2107.6	866.9	382.8	3357.3
REDMOB V	1817.5	440.2	2257.7	933.6	410.0	3601.3
REDMOB VI	1626.5	390.9	2017.4	850.3	368.6	3236.3
REDMOB VII	1408.5	341.6	1750.1	700.2	314.3	2764.6
REDMOB VIII	1308.7	335.9	1644.6	650.2	295.2	2590.0
REDMOB IX	1163.3	311.2	1474.5	616.9	270.6	2362.0
REDMOB X	1290.2	335.9	1626.1	683.6	297.8	2607.5
REDMOB XI	1144.8	311.2	1456.0	616.9	268.0	2340.9
TOTAL			20332.2	8219.3	3668.9	32220.4

TABLE 5-39

## ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET #4

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #2 PERSONNEL IMPACT ANALYSIS

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>CIV</u>
TOTAL BASELINE					
NET INCREASES	(+6)+287	+41	+1077	(+6)+1405	+54
NET DECREASES	(-15)-227	-14	-175	(-15)-416	-60
TOTAL ALTERNATIVE					
FITZSIMMONS AMC, CO					
HQ ARR VIII	(-2) -28	-7	-28	(-2) -63	-8
FT DEVENS, MA					
HQ ARR I	(-2) -22	-1	-12	(-2) -35	-10
MOB PLANNING	(-2) -22	-1	-12	(-2) -35	-12
FT DIX, NJ					+2
HQ ARR II	(-2) -25	-1	-10	(-2) -36	-9
MOB PLANNING	(-2) -25	-1	-10	(-2) -36	-11
FT KNOX, KY					-2
HQ ARR VI	(-2) -22	-1	-11	(-2) -34	-11
MOB PLANNING	(-2) -22	-1	-11	(-2) -34	-13
FT MCPHERSON, GA					+2
HQ ARR IV	(-2) -22		-8	(-2) -30	+12
HQ FORSCOM	(-2) -24		-8	(-2) -32	-13
	+2			+2	+1
FT MEADE, MD					
HQ USAONE	(-1) +26	-1	-2	(-1) +23	+1
HQ ARR III	+49		+6	+55	+10
MOB PLANNING	(-1) -23	-1	-8	(-1) -32	-11
					+2

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>CIV</u>
FT SAM HOUSTON, TX					
HQ USAFIVE	(-1) +16	-1	-3	(-1) +12	-2
HQ ARR VII	(-1) -19	-1	+6	(-1) -29	+8
					-10
FT SHERIDAN, IL					
HQ ARR V	(-2) -27	-1	-11	(-2) -39	-8
MOB PLANNING	(-2) -27	-1	-11	(-2) -39	-10
PRESIDIO SF					+2
HQ USASIX	(-1) +10	-1	-10	(-1) -1	-8
HQ ARR IX	+32		+6	+38	-10
MOB PLANNING	(-1) -22	-1	-16	(-1) -39	+2
					+8
					-9
					+1
FT LEWIS, WA					
CORPS HHC	(+2)+233	+41	+1077	(+2)+1351	+2
CORPS R/O/AFF	+158	+6	+176	+340	
MOB PLANNING	(+2) +1			(+2) +1	
CORPS SIG BDE	+74	+35	+901	+1010	+2
FT BRAGG, NC					
CORPS R/O/AFF	(+2) +1			(+2) +1	+2
MOB PLANNING	(+2) +1			(+2) +1	+2
FT HOOD, TX					
CORPS R/O/AFF	(+2) +1			(+2) +1	+2
MOB PLANNING	(+2) +1			(+2) +1	+2
BN LEVEL ADVISORS					
INSTALLATION MOB	-81		-80	-161	+2
PLANNING					+47

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>ENL</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>CIV</u>
ALT #2A BECOMES:					
FT LEWIS, WA					+2
NET INCREASES	(+8)+52			(+8)+52	+54
NET DECREASES	(-15)-227	-14	-175	(-15)-416	-60
ALT #2B BECOMES:					
NET INCREASES	(-14)+287	+41	+1077	(+14)+1405	+54
NET DECREASES	(-15)-227	-14	-175	(-15)-416	-60

TABLE 5-40

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 5

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #3 MANPOWER IMPACT ANALYSIS

	OFF	WO	EN	AGG	CIV
TOTAL INCREASES	(+52)+343	+9	+215	+567	+460
TOTAL DECREASES	(-12)-375	-12	-254	-641	+475
BIRMINGHAM, AL (121st ARCOM)	-11		-3	-14	-26
COLMAR, PA (79th ARCOM)	-11		-2	-13	-24
COLUMBUS, OH (83d ARCOM)	-7		-4	-11	-21
FT B. HARRISON (123d ARCOM)	-7		-5	-12	-21
FT BRAGG, NC (REDMOB III) (R/O-AFFILIATION)	(+5)+36 (+5)+32 +4	+1 +1	+21 +21	(+5)+58 (+5)+54 +4	+42 +42
FT CAMPBELL, KY (REDMOB VI) (R/O-AFFILIATION)	(+5)+40 (+5)+38 +2	+1 +1	+24 +24	(+)+65 (+5)+63 +2	+51 +51
FT CARSON, CO (REDMOB IX) (R/O-AFFILIATION)	(+5)+27 (+5)+25 +2	+1 +1	+18 +18	(+5)+46 (+5)+44 +2	+37
FITZSIMMONS AMC, CO (HQ ARR VIII)	(-2)-28	-7	-28	(-2)-63	-8
FT DEVENS, MA HQ ARR I 94th ARCOM REDMOB I	(+3)+10 (-2)-22 -11 (+5)+43		+13 -1 -2 +1	(+3)+23 (-2)-35 -13 (+5)+71	+22 -12 -22 +56
FT DIX, NJ (HQ ARR II)	(-2)-25	-1	-10	(-2)-36	-11
FT DOUGLAS, UT (96th ARCOM)	-7		-8	-15	-20

	OFF	WO	EN	AGG	CIV
FT HOOD, TX	(+5)+38	+1	+21	(+5)+60	+42
(REDMOB VII)	(+5)+32	+1	+21	(+5)+54	+42
(R/O-AFFILIATION)	+6			+6	
FT S. HOUSTON, TX	(-1)-22	-1	-13	(-1)-36	-30
HQ ARR VII	(-1)-19	-1	-9	(-1)-29	-10
90th ARCOM	-5		-4	-9	-20
HQ USAFIVE	+2			+2	
FT INDIANTOWN GAP, VA	(+5)+37	+1	+24	(+5)+62	+50
(REDMOB II)					
FT JACKSON, SC	-10		-3	-13	-22
(120th ARCOM)					
FT KNOX, KY	(-2)-22	-1	-11	(-2)-34	-13
(HQ ARR VI)					
FT LAWTON, WA	-6		-3	-9	-20
(124th ARCOM)					
FT LEWIS, WA	(+5)+27	+1	+17	(+5)+45	+37
(REDMOB XI)	(+5)+25	+1	+17	(+5)+43	+37
(R/O-AFFILIATION)	+2			+2	
FT MCCOY, WI	(+5)+43	+1	+27	(+5)+71	+56
(REDMOB V)					
FT MCPHERSON/ATLANTA	(-2)-32		-12	(-2)-44	-37
HQ ARR IV	(-2)-24		-8	(-2)-32	-13
81st ARCOM	-11		-4	-15	-24
HQ FORSCOM	+3			+3	
FT MEADE, MD	(-1)-32	-1	-9	(-1)-42	-30
HQ ARR III	(-1)-23	-1	-8	(-1)-32	-11
97th ARCOM	-11		-1	-12	-19
HQ USAONE	+2			+2	
FT ORD, CA					
(R/O-AFFILIATION)	+2			+2	
FT POLK, LA					
(R/O-AFFILIATION)	+2			+2	

	OFF	WO	EN	AGG	CIV
FT RILEY, KS	(+5)+31	+1	+20	(+5)+52	+39
REDMOB VIII	(+5)+29	+1	+20	(+5)+50	+39
R/O-AFFILIATION	+2			+2	
FT SHERIDAN, IL	(-2)-32	-1	-13	(-2)-46	-34
(HQ ARR V)	(-2)-27	-1	-11	(-2)-39	-10
(86th ARCOM)	-5		-2	-7	-24
FT STEWART, CA	(+5)+41	+1	+27	(+5)+69	+52
(REDMOB IV)	(+5)+39	+1	+27	(+5)+67	+52
(R/O-AFFILIATION)	+2			+2	
FT SNELLING, MN	-6		-2	-8	-20
(88th ARCOM)					
FT TOTTEN, NY	-11		-2	-13	-23
(77th ARCOM)					
HARTFORD, CT	-5		-1	-6	
(76th TD)					
LITTLE ROCK, AR	-5		-3	-8	-20
(122d ARCOM)					
PRESIDIO OF SF	(+4)+9		+3	(+4)+12	+32
HQ USASIX	+2			+2	
HQ ARR IX	(-1)-22	-1	-16	(-1)-39	-9
HQ REDMOB X	(+5)+29	+1	+19	(+5)+49	+41
PITTSBURGH, PA	-10		-2	-12	-24
(99th ARCOM)					
LOS ANGELES, CA	-6		-4	-10	-20
(63d ARCOM)					
ROCHESTER, NY	-5		-1	-6	
(98th TD)					
ST LOUIS, MO	-4		-2	-6	-16
(102d ARCOM)					
WICHITA, KS	-7		-8	-15	-20
(89th ARCOM)					
GENERAL	-64		-105	-169	-15
BN LEVEL ADVISORS	-81		-80	-161	
INSTAL MOB PLANNERS	+28			+28	+36
INSTAL DRC'S	-11		-25	-36	-36
INSTAL BASOPS					-15

ALT #3A BECOMES:

	OFF	WO	EN	AGG	CIV
FT LEWIS, WA	+261	+42	+1094	+1397	
GENERAL	(+8)			(+8)	
NET INCREASES	(+60)+577	+50	+1292	+1919	+460
NET DECREASES	(-12)-375	-12	-254	-641	-475

ALT #3B BECOMES:

FT S. HOUSTON, TX	(-14)-154	-2	-104	(-14)-260	-286
FT MEADE, MD	(-1)+2	-1	+15	(-1)+16	+30
PRESIDIO OF SF	(+4)+21		+12	(+4)+33	+54
NET INCREASES	(+60)+589	+50	+1316	(+60)+1955	+638
NET DECREASES	(-25)-475	-13	-336	(-25)-824	-701

NOTE: A number in parentheses indicates a full time reservist on stat tour or other extended ADT. It is not included in the other number on the same line with it. Total full time manpower impact is obtained by adding the two numbers.



TABLE 5-41

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 6

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #4 MANPOWER IMPACT ANALYSIS

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>CIV</u>
NET INCREASES	(+54)+337	+48	(+104)+1230	(+158)+1615	+347
NET DECREASES	(-16)-298	-10	-212	(-16) -520	-347
FT CARSON, CO HQ ARR VIII	(-2) -28	-7	-28	(-2) -63	-8
FT BRAGG, NC CORPS AREA ELM	(+8) +50	+3	(+4) +30	(+12) +83	+174
FT DEVENS, MA HQ ARR I	(-2) -22	-1	-12	(-2) -35	-12
FT DIX, NJ HQ ARR II	(-2) -25	-1	-10	(-2) -36	-11
FT KNOX, KY HQ ARR VI	(-2) -22	-1	-11	(-2) -34	-13
FT MCPHERSON, GA HQ ARR IV	(-2) -24		-8	(-2) -32	-13
FT MEADE, MD HQ USAONE	(+6) -53	+1	(+35) +9	(+41) -43	-141
HQ ARR III	(-18)-156	-3	-116	(-18) -275	-310
CORPS HHC	(-1) -23	-1	-8	(-1) -32	-11
CORPS AREA ELM	(+15)+55	+2	(+29) +73	(+44) +130	
	(+10)+71	+3	(+6) +60	(+16) +134	+180
FT SAM HOUSTON, TX HQ USAFIVE	(-6) -77		(+4) -51	(-2) -128	-132
HQ ARR VII	(-13)-132	-1	-91	(-13) -224	-256
CORPS AREA ELM	(-1) -19	-1	-9	(-1) -29	-10
	(+8) +74	+2	(+4) +49	(+12) +125	+134
FT ORD, CA CORPS SIG BDE (-)		+74 +35	+901	+1010	
FT SHERIDAN, IL HQ ARR V	(+23)+132	+4	(+35) +128	(+58)+264	+169
CORPS HHC	(-2) -27	-1	-11	(-2) -39	-10
CORPS AREA ELM	(+15)+55	+2	(+29) +73	(+44)+130	
	(+10)+104	+3	(+6) +66	(+16)+173	+179

	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>AGG</u>	<u>CIV</u>
PRESIDIO OF SF	(+9)+81	+5	(+26)+162	(+35)+248	-17
HQ USASIX	(-14)-124	-2	-71	(-14)-197	-226
HQ ARR IX	(-1)-22	-1	-16	(-1) -39	-9
CORPS HHC	(+12)+125	+5	(+18)+169	(+30)+299	
CORPS AREA ELM	(+12)+102	+3	(+8) +80	(+20)+185	+218
GENERAL	(+8)-47		-92	(+8) -139	+4
BN LEVEL ADVISORS	-81		-80	-161	
MACOM STAFFS	(+8)			(+8)	
INSTAL MOB PLANNERS	+42			+42	+22
INSTAL DRC'S	-8		-12	-20	-18

TABLE 5-42

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 7  
 VALUE DERIVED: FY 79 BASELINE BASOPS DATA

1. The majority of organizational elements affected by ACCS-82 are satellites of AC installations (ARCOMs/Advisors). These elements are small in manpower and dispersed geographically; therefore, the BASOPS impact is minimal in any one case. For this reason, the total BASOPS resources of the Support Installations have not been displayed in the Baseline Resource Tableau.
2. A BASOPS slice for the Manyears supported in the Baseline Data is derived below and displayed separately in the Baseline Tableau. The derivation is made from BASOPS Cost Estimating Relationships from the FORSCOM and TRADOC Cost Factor Handbooks respectively.

	VARIABLE FACTOR \$	WORKLOAD MANYEARS	BASOPS \$ TOTAL	CIV SAL (.67) \$	WORK FORCE MANYEARS
Ft. Bragg					
Total (OMAR)	659	67	44153	29583	1.8
RG Bragg					
Ft. Carson, C					
Total (OMAR)	981	(2)258	255060	170890	10.3
HQ ARR VIII		(2) 71			
RG Denver		55			
HQ 96th ARCOM		61			
RG Douglas		71			
Ft. Devens, MA					
Total (OMAR)	1325	(2)363	483625	324029	19.4
HQ ARR I		(2) 47			
RG Devens		144			

	VARIABLE FACTOR \$	WORKLOAD MANYEARS	BASOPS \$ TOTAL	CIV SAL (.67) \$	WORK FORCE MANYEARS
Ft. Devens, MA					
RG Stewart		93			
94th ARCOM		64			
76th Training Div		15			
Ft. Drum, NY	678	79	53562	35887	2.2
RG Seneca (OMAR)		64			
98th Training Div		15			
Ft. Sam Houston, TX					
Total (OMAR)	743	(14)794	600344	402230	24.1
HQ ARR VII		(1) 135			
RG San Antonio		127			
90th ARCOM		52			
HQ USAFIVE		(13)480			
Ft. Indiantown Gap, PA					
Total (OMAR)	1280	204	261120	174950	10.5
RG FIG		75			
79th ARCOM		65			
99th ARCOM		64			
Ft. Lewis, WA					
Total (OMAR)	868	138	119784	80255	4.8
RG Lewis		84			
124th ARCOM		54			
Ft. McCoy, WI					
Total (OMAR)	2770	174	481980	322927	19.4
RG McCoy		52			
RG Snelling		70			
88th ARCOM		52			

	VARIABLE FACTOR \$	WORKLOAD MANYEARS	BASOPS \$ TOTAL	CIV SAL (.67) \$	WORK FORCE MANYEARS
Ft. Meade, MD					
Total (OMAR)	1172	(19)770	924708	619554	37.2
HQ USAONE		(18)585			
HQ ARR III		(1) 43			
RG Meade		84			
HQ 97th ARCOM		58			
Ft. Ord, CA					
Total (OMAR)	439	146	64094	42943	2.6
RG LA	91				
63D ARCOM	55				
Ft. Riley, KS					
Total (OMAR)	820	156	127920	85706	5.1
RG Riley		97			
89th ARCOM		59			
Ft. Stewart, GA					
RG Patrick	1255	68	85340	57118	3.4
Ft. McPherson, GA					
HQ ARR IV	2122	(2)244	522012	349748	21.0
RG Atlanta		(2) 45			
RG Buchanan		85			
81st ARCOM		45			
		69			
Ft. Sheridan, IL					
HQ ARR V	1455	(2)198	291000	194970	11.7
RG Sheridan		(2) 49			
86th ARCOM		93			
		56			

VARIABLE FACTOR \$	WORKLOAD MANYEARS	BASOPS \$ TOTAL	CIV SAL (.67) \$	WORK FORCE MANYEARS
3123	(14)555 (14)423 (1) 48 84	1776987	1190581	71.4

Presidio, SF  
HQ USASIX  
HQ ARR IX  
RG SF

# TRADOC INSTALLATIONS

	\$	Manyears	BASOPS NON PERS \$	CIV SAL \$	TOTAL BASOPS \$	WORK FORCE MANYEARS
Ft. Dix, NJ	576 / .058	202 47 89 66	116352	195062	311414	11.7
HQ ARR II RG Dix HQ 77th ARCOM						
Ft. B. Harrison	1447 / .061	57 57	82479	58352	140831	3.5
Ft. Jackson, SC	524 / .073	116 57 59	60784	141712	202496	8.5
RG Jackson 120th ARCOM						
Ft. Knox, KY	619 / .078	333 47 125 101 60	202127	433472	635599	26.0
HQ ARR VI RG Knox RG Selfridge HQ 83D ARCOM						

TRADOC INSTALLATIONS (CONT'D)

	VARIABLE FACTOR \$/MY	WORKLOAD MANYEARS	BASOPS NON PERS \$	CIV SAL \$	TOTAL BASOPS \$	WORK FORCE MANYEARS
Ft. Lee, VA RG Lee	513 / .072	63	32319	75024	107343	4.5
Ft. McClellan, AL	1105 / .078	218	240890	283424	524314	17.0
RG Redstone 121st ARCOM		151 67				
Ft. Sill, OK	692 / .058	129	89268	125040	214308	7.5
RG Sill 122D ARCOM		79 50				
Ft. L. Wood, MO	671 / .057	125	83875	118371	202246	7.1
RG St. Louis 102D ARCOM		81 44				
TOTAL			3045412	5384828	8430240	330.7

TABLE 5-43

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 8

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #2 BASOPS REQUIREMENTS

1. Using Cost Estimating Relationships quoted in ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 7 and the ALT #2 Manpower Impact Analysis, the following changes in BASOPS requirements are derived:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>WORKLOAD</u>	<u>WORKFORCE</u>	<u>\$000</u>
FT CARSON	-73	-3	-71.6
FT DEVENS	-47	-3	-62.3
FT DIX	-47	-3	-77.1
FT KNOX	-47	-4	-94.5
FT MCPHERSON	-44	-4	-93.4
FT MEADE	+23	+1	+23.4
FT SHERIDAN	-49	-3	-71.3
FT SAM HOUSTON	+10	--	-----
PRESIDIO OF SF	- 1	--	-----
FT LEWIS	+1353	+52	+1171.8
NET	+1078	+33	+ 725.0

2. ALT 2A eliminates the Ft Lewis requirement resulting in the following:

NET	-275	-19	-446.8
-----	------	-----	--------

3. ALT 2B change is insignificant.



TABLE 5-44

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 9

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #3 BASOPS Requirements.

1. Using CER's quoted in ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 7  
and the ALT 3 Manpower Impact Analysis results in the  
following BASOPS changes:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>WORKLOAD</u>	<u>WORKFORCE</u>	<u>\$000</u>
FT BRAGG	+121	+3	+79.8
FT CARSON	-45	-2	-44.1
FT CAMPBELL	+141	+3	+77.8
FT DEVENS	+44	+2	+58.3
FT DIX	-115	-7	-177.4
FT KNOX	-109	-8	-192.5
FT DRUM	-6	-	-4.1
FT I. GAP	+10	-	+12.8
FT S. HOUSTON	-90	-3	-66.9
FT LEWIS	+49	+2	+42.5
FT MCCOY	+105	+12	+290.9
FT MEADE	-100	-5	-117.2
FT ORD	-55	-1	-24.1
FT B. HARRISON	-57	-3	-123.7
FT JACKSON	-59	-4	-102.7
FT RILEY	+54	+2	+44.3
FT SHERIDAN	-97	-6	-141.1
FT STEWART	+149	+8	+187.0
FT MCPHERSON	-116	-10	-246.2
PRESIDIO OF SF	+67	+9	+212.4
FT HOOD	+126	+4	+99.5
FT MCCLELLAN	-67	-5	-161.2
FT SILL	-50	-3	-82.9
FT L. WOOD	-44	-3	-71.3
NET		-15	-450.1

2. In computing workload, consideration in the change of RC drill spaces supported was computed at .158 manyears per drill space.

3. ALT 3A results in the following changes at Ft Lewis and in the net:

	<u>WORKLOAD</u>	<u>WORKFORCE</u>	<u>\$000</u>
FT LEWIS	+1402	+54	+1214.3
NET		+37	+721.7

4. ALT 3B results in the following changes at Ft Meade,  
Ft S. Houston and Presidio of SF:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>WORKLOAD</u>	<u>WORKFORCE</u>	<u>\$000</u>
FT MEADE	+118	+5	+108.3
FT S. HOUSTON	-583	-18	-433.2
PRESIDIO OF SF	+110	+14	+346.7
NET		+37	+715.2

TABLE 5-45

## ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET #10

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #4 BASOPS REQUIREMENTS

1. Using CER's quoted in Item/Cost Explanation Sheet # 7 and ALT #4 Manpower Impact Analysis results in the following BASOPS changes:

<u>INSTALLATION</u>	<u>WORKLOAD</u>	<u>WORKFORCE</u>	<u>\$000</u>
Ft Carson	-73	-3	-71.6
Ft Bragg	+269	+7	+175.3
Ft Devens	-49	-3	-64.9
Ft Dix	-49	-3	-78.2
Ft Knox	-49	-4	-97.0
Ft McPherson	-47	-4	-99.7
Ft Meade	-117	-6	-137.1
Ft Sam Houston	-262	-12	-194.7
Ft Sheridan	+518	+30	+753.7
Presidio of SF	+274	+34	+855.7
Ft Ord	+1010	+18	+443.4
NET		+54	+1585.9

TABLE 5-46

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 11

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #2 MILITARY PERSONNEL PCS COSTS

1. From ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 3, net military decreases are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
-242	-14	-175

Assuming 1/3 of these are normal PCS leaves the following to be charged to reorganization:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
-162	-10	-117

2. Net military increases are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+293	+41	+1077

Assuming 1/3 of these are due to normal PCS, leaves the following to be charged to reorganization:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
195	27	718

3. Total moves chargeable to reorganization are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
357	37	835

4. Using cost factors associated with the 1500-1600 mile move category results as follows:

		<u>\$</u>		<u>\$ 000</u>
<u>OFF</u>	x	3112	=	1111.0
<u>357</u>				
<u>WO</u>	x	3112	=	115.1
<u>37</u>				
<u>EN</u>	x	727	=	607.0
<u>835</u>				
TOTAL			=	1833.1

5. ALT 2A: Net decreases remain the same, but net increases become:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+60	-	-

Total moves chargeable to reorganization are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
202	10	117

Costs are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>\$</u>	<u>\$000</u>
202	x 3112	= 628.6

<u>WO</u>		
10	x 3112	= 31.1

<u>EN</u>		
117	x 727	= 85.1

TOTAL		744.8
-------	--	-------

6. ALT 2B: Net decreases remain the same, but net increases become:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+301	+41	+1077

Moves chargeable to reorganization are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
362	37	835

Costs are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>\$</u>	<u>\$000</u>
362	x 3112	= 1126.5

<u>WO</u>		
37	x 3112	= 115.1

<u>EN</u>		
835	x 727	= 607.0

TOTAL		1848.6
-------	--	--------

TABLE 5-47

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 12

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #3 MILITARY PERSONNEL MOVEMENT COSTS

1. Net increases/decreases at installations/stations are obtained from ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 4.

2. Net increases are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+395	+9	+215

Assuming one-third of these moves will result from normal PCS leaves the following moves chargeable to reorganization:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
263	6	143

3. Net decreases are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
-387	-12	-245

Moves chargeable to reorganization are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
258	8	169

4. Total moves chargeable to reorganization are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
521	14	312

5. Movement costs are:

OFF:  $535 \times \$3112 = \$1664.9K$ 

EN: $312 \times \$727 =$	226.8K
TOTAL	1891.7K

6. For ALT 3A, net increases/decreases are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+637	+50	+1292
-387	-12	-641

These result in the following moves chargeable to reorganization:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
683	41	895

7. Associated costs for ALT 3A are:

OFF:	724 x \$3112 =	\$2253.1K
EN:	895 x \$727 =	650.7K
	TOTAL	\$2903.8K

8. For ALT 3B, net increases/decreases are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+649	+50	+1316
-500	-13	-336

These result in the following moves chargeable to reorganization:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
766	42	1101

9. Associated costs for ALT 3B are:

OFF:	808 x \$3112 =	\$2514.5K
EN:	1101 x \$ 727 =	\$ 800.4K
	TOTAL	3314.9K

TABLE 5-48

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 13

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #4 MILITARY PERSONNEL MOVEMENT COSTS

1. From ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 5, ALT #4 military spaces impacts are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
+391	+48	+1424
-314	-10	-536

2. Moves chargeable to reorganization are:

<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
470	38	1306

3. Associated costs are:

OFF:	508	x	\$3112	=	\$1580.9K
EN :	1306	x	\$ 727	=	<u>949.5K</u>
Total					\$2530.4K



TABLE 5-49

## ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET #14

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #2 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SEPARATION AND MOVEMENT COSTS

1. FOR THE PURPOSE OF DETERMINING CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SEPARATIONS AND MOVEMENTS, FACTORS FROM TWO RECENT FORSCOM REALIGNMENT CASE STUDY AND JUSTIFICATION FOLDERS (CSJF) WERE CONSIDERED. THE FACTORS REPORTED FOR FT INDIANTOWN GAP AND FT SHERIDAN WERE:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>FT I. GAP</u>	<u>FT SHERIDAN</u>
A. Normal Retirement	2%	12%
B. Other Retirement	12%	9%
C. Accepting Transfer	7%	29%
D. Declining Transfer	41%	20%
E. Placed in Other Fed Job (No PCS)	23%	21%
F. Placed in Other Fed Job (PCS)	6%	4%
G. All Others	9%	5%

2. THESE TWO SETS OF FACTORS SHOULD REPRESENT EXTREMES OF FORSCOM EXPERIENCE, FT SHERIDAN BEING A METROPOLITAN AREA AND FT INDIANTOWN GAP BEING A RELATIVELY RURAL AREA. THEREFORE, FOR THE PURPOSES OF COMPARING ACCS-82 ALTERNATIVES, THE MEDIANS OF THESE TWO SETS OF FACTORS WILL BE USED:

<u>CATEGORY</u>	<u>PERCENTAGE</u>
A. Normal Retirement	7
B. Other Retirement	11
C. Accepting Transfer	18
D. Declining Transfer	30
E. Placed in Other Fed Job (No PCS)	22
F. Placed in Other Fed Job (PCS)	5
G. All Other	7
	<hr/> 100%

3. NET NUMBER OF CIVILIAN EXCESSES CREATED BY ALTERNATIVES 2, 2A AND 2B ARE 60. THEREFORE, THE NUMBER OF PERSONNEL FALLING IN THE PERTINENT CATEGORIES ARE:

A.	4	Terminal Leave
B.	7	Terminal Leave
C.	11	PCS
D.	18	Terminal Leave
E.	13	No PCS, No Severance, No Terminal Leave
F.	3	PCS
G.	4	Terminal Leave, Severance Pay
TOTAL	<hr/> 60	

4.	SEVERANCE PAY:		
	4 x \$6097.60	-	\$24.4K
5.	TERMINAL LEAVE		
	33 x \$1828.80	-	\$60.4K
6.	TOTAL SEPARATION		\$84.8K
7.	TRAVEL TO SEEK RESIDENCE:		
	14 x 1500 x \$.093	-	\$ 2.0K
8.	SALE OF HOME		
	14 x \$4502.25	-	\$63.0K
9.	MOVEMENT OF HHG:		
	14 x \$2427	-	\$34.0K
10.	MILEAGE ALLOWANCE:		
	14 x 1500 x \$.107	-	\$ .2K
11.	PER DIEM ALLOWANCE:		
	14 x 5 x \$70	-	\$ 4.9K
12.	TEMPORARY LODGING ALLOWANCE:		
	14 x \$1074.4	-	\$15.0K
13.	MISCELLANEOUS:		
	14 x \$167	-	\$ 2.3K
14.	TOTAL MOVEMENT	-	\$121.4K

TABLE 5-50

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 15

VALUE DERIVED: ALT #3 Civilian Personnel Separation and  
Movement Costs.

1. From ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 14, net civilian  
excesses created by Alt #3 are 475. Using the factors cited  
at Figure 5-44 results in the following breakout.

a. Normal retirement	-	33 Terminal Leave
b. Other retirement	-	52 Terminal Leave
c. Accepting transfer	-	85 PCS
d. Declining transfer	-	143 Terminal Leave
e. Placed in other Fed Jobs	-	105 No PCS, No Term Leave, No Severance
f. Placed in other Feb Jobs	-	24 PCS
g. All Other	-	33 Term Leave, Severance Pay

TOTAL	475
-------	-----

## 2. Severance Pay:

33 x \$6097.60	=	\$201.2K
----------------	---	----------

## 3. Terminal Leave:

261 X \$1828.80	=	\$477.3K
-----------------	---	----------

## 4. Total Separation = \$678.5K

5. Travel to Seek  
Residence:

109 X 1500 X \$.093	=	\$15.2K
---------------------	---	---------

## 6. Sale of Home:

109 X \$4502.25	=	\$490.7K
-----------------	---	----------

## 7. Movement of HHG:

109 x \$2427	=	\$264.5K
--------------	---	----------

## 8. Mileage Allowance:

109 x 1500 x \$.107	=	\$17.5K
---------------------	---	---------

9. Per Diem Allowance:

109 x 5 x \$70 = \$38.2K

10. Temporary Lodging Allowance:

109 x \$1074.4 = \$117.1K

11. Miscellaneous:

109 x \$167 = \$18.2K

12. Total Movement Costs:

\$961.4K

13. Total separation and movement costs remain the same for Alt 3A.

14. Alt 3B results in 701 civilian space excesses. The breakout is:

a.	49	Terminal Leave
b.	78	Terminal Leave
c.	126	PCS
d.	210	Terminal Leave
e.	154	No PCS, No Term Lv, No Sev Pay
f.	35	PCS
g.	49	Term Lv, Severance Pay
	<u>701</u>	

15. Severance Pay:

49 x \$6097.60 = \$298.8K

16. Terminal Leave

386 x \$1828.80 = \$705.9K

17. Total Separation:

\$1004.7K

18. Travel to Seek Residence:

161 x 1500 x \$.093 = \$22.5K

19. Sale of Home:

161 x \$4502.25 = \$724.9K

20. Movement of HHG:		
161 x \$2427	-	\$390.7K
21. Mileage Allowance:		
161 x 1500 x \$.107	-	\$25.8K
22. Per Diem Allowance:		
161 x 5 x \$70	-	\$56.4K
23. Temporary Lodging Allowance:		
161 x \$1074.40	-	\$173.0K
24. Miscellaneous:		
161 x \$167	-	\$26.9K
25. Total Movement Costs		\$1420.2

TABLE 5-51

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 16.VALUE DERIVED: ALT #4 CIVILIAN PERSONNEL SEPARATION AND  
MOVEMENT COSTS1. From ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 5, 347 civilian jobs  
are excessed. Using the previously cited factors results in:

a. Normal Retirement	24	Terminal Leave
b. Other Retirement	38	Terminal Leave
c. Accepting Transfer	63	PCS
d. Declining Transfer	104	Terminal Leave
e. Placed in Other Fed job (No PCS)	76	No PCS, no Term Lv or Sev
f. Placed in other Fed job (PCS)	18	PCS
g. All Other	<u>24</u>	Term Lv, Severance Pay
	347	

## 2. Severance Pay:

24 x \$6097.60 = \$146.3K

## 3. Terminal Leave:

190 x \$1828.80 = \$347.5K

4. Total Separation = \$493.8K

## 5. Travel to Seek Residence:

81 x 1500 x \$.093 = \$ 11.3K

## 6. Sale of Home:

81 x \$4502.25 = \$364.7K

## 7. Movement of HHG:

81 x \$2427 = \$196.6K

## 8. Mileage Allowance:

81 x 1500 x \$.107 \$ 13.0K

9. Per Diem Allowance:

81 x 5 x \$70 = \$28.4K

10. Temporary Lodging Allowance:

81 x \$1074.40 = \$87.0K

11. Miscellaneous:

81 x \$167 = \$13.5K

12. Total Movement Cost = \$714.5K

TABLE 5-52

## ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET #17

VALUE DERIVED: ANNUAL OPERATING COSTS - CORPS HHC AND CORPS SIG BDE (MINUS)

1. THE ARMY FORCE COST INFORMATION SYSTEM (FCIS) LISTS ANNUAL OMA  
OPERATING COSTS (MINUS E-OPS) AS FOLLOWS FOR THE REQUIRED ORGANIZATIONS:

		<u>\$000</u>
SRC 52002H41000	Corps HHC	648
SRC 11402H70000	Corps Sig Bde HHC	335
SRC 11405H71000	Cmd Ops Bn	1803
SRC 11425H70000	Radio Bn	1401
2. PER CAPITA DERIVATION OF CORPS HHC COSTS FOLLOW:		
A. ALO 2:	$340/373 \times \$648K =$	590.7
B. ALO 3:	$299/373 \times \$648K =$	519.4
C. CADRE:	$130/373 \times \$648K =$	225.8
3. PER CAPITA DERIVATION OF SIG BDE COSTS FOLLOW:		
A. HHC:	$110/181 \times \$335K =$	203.6
B. Cmd Ops Bn:	$369/535 \times \$1803K =$	1243.6
C. Radio Bn:	$531/619 \times \$1401K =$	1201.8
TOTAL		2649.0



TABLE 5-53

ITEM/COST EXPLANATION SHEET # 18.VALUE DERIVED: INVESTMENT AND OPERATIONS ONE-TIME COSTS FOR  
CORPS HHC AND CORPS SIG BDE(-).

1. Corps elements in each of the alternatives are organized at equipment level 3. The difference between level 1 and level 3 is essentially in individual weapons and equipment. Major items of equipment are virtually unchanged.

2. The Army Force Cost Information System lists the following Investment and Operations One-Time costs for the required elements:

		<u>\$000</u>
SRC 52002H41000	Corps HHC	\$6050
SRC 11402H70000	Corps Sig Bde HHC	\$3638
SRC 11406H71000	Cmd Ops Bn HHC	\$14084
SRC 11407H71000	Cmd Ops Bn Switching Co	\$3447
SRC 11408H70000	Cmd Ops Bn Telecom Cntr Co	\$2691
SRC 11425H70000	Sig Radio Bn	\$25391
Total		\$55301

3. Reductions in individual weapons and equipment are insignificant; therefore, the above figures will be used to compare alternatives.

## Chapter 6

### Selection of the Preferred Alternative

#### General

Chapter 5 provided a detailed description of the analysis and evaluation of the ACCS-82 alternative command and control structures. This chapter summarizes and interprets the results of the analysis and evaluation. Additional considerations of organizational sensitivities and risk are identified. Finally, the rationale for selection of the preferred alternative is described.

#### Effectiveness of Alternatives

1. The base case is the existing Army CONUS Command and Control Structure as described in detail in Chapter 2. The Effectiveness Evaluation section of Chapter 5 identifies the primary strengths and weaknesses of the base case. The effectiveness assessment described in Chapter 5 assigned an effectiveness score of 4.4, in the "fair" range on a scale of 0-10. This score serves as the basis for comparing the effectiveness of alternatives to the base case.

2. Alternative 1 was designed to evaluate the potential effectiveness of functionalizing the USAR command and control structure to improve branch oriented training and training supervision. Its effectiveness score was 4.5 indicating an insignificant improvement over the base case in overall command and control effectiveness.

3. The evaluation of Alternative 2 and its variations (Alt 2A and 2B) indicates that:

a. The elimination of the ARR streamlines the RC management structure below the CONUSA.

b. Establishment of a peacetime training OPCON relationship between RC units and their gaining (wartime) CONUS MACOM provides a significant improvement in effectiveness of the command and control structure.

c. The establishment of a third CONUS corps headquarters and full employment of the three CONUS corps headquarters for peacetime command and control of FORSCOM deployable AC units are essential features for a major improvement in the effectiveness of the command and

control structure.

Alternative 2B which includes all of the features above, received an effectiveness score of 6.1 which represents a significant improvement in effectiveness over the base case or Alternative 1.

4. The evaluation of Alternative 3 (REDMOB) and its variations (3A and 3B) also confirmed the value of an additional CONUS corps headquarters and the CONUS MACOM training OPCON concept. Alternative 3A achieved an effectiveness score of 6.8 in the evaluation. This represents a major improvement over the base case and Alternative 1. Alternative 3A is marginally more effective than Alternative 2B (scored 6.1).

5. Alternative 4, the five corps structure, also included the CONUS MACOM training OPCON concept. It achieved an effectiveness score of 6.9 in the evaluation. This also represents a major improvement in effectiveness over the base case and Alternative 1. It is marginally more effective (scored 13% higher) than Alternative 2B and is approximately equal to Alternative 3A in overall effectiveness.

6. The effectiveness scores discussed above represent the assessment of the alternative command and control structures under the conditions of full mobilization. The scenario analysis, described in Chapter 5, indicated that the effectiveness scores are relatively insensitive to changes in the nature of the mobilization scenario (i.e., for partial or total mobilization). Although Alternatives 2B and 3A were not scored in the scenario analysis, their effectiveness scores assessed for full mobilization are also representative of their relative effectiveness under partial or total mobilization when compared to Alternatives 1 and 4. Based on the effectiveness assessment of the variations to the basic alternatives, Alternatives 2B and 3A were selected as replacements for Alternatives 2 and 3, respectively, in the list of alternatives for final evaluation.

7. In summary, Alternatives 2B, 3A and 4 all provide a significantly improved effectiveness over Alternative 1 and the base case. Alternatives 3A and 4 are approximately equal in effectiveness and both are marginally more effective than Alternative 2B.

#### Resources Required for Alternatives

1. The Economic Analysis portion of Chapter 5 provides a detailed description of the resources associated with each of the alternatives

and variations. Table 6-1, below, summarizes the resources required for Alternatives 1, 2B, 3A and 4.

a. The figures shown for "NET SPACES" in Table 6-1 are net changes to the base case in total authorized spaces and include active and reserve component military and civilian spaces.

b. The "NET MAN YRS" represents net additional manpower based on the number of spaces to be filled by full time personnel and the number of spaces occupied by RC personnel on a part-time basis. For example, all of the 135 additional spaces required for Alt 1 are filled by part-time reservists (a part-time reservist represents approximately .16 man years).

c. The INCREMENTAL ANNUAL COST figures show increased annual operating costs over the base case and include all personnel costs.

d. The TOTAL ANNUAL Cost is the base case cost (\$146.8M) plus the incremental annual cost.

2. It must be recognized that the resources shown in Table 6-1 for Alternatives 2B, 3A and 4 include resources required for the active component portion of a corps signal brigade (1010 AC military spaces and approximately \$13.3M in annual costs including personnel costs). The signal brigade is required for early deployability of the additional corps headquarters. If the cost of the AC portion of the signal brigade were not attributed to alternatives 2B, 3A and 4, Alternative 2B would provide an annual net savings of approximately \$1.1M and Alternatives 3A and 4 would have an net annual cost increase of \$2.2M and \$5.3M, respectively, over the base case.

Table 6-1 Resources Net Change from Base Case.

	ALTERNATIVES			
	1	2B	3A	4
Net Spaces	+135	+1004	-310	+1673
Net Man Yrs	+22	+1004	+1086	+1352
Incremental Annual Cost	+0.4M	+12.2M	+15.5M	+18.6M
Total Annual Cost	147.2M	159.0M	162.2M	165.4M

### Resource Efficiency

1. Table 6-2 displays both the total annual costs and the effectiveness scores for the base case and Alternatives 1, 2B, 3A and 4. Since the alternatives increase in cost in the same order as they increase in effectiveness, an "EFFICIENCY INDEX" was computed to assist in comparing the alternatives on a cost versus effectiveness basis. The efficiency index is the effectiveness score divided by the total cost and scaled to a two digit integer, therefore a higher efficiency index indicates a more effective application of resources.

2. In Table 6-2, Alternatives 3A and 4 achieved the same efficiency index. These two alternatives are equal in resource utilization efficiency. Since neither the total cost estimates nor the effectiveness scores can be considered precise, and the efficiency index for Alt 2B is less than 10% below that of Alt 4, Alternative 2B must also be considered roughly equivalent to Alternatives 3A and 4 in resource efficiency.

Table 6-2 Resource Efficiency

	TOTAL COST	EFFECTIVENESS	EFFICIENCY INDEX
Base Case	146.8M	4.4	30
Alt 1	147.2M	4.5	31
Alt 2B	159.0M	6.1	38
Alt 3A	162.2M	6.8	42
Alt 4	165.4M	6.9	42

### Organizational Sensitivity and Risk

1. Any assessment of organization sensitivities and risks is, by its very nature, highly subjective. Nevertheless, such subjective factors must be considered in selection of an alternative command and control structure. They become particularly important when no single alternative clearly dominates all others on the objective basis of costs and effectiveness.

2. Several primary organizational sensitivities and risks have been identified pertaining to the alternatives considered. The following is an assessment of these major subjective factors.

a. OSD and GAO have criticized both the Army RC management structure and the capability of the CONUS command and control struc-

ture to perform its functions during mobilization and the transition to war. Alternative 1, even if supplemented with other management and planning improvements not requiring a change in the command and control structure (e.g., development of AMPS), will be perceived as a "do nothing again" solution. It will be judged as not responsive to direction from higher authorities. It also retains all risks associated with failing to resolve current command and control problems.

b. Alternative 2B will be perceived as generally satisfying OSD and GAO criticism pertaining to the command and control structure: it eliminates an RC management layer (the ARR) and significantly improves the FORSCOM span of control. It creates very little turbulence in the RC during implementation. All headquarters established or eliminated are active component. It is a low risk alternative because it is a balanced AC and RC structure consistent with current trends for expanding AC and RC unit affiliations, strengthens the RC chain of command, and has minimal turbulence. The primary element of risk is whether the additional resources provided to the CONUSA will offset the increased span of control and time-distance factors resulting from elimination of the ARR.

c. Alternative 3A will also be perceived as responsive to OSD and GAO criticisms. It will, however, create a great deal of turbulence in the USAR by eliminating 19 ARCOM headquarters and realigning all of the ARCOM subordinate unit command and reporting channels to the REDMOB commands. It will create greater personnel turbulence than other alternatives and may create severe retention and morale problems among senior career reservists in the USAR. The establishment of the REDMOB command will be seen as an AC "take-over" and vote of "no confidence" in the senior command and control structure of the USAR. It may create potential conflicts-of-interest for the REDMOB commanders who must even-handedly provide training assistance and evaluation to the ARNG and USAR while commanding the USAR. The broad REDMOB functions associated with full command of the USAR create the risk that it will become "bogged down" in administration at the expense of training supervision and readiness. Alternative 3A is considered to be a high risk alternative because it commits the Army to a basically new approach to RC management and command, with associated turbulence, at a time of intense Army activity to resolve mobilization and deployment issues from MOBEX 78.

d. Alternative 4 will also be judged as responsive to OSD and GAO criticisms. It will have great appeal in the reserve components

(with concomitant recruiting and retention benefits) because of the identification with major, deployable combat headquarters. It will be perceived as strengthening the Total Army concept. Alternative 4 is also considered to be a high risk alternative. It commits the Army to a basically new concept in RC management and command and creates great turbulence in the structure at a time of intense activity to improve mobilization and deployment capabilities. It places greater dependence on deployable headquarters for command and control functions during mobilization at the potential risk of increased confusion during the M to M+60 period due to potential deployment of AC corps.

e. The ranking of the alternatives based on organizational sensitivity and risk is:

(1) Alternative 2B is ranked first because of both low organizational sensitivity and low risk.

(2) Alternative 4 is ranked second because it is favored by organizational sensitivities but is high risk.

(3) Alternative 1 is ranked third because it is unresponsive to criticisms and resolves no major command and control problem.

(4) Alternative 3A is ranked fourth because of severe organizational sensitivity (in the USAR) and high risk.

#### The Preferred Alternative

1. Alternative 2B is the preferred alternative. It provides a significant increase in CONUS command and control structure effectiveness at low cost, low risk, and low sensitivity.

2. Alternative 4 is the second choice. It is a more effective command and control structure and is organizationally appealing. However, the marginal improvement in effectiveness over Alternative 2B does not justify the additional cost, turbulence and risk.

3. Alternative 3A is the third choice. It is potentially a highly effective command and control structure. However, the marginal increase in effectiveness over Alternative 2B may be partially offset by the disaffection of the USAR and does not justify the additional cost, turbulence and risk.

4. Alternative 1 is ranked last. It provides no significant improvement in the command and control structure.



## Chapter 7

### RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Organizational Structure

Alternative 2B, described in Chapter 4, herein and Chapter 3 of Volume II is the organizational structure recommended by ACCS-82. Discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of all organizational structures is contained in Chapter 5, herein, while Chapter 6 describes the process used to arrive at the selection of Alternative 2B as the preferred alternative.

#### Organizational Issues

1. Layering. There is perceived unnecessary layering of headquarters in the RC management structure.

#### RECOMMENDATION

Eliminate the ARR headquarters; transfer major ARR missions and functions to CONUSA headquarters.

2. Installation Management. There are many problems in post-mobilization installation management. A separate installation management command, that serves selected MACOM, may be advantageous.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That an Installation Management Command (IMCOM) not be established at this time.

b. That OCF continue its on-going examination of regional contracting for Real-Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA); this may establish the basis for contracting BASOPS to its fullest extent.

c. That specific organizations be designated now to command specific installations upon, or soon after, M-Day.

d. That specific positions be identified now at each installation for M-Day assignment of mobilization designees or retired military personnel.

e. That more BASOPS support functions be considered now for

"contracting-out". This would provide a ready expansion basis for increased contract support during post M-Day expansion.

3. Corps Headquarters in CONUS. Additional corps headquarters in CONUS would reduce the FORSCOM span of control and assist in meeting wartime command and control requirements.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That an ACCS-82 alternative that includes activation of an additional corps headquarters be adopted.

4. Span of Control. Considering peacetime and mobilization requirements, some headquarters may have too many subordinates and some may have too few. Time-distance factors influence span of control evaluations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That an ACCS-82 alternative that reduces the HQ FORSCOM span of control be adopted. (See recommendation for Organizational Issue No. 3).

b. That HQ FORSCOM examine the feasibility of increasing the span of control of HQ XVIII Airborne Corps by assigning at least one additional division to that corps. The 24th Infantry Division appears to be a likely candidate for assignment, as is the 197th Infantry Brigade.

5. Functional Alignment of MACOM and RC. The concept of aligning RC units with selected MACOM may be valid.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAMO) pass peacetime limited OPCON for mobilization planning and training supervision of selected USAR units to HSC, TRADOC, MTHC, DARCOM, USACE, CIDC, USACC and INSCOM.

b. That each MACOM, as appropriate, negotiate with state TAG to agree upon responsibility for peacetime mobilization planning and training supervision of ARNG selected units (designated by DAMO) to HSC, TRADOC, MTHC, DARCOM, USACE, CIDC, USACC and INSCOM.

6. ARCOM Command and Control Capability. The ARCOM headquarters do

not appear to be properly staffed (i.e., appropriate representation of branch-related expertise) to exercise the full range of command and control over the diverse specialties of their assigned units.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQ FORSCOM conduct manpower surveys and TDA review of ARCOM headquarters to insure that ARCOM staff positions specify branch (expertise) to permit those headquarters to exercise the full range of command and control.

7. AC Command of AC and RC Elements. Headquarters composed primarily of AC personnel may be able to effectively command and control both AC and RC elements.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That ACCS-82 provide an alternative command and control structure that incorporates this concept.

8. "Pure" USAR Command. A USAR-only chain of command, with no intervening AC headquarters between HQDA and units, may be appropriate.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That a separate USAR command not be established.

9. Wartime Effectiveness Versus Peacetime Efficiency. Aligning forces and headquarters for wartime operations may not permit realization of peacetime efficiencies.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO, NGB, CAR), in conjunction with FORSCOM use the approved SUIP/WARMUP study's structure (the Army "CAPSTONE" program) as the basis for evaluating RC stationing alternatives. The objective will be to geographically support the CAPSTONE program's structure to the greatest degree possible.

10. MACOM Interface Problems. Interface of MACOM for mobilization and deployment planning is incomplete.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the recommendation for Organizational Issue Number 20 be adopted.

b. That special attention be paid to requirements for interface of MACOM plans with other MACOM and between MACOM and other Services and governmental agencies.

11. Capability to Handle CONUS Contingency Missions. A sufficient number of headquarters must be available to handle CONUS contingency operations after deployments begin.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That an ACCS-82 alternative that provides for non-deploying command and control headquarters be adopted.

b. That HQDA (DAMO) and FORSCOM increase emphasis on planning and coordination for CONUS contingency missions.

12. Requirements for Flexibility. There must be a designed capability in the command and control system to permit handling of unanticipated requirements.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That an ACCS-82 alternative that supports decentralized execution of mobilization plans be adopted.

13. Span of Interest. Broad, divergent and demanding missions for a single commander adversely affect his capability to exercise proper command and control.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That span of interest problems receive appropriate consideration when mission assignments for commanders are being considered.

14. Standardization of CONUSA Procedures. Actions affecting the RC should be standardized throughout FORSCOM.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. MACOM that command mobilization stations should, with guidance from HQDA and FORSCOM, insure standardization of mobilization

and deployment procedures. CONUSA should be prohibited from issuing guidance at variance with these procedures.

b. HQ FORSCOM should continue on-going programs to insure that evaluation procedures which are applied to RC units are uniform between CONUSA.

15. CONUSA Peacetime Relationships with Installations. What are the requirements and capabilities for CONUSA peacetime monitorship of installation resource status?

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. CONUSA should not assume responsibility for installation management in peacetime or wartime.

b. CONUSA should be provided ADPE/MIS and manpower resources to monitor AC and RC personnel and logistic status at mobilization stations within their respective areas.

c. ACCS-82 organizational alternatives should be adopted which support centralized personnel and logistics management and reinforce the existing chain of command.

16. Functional RC Commands. Functional RC commands may offer advantages over commands established largely on a geographic basis.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That RC functional commands not be adopted.

17. Elimination of Battalion-Level Advisors. Manpower spaces dedicated to battalion-level advisors may be better utilized elsewhere. Elimination of these advisors may require more complete use of the RC chain of command.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That authorizations for battalion-level advisors be withdrawn.

b. That an ACCS-82 alternative that applies battalion-level advisor spaces to other organizations be adopted.

c. That HQ FORSCOM conduct an evaluation of the validity of current manpower authorizations for flight facility advisors.

18. Excessive RC Administrative Workload. The administrative workload of RC units is excessive for the assets available to accomplish the work. As a consequence, both "extra duty" (non-paid) and training time are used to accomplish administration.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That recommendations contained in the AAA Report of Audit: Administrative Workload in Reserve Components," 16 Apr 79, (Report Number SO 79-708) be adopted.

b. That HQDA (DAPE-MPB and DAMO-ODM) and HQ FORSCOM examine ARs 135-300 and 220-10 and CONUSA produced AGI checklists, with the objective of reducing administrative requirements to the extent feasible.

c. That HQDA (DAIG) and HQ FORSCOM examine the requirements for Annual General Inspections of RC units with the goal of increasing the interval between inspections to at least two years.

d. That HQDA (DAMO, DAPE, DALO) simplify POR/POM requirements.

19. Inappropriate Staffing of RG. The Army's Readiness Groups (RG) may be inappropriately staffed.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQ FORSCOM conduct manpower surveys of RG to determine appropriate staffing. These surveys should consider, in addition to standard measurement factors, that:

a. RC units (the "customers" of the RG) usually only assemble for training for one 2-day period per month.

b. That RC units tend to "drill" on the first or second weekend of the month and that RG have no control over when the units drill.

c. RC units that are in the Affiliation Program should need only limited support from RG. However, there may be advantages to providing support to RC units through a combination of Affiliation Sponsor and RG (considering TDY/Travel, expertise and AC sponsor com-

mitments).

20. Proponency for Mobilization and Deployment Planning. Responsibility for mobilization and deployment planning is not uniformly, consistently and adequately defined in the Army Command and control structure.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

That HQDA:

a. Relieve HQ FORSCOM of "Executive Agent for mobilization and deployment planning" responsibility.

b. Assign the responsibility for mobilization and deployment planning to a HQDA staff agency.

c. Expeditiously develop a comprehensive Army Mobilization Planning System (AMPS) by establishing an Office of the Special Assistant for Army Mobilization Planning Systems to develop and implement the AMPS. This office will:

(1) Report directly to the CSA or VCSA.

(2) Be provided approximately 18 full time personnel (authorized overstrength).

(3) Be given tasking authority over ARSTAFF agencies and MACOM.

(4) Be disestablished within two years.

#### Transition Issues

1. Deleted

2. STARC Organization and Missions. States are applying different interpretations to directions concerning organization and mission assignments for STARC. Control of STARC may present span of control problems for higher headquarters.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That recommendations for Organizational Issues, 4, 11, 12 and 13 be adopted.

b. That HQDA (NGB), FORSCOM and CONUSA increase their involvement with the states with regard to organization and planning for STARC.

c. That recommendation b. above, include provisions for planning and funding support for mobilization training exercises for STARC.

d. That AR 135-300 should include a more specific description of the duties and responsibilities of the STARC.

e. That, in addition to the duties described in the NGB "All-States" letter of 17 May 1978, selected STARC should be considered in order of priority, for the following missions:

(1) Assignment to an AC installation to provide the nucleus for newly-forming AC combat headquarters (brigade, division or corps).

(2) Managing an AC installation.

(3) Responsibility for planning and supporting the movement of all RC units within a state to the mobilization stations.

(4) Providing dependent administrative support and assistance.

3. Lack of ADP/MIS Master Plan for RC. There is no Automatic Data Processing/Management Information System Master Plan that combines AC and RC requirements.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (OACSA lead) establish a policy that will require all new automated systems, and any redesign of existing automated systems, to be planned with the objective of single system support to the AC, USAR and ARNG.

(1) This objective should be defined as an Army Automation Objective in the AAPPE and the AAPPE structure should be modified as necessary to provide a basis for enforcing this policy.

(2) That AR 18-1 be changed to include this policy and the automation management procedures prescribed in AR 18-1 and the TB 18-



100 series be modified as necessary to implement this policy.

b. That OACCSAC, as the principle ARSTAF agency responsible for Automation Management, task OCAR and FORSCOM (OCAR lead) to jointly develop a USAR Automation Management Plan.

(1) This plan must be developed with the following objectives:

(a) Full support of USAR unit management and administrative information requirements and elimination of redundant or duplicative requirements for unit input of either manual or automated information.

(b) Development of single or common application systems supporting AC units at installations and USAR units at home station (coordinated and integrated with ARNG systems).

(c) Development of fully automated interfaces for accessing RC personnel and units into AC data bases upon mobilization.

(2) This plan should include, for the USAR home station environment, management functions similar to those of the Battlefield Automation Management Plan (BAMP) for the battlefield environment.

c. That NGB be tasked to develop a similar ARNG Automation Management Plan for the AARNG home station environment based on common (for USAR and ARNG) guidelines provided by OACCSAC.

4. Lack of ADP Capabilities. Current functional processes and their supporting MIS are not well structured to facilitate termination of non-essential ADP requirements during mobilization. Current installation ADPE is both saturated and approaching obsolescence.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That recommendations for Transitional Issues 3 & 5 be adopted.

b. That the FORSCOM project for acquisition of ADP terminals and communications links for semi-active and inactive mobilization stations be fully funded in FY 80.

c. That the FORSCOM/TRADOC interim upgrade of BASOPS ADPE (PDIP 5S04) be funded in the FY 81 budget (OMA) process.

d. That Project VIABLE be fully supported and the FY 82 OPA funds (PDIP G03A) be restored to the base case (funded) level of the POM during development of the FY 82-87 POM preparation.

e. HQ DA (DALO) and appropriate MACOM should explore all possible means to reduce the mobilization surge of requisitions on installation ADPE, to include the development of more flexible ADP systems. The means found to be most feasible should then be implemented.

f. That ODCSOPS (DAMO-RQ) and OACSAC jointly develop and staff an AC2MP management plan which clearly defines ODCSOPS responsibility as the proponent for C2 systems and OACSAC responsibilities for systems integration, network management and as FYDP Program 3 director.

5. Inadequate Communications. Some headquarters and installations have inadequate communications capabilities. Some headquarters that have a requirement to enter the WWMCCS cannot do so.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAMO) and FORSCOM revalidate requirements for the semi-active, inactive and state operated MS and insure that USACC programs for equipment and facilities are funded for MS which must be activated before M+180.

b. That HQDA (DAMO and DAAC) monitor the resolution of MOBEX 78 CE issues through the FMREC to insure satisfaction of mobilization communications requirements.

c. That HQDA (DAPE) and USACC insure that all USACC personnel requirements are identified and addressed in appropriate tasks under the Mobilization and Wartime Pretrained Manpower Program.

6. Incompatible ADPE. There are ADPE interface problems caused by issuing different models of ADPE to AC and RC headquarters.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That the recommendation for Transitional Issue 3 be adopted.

7. Affiliation Program. Expansion of the Army's Affiliation Program (AR 11-19), especially to combat service support units, appears to be advisable.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO), in conjunction with all CONUS MACOM expedite expansion of the Affiliation Program, particularly to combat service support units.

8. Gaining Command. Immediate implementation of the Gaining Command Program concept appears to be advisable.

#### RECOMMENDATION

a. That recommendations for Organizational Issue 5 be adopted.

b. That HQ FORSCOM working with HQDA (DAMO) and other MACOM, designate Gaining Commands for all RC units as soon as practicable. This action should be fully integrated into the SUIP and WARMUP studies.

9. Post-Mobilization Employment of the IRR. There is confusion about how IRR personnel should, or will, be employed in the event of mobilization.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO) announce the priority for utilization of IRR personnel and that HQDA (DAPE and MILPERCEN) adjust their planning documents accordingly.

10. Installation Capabilities and MACOM Assignment. Installations do not appear to have sufficient assets to handle mobilization and post-mobilization requirements. Inter-MACOM reassignment of installations following mobilization will be disruptive.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That recommendations for Organizational Issues 2, 5 and 12 and Transitional Issues 3, 4, 5 and 9 be adopted.

b. That MACOM conduct detailed examination of installation capabilities, and shortfalls, and take immediate corrective actions.

c. That HQDA (DAMO) program five additional USARG for addition to the force structure (depending upon the ACCS-82 alternative selected). Each USARG TDA should be specifically tailored to the requirements of the installation it will support upon mobilization and the existing garrison staff, that will be available upon mobilization, be used as the nucleus for the installation staff.

d. That ARNG TDA at state operated installations where USARG mobilize be merged with the garrison staff upon mobilization.

e. That MACOM supporting semi-active installations which receive USARG be made aware of the garrison's support capabilities to minimize duplicative requirements in MTDA. Coordination of TDA must occur among MACOM, USARG and semi-active installation staffs.

f. That FORSCOM direct MS civilian personnel offices at mobilization stations to determine the potential availability of local civilian personnel to fill MTDA.

g. That TRADOC, in coordination with FORSCOM, determine the best use of USAR school assets upon mobilization and implement the plan accordingly. USAR expertise should be fully utilized when practical.

h. That FORSCOM study the feasibility/desirability of activating USAR TDA units to augment each active mobilization station.

11. Lack of Dedicated Planning Resources. At every command level there are insufficient resources allocated to mobilization and deployment planning.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That ACCS-82 alternatives that provide for allocation of manpower resources to peacetime planning be approved.

b. That all headquarters insure that personnel assigned to planning functions be required, and permitted, to devote most of their time to planning.

12. Valid Post-Mobilization Missions. All headquarters should have valid post-mobilization missions: those without such missions should be eliminated from the force structure.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAMO-NGB and CAR) continue their examination of the force structure, such as the annual TAA, to insure that all retained units have valid post-mobilization missions.

b. That an ACCS-82 alternative which provides valid post-mobilization missions for selected headquarters be adopted.

13. Mobilization Exercises. The program for RC unit-level and headquarters mobilization exercises/rehearsals is inadequate.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That DOD/JCS exercises involving unified/specified commands and Services be conducted once each three years. All MACOM, CONUSA, STARC/ARCOM level headquarters and most mobilization installations should participate in these exercises.

b. That MUSARC/STARC annually conduct mobilization exercises for subordinate elements. Units should participate in one of the following every 2-3 years, depending upon the capabilities of the MUSARC/STARC (with all assistance available from AC elements, MAC and MTC):

(1) A rehearsal of mobilization wherein the units begin the exercise by initiating their recall plans, load-out, travel to mobilization station, submit initial personnel and logistics requirements to the installation, prepare the initial USAR and conduct designated POR/PCM actions.

(2) A rehearsal of mobilization wherein the units conduct as many of the above actions as possible, but from home station Reserve Centers or Armories.

(3) A command post exercise involving only "player cells" from the units. This type exercise could be conducted from home stations or at mobilization stations.

14. Direct Deployment. Deployment of selected RC units directly from home stations may be desirable.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO, NGB, DAAR), in conjunction with FORSCOM and USAREUR, continue to test the feasibility of direct deployment.

15. Uncovered POMCUS. There is confusion concerning disposition of "uncovered POMCUS," i.e., the materiel left behind by units that deploy to Europe to fall-in on POMCUS.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the current ad hoc committee, chaired by DARCOM, to resolve the problems concerning uncovered POMCUS, resolve this issue as quickly as possible (particularly policy matters).

b. That HQDA immediately disseminate the DA policy to both AC and RC units.

c. That HQ FORSCOM determine the resources required to account for, maintain and ship selected RICC-1 items.

d. That HQDA (DALO) resolve the DARCOM/FORSCOM disagreement over the materiel condition code requirements for items designated for shipment from installations.

16. Early-Mobilization/Late-Deploying Units. Use of early-mobilizing, but late-deploying units may alleviate problems of installations involving manpower shortfalls. However, use of such units may exacerbate the problems of available facilities at installations.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That recommendations for ACCS-82 Organizational Issue 5 and 20 Transitional Issues 7, 10, 12 and 14 be adopted.

b. That MACOM continue their refinement of requirements and identify them to HQDA (DAMO) for inclusion in MOBFORM/TAA.

c. That HQDA (DAMO) coordinate MACOM requirements with FORSCOM capabilities.

17. Role of Advisors During Mobilization. There is confusion concerning the role of advisors to RC units during the mobilization process.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAMO-DAPE) develop policy for post-mobilization utilization of AC personnel assigned to, or who work with, RC units. ACCS-82 recommendations include:

(1) For non-deploying RC elements, advisors/augmentees should be reassigned to the RC unit upon mobilization and then be subject to normal reassignment procedures.

(2) For deploying RC elements, the advisors/augmentees should be reassigned to the RC unit upon mobilization and deploy with the unit.

(3) Personnel assigned to ARR HQ and RC should be reassigned as the ARR/RG structure is phased-out (but not later than M+120 days).

b. That the HQDA policy for the post-mobilization disposition of these personnel receive wide distribution (to include a "Special Instruction" entry on the orders assigning the individuals to RC duty).

18. Incompatibility of AC/RC Systems. Certain RC management systems are incompatible with AC systems: This would cause unnecessary problems upon mobilization.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the recommendations for Transition Issues Number 3, 6, 22 be adopted.

b. That HQDA (DAPE, DALO, DACA) identify the differences between AC and RC management systems and resolve them on an expedited basis.

19. Movement Planning. Current movement plans, both intra-CONUS and inter-theater, cannot be executed in their current form.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That DA (DAMO, DALO, DAPE) intensively review OPLAN data bases (e.g., movement data, resupply data, etc.) during OPLAN review.

b. That FORSCOM provide actual unit movement data vice notional characteristics.

c. That HQDA (DALO) take the initiative with the Joint Staff and the other Services to bring INCONREP into the JOPS framework and make necessary revisions and enhancements.

d. That HQDA (DAMO, DALO, DAPE) monitor closely the development of the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) to:

(1) Insure that compatible systems to provide the JDA required data exist or are developed.

(2) Insure that appropriate regulations and other documents are promulgated to define the roles and responsibilities of DA and the MACOMs to provide data to the JDA.

e. That the status of unit movement planning and unit/ITO interface be continued as a special interest item in Annual General Inspections.

f. That applicable regulations governing mobilization and movement be revised to achieve greater uniformity in unit movement planning and procedures.

g. That ITO MobTDA be filled with Mobilization Designees or recently retired personnel who train at the ITO during peacetime and would be available for employment on, or immediately following, M-Day.

20. Defining "Ready for Deployment." There is confusion concerning the criteria of readiness for deployment.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAMO) determine the criteria for "Ready for Deployment" in coordination with FORSCOM (ARRED) and the supported CINC.

b. That HQ FORSCOM, IAW recommendations in the MOBEX 78 after action report, determine the procedures for certifying units as "Ready for Deployment."

21. Authority for Cross-Leveling of Assets. There is confusion concerning authority of commanders, at various levels, to cross-level personnel and logistic assets to meet deployment schedules.



#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO for drawdown guidance, DAPE for MILPERCEN and DLO for DARCOM operating agencies) examine instructions to commanders for redistribution and ensure that guidance is clear-cut to permit maximum decentralization of execution.

22. RC Pay Systems. Current individual administrative processing requirements for pay documentation upon mobilization could be reduced or eliminated.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That COA continue efforts to simplify the post-mobilization procedures for converting pay systems from JUMPS-RC to JUMPS-ARMY.

23. RC Funding During the Transition. Funding channels and responsibilities for RC units during the transition are ill-defined by AR 135-300.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DACA) examine the Financial Management Emergency Plan (FMEP) with the objective of simplifying transitional procedures for RC units.

24. Training Base Expansion. More detailed planning for expansion of the training base is required.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAMO and DAPE) define, in detail, projected training requirements for full and total mobilization and that these requirements remain fixed for a two-year period.

b. That HQ TRADOC examine the projected training load and compare the requirements with projected capabilities. If a capability shortfall exists, HQDA (DAMO) should be notified and consideration should be given to conducting individual training within FORSCOM units.

25. Roles of USAR Training Division HHC. Roles of the USAR Training Divisions are different when they arrive at FORSCOM and TRADOC installations.

## RECOMMENDATIONS

That the FORSCOM RCMP provide explicit guidance on the role of the training divisions which includes the following provisions:

a. That the training division commander, at single-purpose training installations, assume command 15-30 days after his division closes on the installation. Immediate integration of the installation staff and the divisions staff should be directed by the training division commander except when additional C2 capabilities are required and can be fully justified.

b. That the training division commander, at TRADOC training center installations (non-service school), assume command 30 days after his division closes on the installation. Integration of the division staff into the existing staff will be accomplished by the training division commander.

c. That a training division mobilizing at an installation with a service school (Ft Benning, Ft Knox and Ft Bliss) is assigned to the installation.

### Other Issues

1. "One-Stop" Support for the RC. Is it feasible/desirable to organize "one-stop" support installations for RC support?

## RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That the current area support coordination procedures described by AR 5-9 not be changed significantly.

b. That HQ FORSCOM continue development of the Single Installation Coordinating Concept (SICC).

c. That ART pay and CPO services for the USAR be consolidated at each SICC Coordinating Installation.

2. RCPAC Functions. RCPAC has the capability to provide additional assistance to the USAR.

## RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAPE) direct a program to increase the RCPAC role in cen-

tralized personnel management for the USAR. Specifically the following should be considered.

- a. Maintenance of USAR personnel management files.
- b. Unit vacancy promotions.
- c. Selective retention boards.
- d. Issuance of 20 year certification letters.
- e. Appointment of officers.
- f. Personnel management and accounting ADP system.

3. Resource Allocation Channels. Resource allocation does not follow the chain of command.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That the flow of resources continue as currently prescribed.

4. Quality of AC Personnel Supporting the RC. RC commanders believe that the assignment of high-quality AC personnel to RC support duties has been the key element of STEADFAST's success with the RC. However, AC personnel assigned to RC support duties perceive such assignments as harmful to their careers and they try to avoid such assignments.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

That HQDA (DAPE):

- a. Continue to support RC units with high-quality AC personnel.
- b. Initiate action to offset the AC personnel's perceptions that assignment to RC support duty is harmful to career development.
- c. Consider that if an ACCS-82 alternative is adopted which eliminates any RC support structure, there is increased reason for insuring that RC units are supported by high-quality personnel.

5. Distribution of RC Maintenance Workload. RC maintenance, at the DS/GS levels, should be accomplished at the nearest AC, ARNG, or USAR

facility.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DALO, NGB, CAR) continue the on-going considerations of this issue, with a view towards adopting the concept where feasible.

6. Current Strategy/Guidance. HQDA provides guidance that is not attuned to national strategy.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That all elements of the ARSTAFF conduct immediate, and intensive, review of the guidance documents for which they are responsible and insure that those documents are consistent with current strategy.

7. Use of Recent Retirees in the RC Units. Use of recent retirees, on a selected basis, in non-deploying RC units may provide a potential for increasing the readiness of those units.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO, DAPE, NGB, CAR) examine the feasibility of applying the proposals above to the US Army.

8. Tax Benefits for RC. Would tax benefit programs serve as an incentive to being a member of the RC?

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAPE, NGB, and CAR) investigate the desirability of providing tax benefits for the RC as a recruiting and retention technique.

9. Compo-4 Units. "Compo-4" units, i.e., those in the force structure for recognized requirements, but unmanned due to peacetime strength ceilings and other factors, should be assigned to various MACOM.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That selected Compo-4 units be assigned to MACOM and that MACOM be responsible for plans to activate, organize, train and deploy (if required) such units.

10. RC Leaders Training. Reports concerning the status of RC unit training consistently cite "poor junior leadership" as a fault.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQ TRADOC develop a self-paced "Commanders' Training Program" for RC company and battalion commanders that can be completed at home.

11. Missions for Maneuver Area Commands (MAC). Post-mobilization missions for MAC are not articulated in sufficient detail. Additionally, MAC and AC units could derive mutual benefits from MAC conduct of peacetime exercises for the AC.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQ FORSCOM insure that post-mobilization missions for the MAC be articulated in sufficient detail to provide a listing, by priority, of what units the MAC will exercise, at what location(s) and the projected dates (after M-Day) for the exercises.

b. That the MAC use the above data to develop "on-the-shelf" exercise packages for post-mobilization use.

c. That HQ FORSCOM direct, and coordinate, employment of MAC with at least one AC unit annually when it will not seriously detract from priority missions in support of RC units.

12. IG Activities. RC units do not receive full benefit from the DAIG system.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. That HQDA (DAIG, NB, CAR) insure that IG programs of the RC are consistent with those of the AC.

b. That HQDA (DAIG), FORSCOM, and CONUSA obtain RC representation of their IG staffs.

c. That IG at various levels weigh the merits of conducting AGI on weekends (to observe troops) against the possible loss of training time and develop appropriate programs.

13. Post-Mobilization Individual Training Programs. Current individual training programs are designed for peacetime efficiency.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQ TRADOC re-examine the post-mobilization POI for BCT, AIT, OSUT, and Service Schools to certify that they reflect sufficient instructions to qualify individuals for immediate employment in their MOS upon arrival in units.

14. Poor Exercise Scheduling. Recent practices of scheduling major mobilization exercises at the end of the Fiscal Year cause conflicts for installation managers and units.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That HQDA (DAMO) support the position that major exercise should not be scheduled at the end of the Fiscal Year.

15. ADPE for RC COSCOM/TAACOM. RC Corps Support Commands and the Theater Army Area Command do not have automatic data processing equipment to enable their Materiel Management Centers (MMC) to function efficiently.

#### RECOMMENDATION

That the DCSLOG initiative to obtain CS3 ADPE for the RC COSCOM/TAACOM be supported and expedited.

16. Planning Beyond the Program Force. There is insufficient planning for expansion of the Army beyond the program (full mobilization) force levels.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

a. HQDA (DAMO) identify initial incremental requirements (at least to D+360) for transition to total mobilization.

b. HQDA (AMPS) design appropriate planning framework.

c. In accordance with a. above, assign "be prepared" missions to selected ARCOM HQ to form nuclei for follow-on divisions.

d. HQDA (DAMO) expedite development of MOBREM, to include the requirements for full mobilization as well as total mobilization, and incorporate it in the Total Army Analysis.

17. Validity for Requirement for FORSCOM Forms 1-R/2-R Reporting.  
Is the requirement (FORSCOM Pam 135-3) for evaluating RC training by means of FORSCOM Forms 1-R/2-R valid?

RECOMMENDATION

That HQ FORSCOM reevaluate the requirements for evaluating RC units via FORSCOM Forms 1-R/2-R.

END

DATE  
FILMED

6-82

DTIC